Issues: Whether the Provisional Attachment Order dated 06.10.2017 and the Impugned Order dated 26.03.2018 confirming attachment of immovable property of the appellant can be sustained on the ground that the property is involved in or represents the value/equivalent of proceeds of crime arising from alleged conversion of demonetized currency into gold/bullion.

Analysis: The proceedings arise from recovery of large quantities of demonetized currency and subsequent investigation under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. Investigation material includes statements recorded under Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, CCTV evidence, bank transaction trails showing deposits into accounts of alleged shell entities, inter-account transfers, RTGS payments to bullion traders, and admissions by the appellant regarding collection of demonetized currency and purchase/sale of gold. The statutory test for provisional attachment requires a "reason to believe" that property is involved in money laundering or represents the value/equivalent of proceeds of crime. The material on record discloses a pattern of collection of demonetized currency, placement through front/shell entities, layering by inter-account transfers, and integration by conversion into gold at a premium. The statements and corroborative material supply a prima facie basis to connect the appellant to the alleged process and activity connected with proceeds of crime within the meaning of Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. Attachment is not limited to properties directly acquired from proceeds of crime but extends to equivalent value; at the provisional stage the respondent need only demonstrate reason to believe, which the investigation material supplies.

Conclusion: The Provisional Attachment Order and the Impugned Order confirming attachment are sustainable on the available prima facie material; the appeal is dismissed and the attachment stands confirmed in favour of the Respondent.

Issues: Whether the unrealized loss on fair valuation of principal-protected benchmark linked debentures (BLDs) as on the balance sheet date is an allowable expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or is a contingent liability not allowable for the assessment year 2012-13.

Analysis: The issue was examined in the context of the assessee following the mercantile (accrual) basis of accounting under Section 145 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and applying accepted accounting principles to mark-to-market valuation of BLDs. The obligations arising from legally binding BLD contracts existed on the balance sheet date; only the quantum of payment contingent on future index performance (a trigger set at 120% of the start level) remained uncertain. Established principles on crystallization of liability and prudent accounting require recognition of liabilities and anticipated losses that have arisen and are estimable with reasonable certainty. The approach of recognizing fair valuation losses (and reversing them if subsequent movements so require) aligns with mercantile accounting and recognised judicial authorities applying Section 37(1) to similar mark-to-market losses where the underlying obligation has arisen. The contingent nature argued by Revenue was distinguished because the contractual obligation to pay principal exists and the fair valuation loss on the balance sheet date reflects an accrued expenditure whose quantification may vary but which is not purely contingent on a future event.

Conclusion: The unrealized fair valuation loss on the principal-protected BLDs as on the balance sheet date is allowable as expenditure under Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the disallowance by the Assessing Officer is deleted and the assessee's ground is allowed.

Issues: Whether the provisional attachment of the appellant's bank accounts under Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is legally tenable, including (i) whether proceedings under the PMLA can be initiated against a person not named in the FIR/ECIR, and (ii) whether voluntary declaration and payment under Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Yojna absolve the appellant from attachment under the PMLA.

Analysis: The appeal challenges confirmation of a provisional attachment arising from alleged conversion of demonetized currency into bank entries. Proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 are independent of criminal proceedings in a scheduled offence and may be invoked against any person involved in processes connected with proceeds of crime; absence of the person's name in the FIR or ECIR does not by itself bar action under the PMLA. Section 5 and Section 5(1) permit provisional attachment on material giving "reason to believe" that property is proceeds of crime; Section 2(1)(u) and Section 2(1)(v) define "proceeds of crime" to include the property derived or the value thereof, permitting attachment of equivalent value where original proceeds are not traceable. The record contains prima facie material of routing demonetized currency through intermediaries and RTGS credits into the appellant's firm and company accounts, indicating placement, layering and integration steps consistent with money laundering processes. Payment of taxes or deposits under a separate fiscal scheme does not confer statutory immunity under the PMLA or negate prima facie involvement in money laundering activity.

Conclusion: The provisional attachment under Section 5 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is upheld; the appellate challenge is dismissed and the Adjudicating Authority's confirmation of the Provisional Attachment Order is maintained in favour of the respondent.

Issues: Whether the Central Government could withdraw the Transport and Marketing Assistance (TMA) scheme with retrospective effect by issuing Notification dated 25.03.2022 thereby denying benefits and claims already accrued to exporters under the scheme incorporated in the Foreign Trade Policy.

Analysis: The scheme was introduced by Notification dated 27.02.2019 and incorporated into the Foreign Trade Policy by Notification dated 29.03.2019 under powers exercisable by the Central Government under Section 5 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992. The Court examined whether Section 5 permits retrospective amendments or withdrawal of a policy that has given rise to claims and accrued/vested rights of beneficiaries. Reliance is placed on authoritative precedents establishing that amendments under Section 5 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to divest vested or accrued rights, and that delegated legislation altering or withdrawing benefits cannot retrospectively take away rights which have already accrued. Applying these principles to the impugned Notification dated 25.03.2022, which withdrew the earlier Notification dated 09.09.2021 with retrospective effect, the Court found the retrospective foreclosure inconsistent with the limits on the exercise of power under Section 5 and the settled rules against retrospective deprivation of vested/accrued rights.

Conclusion: The impugned Notification dated 25.03.2022 insofar as it purports to withdraw the TMA scheme with retrospective effect is quashed and set aside; the Notification shall operate from the date of its issuance only, and the petitioners are entitled to have their claims processed and benefits extended for the period prior to 25.03.2022.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to transition input tax credit on exempt stock held on the cut-off date (01.07.2017) when the petitioner failed to produce required proof in Form TRAN-2 and made declarations in TRAN-1 in an incorrect column.

Analysis: The dispute concerns entitlement to transitional input tax credit for stocks held on the GST cut-off date and compliance with the transitional procedure. The Court examined whether the petitioner produced the documentary proof of input stock and invoices as mandated by the transitional scheme and whether procedural irregularities in declaration (TRAN-1 column entry) affected entitlement. The impugned order records failure to furnish details in Form TRAN-2 as required under the transitional rules and absence of necessary documents to substantiate the claimed quantity of inputs available on the cut-off date. Several factual disputes remain concerning the existence and quantity of input stock, which are appropriate for determination by the appellate authority under the GST enactments.

Conclusion: The writ petition is dismissed for lack of merit; the petitioner is denied the claimed transitional input tax credit on the present record. The petitioner is granted liberty to challenge the impugned order before the Appellate Authority within 30 days, and the Appellate Authority shall decide the appeal on merits after hearing, uninfluenced by observations in this order.

Issues: Whether the impugned GST order confirming tax, interest and penalty was liable to be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh consideration in light of the petitioner's objections and the subsequent State authority order.

Analysis: The challenge concerned the confirmation of CGST and SGST liabilities, interest and penalty under the GST enactments for the relevant tax period. The petitioner contended that the demand related to works contract services rendered prior to the GST regime and that the payments were received after 01.07.2017, while also referring to payments already made and to a later assessment order passed by the State authority on an identical demand for part of the period. The Court noted that the petitioner must particularize each transaction and substantiate the claim with supporting material, and further observed that the later State authority order dated 17.02.2025 for the tax period 2020-2021 required consideration before final adjudication.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the respondent for fresh adjudication on merits, after taking note of the subsequent State authority order and after hearing the petitioner.

Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 74 and interest under Section 50 of the respective GST enactments are payable where ineligible input tax credit was purportedly reversed and related payments/declarations were made, and (ii) Whether the matter requires fresh adjudication in light of the reversal and statutory amendment to Section 50(3).

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 74 and interest under Section 50 are payable given the petitioner's reversal of the ineligible input tax credit and the filings made pursuant to Circular No.12/2024.

Analysis: The dispute arises from input tax credit claimed and subsequently sought to be reversed; records show reversal steps and a declaration in a DRC-03A form. Relevant legal context includes the compensatory character of interest on belated tax payment, distinctions between availment and utilisation of input tax credit, and the proviso and amendments limiting interest liability to the cash portion of tax in certain circumstances. The position taken in precedent decisions and the statutory amendment to Section 50(3) (Finance Act, 2022) are material to whether interest and penalty should be imposed after reversal and declarations by the taxpayer. The factual averments and documents are to be examined by the adjudicating authority on merits.

Conclusion: The question of liability to pay penalty under Section 74 and interest under Section 50 is not finally decided and is remitted to the Respondent for fresh adjudication on merits taking into account the reversal, the DRC-03A declaration, relevant judicial decisions, and the statutory amendment to Section 50(3).

Issue (ii): Whether the proceedings should be remitted for fresh consideration and the procedural steps required.

Analysis: The petitioner has been permitted to file a reply with supporting documents treating the impugned order as an addendum; the respondent is required to consider the reply and pass a fresh reasoned order within a specified timeframe. The respondent must take note of the Finance Act, 2022 amendment to Section 50(3) while adjudicating.

Conclusion: The petition is disposed of by remitting the matter to the Respondent to pass fresh orders on merits after the petitioner files a reply within 30 days; the Respondent shall decide the matter expeditiously, within 3 months of receipt of the reply.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant is entitled to benefit of the Works Contract Composition Scheme (Notification No.32/2007-S.T.) for the period 2007-08, and whether any short payment arises in respect of works contract services; (ii) Whether there is any short payment of service tax in respect of maintenance and repair services for 2007-08; (iii) Whether there is any short payment for the period 2011-12 and if the alleged additional payment of Rs.1,10,963/- should be appropriated; (iv) Whether penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 is sustainable, and whether penalty under Section 77 is sustainable.

Issue (i): Entitlement to benefit of Notification No.32/2007-S.T. (Composition Scheme) for works contract service for 2007-08 and existence of any short payment.

Analysis: The Composition Scheme was optional during the period in question. Non-exercise of the option is a procedural defect. The appellant has discharged tax at composition rates (4% for Oct 2007-Nov 2008 and 2% for March 2008). Established authorities hold that substantive concessional benefits under a notification should not be denied for procedural infractions. The records show payments made under the composition rates and no additional quantified shortfall on the works contract account.

Conclusion: The appellant is entitled to the benefit of Notification No.32/2007-S.T. and there is no short payment in respect of works contract services for 2007-08; the demand on this score is set aside (in favour of the assessee).

Issue (ii): Existence of any short payment in respect of maintenance and repair services for 2007-08.

Analysis: The adjudicating authority accepted the appellant's quantified taxable value of Rs.3,55,671/- for the second half of 2007-08. The appellant claims tax was paid on that amount but did not produce documentary evidence before the Tribunal. The question of short payment therefore turns on verification of the claimed payment by the adjudicating authority.

Conclusion: No short payment is found on the maintenance and repair service count subject to verification of the appellant's claimed payment on Rs.3,55,671/- (conclusion favourable to the assessee provisionally).

Issue (iii): Existence of any short payment for 2011-12 and treatment of the claimed additional payment of Rs.1,10,963/-.

Analysis: The appellant has admitted payment of Rs.10,46,530/- plus interest against a liability of Rs.11,53,324/-. The appellant claims an additional payment of Rs.1,10,963/- not considered by the lower authority. The claim requires verification by the adjudicating authority and, if established, must be appropriated towards the tax liability for 2011-12.

Conclusion: There shall be no short payment for 2011-12 subject to verification; if the additional payment of Rs.1,10,963/- is proved, it shall be appropriated and no further demand shall arise (conclusion favourable to the assessee upon verification).

Issue (iv): Sustainability of penalties under Sections 78 and 77 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The demand in respect of works contract service for 2007-08 does not survive. The appellant has paid substantial tax and interest for the periods under dispute. Conceptually, penalty under Section 78 relates to willful evasion; where substantive demand does not survive and substantial amounts have been paid, leniency is appropriate. Failure to register and non-filing of ST-3 returns remain factual triggers for penalty under Section 77.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 78 is set aside (in favour of the assessee). Penalty under Section 77 is sustained (against the assessee).

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed overall; demands in respect of works contract services for 2007-08 are set aside, maintenance and repair tax and the 2011-12 tax positions stand subject to verification of claimed payments, Section 78 penalty is remitted while Section 77 penalty is maintained.

Ratio Decidendi: A substantive concessional benefit conferred by a statutory notification or composition scheme cannot be denied solely on account of procedural non-compliance where the assessee is otherwise eligible and has discharged tax at the concessional rate.

Issues: Whether the directions bringing in NBCC to complete the pending housing and integrated non-residential projects, together with the connected supervisory and ancillary directions, required interference.

Analysis: The appeals arose from an insolvency-related order intended to secure completion of long-pending real estate projects and protect homebuyers who had waited for possession for years. The Court held that the competing claims of creditors and land authorities were, for the time being, secondary to completion and delivery of predominantly completed residential units with basic amenities. It found that the NCLAT's decision to involve NBCC as an implementing agency was neither unfair nor contrary to any express provision of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Court further approved the continuing supervisory structure, including the Apex Committee mechanism, and relied on the equitable reach of Article 142 of the Constitution of India to sustain the practical directions in the peculiar facts of the case. The directions concerning project implementation, completion timelines, and compliance by statutory authorities were also affirmed, while NBCC was given liberty to seek clarification on particular conditions.

Conclusion: The challenge to the NCLAT's core directions failed, and the appeals were dismissed; the impugned order was upheld except to the limited extent modified or clarified by the Court.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration and its appellate confirmation are vitiated where the show cause notice did not specify the ground on which cancellation was ultimately ordered, and whether the impugned orders must be set aside with liberty to issue a fresh show cause notice stating detailed reasons.

Analysis: The proceedings record that the show cause notice was issued on the premise of registration obtained by fraud, willful misstatement or suppression of facts, whereas the cancellation order proceeded on the basis of circular trading and non-payment of tax. The appellate order did not adjudicate the specific contention that the cancellation relied upon a ground not pleaded in the show cause notice but merely observed that the ground was permissible under Section 29(2) of the Act. Prior final decision in a connected matter where identical procedural defect existed resulted in setting aside the appellate order and directing issuance of a fresh show cause notice with detailed reasons so the noticee could respond and speaking orders be passed. A show cause notice is foundational to subsequent adjudication and must disclose the grounds relied upon so that the noticee has an opportunity to reply; passing orders on unpleaded grounds denies that opportunity and is unsustainable.

Conclusion: Impugned cancellation and appellate orders are set aside; liberty is granted to the department to initiate fresh proceedings by issuing a show cause notice specifying detailed reasons, permitting the noticee to file a reply, and thereafter passing appropriate speaking orders.

Ratio Decidendi: An order cancelling GST registration premised on grounds not disclosed in the show cause notice is invalid for denial of the statutory requirement of fair opportunity to answer, and a fresh show cause process with detailed reasons must be afforded before passing speaking orders.

Issues: Whether the Commissioner was justified in imposing penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 for alleged non-levy/short-levy of customs duty.

Analysis: Section 114A imposes penalty where duty or interest has not been levied or short-levied by reason of collusion or any wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts; reduced penalty is available if payment is made within the proviso period. The appellant had self-assessed imports claiming exemption under Notification No. 50/2017-CUS as amended by Notification No. 2/2022-CUS and, though disputing the department's view, voluntarily deposited the demanded duty with interest before the show cause notice was issued and did not conceal facts. Self-assessment, even if incorrect, does not ipso facto constitute collusion, wilful mis-statement or suppression of facts. There is no finding of deliberate concealment or fraudulent suppression; the record shows a bona fide claim of entitlement to exemption and subsequent payment to settle the dispute.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 is not justified and is set aside; decision is in favour of the assessee on the penalty issue.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned properties were benami properties purchased through the funds of the beneficial owner. (ii) Whether the transaction was protected by the fiduciary-capacity exception under Section 2(9)(A)(ii) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned properties were benami properties purchased through the funds of the beneficial owner.

Analysis: The record showed that the properties stood in the name of the benamidar, while the consideration was supplied by the other appellant, and the bank entries reflected fund movements from the beneficial owner's side before payments were made to the sellers. The purchase period, the financial profile of the benamidar, and the absence of independent means to acquire the lands supported the inference that the benamidar was only a name-lender and that the real purchaser was the beneficial owner.

Conclusion: The properties were benami in nature and were rightly proceeded against under the Act.

Issue (ii): Whether the transaction was protected by the fiduciary-capacity exception under Section 2(9)(A)(ii) of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988.

Analysis: The claimed exception was rejected because the benamidar was an employee-labourer and not shown to have held the property in a legally cognisable fiduciary capacity akin to trustee, agent, or similar notified relationship. There was no power of attorney, no clear recital in the sale deeds that the purchase was for the beneficial owner, and the transaction was used to avoid the restrictions governing transfer of tribal land. A broad reading of fiduciary capacity was held incapable of defeating the object of the statute.

Conclusion: The fiduciary-capacity exception did not apply and the appellants were not entitled to exemption.

Final Conclusion: The attachments and the adjudication confirming benami character were sustained, and the appeals failed on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A purchase made in the name of another with the real consideration supplied by the alleged beneficial owner is benami unless the claimant establishes a genuine fiduciary relationship falling within the statutory exception; a mere employer-employee or trusted-person arrangement, especially when used to bypass another law, does not by itself attract the fiduciary-capacity exclusion.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition challenging the refund rejection order in FORM-GST-RFD-06 dated 13.05.2025 and the vires of Circular No.125/44/2019-GST can be entertained, or the petitioner must be relegated to the appellate remedy under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The refund rejection order dated 13.05.2025 was issued after a show cause notice dated 24.04.2025 issued in terms of Section 169(1)(d) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The petitioner did not respond to the show cause notice and raised multiple contentions challenging the grounds of rejection as well as the vires of Circular No.125/44/2019-GST. An alternative remedy of appeal under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was available to the petitioner and was not availed; the writ petition was pending for an extended period. The petitioner was therefore relegated to prefer an appeal, with liberty to seek delay condonation and with the appellate authority being directed to consider the grounds pursued before the writ forum within the bounds of law and in a reasonable time.

Conclusion: The writ petition is dismissed and the petitioner is directed to prefer an appeal under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 within two weeks with a delay condonation application; the appellate authority shall consider the grounds of fact and law, including any challenge to Circular No.125/44/2019-GST, in accordance with law and within a reasonable time.

Issues: Whether the writ petition is maintainable when an efficacious statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is available, and whether the petitioner ought to be directed to avail that remedy.

Analysis: The availability of an appeal under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and related procedural mechanisms including use of the reference number in FORM GST DRC-07 and the Circular No. 249/06/2025-GST dated 09.06.2025 were examined to determine if an effective alternate remedy exists. The Court noted that the appellate route permits the petitioner to raise all permissible grounds of law and fact and that procedural difficulties relating to filing on the GST portal can be addressed by referring to the reference number in the summary form.

Conclusion: The writ petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy by way of appeal under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; the petitioner is granted liberty to file such appeal with pre-deposit within the statutory period and the writ petition is dismissed without adjudication on merits.

Issues: Whether the delay of 59 days in filing an appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 can be condoned beyond the statutory outer limit of thirty plus fifteen days where the appellant contends lack of effective service and delayed knowledge of the impugned ex parte order.

Analysis: Section 61(2) prescribes a statutory period of thirty days for filing an appeal, with a proviso permitting the Appellate Tribunal to condone delay only for a further period not exceeding fifteen days. Where a statute expressly limits the period within which delay may be condoned, the Tribunal lacks power to extend that period beyond the statutory outer limit. The date for computation of limitation is the day after pronouncement of the impugned order; the appellant's subsequent claim of acquiring knowledge at a later date does not alter the computation under the statutory scheme. The record of service, including directions to serve by all modes and proof of delivery relied upon by the Adjudicating Authority, was considered; the appellant did not place sufficient material to displace the finding of service or to establish a basis for extending the statutory condonable period.

Conclusion: The application for condonation of delay is rejected and the appeal cannot be entertained as it was filed beyond the statutory outer limit of thirty plus fifteen days; the appeal and ancillary applications are accordingly rejected.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail should be granted to a petitioner accused of offences under the goods and services tax laws and allied penal provisions despite alleged non-cooperation, repeated non-appearance, and absconding.

Analysis: The petitioner was alleged to be the proprietor of a bogus firm through which fraudulent transactions were routed. The record indicated repeated summons, absence from investigation, and conduct suggesting deliberate evasion, including escape from the premises when officers visited. The co-accused who had cooperated in the investigation stood on a different footing, so parity was not available. The principle that post-charge-sheet custody may not be necessary where the accused has cooperated was held inapplicable on these facts because the petitioner was not cooperating and was still absconding.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was refused.

Final Conclusion: The request for pre-arrest protection failed because the petitioner's non-cooperation and evasive conduct outweighed the claim for parity or custodial leniency.

Ratio Decidendi: Anticipatory bail may be declined where the accused is alleged to have played the principal role in a serious tax-related fraud and the materials show persistent non-cooperation, evasion of summons, and absconding; parity with cooperating co-accused does not apply in such circumstances.

Issues: Whether the deletion by the first appellate authority of addition of Rs. 2,00,000 made by the Assessing Officer by disallowing deduction claimed under Section 80GGC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 can be sustained in the absence of assessee-specific evidence linking the assessee to refund or benefit from alleged bogus donations.

Analysis: The appeal concerns a claim of deduction under Section 80GGC of the Income Tax Act, 1961 for a Rs. 2,00,000 donation to a political party identified in a wider search as implicated in accommodation entries. The Assessing Officer reopened assessment under Sections 147/148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and disallowed the deduction relying on information from a third-party search (under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961) that identified systemic irregularities. The first appellate authority allowed the claim on the ground that no direct, transaction-specific evidence (such as bank trail, confirmation, or direct nexus showing refund to the assessee) was produced to establish that this particular donation was a sham or that the assessee received benefit. The decision distinguishes between general adverse findings arising from third-party search operations and the requirement of primary, assessee-specific corroboration to sustain a disallowance in the hands of an individual donor. The Assessing Officer did not produce bank evidence or other direct material linking the assessee to any refund or benefit; reliance was placed on statements and general investigation results without confronting the assessee with specific proof. The appellate deletion was therefore based on absence of cogent, transaction-specific corroboration necessary to displace the claim of a bona fide donation.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition of Rs. 2,00,000 under Section 80GGC is upheld and the Revenue's appeal is dismissed (decision in favour of the assessee).

Issues: (i) Whether the provisional attachment and its confirmation in respect of 50% share in the residential property were sustainable under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) Whether the appellants' financial contributions, residence in the property, alleged lack of enquiry, and the plea that the matter lay only in the domain of income-tax law vitiated the attachment.

Issue (i): Whether the provisional attachment and its confirmation in respect of 50% share in the residential property were sustainable under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The material on record showed that the scheduled offence had led to an ECIR and that statements and documentary evidence disclosed a prima facie case of collection and conversion of demonetised currency through intermediaries into gold and diamonds, yielding illegal gain. At the stage of provisional attachment and confirmation, the statutory inquiry is confined to whether there is a prima facie nexus between the property and the proceeds of crime. The property was attached only to the extent of the share reflected in the title documents, and attachment of an undivided share in immovable property is permissible under the statutory scheme.

Conclusion: The attachment and its confirmation were held to be valid and sustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellants' financial contributions, residence in the property, alleged lack of enquiry, and the plea that the matter lay only in the domain of income-tax law vitiated the attachment.

Analysis: The claimed payment of purchase consideration, loan instalments, and household expenses did not by itself confer legal ownership or displace the statutory nexus with proceeds of crime. The Act did not require recording of statements of every co-owner as a precondition for confirmation of attachment, and no material prejudice from the alleged want of enquiry was shown. The plea that the transactions concerned only unaccounted income assessable under income-tax law was rejected because the facts disclosed a process connected with laundering of proceeds of crime. The burden to establish that the attached share was untainted was not discharged.

Conclusion: The challenge to the attachment on these grounds failed.

Final Conclusion: The confirmation of provisional attachment suffered from no illegality, perversity, or procedural infirmity, and the appeals were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, provisional attachment may be confirmed on the basis of a prima facie nexus between property and proceeds of crime, including attachment of an undivided share in immovable property, and equitable claims, residence, or payments without legal title do not defeat such attachment absent proof that the attached interest is untainted.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax liability could be imposed on an individual advocate for legal services provided to a partnership firm of advocates in view of Notification No. 25/2012-Service Tax and Notification No. 30/2012-Service Tax; (ii) Whether the impugned proceedings and consequential recovery (including creation of lien on bank accounts under Section 87 of the Finance Act, 1994) are vitiated by breach of principles of natural justice and/or jurisdictional error.

Issue (i): Whether service tax is leviable on an individual advocate for legal services rendered to a partnership firm of advocates in light of the cited notifications.

Analysis: Notification No. 25/2012-Service Tax exempts specified taxable services including services by an individual as an advocate or a partnership firm of advocates by way of legal services to an advocate or partnership firm of advocates. Notification No. 30/2012-Service Tax sets the extent of service tax payable and records that in respect of services provided by an individual advocate or firm of advocates by way of legal services, the percentage payable by the provider is Nil and by the receiver is 100%. The impugned order proceeded to confirm service tax liability without addressing or applying the exemption/notification position, thereby proceeding despite the notifications that remove levy on the individual advocate for services to an advocate or firm of advocates.

Conclusion: The notifications operate to preclude levy of service tax on the individual advocate for services to a partnership firm of advocates; the impugned order imposing service tax on the petitioner is without jurisdiction and is quashed.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned proceedings and the recovery actions (including lien on bank accounts) suffered from breach of principles of natural justice and/or were otherwise unsustainable.

Analysis: The record discloses that the show cause notice and personal hearing notices were dispatched to an old address and were not received by the petitioner; no reply was filed for reasons recorded. The recovery notice under Section 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 and the creation of liens on bank accounts occurred without effective notice to the petitioner and flowed from an order which failed to consider the exemption notifications, rendering the enforcement steps consequent to that order tainted by the jurisdictional error.

Conclusion: The recovery action and lien creation based on the impugned order cannot stand and are set aside; the procedural defects and lack of jurisdiction vitiate the enforcement steps.

Final Conclusion: The petition is allowed; the impugned order imposing service tax on the petitioner and consequential recovery actions are quashed and set aside in view of the exemption notifications and the jurisdictional and procedural defects, and the reliefs claimed in prayer clauses (a), (b) and (c) are granted.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory notification exempts the service in question, adjudicatory action and consequential recovery taken without addressing or applying that exemption constitute jurisdictional error warranting quashment of the order and annulment of consequent recovery steps.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid on Goods Transport Agency services for the period April 2008 to August 2012 is admissible; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation and imposition of penalty is sustainable.

Issue (i): Admissibility of CENVAT credit of service tax paid on GTA services for April 2008 to August 2012.

Analysis: The amendment to Rule 2(p) w.e.f. 01.03.2008 withdrew only the limited facility of treating certain reverse-charge liabilities as "output service" for utilisation purposes; it did not amend Rule 2(l) which defines "input service". Rule 2(l) continued to include inward transportation of inputs/capital goods and outward transportation up to the place of removal. Abatement notifications imposing a condition of non-availment of credit apply to the GTA provider to prevent double benefit and do not prohibit the recipient who pays tax under reverse charge from availing credit. Binding judicial and administrative authorities require determination of the correct "place of removal" based on contractual terms (transfer of property, allocation of risk) before admissibility of outward transportation credit can be conclusively decided. In the present record, contractual terms and documentary evidence regarding place of removal were not examined, and the adjudicating authority proceeded solely on the basis of Rule 2(p) amendment and abatement conditions without verifying contractual place of removal.

Conclusion: Denial of CENVAT credit solely on the basis of amendment to Rule 2(p) and abatement notifications is unsustainable. The matter is remanded to the adjudicating authority for limited verification of contractual place of removal and fresh decision on admissibility strictly in terms of Rule 2(l) and binding precedents.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation and imposition of penalty is sustainable.

Analysis: The availment of credit was disclosed in statutory returns and was within departmental knowledge. Proceedings arose from successive show cause notices on the same issue; once the Department initiated proceedings earlier on identical facts, subsequent invocation of extended limitation alleging suppression cannot be sustained. The dispute arises from an interpretational controversy extensively litigated; mere audit objection or difference of opinion does not establish suppression, fraud or wilful misstatement required to invoke extended period or mandatory penalty under Rule 15(2)/Section 11AC. Any penalty, interest or demand must be limited to the normal period and be consequential only upon final adjudication after remand, and penalty, if any, can only be under Rule 15(1) for civil consequence where mens rea is not established.

Conclusion: Extended period under the proviso to Section 11A(4) is not invocable; demand is restricted to the normal period; penalty under Rule 15(2)/Section 11AC is set aside; penalty, if any after remand, shall be confined to Rule 15(1); interest and penalty shall be re-determined only consequentially after fresh adjudication and verification of utilisation of disputed credit.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders are set aside to the extent indicated and the matter is remanded for limited verification of contractual place of removal and fresh adjudication on admissibility of GTA credit in accordance with Rule 2(l) and binding precedents; the demand, if any, shall be restricted to the normal period and penalties under Rule 15(2)/Section 11AC are set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Amendment to Rule 2(p) withdrawing the facility of treating reverse-charge liabilities as "output service" does not, by itself, bar eligibility of CENVAT credit where the service continues to qualify as an "input service" under Rule 2(l); admissibility of outward transportation credit depends on the contractual determination of the place of removal and abatement conditions apply to the service provider, not the recipient.