Issues: Whether the petitioner, having paid the redemption fine and penalty after the statutory period of 120 days and without a pending appeal, is entitled to re-export the confiscated goods and related directions; and whether the petitioner is entitled to refund of the redemption fine.

Analysis: The Adjudicating Authority's order dated 28.06.2023 confiscated the imported goods but expressly granted an option to redeem the confiscated goods for re-export on payment of a specified redemption fine and penalty under Section 125 and Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962. Section 125(3) provides that the option to pay the fine becomes void if the fine is not paid within 120 days from the date of the option unless an appeal against the order is pending. The petitioner did not file any appeal under Section 128 and paid the redemption fine and penalty only after about one year, well beyond the 120-day period. There is no factual or legal basis to treat the late payment as preserving the statutory option where no appeal was pending, and ignorance of the limitation provision is not a ground to extend or revive the statutory option. The respondents have accepted liability to refund the redemption fine but not the penalty.

Conclusion: The petition is dismissed; the petitioner is not entitled to a direction to re-export the goods as the statutory option under Section 125(3) is void for non-payment within 120 days in absence of a pending appeal. The respondent authorities are directed to refund the redemption fine of Rs. 12,00,000 to the petitioner within one week.

Issues: Whether the admission of the Section 7 insolvency petition could be interfered with on the grounds of alleged procedural defects, including authorization, information utility compliance, stamping, Section 65B compliance, service under Rule 4(3), and limitation, when the record otherwise established financial debt and default.

Analysis: The application was found to be duly authorised after the board resolutions were brought on record. The debt originally advanced by the bank and subsequently assigned to the respondent was supported by loan documents, security documents, the assignment deed, audited balance sheets, and the debtor's own email and account records acknowledging liability. The default and financial distress were therefore treated as established. The objection on limitation was rejected in view of the acknowledgments and the filing date. The absence of an information utility record was held to be directory and not fatal in the facts. The objections based on inadequate stamping and the absence of a Section 65B certificate were also treated as curable or non-fatal at the admission stage. The service defect under Rule 4(3) was held to be a rectifiable procedural lapse that stood cured. The appellate forum reiterated that, at the Section 7 stage, the enquiry is confined to the existence of financial debt, default, and completeness and limitation of the application.

Conclusion: The insolvency admission order was upheld and the technical objections raised by the appellant were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: At the Section 7 admission stage, curable procedural defects do not defeat an otherwise complete application where financial debt and default are established and the claim is within limitation.

Issues: Whether the imposition of a "General Penalty" under Section 125 of the respective GST enactments can be sustained where a concessional "Late Fee" under Section 47 of the respective GST enactments has been levied/accepted in terms of the notifications allowing reduced late fee.

Analysis: The Court examined the challenge to the general penalty imposed for non-filing of annual returns in light of the decision in Ms. Kandan Hardware Mart (batch decision dated 02.01.2026), which held that where taxpayers filed annual returns within the period permitted by the notifications granting concessional late fee, the late fee under Section 47(2) is penal in nature. The ratio adopted in that decision is that a penal late fee levied at a concessional rate under the notifications operates as the penalty for the default, and therefore there is no scope to impose an additional general penalty under Section 125 of the GST enactments over and above the late fee so levied. The petitioner in the present writ petition challenged only the imposition of the general penalty; the proposal for late fee was dropped or adjusted in accordance with the notifications permitting concessional payment.

Conclusion: Impugned order quashed insofar as it relates to levy of the general penalty under Section 125 of the respective GST enactments; petition allowed and consequential relief granted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the provisions of Section 13(2)(e) read with Section 13(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 apply to deny exemption under Sections 11 and 12 by treating the investment in shares as disqualifying application of income, where the impugned shareholding was attributed by aggregating holdings of the assessee and separate persons/entities.

Analysis: Section 13(2)(e) operates where any share, security or other property is purchased by or on behalf of the trust from a person referred to in Section 13(3) for a consideration which is more than adequate; Explanation 3 defines 'substantial interest' in a concern as ownership of not less than twenty percent of the voting power beneficially by such person or by such person together with other persons referred to in Section 13(3). The legal principle of separate juristic identity means that shareholding of an independent person, a HUF, or a corporate entity cannot be automatically attributed to another person unless statutory criteria are satisfied. The factual matrix showed the assessee held 14.18% directly, another individual held 11.66% as karta of his HUF, and a corporate entity connected to an office-bearer held further shares; none of the office-bearers individually held or directly controlled twenty percent or more of voting power, nor did the material establish that the purchases were made from a person falling squarely within Section 13(3) so as to trigger Section 13(2)(e). Reliance on aggregated shareholdings of distinct legal persons and on conjectural control was not justified on the recorded material. Precedential authority supports that mere titular positions or directorships and separate shareholdings cannot be conflated to infer substantial interest for purposes of Section 13 unless statutory tests are met.

Conclusion: Section 13(2)(e) read with Section 13(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not apply on the facts; invocation of Section 13(2)(e) by aggregating distinct persons' or entities' shareholdings was unsustainable and the denial of exemption under Sections 11 and 12 is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For application of Section 13(2)(e) read with Explanation 3 to Section 13, the statutory threshold of substantial interest must be satisfied by the person referred to in Section 13(3) in accordance with their separate legal identity; aggregation of shareholdings of distinct legal persons or entities without satisfying the statutory criteria cannot be used to invoke Section 13(2)(e).

Issues: Whether the assessment order and notices were validly served pursuant to the procedure under Section 282 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 127 of the Income Tax Rules, and whether failure to follow the prescribed service procedure vitiates the assessment proceedings such that the assessment and consequent demand must be quashed.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the record and the factual report filed by the Revenue which admitted that the assessment order could not be served through the e-filing/ITBA portal due to technical/system error and that the Department claimed service by speed post but failed to produce tracking proof of delivery. The Tribunal applied the principle laid down by the Jurisdictional High Court in Suman Jeet Agarwal regarding notices uploaded on the e-filing portal and notices sent to unrelated e-mail addresses, which requires verification of the date on which the assessee viewed the notice on the e-filing portal and recognition of that date as the date of issuance; further, compliance with the statutory procedure for service under Section 282 and Rule 127 is mandatory. In the absence of proof of service by alternative permitted modes and given the admitted failure to properly serve the assessment order as per the prescribed procedure, the Tribunal found that the assessment proceedings suffered a procedural defect causing miscarriage of justice. The Tribunal considered that restoration to the Assessing Officer would not cure the fundamental defect of invalid service and that the assessment and consequential proceedings were thereby unlawful.

Conclusion: The assessment order and consequential proceedings were not validly served in accordance with Section 282 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 127 of the Income Tax Rules; the assessment and related demand proceedings are quashed. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Failure to comply with the mandatory service procedure under Section 282 of the Income-tax Act and applicable rules (including where e-filing upload without verifiable notice or proof of alternative service occurs) renders the assessment proceedings invalid and liable to be quashed for causing a miscarriage of justice.

Issues: (i) Whether there is debt and default within the meaning of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 such as to warrant admission of the Section 7 petition; (ii) Whether the Section 7 application was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether there is debt and default within the meaning of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 such as to warrant admission of the Section 7 petition.

Analysis: The Adjudicating Authority found outstanding debt exceeding the statutory threshold and relied on NeSL record showing default. Multiple OTS proposals by the corporate debtor, including one after admission, were noted as evidencing default. No reconciliation or statement of account was produced by the corporate debtor to controvert the claim. The Adjudicating Authority applied the principle that once outstanding debt and default are established, admission under Section 7 follows.

Conclusion: The Section 7 petition was rightly admitted on the ground that debt and default as contemplated by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 were established.

Issue (ii): Whether the Section 7 application was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The date of default recorded in the application and NeSL was 08.06.2023. The Section 7 application filed on 15.01.2025 was held to be within the prescribed limitation period based on the date of default as recorded in the loan and NeSL records. The Adjudicating Authority's conclusion on limitation was accepted.

Conclusion: The Section 7 application was not barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: The impugned admission order under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the Adjudicating Authority is satisfied that an outstanding debt exists and a default has occurred, admission of a petition under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is required.

Issues: (i) whether the foreign arbitral award, once held enforceable, could be executed by the executing court despite objections based on FEMA, RBI approval, valuation, and alleged distinction between enforceability and executability; (ii) whether the executing court could grant consequential reliefs including transfer of shares, appointment of nominee directors, injunctions, partial execution against remaining respondents, and set-off of costs.

Issue (i): Whether the foreign arbitral award, once held enforceable, could be executed by the executing court despite objections based on FEMA, RBI approval, valuation, and alleged distinction between enforceability and executability?

Analysis: A foreign award that has been found enforceable under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is to be treated as a decree and may be executed in the same proceeding. The distinction sought to be drawn between enforceability and executability was rejected. The executing court cannot reopen objections that were already rejected in enforcement proceedings, especially where the Supreme Court has held that FEMA violations, if any, do not render the award void and that post-facto RBI permission may be available. The objections on valuation and pricing guidelines were also held to be matters already concluded and incapable of being re-agitated in execution.

Conclusion: The objections to executability were rejected, and the award was held executable.

Issue (ii): Whether the executing court could grant consequential reliefs including transfer of shares, appointment of nominee directors, injunctions, partial execution against remaining respondents, and set-off of costs?

Analysis: The residual power under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 permits the court to adopt execution machinery necessary to give effect to the relief granted by the award. The reliefs directing transfer of shares and steps necessary for implementation were treated as severable and capable of partial execution against the remaining respondents after deletion of some parties. The court also held that the directions for appointment of nominee directors and interim injunctions were consequential to the award and within execution powers. The request to rely on RBI correspondence to postpone execution was rejected, and the set-off of arbitral costs against the transfer price was allowed.

Conclusion: The consequential reliefs were granted, including transfer of shares, appointment of nominee directors, injunctions, partial execution, and set-off.

Final Conclusion: The execution application succeeded in substance, with the award enforced and the connected interim and ancillary reliefs granted to facilitate implementation of the award.

Ratio Decidendi: Once a foreign arbitral award is held enforceable and deemed a decree, the executing court must give effect to it in execution and cannot reopen merits-based objections already rejected in enforcement proceedings, unless the decree is a nullity on the face of the record; consequential and severable reliefs necessary to implement the award may also be granted in execution.

Issues: Whether the communication rejecting condonation of delay in receipt of remittance for export of services under Rule 96A(1)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, constitutes a valid order and whether the matter requires reconsideration after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The impugned instrument is a communication/notification of a purported decision rather than a reasoned order passed by the competent authority. The record shows a note by a subordinate officer with the Commissioner s endorsement but no contemporaneous order recorded after consideration of the petitioner s grounds or after affording an opportunity of hearing. The legal framework under Rule 96A(1)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits consideration of applications for condonation of delay in relation to receipt of remittance; such consideration requires a decision rendered in accordance with principles of fair procedure, including giving the affected party an opportunity to be heard and recording reasons for acceptance or rejection of the application. Procedural irregularity is exacerbated where the authority has not addressed the substantive grounds raised by the applicant.

Conclusion: The impugned communication does not amount to a valid order; the matter is remitted to the competent authority to decide the application for condonation of delay afresh in accordance with law after affording the applicant an opportunity of hearing and after recording reasons for the decision.

Issues: Whether the assessment for the relevant year 2015-16 could be validly reopened by issuance of notices under Section 148 and Section 142(1) after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year.

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory scheme governing reassessment after four years, particularly the first proviso to Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Explanation 1 thereto, which permit reopening only if income has escaped assessment by reason of failure to file a return in response to specified notices or failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts. The petitioner had obtained a court order for reduction of capital and had furnished to the assessing officer, during the original scrutiny assessment, the certified order, minutes, ledger entries, remittance certificates, share certificates and tax residence certificates of non-resident shareholders, and a tabulation of amounts paid to shareholders. The Court contrasted such specific documentary responses with the generic production of books contemplated by Explanation 1 and concluded that the materials provided constituted specific disclosure of the capital reduction and payments made out of the securities premium account. The Court found no basis to treat the reassessment as falling within the limited exceptions in the first proviso; reopening appeared to result from a change of opinion or information from the investigation wing rather than any established failure by the assessee to disclose material facts.

Conclusion: The notices under Section 148 and Section 142(1) issued for reopening the assessment are quashed and the writ petition is allowed; the reassessment does not satisfy the conditions of the first proviso to Section 147 and is not justified.

Issues: (i) Whether the value of spare parts separately billed in invoices for repair and maintenance of vehicles could be included in the taxable value of service for levy of service tax. (ii) Whether the vehicle painting activity, involving use of paints purchased on payment of VAT and labour, was classifiable as works contract service so as to entitle the appellant to abatement under the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006.

Issue (i): Whether the value of spare parts separately billed in invoices for repair and maintenance of vehicles could be included in the taxable value of service for levy of service tax.

Analysis: The invoices showed a clear bifurcation between the price of spare parts and the labour/service component. The spare parts were separately billed and VAT was discharged on their sale, while service tax was paid on the labour element. On such facts, the transaction could not be treated as a single composite service for taxing the entire invoice value. The material value attributable to spare parts had to be excluded from the taxable value of service.

Conclusion: The inclusion of the value of spare parts in the service tax base was not sustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the vehicle painting activity, involving use of paints purchased on payment of VAT and labour, was classifiable as works contract service so as to entitle the appellant to abatement under the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006.

Analysis: The painting work involved use of paints procured on payment of VAT and execution through the appellant's own labour. The activity therefore had the essential features of works contract service. Once the classification as a mere repair or reconditioning service was rejected, denial of abatement under the valuation rules could not stand.

Conclusion: The painting activity was held to be works contract service and the appellant was held entitled to the benefit of abatement, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The demands confirmed in the impugned order were set aside and the appeal succeeded on the substantive tax issues.

Ratio Decidendi: Where invoices separately disclose sale of goods and service components, the value of goods sold on payment of VAT cannot be added to the taxable service value, and an activity involving supply and incorporation of materials with labour may be classified according to its true nature for purposes of valuation relief.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under Section 148A(b)/Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (new regime) was validly issued in compliance with the statutory requirement to supply the materials forming the basis of reopening, and whether the resulting assessment is legally sustainable.

Analysis: Reopening under the new provisions introduced by the Finance Act, 2021 requires not only reasons recorded but also supply of the materials forming the basis of the reopening so that the assessee can file an effective reply. In the present case, only the reasons recorded were furnished with the notice issued under Section 148A(b), while the underlying material available with the assessing officer was not supplied. The absence of materials precluded effective representation by the assessee and thereby breached the procedural requirements of Section 148A and the principles of natural justice. Relevant authority establishes that assessment proceedings commenced without providing the requisite material are unsustainable. The Tribunal permitted the Revenue to recommence proceedings from the stage of notice under Section 148A(b) subject to supplying the relevant material and limitation constraints.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148A(b)/Section 148 was invalid for non-compliance with the requirement to supply materials forming the basis of reopening; the assessment order is quashed and Ground No. 1 is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether denial of input tax credit on the ground of delay under Section 16(4) of the GST enactments could survive after the retrospective insertion of Sections 16(5) and 16(6), and whether the impugned order required to be set aside with remand for examination of the remaining statutory conditions.

Analysis: The impugned order confirmed the tax demand, interest and penalty primarily on the footing that the input tax credit had been availed belatedly. The order was challenged on the ground that the time-limit issue was no longer decisive in view of the statutory intervention by the insertion of Sections 16(5) and 16(6) by Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024, with retrospective effect from 01.07.2017. The Court accepted that the substantial benefit of input tax credit could not be denied merely on the ground of lapse of time, but also noted that compliance with the other statutory requirements still had to be examined on facts and in law.

Conclusion: The denial of input tax credit solely on the ground of limitation could not stand, and the impugned order was set aside with a remand for fresh decision on the remaining requirements.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded to the extent of setting aside the adjudication on limitation, while leaving open the question of eligibility on other statutory conditions for reconsideration by the assessing authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory time-bar for availing input tax credit is retrospectively altered, denial of credit cannot rest only on delay, and the authority must independently examine the other substantive conditions for availment before finalising liability.

Issues: Whether the penalty order under Section 271AAB of the Income-tax Act, 1961, dated 30.06.2022, is barred by limitation; and whether clause (a) or clause (c) of Section 275(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, governs computation of the limitation period in the present facts.

Analysis: The Court examined Section 275(1) and concluded that clause (c) is a residuary provision applicable only where clauses (a) and (b) do not apply. Clause (a) applies when (i) the relevant assessment or other order is the subject-matter of an appeal to the Commissioner (Appeals) or the Appellate Tribunal and (ii) the action for imposition of penalty was initiated in the course of the assessment or other proceedings culminating in that order. The Court analysed Section 271AAB and the factual matrix: search proceedings under Section 132 resulted in an admission of cash income; the assessment order dated 30.12.2017 initiated action for imposition of penalty under Section 271AAB and the same assessment order was appealed to the CIT(A) and further to the ITAT. As the penalty proceedings originated in the assessment order and the assessment order was the subject-matter of appeals culminating in a final ITAT order, clause (a) of Section 275(1) applied. Clause (b) was inapplicable because the revision order had been quashed, leaving clause (a) operative. Under clause (a) the limitation may be computed either from the end of the financial year in which the proceedings were completed or from six months from the end of the month in which the appellate order was received. The ITAT order was received in December 2021 (dated 22.12.2021); six months from the end of that month expired on 30.06.2022. The penalty order dated 30.06.2022 therefore fell within the limitation period prescribed by clause (a).

Conclusion: Clause (a) of Section 275(1) applies and the penalty order dated 30.06.2022 is within the period of limitation; the writ petition challenging the penalty is dismissed.

Issues: Whether penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be sustained for under-reporting of income arising from disallowance of interest expenditure claimed under section 57 when the assessee failed to establish nexus between borrowed funds and loans advanced.

Analysis: The assessee claimed interest expenditure under section 57 against interest income and, on scrutiny under sections 143(2)/142(1) and assessment under section 143(3) r.w.s. 144B, failed to demonstrate a direct link between the borrowed funds (on which interest was paid) and the interest earning advances. The assessment recorded higher income than returned, and the assessee accepted the disallowance by not appealing against the assessment order. In penalty proceedings under section 270A(2)(a), the authorities found the requirements of clauses (6)(a) and (6)(c) of section 270A inapplicable because the assessee did not disclose all material facts or make an estimate of the disallowance; the claim was a substantive deduction unsupported by evidence. The tribunal applied the statutory scheme of section 270A and related provisions to conclude that the factual failure to substantiate nexus and the resulting shortfall in declared income fall within the statutory definition of under reporting.

Conclusion: Penalty under section 270A is sustained against the assessee; the levy of penalty for under reporting of income is upheld in favour of the revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether the Special Leave Petition should be entertained despite a delay of 360 days in filing; (ii) Whether any further relief or modification is required in view of this Court's earlier order clarifying directions given with reference to changes to be made in the software.

Issue (i): Whether the petition is barred by delay of 360 days and whether condonation should be granted.

Analysis: The petition record shows a delay of 360 days. The petitioners did not persuade this Court to overlook the delay. The petition was considered in the factual context of earlier intervening orders addressing similar issues.

Conclusion: The petition is dismissed on the ground of delay; condonation of delay is not granted.

Issue (ii): Whether further orders are required in light of this Court's earlier directions regarding changes to the software.

Analysis: This Court's earlier order in Civil Appeal No. 197 of 2026 dated 12th January, 2026 clarified the directions concerning software modifications. The present petition does not require additional directions beyond those already issued.

Conclusion: No further orders are necessary; the petition is dismissed on merits insofar as no additional relief is warranted.

Final Conclusion: The Special Leave Petition is dismissed both for delay and on merits, with no further directions required in view of the prior clarification of software-related directions by this Court.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained on the basis of a transfer pricing adjustment and whether the petitioner was entitled to immunity under Section 270AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The adjustment arose from determination of the arm's length price in respect of international transactions under Chapter X, and the resulting addition was made after the Transfer Pricing Officer applied comparables and the assessment was later rectified. The penalty was imposed on the premise that the under-reporting was in consequence of misreporting within Section 270A(8) and Section 270A(9). The Court held that misreporting requires one or more of the statutory ingredients such as misrepresentation, suppression, false entries, or failure to report transactions, and that a transfer pricing addition based on estimation and arm's length determination does not by itself establish such aggravated conduct. It further held that where the assessee maintained the prescribed information and documents under Section 92D, declared the international transaction, and disclosed all material facts, the case falls within the exclusion in Section 270A(6)(d), and immunity under Section 270AA is available.

Conclusion: The penalty proceedings were not sustainable, and the petitioner was entitled to immunity under Section 270AA.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was allowed and the impugned penalty and rejection of immunity were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A transfer pricing addition, without proof of the statutory ingredients of misreporting and where Chapter X disclosures and prescribed records are maintained, does not attract penalty for misreporting under Section 270A and remains outside the scope of denial of immunity under Section 270AA.

Issues: Whether the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax was justified in invoking the revisional jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to set aside the assessment order under Section 143(3) for alleged error prejudicial to the interests of revenue arising from allowance of deduction under Section 54F(1) when the Assessing Officer had not recorded any finding or conducted enquiry on the applicability of the proviso to Section 54F(1).

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the record of the scrutiny assessment proceedings, including notices issued under Section 142(1), the queries raised by the Assessing Officer, and the assessee's written responses. The Assessing Officer's assessment order under Section 143(3) accepted the returned income without addressing whether the assessee owned more than one residential house at the relevant time as required by the proviso to Section 54F(1). The Tribunal treated the absence of any finding or application of mind by the Assessing Officer on the proviso as a complete lack of enquiry. The Tribunal noted that where no view is recorded by the Assessing Officer and the order is made without application of mind on a material statutory condition, such an order can be erroneous and prejudicial to the revenue, thereby falling within the scope of Section 263. The Tribunal also observed that differing judicial views exist on the substantive interpretation of the proviso to Section 54F(1), but declined to decide that interpretative question on merits because the Assessing Officer had not adjudicated the point; instead the matter required fresh adjudication after proper enquiry.

Conclusion: The assessment order under Section 143(3) is erroneous in so far as prejudicial to the interests of the revenue for lack of enquiry and application of mind regarding the proviso to Section 54F(1); the invocation of Section 263 by the Principal Commissioner is not illegal; the impugned order is modified to the extent of directing fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer on the merits of the Section 54F(1) claim, and the appeal is allowed for statistical purposes.

Issues: (i) Whether the Competition Commission of India (CCI) erred in declining to order an inquiry under Section 19(1) of the Competition Act, 2002 into alleged abuse of dominance by the National Stock Exchange (NSE); (ii) Whether the CCI correctly addressed allegations that NSE's co-location facilities resulted in discriminatory or restrictive market access in violation of Section 4(2)(a)(i), 4(2)(b)(ii) and 4(2)(c) of the Competition Act, 2002; (iii) Whether absence of a load balancer and randomiser in NSE's earlier TCP/IP architecture established denial of equitable access; (iv) Whether the CCI was required to ignore or decline reliance on SEBI and related expert reports when forming its prima facie view.

Issue (i): Whether the CCI erred in declining the Appellant's request to direct an inquiry under Section 19(1) of the Competition Act, 2002.

Analysis: The statutory scheme permits the CCI to direct an investigation only upon forming an opinion that a prima facie case exists. The threshold for prima facie satisfaction requires adequate material on record to justify further probe, but does not mandate a full adjudicatory hearing at the prima facie stage. The CCI evaluated the information submitted by the informant, the responses and submissions of NSE, and relevant reports and orders from SEBI and SAT before forming its view.

Conclusion: The CCI did not err in declining to direct an inquiry under Section 19(1) because it lawfully formed the view that no prima facie case was made out.

Issue (ii): Whether the CCI correctly considered and decided the allegations that NSE's co-location facilities caused discriminatory or restrictive market access in violation of Section 4(2)(a)(i), 4(2)(b)(ii) and 4(2)(c).

Analysis: The assessment required identification of the relevant market, dominance, descriptive clause fit, and whether conduct produced or was likely to produce an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC). Evidence on record, including SEBI, TAC, forensic reports and SAT findings, was considered for both technical and commercial effects. The materially contested points included whether co-location as offered was exclusionary, whether fees or first-come allocation amounted to discriminatory conditions, and whether any asserted preferential access produced demonstrable harm to competition or consumers.

Conclusion: The CCI's conclusion that the co-location facility, as offered, did not disclose a prima facie abuse of dominance under the cited clauses of Section 4 was correct; no AAEC was established at the prima facie stage.

Issue (iii): Whether, in the absence of a load balancer and randomiser, NSE failed to ensure free and equitable access to all trading members.

Analysis: Technical architectural choices were examined in context of contemporaneous market conditions, regulatory guidance, and subsequent migration to multicast. The record showed that TCP/IP was selected for reasons of accessibility and phased adoption and that SEBI and SAT findings identified procedural and monitoring deficiencies but did not establish deliberate preferential access or fraud that would, per se, satisfy the effects requirement under Section 4.

Conclusion: The absence of a load balancer and randomiser, on the material before the CCI, did not suffice to establish a prima facie denial of equitable access requiring a DG inquiry.

Issue (iv): Whether the CCI erred in relying on SEBI and other expert reports when forming its prima facie opinion.

Analysis: Sectoral regulator findings and expert reports bear directly on technical and factual questions that inform the competition assessment. Reliance on such material at the prima facie stage is permissible to the extent the material is relevant to the identification of market effects and dominance attributes; the CCI remained required to form its own prima facie view on competition law elements.

Conclusion: The CCI acted within lawful bounds in considering SEBI and related expert findings in forming its prima facie opinion.

Final Conclusion: Taken together, the pleaded materials and regulatory/expert findings did not establish, on the record before the CCI, a prima facie case of abuse of dominance by NSE under Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002; the appellate challenge therefore fails and the impugned order declining a DG inquiry is sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: At the prima facie stage under Section 26/19 of the Competition Act, 2002, the Commission must form an opinion based on adequate material that the alleged conduct falls within the descriptive clauses of Section 4 and is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC); absent such material showing effects or probable harm, reliance on regulatory and expert reports to test allegations does not require directing a Director General investigation.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 59,18,00,000/- made by the Assessing Officer as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be sustained in the absence of evidence establishing receipt/possession of the amount by the assessee and in view of absence of remand/clarification report from the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the materials placed before the Assessing Officer and the appellate authority, including the report relied upon by the Assessing Officer (Resolution Professional's report before NCLT) and documents submitted by the assessee such as resignation letters, communication with the Registrar of Companies, and confirmations from the employer. The Assessing Officer failed to produce particulars demonstrating that the amounts alleged to have been received from 636 investors were in the assessee's possession during the relevant year, and did not furnish a remand report or bank account particulars despite repeated calls by the CIT(A). The Tribunal noted that mere reliance on the RP's report without independent evidence connecting the alleged receipts to the assessee, and without proof of mode, dates or bank transactions, is insufficient to establish the assessee's ownership or possession of the funds for application of Section 69A. The appellate authority's finding that the question of proving innocence arises only after a charge is established was considered in light of the lacunae in the assessment evidence. The Tribunal found no material to disturb the reasoned conclusion of the CIT(A) that the addition could not be sustained where the revenue had not discharged the evidentiary burden and had not filed the remand/clarification report called for during appellate proceedings.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 59,18,00,000/- under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is unsustainable and is deleted; the revenue's appeal is dismissed (decision in favour of the assessee).