Issues: (i) Whether cash received as part of sale consideration at the time of execution and registration of a sale deed falls within the scope of "specified sum" under section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 attracting penalty under section 271D; (ii) Whether penalty under section 271D can be validly imposed in the absence of recorded satisfaction by the Assessing Officer in assessment proceedings or other proceedings under the Act and whether initiation of penalty proceedings complied with limitation under section 275.

Issue (i): Whether cash received as sale consideration at registration of the sale deed is a "specified sum" under section 269SS attracting penalty under section 271D.

Analysis: The Amendment to section 269SS (w.e.f. 01.06.2015) introduced the term "specified sum". Legislative material including the Budget speech, Memorandum to the Finance Bill, and CBDT Circular No.19 of 2015 explain the amendment's aim to curb acceptance of cash advances in immovable property transactions. Coordinate Tribunal authority (ITA, Chennai) has interpreted the amendment as intended to target advances and not completed sale transactions where payment is made at registration before the Sub-Registrar.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee. Cash received as part of the sale consideration at the time of execution and registration of the sale deed does not attract section 269SS and consequent penalty under section 271D on the facts of this case.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under section 271D can be imposed without recorded satisfaction in assessment proceedings or other proceedings under the Act and whether the penalty initiation complied with limitation under section 275.

Analysis: Jurisprudence establishes that initiation of penalty under chapter XXI presupposes existence of assessment proceedings or proceedings arising from an assessment order and that satisfaction by the Assessing Officer must be recorded for initiating penalty under provisions pari materia to section 271D. Section 275 prescribes limitation rules for penalty proceedings. Coordinate Tribunal and Supreme Court authorities have held that absence of recorded satisfaction and absence of assessment proceedings render penalty proceedings invalid; CBDT Circular No.9/2016 and relevant authorities support application of limitation principles and requirement of reasonable time for initiation.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee. Penalty under section 271D imposed without recorded satisfaction in assessment or related proceedings and where initiation is beyond the permissible/ reasonable time is not valid and is quashed.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed and the penalty orders under section 271D are deleted; the decision results in relief to the assessee on both the applicability of section 269SS to the facts and on the jurisdictional and limitation defects in imposing penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under section 271D cannot be sustained where (a) the cash payment is part of a completed sale made and acknowledged at the time of registered sale deed (not an advance) and thus outside the intended scope of "specified sum" under section 269SS, and (b) there is no recorded satisfaction in assessment or related proceedings as a precondition for initiating penalty proceedings and/or the proceedings are time-barred under section 275.

Issues: Whether there was a default by the corporate debtor under the loan agreements and whether the petition under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 filed by the financial creditor was maintainable.

Analysis: The loan agreements and promissory notes provided for interest at 24% per annum compounded monthly, payable monthly in advance from the date of first payment. Clause 7 and Clause 8 made the loan repayable after six months, while Clause 9 dealt with the lender's remedy on non-repayment after thirty months and a further 60-day period. Clause 2 mandated monthly payment of interest. The ledger and account statement show interest was not paid after March 2019 and a cheque for repayment was dishonoured. The Tribunal's reading that default could only occur after 30 months misconstrued the contract: Clause 9 prescribes a remedy on continued non-payment after 30 months but does not negate the occurrence of default upon failure to pay monthly interest. On the facts, there was an admitted failure to pay monthly interest, and the lender was entitled to treat the loan as in default and to seek repayment, thereby giving rise to a cause of action under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The impugned order dismissing the Section 7 petition on the ground that the debt was not due was therefore incorrect.

Conclusion: The appeal is allowed; the impugned NCLT order dated 15.11.2022 is set aside and the petition under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is admitted. The decision is in favour of the appellant.

Issues: Whether the impugned Assessment Order dated 20.12.2023 should be quashed/remitted for fresh adjudication and on what terms of interim compliance and relief (deposit, filing of reply, and vacation of bank attachment).

Analysis: The Court examined the petition seeking relief against the Assessment Order for tax period 2017-2018 and considered the factual position including delay in approaching the court, expiry of the statutory appeal period under Section 107 of the respective GST enactments, prior authorities applying conditional remittal with deposit requirements, and the Respondent's submissions regarding non-cooperation. Balancing the interests of the Assessee and the Revenue, the Court applied the approach of remitting matters for fresh consideration subject to pre-deposit and compliance, setting timelines for deposit and submission of reply, directions for verification and adjustment of any amounts already recovered, and conditional vacation of bank attachment upon compliance and not being in arrears for other periods. The Court also provided that failure to comply would entitle the Respondent to proceed as if the petition were dismissed.

Conclusion: The impugned Assessment Order is remitted to the first Respondent for fresh adjudication on merits subject to the petitioner depositing the entire disputed tax of Rs. 2,05,652/- from the petitioner's electronic cash register within 30 days and filing a reply to the Show Cause Notice; on compliance the Respondent shall pass final order preferably within three months and the bank attachment shall stand vacated; failure to comply permits the Respondent to proceed as if the writ petition were dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether prosecution and conviction under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were barred because the predicate offences had already resulted in conviction and the alleged predicate transactions pre-dated the PMLA amendment. (ii) Whether the materials on record established the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether prosecution and conviction under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were barred because the predicate offences had already resulted in conviction and the alleged predicate transactions pre-dated the PMLA amendment.

Analysis: The offence of money laundering was treated as an independent offence distinct from the scheduled offence. The Court applied the settled principle that the process or activity connected with proceeds of crime is continuing in nature and may be prosecuted irrespective of the date of the predicate offence. It also held that prosecution for the scheduled offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Indian Penal Code, 1860 does not attract Article 20 of the Constitution of India, because the ingredients of the two offences are different and the PMLA proceeds on a separate statutory basis.

Conclusion: The objection based on double jeopardy and retrospectivity was rejected and the prosecution under the PMLA was held maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the materials on record established the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The Court found that the appellants had acquired and used property and construction proceeds far beyond their known sources of income, and that the funds were projected as untainted through the construction of the building. On the evidence of the property purchase, construction records, valuation material, cash transactions, and the appellants' own explanations, the Court held that the ingredients of possession, acquisition, use, and projection as untainted property were satisfied. The burden under the statutory presumption was not rebutted.

Conclusion: The offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was proved.

Final Conclusion: The conviction for money laundering was upheld and the appeal was dismissed, leaving the trial court's sentence undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Money laundering is a distinct and continuing offence; once involvement in possession, acquisition, use, concealment, or projection of proceeds of crime as untainted property is proved, prosecution under the PMLA is maintainable notwithstanding conviction for the predicate offence.

Issues: Whether the criminal proceeding alleging offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating, arising out of a business transaction, disclosed the essential ingredients of the offences so as to justify quashing.

Analysis: The dispute arose from long-standing commercial dealings between the parties, with payments having been made over time and the alleged balance relating to outstanding business accounts. For an offence of cheating, the necessary element is dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction, and mere non-payment or subsequent failure to honour a commercial arrangement does not by itself establish such intention. The materials did not show any fraudulent or dishonest inducement from the beginning, nor did the complaint disclose the ingredients necessary for criminal breach of trust. The controversy was found to be essentially civil in nature, and continuation of the criminal case would amount to abuse of process.

Conclusion: The criminal proceeding was quashed insofar as the petitioner was concerned; the case against the petitioner could not be sustained under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code.

Final Conclusion: The order brings the revisional application to a final end in favour of the petitioner by terminating the criminal prosecution arising from the commercial dispute.

Ratio Decidendi: In a commercial transaction, criminal liability for cheating or criminal breach of trust arises only where dishonest intention or fraudulent inducement exists from the inception; a mere unresolved monetary dispute or breach of contract does not justify criminal prosecution.

Issues: (i) Whether the order dated 11.09.2024 cancelling the petitioner's GST registration (on account of failure to furnish returns) is liable to be set aside and what reliefs/directions, if any, should follow including the period for filing returns and computation of statutory period for recovery under relevant provisions.

Analysis: The petition challenges cancellation of registration effected on 11.09.2024 for failure to furnish returns. The petitioner filed returns subsequently for relevant months and sought revocation under Section 30 of the Assam Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 but the authority did not act. The Court found the facts analogous to the decision in Motaleb Bhuyan Vs. The State Of Assam And Ors. and applied that precedent. The Court considered statutory provisions governing revocation and computation of recovery periods, namely Section 30 of the Assam Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, Section 73(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Section 44 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for the financial year 2025-26, and balanced the entitlement to administrative relief with the statutory obligation to pay tax, penalty, interest and late fees.

Conclusion: The order of cancellation dated 11.09.2024 is set aside. The petitioner is directed to file returns for the period from 15.07.2023 till date within 30 days (if already filed, no need to file again). The period under Section 73(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 shall be computed from the date of this judgment, except for the financial year 2025-26 which shall be computed as per Section 44 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The petitioner remains liable to pay arrears including tax, penalty, interest and late fees. The relief is in favour of the petitioner.

Issues: (i) Whether deletion of additions made under section 40(a)(ia) for alleged deduction of tax at source under an incorrect section (194C instead of 194J) was justified; (ii) Whether liberty should be granted to the Revenue to approach the Tribunal in the event a higher-court decision is decided in the Revenue's favour.

Issue (i): Whether disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) can be sustained where tax was deducted at source under a different section but at the same prescribed rate.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the facts showing deduction at the same rate and considered coordinate bench and jurisdictional High Court authority holding that section 40(a)(ia) is not applicable to short deduction where tax is deducted albeit under a different section; reliance was placed on decisions treating short deduction differently from non-deduction and on the applicability of amended TDS rates.

Conclusion: The deletion of the disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) is upheld in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether liberty should be granted to the Revenue to approach the Tribunal if higher-court decisions are subsequently decided in its favour.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that a jurisdictional High Court had earlier granted such liberty and that a higher-court decision on the underlying legal question was pending; in light of this, a procedural liberty to re-agitate the matter was considered appropriate.

Conclusion: Liberty is granted to the Revenue to approach the Tribunal if the relevant higher-court decision is decided in the Revenue's favour.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal affirms the deletion of the disallowance under section 40(a)(ia) while simultaneously granting procedural liberty to the Revenue to revive the contest in case of a subsequent favourable higher-court ruling, resulting in a partly allowed appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is not applicable to cases of short deduction where tax has been deducted at source albeit under a different provision and at the same prescribed rate; such short deduction does not automatically warrant disallowance under section 40(a)(ia).

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned assessment order under Section 74 confirming demand of ineligible input tax credit, interest and penalty is liable to be interfered with.

Analysis: The assessment challenged is one where a show cause notice issued under the relevant GST provisions alleged ineligible input tax credit. The petitioner accepted the proposed demand and made payment from the electronic credit ledger prior to the assessment order. Interest was confirmed on the basis of insufficiency of credit ledger balance for specified earlier periods, and penalty was imposed under the relevant penalty provisions for delayed payment. The statutory framework provides alternative reduced penalty/payment options if the taxpayer makes payment within specified time limits after issuance of the notice or prior to assessment; those options were available but not availed by the petitioner. Given the petitioner admitted the tax liability and effected payment, and having not invoked the alternative payment/penalty options prescribed in the statute, there is no basis to interfere with confirmation of tax, interest and penalty in the assessment order.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment order confirming demand of tax, interest and penalty is upheld and the writ petition is dismissed, against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the acquittal of the respondent under the Customs Act could be interfered with on the basis of the statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 and the inculpatory statements of the co-accused, despite the non-production of the recording witness for post-charge cross-examination and the absence of independent corroboration.

Analysis: The statement of a co-accused under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 cannot be treated as substantive evidence against another accused. Such a confession can, at the highest, lend assurance to other admissible evidence, but it cannot by itself found a conviction. The Court held that the witness who recorded the statement of the respondent was not shown to be unavailable, incapable of giving evidence, or otherwise covered by Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The complainant also did not establish admissibility through Section 32(2) read with Sections 47 and 67 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the absence of such proof, the testimony recorded at the earlier stage could not be used against the respondent to sustain guilt. The remaining material, after excluding the confessional statements, was insufficient to dislodge the acquittal.

Conclusion: The respondent was rightly acquitted, and the appeal did not justify interference.

Ratio Decidendi: A confession or inculpatory statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 is not substantive evidence against a co-accused and can be used only to lend assurance to otherwise admissible evidence; where the recording witness is not proved unavailable, earlier testimony cannot be relied upon under Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

Issues: Whether the writ court should interfere with the tax demand order and permit the petitioner to pursue an appeal beyond limitation on the plea that the show cause notices and order were not brought to its knowledge.

Analysis: The notices and the impugned order were sent to the e-mail address furnished by the petitioner to the Department, and the petitioner admitted that the account handling was with its chartered accountant. The order also recorded issuance of the initial intimation, absence of reply, issuance of the show cause notice, grant of further opportunities, and failure to respond or deposit the amount. In these circumstances, the Court held that due service had been effected and that no exceptional ground existed for exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The plea that the documents were also uploaded on the GST portal was not accepted as a basis for interference.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to writ interference or to the relief of being permitted to file an appeal by the High Court in these proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether any substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order in the appeal under Section 68 of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005. (ii) Whether penalty under Section 14B(7)(ii) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 was justified on the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether any substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order in the appeal under Section 68 of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

Analysis: The appeal was required to disclose a real substantial question of law. The questions framed by the appellant did not address the core finding of alleged tax evasion and merely complained that the Tribunal had not discussed the arguments in detail. The record showed that the Tribunal had examined the factual and legal material and had not ignored any material issue warranting interference.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose, and the challenge to the Tribunal's order failed on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under Section 14B(7)(ii) of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948 was justified on the facts of the case.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 14B(7)(ii) could be imposed only where there was an intention to evade tax. The goods were produced at the information collection centre and were entered in the record, and the discrepancy in the invoice concerning the handwriting or truck details did not by itself establish evasion. On the facts found, the goods travelled in the same truck and with the same GR disclosed in the invoice, so the inference of deliberate evasion was not sustainable.

Conclusion: The penalty was not justified, and the Tribunal's order setting it aside was in substance.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were liable to fail because the Tribunal's view on absence of tax evasion and consequent penalty interference disclosed no legal or factual infirmity.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty for alleged tax evasion cannot be sustained unless the material establishes a deliberate intention to evade tax, and a mere discrepancy in invoice particulars without such intention does not justify appellate interference with the Tribunal's factual finding.

Issues: (i) Whether a demand notice issued in Form B under Rule 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 can be treated as a notice invoking a continuing guarantee for the purpose of initiating proceedings under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires that an application under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 be accompanied by particulars demonstrating (inter alia) the debt owed by the debtor, failure to pay within fourteen days of service of a notice of demand and relevant evidence of default. Rule 7(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority for Insolvency Resolution Process for Personal Guarantors to Corporate Debtors) Rules, 2019 prescribes service of a demand notice under clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 95 in Form B. Rule 3(1)(e) of the 2019 Rules defines 'guarantor' as a person in respect of whom the guarantee has been invoked by the creditor and remains unpaid in full or part. The definitions of "debt" and "default" in Sections 3(11) and 3(12) of the Code indicate that debt must be due and default is non-payment when the debt is due and payable. The deed of guarantee in the case is a continuing on-demand guarantee which makes the guarantor liable only upon demand in terms of the guarantee deed. Coordinate decisions of this Tribunal have held that where the deed of guarantee makes liability contingent on a demand, default on the part of the guarantor arises only after invocation/demand as per the guarantee, and that notice in Form B under Rule 7(1) is not a separate substitute for a prior invocation when the guarantee requires an explicit demand. Applying these principles to the admitted facts that no separate invocation/demand preceded issuance of Form B, the requirement that the guarantor's liability be invoked before initiating Section 95 proceedings is not satisfied.

Conclusion: Issue (i) is answered in favour of the appellant. A demand notice in Form B under Rule 7(1) of the 2019 Rules cannot be treated as a notice invoking a continuing guarantee where the deed of guarantee requires a distinct invocation; in absence of prior invocation and resultant default by the guarantor, initiation of proceedings under Section 95 is impermissible.

Issues: (i) Whether the Appellate Tribunal under Section 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can examine questions of fact in a second appeal under the GST regime; (ii) whether the demand originally proceeded under Section 74 could be sustained in the absence of established fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, and whether the matter required remand for re-determination under Section 73.

Issue (i): Whether the Appellate Tribunal under Section 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can examine questions of fact in a second appeal under the GST regime.

Analysis: The Tribunal contrasted the restricted second appeal jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 with the scheme of Section 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Rule 112 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017. It noted that the GST appellate framework does not impose the same limitation to substantial questions of law and that the Tribunal is competent to scrutinise factual issues arising from the record.

Conclusion: The Tribunal held that it can examine questions of fact in an appeal under Section 112.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand originally proceeded under Section 74 could be sustained in the absence of established fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, and whether the matter required remand for re-determination under Section 73.

Analysis: The Tribunal accepted the finding that the ingredients for Section 74 were not established, but also noted that the dispute regarding mismatch between GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B, credit notes, debit notes, annual return reconciliation and ITC reversal required fresh factual examination. It further relied on Section 75(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 to hold that where a notice under Section 74 is not sustainable for want of fraud or suppression, the proper officer must determine the tax as if the notice were under Section 73. Since such re-determination has to be undertaken by the proper officer, the matter could not be finally concluded at the appellate stage.

Conclusion: The Tribunal set aside the treatment of the matter as one under Section 73 at the appellate stage and remanded the case to the proper officer for fresh consideration under Section 73 after affording opportunity to the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the extent that the impugned orders were interfered with on the reclassification issue and the matter was sent back for fresh adjudication by the proper officer under the correct statutory framework.

Issues: Whether the appellate authority's dismissal of the appeal for failure to make the prescribed 10% pre-deposit should be quashed and the appeal restored with an opportunity to make the pre-deposit.

Analysis: The petition seeks setting aside of the appellate order of dismissal for non-payment of the pre-deposit on the ground that the appeal was instituted offline and the petitioner was not intimated of the default nor heard before dismissal. The relief proposed is restoration of the appeal on the file of the Appellate Authority subject to the petitioner making the required pre-deposit within a specified short period, failing which the appeal would stand dismissed without further reference.

Conclusion: The appellate authority's order dated 28.11.2025 is quashed and the appeal is restored to the file of the Appellate Authority on condition that the petitioner makes the required pre-deposit within three weeks from the date of uploading of this order; failure to comply will result in dismissal of the appeal and the impugned order remaining undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an appeal is dismissed for non-payment of a statutory pre-deposit without intimation or hearing and the default can be cured, a court may quash the dismissal and restore the appeal on terms permitting a short opportunity to make the pre-deposit, subject to a clear timeline and consequence for non-compliance.

Issues: Whether the 2nd respondent is obliged to consider and dispose of the petitioner's rectification application dated 11th December, 2025 filed for grant of input tax credit in view of the retrospective insertion of Section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and related circulars.

Analysis: The petition challenges an order-in-original rejecting input tax credit for 2017-18 issued under Section 73(9) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Section 20 of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. After the impugned order, Section 16(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was inserted with retrospective effect (Finance Act, 2024) permitting input tax credit claims for specified financial years if returns were filed up to 30 November 2021; additionally, Circular No. 237/31/2024-GST dated 15.10.2024 contains a para (clause 3.5) prescribing a six-month period for seeking rectification to avail the retrospective amendment. The Court examined competing contentions: the petitioner's submission that the retrospective amendment potentially overturns the impugned rejection and the respondents' reliance on the circular and prescribed six-month rectification window. The Court did not decide the merits of the rectification claim or the applicability of the circular; instead, it confined itself to the procedural question whether the rectification application should be considered and directed the 2nd respondent to decide the application on merits and in accordance with law after affording hearing within a specified timeframe. The Court expressly left open substantive contentions including the applicability of the circular and limitation period for determination by the 2nd respondent.

Conclusion: The Court directed issuance of a limited mandamus requiring the 2nd respondent to afford the petitioner an opportunity of hearing and to decide the rectification application dated 11th December, 2025 on its merits and in accordance with law within two months from uploading of the order; the petition is disposed of in these terms.

Issues: (i) Whether the disallowance of business expenses under section 37 should be sustained where complete supporting details were not produced; (ii) Whether additions under section 68 in respect of unsecured loans should be sustained where identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of lenders were supported by documents and confirmations u/s 133(6).

Issue (i): Disallowance of business expenses under section 37 in respect of purchase of construction material and travelling expenses.

Analysis: The assessee submitted partial voucher evidence for construction materials and did not produce complete primary details for travelling expenses. The Assessing Officer disallowed the full amounts but did not reject books of account or make specific adverse findings that entirely negated the claimed expenditures. Considering that both sides had some justification and in the interest of equity, a proportionate adjustment was considered appropriate.

Conclusion: The disallowance is reduced by allowing 80% of the unsubstantiated balance for building materials and 80% of the travelling expense; 20% of each such unsubstantiated amount is disallowed. The grounds on this issue are partly allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Additions made under section 68 in respect of unsecured loans from five lenders.

Analysis: The assessee furnished copies of income-tax returns, computations, balance sheets, confirmations and bank statements for the lenders; loans were made by banking channels and lenders replied to notices u/s 133(6). Repayments were made in subsequent years and no material discrepancies were pointed out by the Assessing Officer. The requirement to explain the source of source was not applicable to the assessment year in question.

Conclusion: The additions under section 68 are deleted and the grounds on this issue are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: the additions under section 68 are deleted while limited disallowances under section 37 are sustained at an adhoc rate of 20% on the unsubstantiated portions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of creditors are supported by documentary evidence and banking transactions and no discrepancies are pointed out, additions under section 68 are not sustainable; absence of complete vouchers for business expenditure may justify a proportionate disallowance under section 37 rather than a total disallowance.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 542/543 days in filing the appeal should be condoned; (ii) Whether the assessee is entitled to full exemption under Section 10(10AA) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in view of CBDT Notification No.31/2023 dated 24.05.2023 which enhanced the monetary limit.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: The application for condonation set out medical treatment of the appellant and his mother, death of the mother, marriage-related family commitments, breakdown of prior counsel-client communication, and reliance on fresh counsel. Documentary evidence in support of medical treatment and related events was placed on record.

Conclusion: Delay condoned and the appeal admitted for adjudication.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee is entitled to the claimed exemption under Section 10(10AA) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 up to the enhanced limit specified by CBDT Notification No.31/2023 dated 24.05.2023.

Analysis: The assessing officer applied an earlier monetary ceiling of Rs.3,00,000/-, whereas the CBDT Notification No.31/2023 dated 24.05.2023 raised the ceiling to Rs.25,00,000/-. The claimed leave encashment amount was less than the enhanced limit. Coordinate bench decisions on identical issues were referenced in support.

Conclusion: The assessing officer's restriction to Rs.3,00,000/- is set aside; relief under Section 10(10AA) is to be granted to the full extent claimed by the assessee, subject to the enhanced limit in the cited notification.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed on merits after condonation of delay, resulting in full grant of the claimed exemption under Section 10(10AA) within the enhanced monetary limit prescribed by CBDT Notification No.31/2023 dated 24.05.2023.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory or administrative instrument (here, CBDT Notification No.31/2023 dated 24.05.2023) increases the monetary ceiling applicable to an exemption, the enhanced limit applies to claims falling within that amount and the assessing officer must allow the exemption up to the enhanced limit under Section 10(10AA) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellate authority erred in admitting or considering additional material/evidence without remanding the matter to the assessing officer under Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules; (ii) Whether the deletion of the addition of Rs. 12.30 crores by the first appellate authority was unsustainable for lack of verification of the nature of funds received and the creditworthiness of the payer.

Issue (i): Whether additional material was admitted or considered in breach of Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules.

Analysis: The file shows that the first appellate authority requested and received bank statements, mutual fund statements, tax returns and financial statements which were produced during appellate proceedings and reproduced in the appellate order. The material was not placed before the appellate authority by invoking procedural provision for belated evidence alone; rather, the authority exercised its discretion to call for and examine substantiating material furnished during appeal.

Conclusion: The admission and consideration of the additional material did not violate Rule 46A and was within the appellate authority's discretion.

Issue (ii): Whether deletion of the unexplained investment addition of Rs. 12.30 crores was incorrect for want of verification of the source and payer's creditworthiness.

Analysis: The appellate record contains the assessee's bank statements reflecting receipts from and repayment to the payer, mutual fund investment and redemption entries, and the payer's financial statements showing sufficient surplus. Those materials were relied upon to establish that the receipts were received and returned within the year and that the payer had capacity to advance the funds. The payer's project not proceeding to fruition does not, by itself, render the transaction sham or unexplained where source documentation supports the transaction.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition of Rs. 12.30 crores is sustained and the finding that the investment was not unexplained is affirmed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revenue's appeal is without merit and is dismissed; the appellate authority's exercise of discretion to call for and rely upon substantiating material is upheld and the assessment addition is correctly deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: Where substantiating bank records, mutual fund statements and the payer's financials are produced and relied upon on appeal, the appellate authority may, in exercise of its discretion, admit and consider such material and delete an unexplained investment addition if those materials establish the source and genuineness of the transaction.

Issues: Whether the ICDS adjustment of Rs. 1284.66 crores, made while processing the return under section 143(1)(a), was required to be deleted from the computation of total income in the scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) after the intimation under section 143(1)(a) had been quashed by the High Court.

Analysis: The adjustment had been carried forward into the assessment order under section 143(3), but the earlier intimation under section 143(1)(a) making the disputed ICDS addition had already been quashed by the jurisdictional High Court. Once the foundational intimation was set aside, the same adjustment could not survive in the later computation of income. The appellate authority's jurisdictional objection did not prevent grant of consequential relief in the assessment proceedings.

Conclusion: The ICDS adjustment was directed to be deleted from the assessment computation, and the issue was answered in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the extent that the disputed ICDS addition was removed from the scrutiny assessment, and the remaining matters were only consequential.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an adjustment made under section 143(1)(a) has been quashed, the same adjustment cannot be retained in the assessment under section 143(3) and consequential deletion must follow.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 20-07-2022 was barred by limitation and, if so, whether the reassessment proceedings were void ab initio.

Analysis: The assessment year involved was 2013-14. The reassessment notice had earlier been issued under the old regime on 07-06-2021, and the subsequent proceedings were undertaken pursuant to the Supreme Court directions in Ashish Agarwal. Applying the limitation principles explained in Rajeev Bansal, the period between the deemed notice and the supply of information, as well as the statutory reply period, had to be excluded while computing the surviving time for issuance of notice under the new regime. On that computation, the extended date for issuance of notice expired on 25-06-2022. The notice actually issued on 20-07-2022 was therefore beyond the permissible period.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was time barred and the reassessment proceedings were liable to be quashed as void ab initio; the legal ground was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a reassessment notice under the new regime is issued after the surviving limitation period computed by excluding the legally mandated intervals, the notice is invalid and the consequential reassessment cannot stand.