Issues: (i) Whether penalty under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed on the appellant for abetting imports in the absence of knowledge of mis-declaration; (ii) Whether the adjudicating authority could place sole reliance on statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 without following the procedure mandated by Section 138B(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 (and similarly Section 9D(1)(b) of the Central Excise Act, 1944).

Issue (i): Whether penalty under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed on the appellant for abetting in absence of knowledge of mis-declaration.

Analysis: Section 112(a) contemplates liability for abetment which, as interpreted by higher courts, requires intentional aiding or knowledge beyond mere facilitation. Precedents establish that mere facilitation without knowledge does not constitute abetment attracting penalty under Section 112(a).

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 112(a) could not be sustained against the appellant where there is no allegation or proof of knowledge of mis-declaration; decision on this issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be treated as relevant evidence without complying with Section 138B(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 (and Section 9D(1)(b) Central Excise Act, 1944).

Analysis: Sections 138B(1)(b) and 9D(1)(b) impose a two-step mandatory procedure where clause (a) is inapplicable: (1) the person who made the statement must be examined as a witness before the adjudicating authority; and (2) the adjudicating authority must record an opinion that, having regard to the circumstances, the statement should be admitted in evidence in the interests of justice. Authorities consistently hold this procedure to be mandatory to guard against statements recorded under coercion and to secure the affected party's right to test the statement by cross-examination. Where this procedure is not followed, statements recorded under Section 108 are not relevant or admissible for adjudication.

Conclusion: Reliance solely on statements recorded under Section 108, absent compliance with Section 138B(1)(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 (and Section 9D(1)(b) of the Central Excise Act, 1944), is impermissible; the adjudicatory reliance on such statements is rejected and this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The penalties imposed under Section 112(a) of the Customs Act, 1962 on the appellant and its director are set aside because (a) there is no proved knowledge required for abetment under Section 112(a), and (b) the impugned order improperly relied solely on statements recorded under Section 108 without complying with the mandatory procedure in Section 138B(1)(b) (and Section 9D(1)(b) of the Central Excise Act, 1944); accordingly the appeals are allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statements recorded during departmental inquiry are relied upon in adjudication, the person who made the statement must be examined as a witness before the adjudicating authority and the authority must record an opinion admitting the statement in evidence in the interests of justice; absent this mandatory process such statements are not relevant or admissible.

Issues: (i) Whether the differential duty demand and reclassification in the impugned order is sustainable; (ii) Whether the demand is barred by limitation under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962; (iii) Whether imposition of penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 and the First Appellate Authority's direction to remand for verification of entitlement to Notification No.46/2011-Cus. are justified.

Issue (i): Whether the differential duty demand and reclassification in the impugned order is sustainable.

Analysis: The classification issue involves whether the imported joss powder falls within Note 1(a) to Chapter 44 exclusion (wood in powdered form used primarily in perfumery) or within CTH 1211 (plants and parts used primarily in perfumery or for medicinal/insecticidal purposes). The goods lack an essential perfumery or medicinal characteristic and were described as bark powdered akin to sawdust with adhesive/binder use, not primarily for perfumery. The reclassification in the Order-in-Original relied on Note 1(a) to Chapter 44 without establishing that the goods are of a kind used primarily in perfumery.

Conclusion: The differential duty demand based on the reclassification is not sustained in respect of the characteristics required for classification under CTH 1211 or the Note 1(a) exclusion.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand is barred by limitation under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 28 provides a one-year normal limitation with extension up to five years only where duty was not levied or short-levied or erroneously refunded by reason of collusion, willful misstatement or suppression of facts. The SCN pertained to imports in May, June and September 2012, while the SCN was issued in September/October 2013, beyond the one-year period. The extended period was not shown to be justified by collusion or similar grounds, and applicable Supreme Court precedents on limitation and extended period were applied.

Conclusion: The demand is barred by limitation and the SCN is time-barred under Section 28.

Issue (iii): Whether imposition of penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 and the remand to verify entitlement to Notification No.46/2011-Cus. by the First Appellate Authority were justified.

Analysis: The First Appellate Authority imposed penalty under Section 114A and remanded the matter to verify entitlement to the notification despite those directions not arising from the Review Order and without appropriate pleading or findings justifying such directions. The imposition of penalty and the limited remand went beyond issues before the appellate authority and lacked supporting allegations of non-entitlement or non-compliance requiring such action.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 114A and the remand direction to verify entitlement to Notification No.46/2011-Cus. are set aside.

Final Conclusion: The impugned Order-in-Original and consequential directions of the First Appellate Authority are set aside, the appeals are allowed and relief granted to the importer with consequential benefits as per law.

Ratio Decidendi: A demand under Section 28 is time-barred unless the extended period is justified by collusion, willful misstatement or suppression of facts; reclassification requires factual satisfaction that the goods possess characteristics (such as primary use in perfumery) necessary for exclusion under tariff notes or for inclusion under alternative headings; imposition of penalty or remand by an appellate authority must be founded on allegations or findings within the scope of the proceedings.

Issues: Whether the services rendered by the appellant, under the work order for deployment of ex-railway staff for rake movement, are to be classified as manpower recruitment/supply agency services attracting reverse charge mechanism and therefore whether the departmental demand for service tax, interest and penalty against the appellant is sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the scope and terms of the work order which expressly required deployment of ex-railway staff, substitution for absenteeism, and personal supervision, indicating a contract for supply of manpower. The Tribunal analysed the legal contours of 'cargo handling service' as defined in Section 65(23) of the Finance Act, 1994 and relevant circulars and case-law, observing that cargo handling services require the existence of cargo accepted by a carrier and are typically performed by specialised cargo handling agencies; ordinary manpower deployment for rake movement does not ipso facto constitute cargo handling service. The Tribunal noted the applicability of Notification No. 30/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012 (as amended by Notification No. 07/2015-Service Tax dated 01.03.2015) which places tax liability on the service recipient for supply of manpower to a body corporate. The Tribunal further observed that post-01.07.2012 charging provisions and the negative list framework (Sections 66B, 66D, 67 and related definitions) must be applied as existing at the time of the show cause notice and that the adjudicating authority failed to properly examine records, contractual terms, exemptions and the correct value of taxable service before confirming demand, interest and penalty. The Tribunal also relied on precedent holding that demands cannot be confirmed under deleted or inapplicable provisions and that executive authorities must verify audit discrepancies with reference to books and admissible evidence before issuing demands.

Conclusion: The Tribunal concluded that the services performed by the appellant fall within manpower recruitment/supply agency services and, on the facts and documents, the tax liability in respect of such services was to be borne by the service recipient under the reverse charge mechanism as per Notification No. 30/2012-Service Tax read with Notification No. 07/2015-Service Tax. The impugned order confirming demand, interest and penalties against the appellant was unsustainable. The impugned order is set aside and the appellant's appeal is allowed.

Issues: Whether an addition in respect of unsecured loans was sustainable where the loans were repaid with interest during the same assessment year and the creditors' identity and existence were established.

Analysis: The loans were repaid with interest in the same assessment year. The creditors' PAN details were furnished and their registration with the Registrar of Companies established their existence. The factual findings of the appellate authorities did not give rise to a question of law requiring interference.

Conclusion: The unsecured-loan addition was unsustainable; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether capital contributions made by identified partners could be assessed as unexplained cash credits in the partnership firm's hands when the partners had confirmed the contributions and remittances were through banking channels?
(ii) Whether remand was warranted to verify the partners' foreign-bank-account sources and additional evidence?

Issue (i): Whether capital contributions made by identified partners could be assessed as unexplained cash credits in the partnership firm's hands when the partners had confirmed the contributions and remittances were through banking channels?

Analysis: Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires the assessee to establish the identity of the contributor, genuineness of the transaction, and creditworthiness. Capital contribution by a partner is distinct from a loan or borrowing and represents the partner's ownership interest in the firm. The additional statutory burden applicable to specified share-capital credits of closely held companies does not extend to partnership firms. The partners' affidavits, financial statements, residency certificates and bank records established their identity, ownership of the contributions and remittance through banking channels. Doubts regarding the ultimate source of funds in the partners' foreign bank account concern their individual assessments and cannot, without material showing that the funds belonged to the firm or that the partners were fictitious, justify taxing the contribution as the firm's income.

Conclusion: The capital contributions could not be assessed as unexplained cash credits in the hands of the partnership firm. The deletion of the addition was warranted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether remand was warranted to verify the partners' foreign-bank-account sources and additional evidence?

Analysis: Reliance on a remand report without supplying it to the assessee and allowing rebuttal is contrary to the principles of natural justice. Nevertheless, further factual verification was unnecessary because the addition was legally unsustainable in the firm's hands, and there was no material that the firm's undisclosed income had been routed through the partners as capital contribution.

Conclusion: Remand was not warranted and the request for restoration was rejected.

Final Conclusion: Capital contributed by identified partners, who own and explain the contribution, cannot be taxed as the firm's unexplained income merely because the Revenue questions the partners' ultimate source of funds; any such enquiry lies in the partners' individual assessments.

Ratio Decidendi: Once a partnership firm establishes the identity of its partners and their ownership of capital contributions, Section 68 does not permit taxation of those contributions in the firm's hands merely on doubts about the partners' ultimate source of funds.

Issues: Whether GST was payable separately to the contractor on periodical bills under a municipal public-works contract where the tender rates were quoted exclusive of GST.

Analysis: The applicable governmental circulars required tender and estimate rates to exclude GST, required GST to be separately indicated for administrative approval, and mandated payment of the contract value plus applicable GST when bills for public works were processed. The tender and work order were issued after these directions came into force. The contention that the cost index already included GST was untenable because GST was introduced only from 01.07.2017, whereas the relied-on cost index was prepared in 2016. Section 15 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 also supported exclusion of CGST/SGST from the contractor's supply value.

Conclusion: The contractor was entitled to separate payment of the applicable GST component on its periodical bills; recovery of GST previously paid was impermissible.

Issues: Whether the Principal Commissioner was justified in invoking revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 on the ground that the assessment was made without proper enquiry into share capital, share premium and unsecured loans, and whether the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.

Analysis: The assessment year involved was governed by the amended regime of section 68 applicable to closely held companies, requiring the assessee to establish the identity of investors, their creditworthiness and the genuineness of the transaction, including the source of the source in relation to share capital and share premium. The record showed that the Assessing Officer had not carried out adequate verification of the investors and lenders, while the material before the Principal Commissioner indicated significant doubts regarding creditworthiness, bank credits, and the ability of several subscribers to make the stated investments. In these circumstances, the assessment was found to have been framed without the enquiries that ought to have been made, bringing the case within section 263.

Conclusion: The revision under section 263 was valid, and the assessee's challenge failed.

Issues: Whether penalty for under-reporting of income under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was leviable where the assessee did not file the return within time due to Covid-19 related difficulty, but the return filed in response to notice under section 148 was accepted in assessment and the tax liability was substantially covered by TDS.

Analysis: The assessee had a consistent history of filing returns and, for the relevant year, explained the failure to file within time as arising from Covid-19 related illness affecting the assessee and family members, followed by unsuccessful attempts to upload the return. The assessment order recorded that the assessee's claims were verified against available records and found satisfactory. The returned income was accepted, and the tax burden was largely discharged through TDS. On these facts, the explanation was held to be bona fide and supported by material facts, bringing the case within section 270A(6)(a), which excludes such income from the ambit of under-reporting.

Conclusion: Penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not leviable and was deleted.

Issues: Whether the second application for regular bail was liable to be allowed despite the prior rejection of bail, dismissal of the SLP, and the alleged active role attributed to the applicant in the offence.

Analysis: The application was considered as a second bail request after earlier rejection on merits and dismissal of the SLP. The material on record, including the prosecution version, the charge-sheet, the sanction for prosecution, the search and seizure proceedings, and the allegation of the applicant's involvement in the conspiracy and raid, was taken into account. The distinction drawn between the applicant's role and the bail granted to a co-accused did not persuade the Court to hold that the applicant's case stood on the same footing. No sufficient or compelling ground was found to justify release on bail.

Conclusion: The second bail application was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A second bail application will not be allowed where the record reflects active involvement in the offence and no sufficient change in circumstances is shown to warrant departure from the earlier refusal of bail.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 79 days in filing the appeal deserved condonation on showing sufficient cause. (ii) Whether the reassessment notice and the consequential proceedings were valid when approval under the reassessment provisions was granted by an authority not competent under the applicable time-limit structure.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 79 days in filing the appeal deserved condonation on showing sufficient cause.

Analysis: The delay was explained on the basis of the assessee's limited legal awareness, reliance on the accountant, and the need to deal urgently with attachment and release of the bank account. The explanation was found to be bona fide and not motivated by dilatory conduct. A liberal approach to "sufficient cause" was applied to advance substantial justice.

Conclusion: The delay of 79 days was condoned and the appeal was admitted.

Issue (ii): Whether the reassessment notice and the consequential proceedings were valid when approval under the reassessment provisions was granted by an authority not competent under the applicable time-limit structure.

Analysis: Under the post-2021 reassessment regime, prior approval under the specified statutory hierarchy is a jurisdictional precondition for issuing a notice and for passing the order deciding whether reassessment should proceed. Where the alleged escapement was below the threshold and more than three years had elapsed from the end of the assessment year, approval could not lawfully be granted by the authority that sanctioned it in this case. Non-compliance with the prescribed approval requirement affected jurisdiction and rendered the reassessment notice invalid.

Conclusion: The notice under reassessment was held to be bad in law and was quashed, with the consequential proceedings also falling.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded, the reassessment was annulled on jurisdictional grounds, and the merits of the addition were rendered academic.

Ratio Decidendi: In reassessment proceedings, compliance with the statutorily prescribed approval hierarchy is a jurisdictional condition precedent, and breach of that requirement invalidates the notice and all consequent proceedings.

Issues: Whether addition for alleged on-money receipts on sale of flats could be sustained solely on digital data and documents seized from an independent third-party broker, without corroborative material from the assessee.

Analysis: The additions for the two flats rested on digital data and documents recovered from an independent broker, while no incriminating material was found from the assessee. The broker was neither an employee nor a partner/director of the assessee, and the material was not corroborated through independent evidence. The presumption concerning seized material under Section 132(4) was confined to the person from whom the material was found and could not, without corroboration, establish undisclosed receipts of the assessee in an assessment under Section 143(3).

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 1,17,00,000 for alleged on-money receipts was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether revision under section 263 was valid where the assessment accepted exemption of interest on enhanced compensation without examining the governing statutory provisions and binding jurisdictional precedent; (ii) Whether interest received under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on enhanced compensation is taxable as income from other sources or exempt as compensation under section 10(37); (iii) Whether a faceless assessment shifted the applicable jurisdictional High Court from Punjab and Haryana to Delhi; (iv) Whether approval for reopening, alleged invalidity of the assessment order, or initiation following an audit objection or Assessing Officer's proposal invalidated the revisionary proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether revision under section 263 was valid where the assessment accepted exemption of interest on enhanced compensation without examining the governing statutory provisions and binding jurisdictional precedent.

Analysis: Revision under section 263 requires that the assessment order be both erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue. The assessment order contained no examination of the taxability of interest on enhanced compensation, the statutory treatment under sections 145B(1), 56(2)(viii) and 57(iv), or the binding decisions of the jurisdictional High Court. Mere collection of material without a conscious enquiry, application of law, or reasoned view did not constitute a valid enquiry. The possible-view principle did not apply because the assessment order disclosed no reasoned adoption of a permissible view and disregarded mandatory provisions and binding precedent.

Conclusion: The assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to Revenue, and revision under section 263 was valid. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest received under section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on enhanced compensation is taxable as income from other sources or exempt as compensation under section 10(37).

Analysis: The post-amendment statutory scheme specifically charges interest on compensation or enhanced compensation under section 56(2)(viii), taxes it on receipt basis under section 145B(1), and permits only the prescribed deduction under section 57(iv). Binding jurisdictional precedent treated such interest as income from other sources. Section 10(37) applies to capital gains arising from compulsory acquisition of agricultural land; it cannot override the specific charging and computation scheme governing interest on enhanced compensation.

Conclusion: Interest on enhanced compensation is taxable as income from other sources and is not exempt under section 10(37). This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether a faceless assessment shifted the applicable jurisdictional High Court from Punjab and Haryana to Delhi.

Analysis: The faceless assessment mechanism is procedural and does not alter territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction remained determined by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, whom the assessee had identified as situated at Chandigarh. Consequently, Punjab and Haryana High Court decisions bound the Assessing Officer, whereas decisions of the Delhi High Court and coordinate benches had no overriding force.

Conclusion: Faceless assessment did not shift the applicable jurisdictional High Court to Delhi. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether approval for reopening, alleged invalidity of the assessment order, or initiation following an audit objection or Assessing Officer's proposal invalidated the revisionary proceedings.

Analysis: Approval under section 151 for reopening is a distinct prima facie exercise and neither determines the merits nor restricts the independent revisionary power under section 263. An assessment order remains operative unless set aside or declared void in appropriate proceedings; its alleged defects could not render it non est in the revision appeal. An audit objection or Assessing Officer's proposal may provide information or trigger scrutiny, provided the Principal Commissioner independently examines the record and forms the required satisfaction. The record and revision order demonstrated such independent application of mind.

Conclusion: None of the technical objections invalidated the exercise of revisionary jurisdiction. This issue is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revisionary orders requiring fresh assessment in accordance with the statutory scheme governing interest on enhanced compensation were legally sustainable across all connected matters.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings and the consequential assessment could be sustained where approval for issuance of notice was granted by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax rather than the competent Chief Commissioner of Income Tax.

Analysis: For the relevant reassessment action, approval under Section 151 for issuance of notice under Section 148 was required from the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. The approval was instead accorded by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. The applicable CBDT instructions and the adopted coordinate-bench ruling treated approval by the Principal Commissioner as incompetent, rendering the notice and all consequential proceedings invalid.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice and consequential assessment were invalid for want of approval by the competent authority; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment was invalid for want of notice under Section 143(2) where no return was filed in response to notice under Section 148; (ii) Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption under Section 10(26) on the bank deposits; (iii) Whether the cash deposits in the bank accounts were assessable as unexplained money under Section 69A.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment was invalid for want of notice under Section 143(2) where no return was filed in response to notice under Section 148.

Analysis: The additional legal ground was admitted because it arose from the existing record and required no factual verification. Notice under Section 143(2) is required only where the assessee files a valid return. As no return was filed either under Section 139 or in response to the notice under Section 148, issuance of such notice was not required.

Conclusion: The reassessment was not invalid for absence of notice under Section 143(2), against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption under Section 10(26) on the bank deposits.

Analysis: Tribal status, residence certificates and GST registration did not establish that the deposits represented income derived from a legitimate business carried on within the specified area. The assessee neither maintained nor produced books of account, bills, vouchers, financial statements or a computation of business income. Section 10(26) exempts qualifying income computed under the Act and does not exempt the entire receipts or bank deposits.

Conclusion: Exemption under Section 10(26) was rightly denied, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the cash deposits in the bank accounts were assessable as unexplained money under Section 69A.

Analysis: The assessee failed, including in remand proceedings, to substantiate the nature and source of the substantial cash deposits through reliable evidence. Bank statements, GST returns and supplier agreements without supporting business records did not establish a legitimate source for the deposits.

Conclusion: The additions under Section 69A for unexplained bank deposits were sustained, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment and the tax treatment of the unexplained deposits remain legally sustainable, and no exemption is available on the unsubstantiated deposits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where no return is filed in response to a notice under Section 148, notice under Section 143(2) is not a prerequisite to the reassessment.

Issues: Whether the assessment orders passed under Section 62 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, stood deemed to be withdrawn under Section 62(2) after the returns were filed and the taxes, interest, penalty and late fee were paid.

Analysis: The assessment orders had been issued on the footing that the returns had not been filed. The record showed that the returns in Form GSTR-3B were subsequently filed for the relevant periods and that the amounts due under those returns were also paid. In those circumstances, the deeming provision under Section 62(2) became operative and the earlier assessment orders could not survive.

Conclusion: The assessment orders were deemed to have been withdrawn, and the petition was allowed.

Issues: (i) Whether depreciation on the in-house software, claimed in the books, could be excluded while computing the assessee's PLI under TNMM for benchmarking the international transaction; (ii) Whether certain comparables were liable to be excluded on the ground of excessive turnover and whether the question of functional dissimilarity required fresh examination.

Issue (i): Whether depreciation on the in-house software, claimed in the books, could be excluded while computing the assessee's PLI under TNMM for benchmarking the international transaction.

Analysis: Under Rule 10B(1)(e) and Rule 10B(3), net profit margins under TNMM are to be compared after making reasonably accurate adjustments for differences that materially affect profitability. The assessee demonstrated that the major portion of its depreciation related to capitalised in-house CRM software, that this depreciation materially distorted its margin in the impugned year, and that the software's revenue impact became meaningful only in later years. The material difference between the assessee's margin and the comparables' depreciation profile justified a year-specific adjustment for benchmarking purposes.

Conclusion: The exclusion of depreciation on the in-house software for PLI computation was upheld, and the TPO was directed to recompute the PLI accordingly.

Issue (ii): Whether certain comparables were liable to be excluded on the ground of excessive turnover and whether the question of functional dissimilarity required fresh examination.

Analysis: Comparability under TNMM must be evaluated with reference to functions, assets and risks, and turnover materially affects comparability. Companies with turnover many times higher than the assessee's were found unsuitable, and the upper turnover filter was held applicable on the facts. As to the functional dissimilarity objections, the record showed that the assessee's functional profile in the transfer pricing study was broader than pure software development, while the objections had not been fully examined at the lower stages; therefore the matter required reconsideration on a proper factual basis.

Conclusion: The comparables with excessive turnover were directed to be excluded, and the functional dissimilarity objections were remitted to the TPO for fresh consideration.

Final Conclusion: The transfer pricing adjustment was not sustained in its existing form; the assessee succeeded on the depreciation adjustment and turnover-based exclusion of comparables, while the remaining comparability issue was sent back for fresh adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: Under TNMM, a materially distortive item affecting the tested party's margin may be adjusted if the adjustment is reasonably accurate, and comparability must account for functional similarity and turnover-related differences that materially affect profit margins.

Issues: Challenge to cancellation of GST registration and consequential directions for revocation and restoration of registration.

Analysis: The writ petition questioned cancellation of the petitioner's GST registration for alleged non-filing of returns and non-payment of tax. Relief was granted by directing the petitioner to apply for revocation, file draft returns, deposit all tax dues within the stipulated time, and, if the revocation plea is accepted, complete the pending returns after restoration of registration. Provision was also made for manual filing if online filing posed difficulty.

Conclusion: The petitioner was given an opportunity to seek revocation of cancellation, subject to compliance with the stated directions, and the writ petition was disposed of accordingly.

Issues: (i) whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the availability and expiry of the statutory appellate remedy under the CGST Act; (ii) whether the petitioner was entitled to correction of the revised TRAN-1 and TRAN-2 forms and consequential reconsideration of the denial of transitional credit.

Issue (i): whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the availability and expiry of the statutory appellate remedy under the CGST Act

Analysis: The challenge was not a routine grievance against an assessment, but one seeking correction of a bona fide mistake in the revised TRAN-1 and TRAN-2 forms. The relief sought was treated as one beyond the effective powers of the statutory authorities under the CGST framework and therefore within the writ jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In these circumstances, non-availment of the appellate remedy within limitation was held not to bar the writ petition.

Conclusion: The writ petition was held to be maintainable.

Issue (ii): whether the petitioner was entitled to correction of the revised TRAN-1 and TRAN-2 forms and consequential reconsideration of the denial of transitional credit

Analysis: The record showed that the original transitional credit claim had been verified and a substantial part was found eligible. The revised filings were found to have omitted the figures in the earlier forms, and the omission was accepted as a bona fide mistake. The denial of any opportunity to correct the revised forms was considered likely to result in double taxation, and a liberal approach was adopted where no tax evasion was alleged. Accordingly, the impugned order and demand were set aside, and the matter was directed to be reconsidered after permitting rectification and after giving an opportunity of hearing and document production.

Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to rectification of the revised TRAN-1 and TRAN-2 forms and to fresh consideration of the transitional credit claim.

Final Conclusion: The impugned assessment and demand were quashed, the petitioner was allowed to rectify the revised transitional forms, and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a revised transitional return omits earlier claimed credit due to a bona fide mistake and the statutory remedy is ineffective for correction, writ jurisdiction may be exercised to permit rectification and require fresh consideration of the claim.

Issues: Whether the appellant, whose intervention application had been disposed of and who did not challenge that order, could still maintain an appeal against the liquidation order under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The right of appeal under Section 61 is available to a person aggrieved, but that status depends on the legal effect of prior orders. The appellant had sought intervention in the liquidation proceedings, and the Tribunal's order disposing of that application was treated as a rejection of intervention. Since that order was not challenged, it attained finality. In these circumstances, the appellant could not bypass the concluded order on intervention and directly assail the liquidation order as an aggrieved person. The earlier orders closing the stay application and the intervention application therefore controlled the appellant's standing in the appeal.

Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to maintain the appeal against the liquidation order, and the challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A party whose request to intervene has been finally rejected and who does not challenge that rejection cannot later invoke the appellate remedy as a person aggrieved against the subsequent substantive order in the same proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether the earlier assessment order dated 28.11.2025 and the subsequent order dated 08.12.2025, insofar as they pertain to the same discrepancy between Form GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B, result in duplication of proceedings and double taxation and are liable to be quashed; (ii) Whether the impugned order dated 08.12.2025 was passed without affording the petitioner an opportunity of personal hearing because notices were uploaded on the GST portal and the order is liable to be set aside with directions for fresh consideration.

Issue (i): Whether two assessment orders covering the same discrepancy amount to duplication and double taxation and whether the earlier order must be quashed.

Analysis: The Court examined the fact that the 28.11.2025 order addressed only the discrepancy between Form GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B and that the 08.12.2025 order again quantified the same issue leading to two orders for the same taxable event. The Court treated the two orders as covering the identical issue and noted that such repetition produces overlapping liability and double taxation.

Conclusion: The earlier order dated 28.11.2025 is quashed on account of duplication of proceedings and resulting double taxation. The conclusion is in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the order dated 08.12.2025 was passed without personal hearing due to notices being uploaded on the GST portal and whether that order should be set aside and remanded for fresh consideration subject to conditions.

Analysis: The Court analysed the process of service via the GST portal and the petitioner's assertion that they were unaware of the show cause notice and were not furnished an original notice or afforded personal hearing. Having regard to the absence of an opportunity of personal hearing and the Court's view that the assessment confirmed proposals from the show cause notice without personal hearing, the Court considered remedial directions including conditional payment and remand for fresh hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned order dated 08.12.2025 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the respondent for fresh consideration after compliance with the Court's directions; this conclusion is in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The Court quashed the earlier order dated 28.11.2025 and set aside the subsequent order dated 08.12.2025, remanding the matter to the appropriate officer for fresh consideration after the petitioner pays 25% of the disputed tax within four weeks, files a reply within three weeks of payment, and is granted a personal hearing; the writ petition is disposed of accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: Administrative orders resulting in duplication of liability for the same taxable discrepancy are unsustainable and must be quashed, and an assessment confirmed without affording an opportunity of personal hearing (where service was effected electronically and the party was unaware) vitiates the order and warrants setting aside and remand for fresh consideration subject to conditions laid down by the Court.