Issues: (i) Whether the order-in-original passed under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, can be converted into an order under Section 73 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, thereby enabling the petitioner to avail benefits under Section 128A of the CGST Act.

Analysis: The proceeding required examination of whether documentary evidence existed to show that the assessment under Section 74 involved no fraud, misrepresentation, or suppression of facts and therefore could be recharacterised as an order under Section 73. The statutory framework relevant to this issue includes Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 governing demand determinations, Section 128A providing waiver benefits, Section 75(2) and the first proviso concerning related procedural provisions, Sections 16, 41(1) and 42(5) and Rule 36 and Rule 71(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 concerning eligibility and documentation for input tax credit. The adjudicating authority recorded absence of prescribed supporting documents (such as tax invoices under Section 31(3)(f) and records like GSTR-3B/GSTR-2A) and reached specific findings of fraudulent availment and deliberate utilization of ineligible input tax credit. A prior order under Section 73 for a different year was distinguishable on the ground that documentary evidence had been produced in that year; no such documents were produced in the present matter despite an opportunity to do so.

Conclusion: The petitioner's request for conversion of the order under Section 74 to an order under Section 73 is rejected for lack of documentary evidence and in view of the adjudicating authority's specific findings of fraud and ineligible availment of input tax credit.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellate order rejecting the appeal for want of mandatory pre-deposit could be interfered with on the ground that the appellant was first entitled to an intimation or calculation of the exact pre-deposit amount. (ii) Whether the writ petition, filed long after the impugned appellate order, was liable to be declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Issue (i): Whether the appellate order rejecting the appeal for want of mandatory pre-deposit could be interfered with on the ground that the appellant was first entitled to an intimation or calculation of the exact pre-deposit amount.

Analysis: The appeal was not accompanied by proof of mandatory pre-deposit, and the deficiency was specifically communicated. The record also showed that the appellant was afforded opportunities to make the deposit, including before the first appellate authority, but no deposit was made even on the appellant's own showing. The plea that the authority was bound to first compute and intimate the exact amount of pre-deposit was found untenable.

Conclusion: The challenge on this ground failed and the rejection of the appeal on account of non-compliance with the pre-deposit requirement was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition, filed long after the impugned appellate order, was liable to be declined on the ground of delay and laches.

Analysis: The writ petition was instituted in September 2025 against an appellate order dated 22.12.2023, with no explanation for the delay. The settled principle applied was that although no statutory limitation governs writ petitions, the remedy must be invoked within a reasonable time, and unexplained delay and laches can bar relief.

Conclusion: The writ petition was barred by delay and laches and no interference was warranted.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to relief, and the challenge to the appellate order was rejected on merits as well as on the ground of unexplained belated approach.

Ratio Decidendi: A writ court may decline interference where an assessee fails to comply with a mandatory pre-deposit requirement despite opportunities, and where the writ remedy is invoked after an unreasonable, unexplained delay.

Issues: Whether the impugned assessment orders dated 22.07.2025 under Section 74 of the respective GST enactments are sustainable on merits or whether the matters should be remitted for fresh consideration subject to deposit and related conditions.

Analysis: The petitions challenge assessment orders raising demand mainly based on differences between amounts in Form GSTR-3B and amounts credited to the petitioner's bank account. The petitioner filed skeletal replies and later furnished bank statements by email which, according to the petitioner, were not examined before passing the impugned orders. The Court finds that the replies lack necessary tabulation and reconciliation of bank entries with monthly and annual returns and that further opportunity to submit a clear, substantiated reply is appropriate. Consistent with the Court's established approach in similar cases, a conditional remand with an order for pre-deposit and suspension of recovery measures pending fresh adjudication is an appropriate remedy where the petitioner is given a final chance to substantiate its defence.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment orders are remitted to the first respondent for fresh consideration on merits. This remand is subject to the petitioner depositing Rs. 35,00,000 from its electronic cash register within 30 days and filing a proper, substantiated reply; on compliance, the first respondent shall decide the matters afresh and the bank attachment shall be vacated. The petitioners obtain interim relief conditional on compliance.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment order confirming demands for tax (RCM liability), excess ITC claim and ITC reversal under Section 42 should be re-determined in view of the deletion of Section 42 by the Finance Act, 2022 and related entitlement to retrospective benefit, and whether interim relief (vacation of bank attachment) should be granted subject to deposits.

Analysis: The Court noted that the petitioner had sought time to contest the excess ITC claim but did not file further challenge and that the petitioner admitted the RCM liability. The Court observed that Section 42 has been deleted by the Finance Act, 2022 effective 01.10.2022, and that the deletion could affect the department's authority to levy the disputed amounts for the period in question; accordingly, the correctness of confirming demands under Section 42 required fresh consideration. Applying the Court's consistent approach in similar cases, the Court directed a remand to the Respondent for fresh adjudication on merits, requiring conditional deposits by the petitioner (25% of disputed tax relating to excess ITC and ITC reversal under Section 42; full disputed tax admitted for RCM liability; and full late fee) within thirty days, and provided that bank attachment would be vacated subject to compliance. The Respondent was directed to pass a fresh order with revised calculations including interest as per law within three months of compliance, and was given liberty to recover amounts if stipulations were not met.

Conclusion: The matter is remitted to the Respondent for fresh adjudication and calculation of tax and interest, and the petitioner is granted conditional relief (vacation of bank attachment) subject to specified deposits; outcome is partly in favour of the petitioner (assessee).

Issues: Whether the recovery notice in Form GST DRC-13 attaching the bank account of a director can be sustained under Section 89 of the respective GST enactments and whether the director bears the burden to prove that non-recovery of tax cannot be attributed to gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty.

Analysis: Section 89(1) places liability on every person who was a director of a private company where tax due from the company cannot be recovered, subject to the director proving that the non-recovery is not attributable to gross neglect, misfeasance or breach of duty. The statutory scheme thus allocates the evidential burden to the director to demonstrate absence of such culpable conduct. Where an attachment has been effected without a determination on the director's discharge of that burden, the matter requires reconsideration by the adjudicating authority on merits with opportunity to the director to file a reply and lead evidence addressing the statutory criteria.

Conclusion: The recovery notice in Form GST DRC-13 attaching the director's bank account is quashed and the matter is remitted to the first respondent to pass a fresh order on merits after affording the director an opportunity to discharge the burden under Section 89(1) of the respective GST enactments.

Outcome: The civil appeals were disposed of after recording that the cause no longer survived for consideration on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the Principal Commissioner has power to condone delay in uploading Form No. 67 and exercise discretion under Section 264 read with Section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in cases of default by the assessee; (ii) Whether the Assessing Officer must allow foreign tax credit after subsequent filing of Form No. 67 and verification in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether the Principal Commissioner can condone the delay in uploading Form No. 67 and exercise power under Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, including invoking powers under Section 119, where the assessee defaulted in filing within the due date.

Analysis: The Court examined the interplay between Rule 128 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 (requiring Form No. 67 by the due date under Section 139) and the discretionary powers available to the Commissioner under Section 264 and Section 119 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Court considered precedent recognising the Commissioner's power to deal with defaults by assessees and weighed the consequence of a technical delay against the assessee's substantive right to foreign tax credit, noting that denial of credit solely for a venial or technical breach would result in withholding of a substantial amount without lawful authority.

Conclusion: The Commissioner has power to consider and, where appropriate, condone delay in filing Form No. 67 when exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 264 and may invoke the powers available under Section 119; denial of foreign tax credit solely on account of such technical delay is not justified in the circumstances.

Issue (ii): Whether, having subsequently furnished Form No. 67, the Assessing Officer is required to allow foreign tax credit after verification, and what relief the writ court may grant.

Analysis: The Court noted that the petitioner furnished Form No. 67 after the due date and sought rectification under Section 154 and revision under Section 264; the AO had denied credit because Form No. 67 was not uploaded in time. Exercising writ jurisdiction, the Court directed the AO to verify the facts and allow the foreign tax credit if supported by the record, or else to pass a speaking order denying the credit, preserving the assessee's right to further remedies.

Conclusion: The AO is directed to verify the subsequently filed Form No. 67 and, if the facts warrant, to allow the foreign tax credit; if the credit is not allowed, a speaking order must be passed, preserving the assessee's rights.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions are allowed on merits: the Commissioner's rejection of the revision application on the ground of inability to condone delay is not sustained, and the AO is directed to consider and decide allowance of foreign tax credit after verification within two months; related petitions are allowed for the same reasons.

Ratio Decidendi: A technical or venial failure to file Form No. 67 by the due date cannot, by itself, justify denial of an assessee's substantive right to foreign tax credit; revisional powers under Section 264 read with Section 119 permit condonation of such default and the AO must verify and allow credit where warranted or record reasons in a speaking order.

Issues: (i) Whether the plea of absence of sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 barred the prosecution at the stage of discharge. (ii) Whether the offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was liable to be rejected as impermissible on the ground of temporal application and want of material showing proceeds of crime. (iii) Whether the impugned order refusing discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 suffered from any illegality or impropriety.

Issue (i): Whether the plea of absence of sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 barred the prosecution at the stage of discharge.

Analysis: The governing test is whether the alleged act bears a reasonable nexus with official duty. Protection under Section 197(1) is not automatic and is not to be invoked mechanically at the threshold. The requirement of sanction may arise at a later stage and, in an appropriate case, depends upon the evidence that emerges during trial. The plea is therefore not a complete jurisdictional bar merely because it is raised before charge.

Conclusion: The plea of absence of sanction did not warrant discharge at the threshold and does not help the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the offence under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 was liable to be rejected as impermissible on the ground of temporal application and want of material showing proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The offence of money laundering is independent of the scheduled offence and is of continuing nature so long as the proceeds of crime are concealed, possessed, acquired, used, or projected as untainted property. The expression proceeds of crime is expansive and includes transformed property and equivalent value. At the stage of discharge, the Court is not to conduct a mini-trial or weigh probative value; it is sufficient if the materials disclose a prima facie nexus with the alleged laundering activity. Whether the property is genuinely acquired or otherwise is a matter for trial.

Conclusion: The temporal objection and the challenge to the existence of proceeds of crime did not justify discharge and are rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the impugned order refusing discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 suffered from any illegality or impropriety.

Analysis: At the stage of Section 227, the Court is required to see whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses the ingredients of the offence and gives rise to grave suspicion. The materials referred to in the charge-sheet were sufficient to bring the matter to trial, and the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction or undertake any impermissible exercise. No patent illegality or impropriety is shown in the order refusing discharge.

Conclusion: The refusal to discharge was legally sustainable and called for no interference.

Final Conclusion: The revision failed because the petitioners did not establish any ground to prevent the trial from proceeding on the existing material, and the prosecution was allowed to continue.

Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of discharge, the Court must assume the prosecution material to be true and interfere only if the record clearly fails to disclose a prima facie offence; sanction under Section 197 is not an automatic threshold bar, and money-laundering liability may continue so long as proceeds of crime are dealt with in any proscribed manner.

Issues: (i) Whether the amounts awarded under the arbitral awards and received under the settlement were supply taxable under GST or compensatory payments in the nature of liquidated damages; (ii) whether the arbitration cost awarded was liable to GST and whether the arbitral service fee attracted reverse charge; (iii) what SAC, rate, time of supply, and documentary requirements applied to the taxable portions; and (iv) whether receipt in the GST era of amounts arising from pre-GST contracts attracted tax under the transitional provisions.

Issue (i): Whether the amounts awarded under the arbitral awards and received under the settlement were supply taxable under GST or compensatory payments in the nature of liquidated damages.

Analysis: The Authority examined the nature of each awarded head of claim in the light of the GST concept of supply, the requirement of a contractual arrangement to tolerate, refrain from, or do an act, and the CBIC clarification on liquidated damages. It held that amounts awarded for extra work, price adjustment of extra items, correction of final bill deductions, extra excavation work, pre-stressed anchor material, and backfilling amounted to consideration for supply arising from upward revision of price or extra work under the contract. By contrast, amounts awarded for extra expenditure caused by failure to provide quarry access, private quarry operating costs, differential cement cost, and shifting of infrastructure were compensatory in nature and did not amount to supply.

Conclusion: The issue was answered partly in favour of the applicant and partly against the applicant. Only the compensatory heads were held not taxable, while the identified extra-work and price-revision heads were held taxable.

Issue (ii): Whether the arbitration cost awarded was liable to GST and whether the arbitral service fee attracted reverse charge.

Analysis: The Authority distinguished between the cost awarded to the applicant as reimbursement of arbitration expense and the fees payable for the arbitral tribunal's services. It held that the cost awarded to the applicant was not consideration for any supply and therefore not taxable. However, the arbitral tribunal rendered a taxable service to the business entity, and the recipient was liable to discharge tax under reverse charge on the tribunal fee in accordance with the notified reverse-charge entry for services supplied by an arbitral tribunal.

Conclusion: The arbitration cost awarded to the applicant was not taxable, but the arbitration fee paid to the arbitral tribunal was taxable under reverse charge.

Issue (iii): What SAC, rate, time of supply, and documentary requirements applied to the taxable portions.

Analysis: For the taxable heads, the Authority treated the underlying service as general construction services and applied the relevant construction-service classification. It held that the taxable amount was chargeable at the applicable CGST and SGST rates under the residuary construction entry. Where the taxable amount arose by way of upward revision in pursuance of a pre-GST contract, the Authority applied the transitional rule deeming a supplementary invoice or debit note to have been issued in respect of an outward supply under the GST regime. For reverse-charge arbitration services, the time of supply was linked to the recipient's payment date under the statutory reverse-charge rule.

Conclusion: The taxable construction-related claims were classified under the stated construction-service heading and taxed at the applicable GST rate, with supplementary invoice or debit note requirements applying where the amount represented upward revision; the reverse-charge time-of-supply rule applied to the arbitration fee.

Issue (iv): Whether receipt in the GST era of amounts arising from pre-GST contracts attracted tax under the transitional provisions.

Analysis: The Authority held that mere receipt during the GST period did not by itself determine taxability. What mattered was whether the amount represented upward revision of contractual price or merely compensation for breach. For claims linked to extra work or revised price under the existing contract, the transitional provision was attracted. For claims that were purely compensatory and outside the contract, the transitional provision did not bring them to tax.

Conclusion: GST applied to receipts constituting upward revision of pre-GST contractual consideration, but not to purely compensatory receipts not amounting to supply.

Final Conclusion: The ruling upheld GST liability only on those award components found to be price revisions or consideration for extra work under the existing contract, while compensatory award components and the arbitration-cost reimbursement were held outside GST, save for the tribunal fee payable under reverse charge.

Ratio Decidendi: An award amount is taxable under GST only when it represents consideration for supply or an upward revision of contractual price under a pre-existing contract; a mere compensatory payment for breach, loss, or reimbursement without any agreement to tolerate or perform an independent act is not consideration for supply.

Issues: (i) Whether tobacco leaves purchased from farmers after sun-curing and sold with only storage or stocking remain classifiable as tobacco leaves eligible for GST at 5%; (ii) Whether grading tobacco leaves by size, colour, length, or texture changes their tax treatment; (iii) Whether removal of butts from tobacco leaves for packing or transport changes their tax treatment.

Issue (i): Whether tobacco leaves purchased from farmers after sun-curing and sold with only storage or stocking remain classifiable as tobacco leaves eligible for GST at 5%.

Analysis: Sun-curing was treated as a drying process that removes moisture but does not alter the essential character of tobacco leaves. The relevant tariff entry distinguished tobacco leaves from unmanufactured tobacco other than tobacco leaves, and the clarification on tobacco leaves covered leaves as such, including broken leaves and stems. On the facts, storage or stocking alone did not amount to processing that would take the goods out of the concessional entry.

Conclusion: The goods continue to be tobacco leaves and are taxable at 2.5% CGST plus 2.5% SGST.

Issue (ii): Whether grading tobacco leaves by size, colour, length, or texture changes their tax treatment.

Analysis: Grading was viewed as a physical segregation based on market characteristics and not as a process that changes the identity of the leaves. Since the leaves retain their basic character after grading, the tariff classification remains unchanged.

Conclusion: Graded tobacco leaves remain eligible for the same concessional rate of 2.5% CGST plus 2.5% SGST.

Issue (iii): Whether removal of butts from tobacco leaves for packing or transport changes their tax treatment.

Analysis: Removing the butt was considered only a step to prevent damage during packing and transportation. The leaf continued to retain its character as tobacco leaf after the butts were removed, so the supply remained within the concessional entry.

Conclusion: Butt-removed tobacco leaves are still taxable at 2.5% CGST plus 2.5% SGST.

Final Conclusion: The ruling accepted that the processes described by the applicant do not convert tobacco leaves into a different taxable product, and the concessional GST treatment continues to apply.

Ratio Decidendi: A drying, grading, or minor trimming activity that does not alter the essential character of tobacco leaves does not take the goods out of the specific concessional entry for tobacco leaves.

Issues: Whether, in view of the petitioner having an efficacious alternative remedy under the Finance Act, 1994 and the Adjudication Order being supplied during hearing, the High Court should direct the petitioner to file the statutory appeal and protect it from being rejected on limitation grounds so that the Appellate Authority may decide the merits.

Analysis: The Court noted that the petitioner challenges service tax demands raised for FY 2014-15 to 2016-17 on grounds including that the transactions qualified as export of services under Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and thus fell outside Chapter V of the Finance Act, 1994, and that the Adjudication Order was not communicated timely or certified copies supplied. The Court observed that factual findings on limitation and the prima facie applicability of the export exemption require scrutiny of the authority's records and are matters for the Appellate Authority to decide on evidence. Given the availability of a statutory appeal under the Finance Act, 1994 and the supply of the Adjudication Order during the hearing, the Court exercised its discretion to direct the petitioner to pursue the appellate remedy and placed a time limit for filing the appeal, with protection from a limitation objection if filed within that period. The Court further directed supply of a certified copy to the petitioner and required the Appellate Authority to admit and decide the appeal on merits without being influenced by observations in the writ petition.

Conclusion: The petitioner is directed to file the statutory appeal within fifteen days; the Appellate Authority shall not raise limitation as a bar if the appeal is filed within that period; the petitioner shall obtain certified copy of the Adjudication Order within seven days of delivery; and the appeal shall be admitted and decided on merits. The writ petition is disposed of.

Issues: Whether the listed polymer-based medical products (medical examination gloves, sterile aprons, OT shoe covers, probe covers, camera covers, cable covers, procedure drapes and drape sheets) are classifiable under HSN 9018 or HSN 6210 or under other HSN headings for GST purposes.

Analysis: Apply the Harmonised System General Interpretative Rules, including Rule 2(b) (goods consisting wholly or partly of a material are goods of that material) and Rule 3 (preference to the most specific heading and essential character test). Consider whether items are garments of the textile headings required for HSN 6210 or instruments/appliances for HSN 9018, and whether certain items function as accessories to chapter 90 apparatus such that they fall under parts and accessories headings. Material composition (plastic copolymers such as EVA/LDPE) is decisive where specific HSN entries for plastic articles exist. For items that are supplementary covers to medical apparatus, determine whether they are accessories (not essential for primary functioning but complementary) and therefore classifiable under parts and accessories headings of chapter 90.

Conclusion: (i) Handcare sterile and non-sterile EVA gloves are classifiable under HSN 39262011. (ii) Wearon sterile apron is classifiable under HSN 39262029. (iii) Cleancare OT shoe cover, Cleansheet procedure drape and drape sheet are classifiable under HSN 39269099. (iv) Clearprobe endocavity/transvaginal probe cover, general purpose ultrasound probe cover, laparoscopy camera cover and intraoperative cable cover are accessories to chapter 90 instruments and are classifiable under HSN 90330000. Applicable GST rate for the above classifications is 9% CGST + 9% SGST as per the schedules cited by the Authority.

Issues: (i) Whether "Shaving Foam" and "Shaving Cream" are the same product and classifiable under HSN Code 33071010; (ii) Whether concessional GST at 5% (2.5% CGST + 2.5% SGST) applies to all products falling under HSN Code 330710 as per Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025, effective from 22.09.2025.

Issue (i): Whether "Shaving Foam" and "Shaving Cream" are the same product and classifiable under HSN Code 33071010.

Analysis: The relevant tariff sub-headings under heading 3307 distinguish shaving cream as tariff item 33071010 and other pre-shave, shaving or after-shave preparations under tariff item 33071090. Composition, physical form and mode of application differ: shaving cream is a semi-solid emulsion requiring manual lathering, whereas shaving foam is an aerosol pre-lathered preparation. Chapter notes and the Customs Tariff entries show shaving cream expressly in 33071010 while other shaving preparations, including shaving foam, fall within the residual 33071090 entry. The GST schedules mirror this classification by allocating shaving cream, shaving lotion and aftershave lotion to the concessional Schedule I entry and leaving other preparations in Schedule II.

Conclusion: Shaving foam and shaving cream are not the same product for classification purposes; shaving cream is classifiable under tariff item 33071010 and shaving foam falls under tariff item 33071090.

Issue (ii): Whether concessional GST at 5% applies to all products falling under HSN Code 330710 as per Notification No. 09/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025.

Analysis: Notification entries and the amended GST schedules specifically list shaving cream, shaving lotion and aftershave lotion under the concessional schedule entry, while the residual category of pre-shave, shaving or after-shave preparations (tariff item 33071090) remains in the higher-rate schedule. The text of the notification and the schedules demonstrate a deliberate bifurcation of rates within heading 3307, treating tariff item 33071010 differently from tariff item 33071090.

Conclusion: The concessional rate does not apply to all products under HSN 330710; shaving cream, shaving lotion and aftershave lotion qualify for the concessional entry while other preparations including shaving foam (33071090) do not.

Final Conclusion: The Authority has ruled that shaving foam is distinct from shaving cream for tariff classification and that the concessional rate entry is limited to specific tariff items; consequently shaving foam is not eligible for the concessional rate and remains taxable under the residual tariff item at the higher rate.

Ratio Decidendi: Where tariff sub-headings and notified GST schedule entries separately identify specific items within a heading, classification and rate application must follow the distinct tariff itemization; goods falling within a residual sub-item are subject to the rate and treatment applicable to that residual entry rather than rates allocated to a different specific sub-item.

Issues: (i) Whether the reopening of assessment under Section 147/148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is valid or vitiated by borrowed satisfaction and lack of assessee-specific material; (ii) Whether addition of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable in the absence of evidence showing receipt or ownership by the assessee.

Issue (i): Validity of reopening under Section 147/148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The reopening was founded solely on generalized information and investigation reports relating to other persons; the reasons reproduced a label that the assessee was a "beneficiary" without articulating the basis, dates, transactions, bank entries or documents linking the assessee to the alleged transactions; there was no independent application of mind demonstrated by the assessing authority and the material supplied was vague and non-specific; inconsistency in the characterisation of the alleged escapement (loan, accommodation entry, penny stock LTCG) further demonstrates lack of clear basis for formation of belief.

Conclusion: The reopening under Section 147/148 is invalid as it reflects borrowed satisfaction and does not disclose a proper independent formation of belief against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Sustenance of addition of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: For invoking Section 69A, ownership or possession of unexplained money must be established; there is no evidence of cash or money in the assessee's possession, no bank entries evidencing receipt, no seized document referring to receipt by the assessee and no transaction trail; the assessment order largely reproduces third-party investigation reports without producing assessee-specific documents or independent verification against the assessee's books, bank accounts or audited financials; statements of third parties relied upon were not supplied to the assessee.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- under Section 69A is unsustainable for want of any evidence establishing receipt or ownership by the assessee and is directed to be deleted.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allows the appeal, holding that the reopening and consequent assessment are vitiated and that the addition under Section 69A must be deleted, with the appellate order of the lower authority set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A reopening under Section 147/148 must be based on an independent formation of belief supported by assessee-specific material; absent such material and any evidentiary nexus establishing receipt or ownership of unexplained money, an addition under Section 69A cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the deletion by the Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals) of the addition of Rs. 93,75,500 made by the Assessing Officer treating acceptance of specified bank notes during demonetisation as unexplained cash credit was justified.

Analysis: The assessee is a cooperative credit society functioning as an intermediary under the Kisan Credit Card scheme and produced detailed records identifying farmers/members from whom specified bank notes were accepted. The Assessing Officer did not dispute the identity of the depositors, the genuineness of the transactions, or that the receipts were recorded in the regular books of account. Under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, once the assessee established identity, creditworthiness and genuineness, the onus shifted to the Assessing Officer to show otherwise. Mere acceptance of specified bank notes during the demonetisation period, without disproving source, purpose or genuineness, does not convert the receipts into unexplained income. The Tribunal found the order of the Ld. CIT(A) to be well reasoned in deleting the addition.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition of Rs. 93,75,500 is upheld and the Revenue's appeal is dismissed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be sustained where additions for alleged bogus purchases are made on the basis of estimation/guesswork and the Assessing Officer relied on information from the Sales Tax Department not furnished to the assessee.

Analysis: The appeals concern imposition of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) following assessment additions for alleged bogus purchases that were computed by the Assessing Officer on an estimated profit percentage and later reduced by the first appellate authority. The Tribunal applied the principle that levy of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) requires a clear subjective satisfaction that the assessee concealed particulars of income or furnished inaccurate particulars of income. Where additions are founded on ad-hoc estimation or guesswork, and where the Assessing Officer's conclusion rests on information obtained from the Sales Tax Department which was not placed before the assessee or proved in the assessment, the threshold for invoking penal machinery is not satisfied. The Tribunal relied on the decision of the Jurisdictional High Court holding that estimation-based additions and reliance on uncommunicated information do not justify invoking Section 271(1)(c), and emphasised the distinct and stricter parameters applicable to penalty proceedings compared to assessment proceedings.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 deleted; appeals allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty under Section 271(1)(c) cannot be imposed where the impugned additions are the result of estimation or guesswork and the Assessing Officer's reliance on information not furnished to the assessee prevents the requisite subjective satisfaction of concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income.

Issues: (i) whether the habeas corpus petition was maintainable against the arrest and remand; (ii) whether the remand order was vitiated for non-compliance with the mandatory requirements relating to grounds of arrest and arrest memo under the GST arrest procedure.

Issue (i): whether the habeas corpus petition was maintainable against the arrest and remand.

Analysis: A writ of habeas corpus was held to be maintainable where the remand order is not in accordance with law. The availability of an alleged statutory arrest procedure does not bar the Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India if the detention is shown to be unlawful.

Conclusion: The petition was maintainable.

Issue (ii): whether the remand order was vitiated for non-compliance with the mandatory requirements relating to grounds of arrest and arrest memo under the GST arrest procedure.

Analysis: The Court held that the Commissioner must record reasons to believe on the basis of material, but the reasons to believe need not be furnished to the arrestee. At the same time, the grounds of arrest had to be explained to the arrested person and furnished in writing along with the arrest memo in accordance with the governing instructions. On the facts, there was a serious dispute as to prior service of the grounds of arrest, the arrest memo did not reflect annexure compliance, and the remand order did not show proper satisfaction before remand. The remand was therefore held to suffer from legal infirmity.

Conclusion: The remand order was illegal and liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The detention could not be sustained and the petitioner was directed to be released, while leaving it open to proceed afresh in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the remand order is shown to be contrary to law and the mandatory pre-remand safeguards relating to communication of grounds of arrest are not duly complied with, the resulting detention is unlawful and amenable to habeas corpus relief.

Issues: (i) Whether this High Court has territorial jurisdiction under Article 226(2) to entertain a writ petition challenging debit freezing of a bank account maintained within its territorial limits; (ii) Whether a notice under Section 94 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 authorises a police officer to direct a bank to debit freeze a bank account without appropriate magistrate orders under Sections 106/107 of the Sanhita.

Issue (i): Whether this High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

Analysis: The pleadings assert that the debit freezing directed by notice affected the petitioner's bank account at the Kankurgachi branch within the territorial limits of this Court and that the grievance is confined to the freezing of that account. Jurisdictional tests require that material facts constituting part of the cause of action arise within the territorial jurisdiction for clause (2) of Article 226 to be attracted; the nature and substance of the cause of action are material in this inquiry.

Conclusion: The territorial nexus for part of the cause of action is established by the debit freezing of the account within this Court's jurisdiction; the writ petition is maintainable before this High Court.

Issue (ii): Whether the police notice under Section 94 BNSS, 2023 authorised the debit freezing of the petitioner's bank account without magistrate orders under Sections 106/107.

Analysis: Section 94 BNSS relates to summons to produce documents or things and does not itself empower police to effect debit freezing of bank accounts. Sections 106 and 107 distinguish seizure (immediate securing of property during investigation) from attachment (which requires application to and orders by the magistrate, including show-cause and opportunity). The impugned notice effected a debit freeze without record of any magistrate order or an application under Section 107 and without reporting seizure/attachment to the jurisdictional magistrate as required for continuing restraints on bank accounts.

Conclusion: The direction in the notice to debit freeze the petitioner's bank account was not authorised by Section 94 and cannot be continued indefinitely in the absence of appropriate magistrate orders under Sections 106/107; the debit freeze is quashed and the bank is directed to allow operation of the account.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is maintainable in this High Court and, on the merits, the part of the police notice mandating debit freeze of the petitioner's account is set aside; the petitioner's account shall be permitted to operate, subject to any future lawful steps taken in accordance with Sections 106/107 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice under Section 94 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 does not empower police to order debit freezing of bank accounts; attachment or continued restraint of bank accounts requires compliance with seizure/attachment procedures and appropriate magistrate orders under Sections 106 and 107 of the Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.

Issues: Whether the assignment/transfer of leasehold rights (with prior consent of the lessor) constitutes a supply of services attracting GST and whether the show cause notice issued under Section 74(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 demanding tax, interest and recovery is sustainable.

Analysis: The Court examined the scope of "supply" under Section 7(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the entries in Schedule II, including Clause 2(b) which treats lease or letting out of a building as supply of services. The Court noted that the transaction in question is an assignment of long-term leasehold rights (95 years) which extinguishes the transferor's rights and transfers the benefits arising out of immovable property. The Court contrasted classification of petty or miscellaneous services (as exemplified in the rate Notification No. 11/2017-C.T. (Rate) dated 28-06-2017) with the commercial reality of assignment of leasehold rights and found the former inapplicable. The Court applied the reasoning of the Gujarat High Court (considering statutory provisions including annotation of exemptions in Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28-06-2017) that assignment/sale/transfer of leasehold rights of land and building constitutes transfer of benefits arising out of immovable property and is not a supply of services in the course or furtherance of business where the assignment has no nexus with the assignor's business.

Conclusion: The assignment of leasehold rights does not amount to a supply of services attracting GST; the show cause notice issued under Section 74(1) is unlawful and is quashed. The result is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Revision Petitions withdrawn after filing declaration under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 and subsequently not complied with, stood automatically revived by operation of law under Section 4(6) of the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020, thereby entitling the petitioner to benefits under the DTVSV Scheme, 2024.

Analysis: The court examined Section 4 of the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020, including sub-sections (2), (5) and (6), and Section 5(1). Section 4(2) provides that upon issuance of the certificate under Section 5(1) any pending appeal or revision is deemed withdrawn from that date. Section 4(6) creates a legal fiction that the declaration shall be presumed never to have been made where the declarant violates conditions or the undertaking in Section 4(5), and in such cases "all the proceedings and claims" withdrawn under Section 4 and "all the consequences under the Income-tax Act" shall be deemed revived. The court construed the phrase "all the proceedings and claims" and the consequences under the Income-tax Act as encompassing proceedings initiated by both the Department and the assessee (including revision petitions under Section 264 of the Income-tax Act, 1961). The court rejected the respondents' narrow reading that revival applies only to departmental proceedings, noting that the statutory language contains no such limitation and that a harmonious, purposive construction supports restoration of the parties to their original positions on default. The court also noted the petitioner had submitted the declaration and Form-3, but failed to make required payments and that Schedule-X referenced both tax and penalty; the omission to mention Section 271(1)(c) in Form-1 was treated as bona fide and inadvertent.

Conclusion: The Revision Petitions withdrawn after issuance of Form-3 stood automatically revived by operation of law upon the petitioner's failure to comply with the statutory conditions under Section 4(6) of the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020. The impugned rejection dated 10.01.2025 is set aside and the petitioner is permitted to complete formalities to avail benefits under the DTVSV Scheme, 2024 within the timelines stated by the Court; relief is granted in favour of the assessee.