Issues: Whether the adjudicating authority's order including certain secured assets into the liquidation estate and directing relinquishment/sale under Regulation 21A(2) of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 and related directions under Regulation 37 should be sustained, and what relief, if any, should be granted to the secured financial creditor regarding sale of the assets and payment/deposit obligations.

Analysis: The Court examined Regulation 21A of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 which presumes security interest becomes part of the liquidation estate where the secured creditor does not intimate decision within thirty days, and which prescribes payment obligations if a secured creditor elects to realise its security (including payment of amounts under Regulation 21A(2)(a) within 90 days and deposit of excess realised value under Regulation 21A(2)(b) within 180 days). The Court also considered Regulation 37 of the IBBI (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 setting out the liquidator's duty to inform a secured creditor of a willing buyer offering a higher price and the secured creditor's obligation to sell to such buyer. Applying these provisions to the facts, the Court found that the secured creditor had communicated within the 30-day period and had paid the relevant share of costs; there was no communication from the liquidator of an amount payable that would trigger deposit under Regulation 21A(2)(b). The Court concluded that the ends of justice require permitting the liquidator to intimate any willing buyer price to the secured creditor, obliging the secured creditor to sell to such buyer if so informed, and otherwise permitting the secured creditor to proceed with sale and make deposits as required by Regulation 21A(2)(b). The Court clarified that the secured creditor is not to be directed to surrender the flats but must provide access to the liquidator for relevant purposes.

Conclusion: The appeal is allowed in part: the impugned order is modified to permit the liquidator to intimate any willing-buyer price under Regulation 37, the secured creditor must sell to such buyer when so informed and, failing that, may sell the assets and comply with deposit obligations under Regulation 21A(2)(b); the secured creditor is not directed to surrender the flats but must provide access to the liquidator. This result is in favour of the Appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether authorities at a check post can determine valuation of goods under proceedings initiated under Section 129/Section 130 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether goods seized or confiscated under impugned orders should be released pending adjudication; (iii) Whether the inspection and online reporting in W.P. No.3258 of 2026 satisfies the requirements of Rule 138C of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether authorities at a check post can undertake valuation of goods under Section 129/Section 130 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The issue was considered in the light of precedent from various High Courts and the statutory scheme governing seizure/confiscation under Section 129 and Section 130. The valuation question falls within assessment jurisdiction and is not a matter designed to be conclusively determined at roadside check post proceedings. The records show reliance on external valuation without participation of consignors and without proper sample protocol.

Conclusion: The valuation of goods cannot be conclusively undertaken by check post authorities under Section 129 or Section 130; the matter of valuation is for the jurisdictional assessing authority.

Issue (ii): Whether goods seized or confiscated under the impugned orders shall be released to the petitioners pending further proceedings.

Analysis: The statutory objectives of Sections 129 and 130 are to protect revenue but must be exercised within reasonable jurisdictional limits. In the present cases there were procedural and substantive defects in the seizure/confiscation process, including one-sided valuation and deficient sample handling. For consignments in transit where statutory documents under Section 68 were available (except in one matter), continued detention is not justified pending appropriate procedures by the assessing authority.

Conclusion: The interlocutory applications for release of goods are allowed and the seized/confiscated goods and any detained vehicles shall be released to the petitioners.

Issue (iii): Whether the inspection and online reporting in W.P. No.3258 of 2026 complied with Rule 138C of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 and whether an E-Way Bill generated after inspection validates the seizure.

Analysis: Rule 138C requires a Part A summary report within 24 hours of inspection and a Part B final report within three days. The respondents recorded only one inspection online (the second) and no report for the first alleged inspection was produced. Evidence suggested the E-Way Bill was prepared after the recorded inspection, and there was no proof of an earlier inspection being logged as required.

Conclusion: The inspection and reporting in W.P. No.3258 of 2026 did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 138C; the consequential seizure/detention cannot be sustained on that basis and the consignment/vehicle shall be released.

Final Conclusion: Orders for release of the seized goods and vehicles are directed, with a requirement that respondents draw tripartite sealed samples (one retained by respondents, one sent to the jurisdictional assessing officer, and one given to the petitioner or representative) to enable appropriate adjudication by the assessing authority without prejudice to further proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Valuation of goods in transit is not to be conclusively determined by check post officers under Section 129 or Section 130 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; procedural safeguards for inspection reporting (Rule 138C) and tripartite sample-taking must be followed and valuation issues are to be referred to the jurisdictional assessing authority.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail should be granted when the accused has joined the investigation and custodial interrogation is not shown to be necessary, and whether cooperation with investigation can compel self-incrimination.

Analysis: The appellant had joined the investigation and was cooperating. The only grievance raised was non-production of the mobile phone, but cooperation with investigation does not extend to requiring an accused to incriminate himself. In the absence of grounds warranting custodial interrogation, continued protection from arrest was justified, subject to compliance with lawful conditions.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was granted and the denial of relief by the High Court was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appellant obtained pre-arrest protection, with liberty to proceed on bail in the event of arrest, subject to compliance with the stipulated statutory conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an accused has joined the investigation and custodial interrogation is not necessary, anticipatory bail may be granted, and cooperation with investigation cannot be equated with compelled self-incrimination.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the notice dated 15th December, 2025 requiring response on GST assessment is ripe for adjudication and whether relief in the form of extension of time and direction for reconsideration should be granted.

Analysis: The notice dated 15th December, 2025 is a pre-adjudicatory communication affording the petitioner an opportunity to respond within seven working days and does not record any final determination of GST liability. The question of applicable GST rate for affordable and other residential apartments and the correctness of any calculation are matters for final adjudication by the appropriate authority after receipt and consideration of the petitioner's response. In these circumstances, interlocutory adjudication on the merits would be premature; however, procedural relief in the form of additional time to respond and a direction to the authority to decide the matter in accordance with law is appropriate to preserve the petitioners' rights and ensure lawful decision-making.

Conclusion: The writ petition is premature for substantive adjudication. The petitioners are granted a fortnight's extension from the current prescribed period to file their reply to the notice dated 15th December, 2025. The concerned State GST authority shall consider the petitioner's response and decide the matter in accordance with law following due procedure. The writ petition is disposed of on these terms.

Issues: Whether the rejection of permission to travel abroad was justified in the facts of the case, having regard to the allegations of fraudulent availment of input tax credit, the penalties imposed in adjudication, and the apprehension that the petitioner may not return.

Analysis: The petitioner's request was considered against the settled principle that the right to travel abroad forms part of personal liberty under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and can be restricted only by fair, reasonable and lawful procedure. The material on record did not show conduct suggesting that the petitioner was a flight risk or had previously violated the conditions of bail. The revenue's concern was founded primarily on the seriousness of the alleged offence and the magnitude of the adjudicated demand, but the Court held that the mere gravity of the allegations and the existence of penalties against corporate entities could not by themselves justify curtailment of the petitioner's liberty to travel, especially when the petitioner had shown roots in society and the prosecution had not demonstrated a credible basis for apprehending abscondence.

Conclusion: The refusal to grant permission to travel abroad was unsustainable, and the petitioner was entitled to permission to travel abroad subject to the conditions imposed by the Court.

Issues: Whether the assessment orders dated 08.01.2024 and 29.04.2024, passed under Section 74 of the TNGST/CGST Act, 2017, without affording the petitioner a personal hearing and relying on absence of portal filing, are violative of principles of natural justice and liable to be set aside and remanded for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The Court examined the procedural record and the submissions that show cause notices were uploaded on the GST portal and the petitioner had filed replies in person but did not upload them to the portal. The respondents conceded that no personal hearing was afforded prior to passing the impugned assessment orders. The Court applied the principle that an assessment order passed without giving an opportunity of personal hearing where one was feasible engages principles of natural justice. Given the admitted absence of personal hearing and the factual matrix of in-person replies, the Court found the orders to be vitiated for want of compliance with natural justice and requiring reconsideration on merits after affording opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned orders dated 08.01.2024 and 29.04.2024 are set aside and the matter is remanded to the 2nd respondent for fresh consideration with directions to permit the petitioner to file reply/objection within two weeks and to issue a 14 days clear notice fixing the date of personal hearing before passing appropriate orders on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned assessment order dated 19.09.2025, passed without affording personal hearing and after a prior assessment for the same year, is liable to be set aside and remitted for fresh consideration; and the appropriate remedial directions.

Analysis: The Court examined the fact that an earlier assessment order for the same assessment year had been passed and was under appeal, and that the impugned order was subsequently passed for a higher amount without any personal hearing. The Court found that service by portal upload, followed by repeated reminders without any response, required the officer to explore other modes of service prescribed under Section 169(1) of the Act (preferably RPAD) to effectuate service. The absence of effective service and lack of opportunity for personal hearing rendered the impugned order vitiated and liable to reconsideration. The petitioner offered to pay 10% of the disputed tax amount, and the respondent accepted remission of the matter subject to that payment and a fresh personal hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned assessment order dated 19.09.2025 is set aside and the matter is remanded to the respondent for fresh consideration on condition that the petitioner pays 10% of the disputed tax amount within four weeks; the petitioner shall file reply/objection within three weeks of such payment; the respondent shall issue a clear 14 days notice fixing date for personal hearing and thereafter pass orders on merits in accordance with law; bank account to be unfrozen on proof of payment.

Final Conclusion: The remedy granted restores the petitioner's opportunity to be heard and requires the assessing authority to serve notices effectively and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law while conditioning relief on a partial payment to balance interests of revenue and assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment order passed without effective service and opportunity of personal hearing is vitiated; where service by a particular electronic mode fails, the officer must explore other modes prescribed under Section 169(1) and a remand with conditional payment may be an appropriate remedy to secure both procedural fairness and revenue interest.

Issues: Whether the incentives/discounts received by an authorised vehicle dealer from the manufacturer constitute consideration for provision of services taxable as Business Auxiliary Service under the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The appeals concern discounts/incentives credited by the vehicle manufacturer to the dealer which arose from their purchase-resale commercial relationship. The Tribunal's earlier decisions and subsequent CESTAT precedents treat such incentives as adjustments to the sale transaction between principal parties rather than payments for services. Where vehicles are purchased from the manufacturer on a principal-to-principal basis and resold to customers, year-end or performance-linked discounts granted by the manufacturer reduce the sale consideration and are part of the sale transaction. The amounts recorded as miscellaneous income in dealer accounts do not, in that factual matrix, represent remuneration for rendering business support or promotional services to the manufacturer and thus do not fall within the ambit of Business Auxiliary Service or declared services under the Finance Act, 1994. In light of these authorities and the principal-to-principal commercial arrangement, the incentives/discounts cannot be taxed as service consideration under the statutory provisions invoked by Revenue.

Conclusion: The discounts/incentives received from the manufacturer are not consideration for any service and therefore are not taxable under Business Auxiliary Service; the impugned demand is set aside and the appeals are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner should be permitted to file an appeal before the tribunal; (ii) Whether the time spent in pursuing the writ petition should be taken into account for the purpose of limitation for filing the appeal.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner should be permitted to file an appeal before the tribunal.

Analysis: The Court noted that the tribunal's IT infrastructure has been put in place and hearings are being conducted in a virtual/e-court enabled mode with stabilized systems and scrutiny/marking of defects having commenced; on that basis the Court considered allowing the petitioner to proceed to file the appeal.

Conclusion: Permission granted to the petitioner to file the appeal.

Issue (ii): Whether the time spent in pursuing the writ petition should be taken into account for the purpose of limitation for filing the appeal.

Analysis: The Court directed that the period consumed in prosecuting the writ petition shall be taken into account if limitation is to be reckoned for filing the appeal, thereby addressing the relevance of that period to any limitation objection.

Conclusion: The time spent in pursuing the writ petition shall be taken into account for limitation purposes in filing the appeal.

Final Conclusion: The petition is disposed of permitting the petitioner to file the appeal and directing that time spent in the writ petition be reckoned for limitation purposes; the petition and any pending applications stand disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned attachment could be sustained on the basis of the director's alleged personal liability under the VAT regime; (ii) Whether the transfer of the property and the absence of an attachment on the date of transfer barred attachment of the subject property under the VAT and GST provisions.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned attachment could be sustained on the basis of the director's alleged personal liability under the VAT regime.

Analysis: Section 37 of the VAT Act was applied on the footing that a director's personal liability arises only where the company is wound up and the tax dues cannot be recovered from the company. The company concerned was still in existence and had not been wound up. On that basis, joint and several liability of the director had not crystallized so as to justify attachment of the property.

Conclusion: The attachment could not be sustained on the basis of the director's personal liability.

Issue (ii): Whether the transfer of the property and the absence of an attachment on the date of transfer barred attachment of the subject property under the VAT and GST provisions.

Analysis: Sections 43 of the VAT Act and 82 of the GST Act were treated as applying only where a transfer is made to defeat revenue after tax dues have become payable and crystallized. The property had already been transferred before the attachment order was issued, and on the date of attachment it was no longer owned by the company or the director. The Court also held that third-party property cannot be attached unless the statutory conditions are strictly satisfied.

Conclusion: The impugned attachment over the subject property was illegal and unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The writ petitions succeeded and the prohibitory communication and check slip were quashed, with a direction to register the sale deed without insisting on a no objection certificate.

Ratio Decidendi: Tax recovery attachment cannot be sustained against property transferred before the attachment order unless the statutory prerequisites for director liability or avoidance of revenue-defeating transfer are strictly established.

Issues: Whether the writ order directing refund of tax deducted at source from land acquisition compensation could be sustained when the compensation amount had already been refunded in income-tax proceedings and the writ petition was founded on incorrect and misleading facts.

Analysis: The writ petitioner had sought refund of the tax deducted at source on compensation paid for acquisition of land and had also sought a declaration that such compensation was exempt from income tax under Section 96 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The appeal disclosed that the refund had already been processed under Section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and that the amount, including interest under Section 244-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, had been credited to the respondent's bank account long before the writ petition was filed and decided. The explanation that the refund was unknown to the respondent was rejected, and the Court inferred that the writ petition had been prosecuted on misleading and incomplete facts with an attempt to secure the same refund twice.

Conclusion: The writ order could not be sustained and was set aside. The appeal was allowed and costs were imposed on the respondent.

Final Conclusion: Relief based on alleged non-refund of tax deducted at source was declined because the same amount had already been refunded in income-tax proceedings, and the writ order obtained on misleading facts was annulled with consequential costs.

Ratio Decidendi: An order obtained on the basis of misleading or suppressed material facts, especially where it would result in a double refund of the same tax amount, is liable to be set aside and may justify the imposition of costs.

Issues: Whether the respondents are obliged to process and grant the petitioner's pending refunds of Fringe Benefit Tax for Assessment Years 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10, together with statutory interest, notwithstanding technical constraints in the Department's ITBA system, and whether relief by way of mandamus under Article 226 should be granted.

Analysis: The facts concerning filing of FBT returns, claims for refunds, rectification applications and follow-up correspondence are admitted and not disputed. The entitlement to the refunds and the denial of credited advance tax were not controverted on merits. The sole defence rests on technical limitations of the Department's ITBA system which prevented uploading or finalisation of rectification orders and refunds. A system created and maintained by the Department cannot lawfully be allowed to deprive a taxpayer of a statutory entitlement indefinitely. Administrative or technical difficulties do not extinguish the legal right to a refund or the statutory obligation to process rectification and grant interest as provided by the statute. The statutory framework provides for payment of interest on delayed refunds under Section 244A read with Section 115WL of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and for rectification and adjustment under the provisions invoked in the proceedings. Given the admitted entitlement and prolonged inaction, the appropriate remedy is to direct the respondents to rectify demands, process pending applications and grant the due refunds with statutory interest within a specified timeframe.

Conclusion: Relief granted in favour of the petitioner (assessee). The respondents are directed to process and grant the specified refunds for AY 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09 and 2009-10 along with interest under Section 244A read with Section 115WL of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and to pass necessary rectification orders within eight weeks from the date of the order.

Issues: (i) Whether impugned orders passed ex parte as a consequence of notices/SCNs being uploaded only under the 'Additional Notices' tab on the GST portal, which did not effectively bring the SCNs to the notice of the petitioner, required setting aside and remand for fresh adjudication; (ii) Whether the petitioner should be afforded an opportunity to file replies and for personal hearings with effective communication safeguards.

Issue (i): Whether lack of effective notice caused by uploading SCNs under the 'Additional Notices' tab warrants setting aside the impugned orders and remand for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The petitions concern SCNs dated 23 September 2023 and 28 May 2024 which, as pleaded, were uploaded under the 'Additional Notices' tab and were not effectively brought to the petitioner s attention, resulting in non-filing of replies and ex parte orders. Prior decisions of this Court on similar facts have treated portal-only uploads under that tab as not constituting effective communication where access was not demonstrably available, and have set aside orders to permit adjudication on merits. The factual distinction between notices dated before and after the portal changes was considered but the overarching concern is that adjudication proceeded on the basis of non-filing owing to alleged deficient communication.

Conclusion: The impugned orders are set aside and remanded for fresh adjudication on the ground of lack of effective notice arising from the mode of portal upload.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner should be permitted to file replies and be heard by personal hearing with specified safeguards for communication.

Analysis: The petitions by the same petitioner raise a common grievance regarding portal-based intimation. To ensure adjudication on merits and to meet requirements of fair opportunity and natural justice, specific procedural safeguards were directed: a time period for filing replies, issuance of personal hearing notices, and communication of those notices via registered mobile number and e-mail, together with access to the GST portal to enable uploading of replies and access to notices and documents.

Conclusion: The petitioner is granted four weeks to file replies; the Adjudicating Authority shall issue and communicate personal hearing notices by registered mobile and e-mail, allow portal access, consider the replies and hearing submissions, and pass fresh orders.

Final Conclusion: The relief sought to set aside the impugned ex parte orders and to secure an opportunity to be heard has been granted by setting aside the orders and remanding the matters for fresh adjudication with specified communication safeguards.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statutory notices are uploaded on a portal in a manner that does not effectively bring them to the notice of the addressee, resulting in non-filing of replies and ex parte adjudication, the appropriate remedy is to set aside the impugned orders and remand for fresh adjudication after affording an effective opportunity to file replies and be heard.

Issues: Whether the additions made by the Assessing Officer for unexplained cash deposits can be sustained where the assessee has filed returns under the presumptive taxation scheme and placed documentary evidence of regular business receipts and payments.

Analysis: The appeal engages assessment under notice issued u/s 147 r.w.s. 144B and appellate disposal u/s 250 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 with contention that the ex parte treatment and addition for unexplained cash deposits were improper. Documentary evidence in the appellate record shows regular business invoices reflecting quantities and rates, bank statement entries of receipts from the buyer through bearer cheques, and subsequent deposits into a loan/FD account used to make payments to suppliers. The assessee had declared income under the presumptive taxation regime and returned turnover; however, total credits in the bank records exceeded declared turnover. On examining the documentary record, the receipts and mode of payment were found to be consistent with a regular milk purchase-and-sale business, and the cash flows reflected encashment of bearer cheques and subsequent use for business payments. The Tribunal adjusted the turnover upward based on bank credits and allowable estimation method under the presumptive taxation framework, computed presumptive income at 8% of the revised turnover, and compared it with the income declared by the assessee to quantify the sustainable addition.

Conclusion: The addition for unexplained cash deposits is not fully sustainable; part of the addition is deleted and a limited addition of Rs. 66,470 is sustained after estimating turnover at Rs. 46,00,000 and applying the presumptive rate, resulting in part relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee carrying on small business has documentary evidence of regular business transactions and bank credits consistent with declared business activity, the presumptive taxation framework permits estimation of turnover from bank credits and documentary record and limits additions for unexplained cash deposits to the extent not covered by such estimation and evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the salary expenditure debited to profit and loss account of Rs. 41,27,199 is allowable in full for the assessment year; (ii) If allowable, the correct method to apportion the salary expenditure between the power generation unit and the share trading business for computing deduction under Section 80IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the salary expenditure of Rs. 41,27,199 is allowable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the tax audit report and supporting details which showed the salary debited in the profit and loss account. The Tribunal accepted the assessee's audit-backed figure as properly substantiated.

Conclusion: The salary expenditure of Rs. 41,27,199 is allowable in full in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): The proper basis for apportioning the salary between the power generation unit and the share trading business for computation of deduction under Section 80IA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the competing approaches adopted by the Assessing Officer (50:50), the CIT(A) (allocation of one-fourth to power generation), and the assessee (apportionment by turnover). The Tribunal found apportionment by turnover to be a rational and scientific method to allocate common salary expenses between distinct business undertakings.

Conclusion: The salary expenditure shall be apportioned between the power generation unit and the share trading business in the ratio of their respective turnovers; direction given to the Assessing Officer to recompute deduction under Section 80IA accordingly, which is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed by accepting the full salary claim and directing recomputation of Section 80IA deduction after apportioning salary between businesses on turnover basis.

Ratio Decidendi: Where common expenses relate to distinct businesses, apportionment by the relative turnover of each business is an acceptable method for allocating such expenses for the purpose of computing business-specific deductions under the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether the Order-in-Original passed against the petitioner should be set aside and the show-cause proceedings reopened where a no due certificate and cancellation of registration had been issued in favour of the erstwhile company that underwent amalgamation.

Analysis: The existence of a no due certificate and cancellation of registration raised a substantive question about the validity of proceedings conducted against the petitioner. The petitioner undertook to deposit the entire amount stated in the impugned Order-in-Original within two weeks and to submit a reply to the show-cause notice along with written submissions. On that basis, the impugned Order-in-Original was quashed and a direction given to the authority to evaluate the petitioner's claim afresh after allowing an opportunity of hearing, subject to the deposit and submission of reply and written submissions. The authority was directed to communicate its fresh order within three months and to refund the deposit if the show-cause notice was discharged; otherwise the deposit could be adjusted against any liability.

Conclusion: The petition is partly allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned Order-in-Original dated December, 2025, subject to the petitioner depositing the entire amount within two weeks and submitting the reply and written submissions, and by directing the respondent authority to pass a fresh order after giving an opportunity of hearing and communicating the order within three months.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a no due certificate and cancellation of registration raise a real issue as to liability, an impugned order may be quashed and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication with directions for deposit and an opportunity of hearing to the affected party.

Issues: Whether the Settlement Commission/competent authority was justified in rejecting the assessee's settlement application under Section 245C(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for alleged failure to make full and true disclosure in respect of Rs. 80 crores claimed as undisclosed income linked to inflated refinery loss.

Analysis: The assessee submitted a confidential enclosure detailing the manner in which the additional income was derived, describing the process of inflating refinery loss and correlating stock in trade with the claimed undisclosed income. The authority's rejection recorded that full and true particulars and evidential materials were not disclosed, but did not adequately examine the detailed explanation provided by the assessee. Given that rejection under Section 245C(1) carries consequences including interest, penalty and potential prosecution, the authority was required to closely scrutinize and verify the manner in which the undisclosed income was shown to have been derived before concluding there was no full and true disclosure. The record shows that, on the remaining amounts, the revenue accepted eligibility for settlement.

Conclusion: The rejection cannot stand without a detailed re-scrutiny of the materials tendered by the assessee; the matter is remitted to the competent authority for fresh consideration of the settlement application keeping in view the detailed disclosures made by the assessee. The writ appeal is allowed and the impugned orders are set aside.

Issues: Whether the appeal preferred under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 properly lies to the High Court or, having regard to the questions involved, falls to be preferred to the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Sections 35G and 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 set out the jurisdictional criteria for appeals to the High Court and to the Supreme Court respectively. Section 35G permits an appeal to the High Court where the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, subject to certain exclusions. Section 35L provides for appeals to the Supreme Court from High Court judgments delivered under section 35G and includes matters involving determination of taxability or excisability. The materials and submissions were examined in light of these provisions to determine the appropriate forum for appellate remedy.

Conclusion: The matter falls to be preferred to the Supreme Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944; accordingly the appeal under Section 35G is dismissed and no interference is made in favour of the appellant (revenue).

Issues: (i) Whether the disputed MS frame parts and transformer tanks were correctly classifiable under CTH 85049010 as parts of transformers or under CTH 73269099 as articles of iron and steel; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked and penalty sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the disputed MS frame parts and transformer tanks were correctly classifiable under CTH 85049010 as parts of transformers or under CTH 73269099 as articles of iron and steel.

Analysis: The goods were manufactured against specific purchase orders and drawings supplied by the buyers, and the buyer certificates as well as the independent professional certificate supported the position that the items were exclusively used in transformer manufacture. The cited precedent on transformer tanks and frames supported treatment of such items as parts of transformers. On the facts, the goods were not mere general articles of iron and steel but components made for use in transformers.

Conclusion: The classification under CTH 85049010 was correct and the contrary classification under CTH 73269099 was not sustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked and penalty sustained.

Analysis: The periodic returns disclosed the classification adopted by the appellant, and the department was aware of the clearances from the beginning. In the absence of suppression or concealment, the demand could not be raised by invoking the extended period. Since the classification dispute failed in favour of the Revenue, the penalty and demand based on the disputed classification also could not survive.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invokable and the penalty was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appellant succeeded on merits and on limitation, and the impugned order was set aside with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods manufactured to specific buyer drawings and exclusively used as transformer components are classifiable as parts of transformers, and where the classification adopted is fully disclosed to the department, the extended period cannot be invoked absent suppression of facts.