Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 12,50,000 made under the assessment framed under Section 147 of the Income tax Act, 1961 as alleged 'on money' based on seized loose sheets is sustainable in the absence of independent corroboration.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the assessment order dated 06.03.2024 and the seized loose sheets reproduced therein which reference the assessee's name and the impugned amount. The assessing authority relied on the seized material to make an addition of Rs. 12,50,000 as on money. However, the seized entries themselves do not demonstrate that any on money was actually paid; there is no independent or contemporaneous corroborative evidence establishing payment. In the context of reassessment proceedings under Section 147 of the Income tax Act, 1961, reliance on seized documents requires evidentiary corroboration to convert entries into taxable income. Absent such corroboration, the Tribunal found the addition to be unsubstantiated.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 12,50,000 treated as on money is deleted and the assessee's appeal is allowed; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether amounts adjusted against excess royalty previously paid to the State (shown as negative liability on final determination) qualify as "actual payment" for the purpose of claiming deduction under section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The authorities below accepted that certain sums were paid through banking channels while treating remaining amounts as mere book adjustments against receivables arising from prior excess royalty payments. The appellate record before the Tribunal included orders of the State Mineral Superintendent showing final determination of liability and instances of negative balances reflecting excess pre-payments. The lower authorities and CPC did not verify whether the initial estimated payments, held by the State, effectively amounted to payments extinguishing liability once final determinations were made. In view of the foregoing factual materials and absence of adequate verification by the Assessing Officer and CIT(A), the issue of whether the adjustments represent actual payments cannot be conclusively resolved on the present record and requires fresh examination and opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The matter is remitted to the Assessing Officer for detailed verification of records and factual determination whether the adjustments represent actual payments qualifying under section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961; appeal is allowed for statistical purposes and in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 29.07.2022 and the assessment framed thereunder are time-barred and liable to be quashed in view of the surviving period computed following the decision in Rajeev Bansal v. Union of India (03.10.2024).

Analysis: The initial notice under section 148 was issued on 28.06.2021 which, following the precedent treating that notice as a deemed show-cause notice, created a surviving period. The assessee responded to the show-cause/148A(b) notice by filing a reply received by the Assessing Officer on 10.06.2022. Applying the surviving-period computation in Rajeev Bansal, the Assessing Officer was required to issue the order under section 148A(d) and any notice under section 148 within two days from the date the reply was furnished, i.e., by 12.06.2022. The Assessing Officer issued the impugned notice under section 148 on 29.07.2022, beyond the surviving period. Given that the appeal was decided on this legal ground, the Tribunal did not adjudicate the merits of the additions and relied solely on the limitation defect to determine validity of the proceeding.

Conclusion: The notice dated 29.07.2022 under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the assessment order framed pursuant thereto are time-barred and are quashed. The assessee's ground challenging the validity of the notice is allowed and the assessment is quashed; no merit adjudication was undertaken.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 488 days in filing the appeal should be condoned; (ii) Whether the expenditure incurred on renovation, repairs and electrical works of temple premises is capital in nature or allowable as revenue expenditure.

Issue (i): Condonation of delay in filing the appeal of 488 days.

Analysis: The delay was attributed to notices being sent to an incorrect e-mail id resulting in non-receipt by the appellant. The applicable legal principle permits a liberal view in condoning delay where sufficient cause is shown and substantial justice warrants condonation.

Conclusion: Delay of 488 days is condoned; appeal admitted for adjudication.

Issue (ii): Characterisation of expenditure on renovation, flooring with marble up to 20 feet, repairs and electrical works - capital or revenue.

Analysis: The renovations and repairs were undertaken to maintain and make safe the existing temple structures and to provide better facilities to devotees; there was no creation of a new asset. The expenditures rehabilitated dilapidated structures and served the purpose of upkeep rather than acquisition of a distinct enduring asset. Relevant documentary evidence was produced before authorities but the assessing officer rejected the claim and the appellate authority confirmed the disallowance.

Conclusion: The disputed expenditure is revenue in nature (repair and maintenance) and not capital; the disallowance is deleted and the full expenditure is to be allowed.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is allowed - delay is condoned and the assessment disallowance is deleted, directing allowance of the entire claimed expenditure.

Ratio Decidendi: Expenditure incurred on repair, renovation and electrical works that preserve and restore existing temple structures without creating a new asset qualifies as revenue expenditure and is allowable; procedural delays caused by notices sent to incorrect contact details justify condonation of delay to secure substantial justice.

Issues: Whether additions made by the Assessing Officer as commission income on alleged accommodation entries based solely on statements recorded under Section 132(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, without specific corroborative incriminating material, are sustainable.

Analysis: The appeals concern search assessments framed under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 with additions computed as commission income on alleged accommodation entries. The Tribunal examined whether the Assessing Officer and the First Appellate Authority relied upon adequate incriminating material unearthed during search proceedings or merely on confessional/statements of a third party recorded under Section 132(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The decision reviews the requirement that admissions made during search must be supported by specific seized material or corroborative evidence before forming the basis of an attribution of income to the assessee. The Tribunal contrasted the factual matrix with coordinate authority where assessments were quashed because additions rested on uncorroborated statements and not on specific incriminating material, and noted the absence of independent material linking the seized entries to the assessee such that estimation of commission could be sustained. The analysis also considers the role of statements and the limits on making additions without corroboration, and the relevance of provisions invoked during assessment and appellate proceedings.

Conclusion: The additions made as commission income on the basis of uncorroborated statements recorded under Section 132(4) are not sustainable; the appeals are allowed and the impugned assessments under Section 143(3)/Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 are quashed.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 1,90,36,240 under Section 40A(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is justified, or whether the cash payments made to farmers fall within the exception provided by Rule 6DD and related administrative guidance (CBDT Circular No. 452 dated 17.03.1986).

Analysis: The assessee produced a valid mandi licence and contemporaneous records including mandi parchis showing seller (farmer), buyer, and commission, affidavits of farmers, cash book entries and revenue records evidencing agricultural land holdings. The Revenue did not produce evidence to disprove the genuineness of these documents. Applying Rule 6DD and the clarificatory CBDT Circular No. 452 dated 17.03.1986 (distinguishing kachha arhatia and pacca arhatia), the materials establish that the assessee acted as a commission agent who merely facilitated sale proceeds to cultivators and received commission, and that the impugned payments represented disbursements to farmers for their agricultural produce rather than payments attracting the cash-payment disallowance under Section 40A(3).

Conclusion: The addition under Section 40A(3) is not attracted; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the appeals should be condoned under Section 249(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019 is exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 subject to compliance with Rule 2BA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 and whether the assessee is entitled to refund of TDS.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeals should be condoned under Section 249(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The explanation for delay included bona fide ignorance of the exemption under Section 10(10B) and lack of legal knowledge, the appeals were filed after relevant precedent was rendered, and the appellate tribunal exercised discretion to consider the merits. The applicable statutory provision is Section 249(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which permits condonation of delay on sufficient cause.

Conclusion: Delay in filing the appeals is condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019 is exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 subject to compliance with Rule 2BA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 and whether the assessee is entitled to refund of TDS.

Analysis: The claim for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was considered on merits following a directly applicable precedent concerning the same VRS scheme. Rule 2BA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 governs compliance for exemption. Because the compensation was held to be not taxable under the applied legal framework, the assessee becomes eligible for refund of tax deducted at source; Section 143(1) and procedural provisions were considered only as background.

Conclusion: Compensation received under BSNL VRS-2019 is held exempt under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 subject to compliance with Rule 2BA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, and the assessee is entitled to refund of the TDS, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed after condoning delay and on merits, resulting in allowance of the exemption claim and direction for refund of tax deducted at source.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a bona fide failure to claim a statutory exemption is subsequently supported by directly applicable precedent, the appellate authority may condone delay under Section 249(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and grant the exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 subject to compliance with Rule 2BA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Issues: Whether the deletion by the appellate authority of the addition of Rs. 3,03,91,873/- made by the assessing officer on account of alleged undervaluation and under-reporting of closing stock is sustainable.

Analysis: The assessing officer revalued closing stock on two bases-(i) alleged short reporting of quantity by 13,515 units and applying opening stock rate to that shortfall; and (ii) not accounting for change in inventory value-resulting in a total addition. The appellate authority found the reported quantity error to be a typographical error in the tax audit statement and accepted documentary evidence corroborating the actual quantity manufactured, thereby negating any shortage in closing stock. The appellate authority also accepted evidence that the reduced valuation of closing stock reflected damage due to exceptional rains, applying the accounting principle of valuing stock at cost or market whichever is lower. The assessing officer's inclusion of variation in stock as a separate addition was identified as a misunderstanding of the nature of variation (being the difference between opening and closing stock values) and thus duplicative. The appellate authority's findings were factual and supported by documentary records and accounting principle; no infirmity was shown in those findings by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition of Rs. 3,03,91,873/- is upheld and the appeal by the Revenue is dismissed; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the additions of Rs. 8,42,424 made under section 69A on account of cash deposits and Rs. 2,50,000 made on account of household expenses can be sustained.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the factual material and submissions on record regarding cash deposits of Rs. 10,46,434 during the year and the assessee's explanation that the cash receipts arose from small business sales dispatched by courier. The Tribunal noted the assessee filed return under presumptive taxation and that the evidence furnished before the appellate authority was sufficient to link the cash deposits to business receipts. The Tribunal also examined the basis for the household expenditure addition and found that, on the specific facts and evidence, no separate disallowance on household expenses was warranted.

Conclusion: The additions of Rs. 8,42,424 under section 69A in respect of cash deposits and Rs. 2,50,000 on account of household expenses are deleted; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: An addition under unexplained cash deposits or household expenditure cannot be sustained where the assessee furnishes satisfactory explanation and evidence linking deposits to business receipts and where presumptive taxation treatment is applicable.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition of Rs. 1,00,00,252/- made under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground of alleged accommodation entries is sustainable.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the documentary material produced by the assessee pertaining to the loan receipts and repayments from DSR Impex Pvt. Ltd. and M.A. Financial Services Pvt. Ltd., including bank statements, ledger entries, contra entries, repayment details showing interest, company bank statements and source certificates. The Tribunal evaluated whether the evidence was sufficient to establish the genuineness of the transactions and the repayment of loans so as to rebut the addition under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 1,00,00,252/- under section 68 is not sustainable and is set aside; the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal allowed the assessee's appeal by accepting the evidence of receipt and repayment of loans and disallowing the addition confirmed by the lower authorities.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee furnishes contemporaneous bank evidence, ledger entries, contra entries, repayment particulars including interest and supporting bank statements and source certificates, such documentation, if credible, rebuts the presumption of unexplained credits under section 68 and the addition cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the writ court's interference with the suspension and consequential disciplinary steps at the stage of issuance of charge memo was justified, and whether the appellate court should modify the order while permitting the departmental inquiry to continue.

Analysis: The appeal arose from a challenge to the writ court's interference after only the show-cause notice, articles of charge, and suspension order had been issued in the disciplinary process. The material placed before the Court showed that the allegation required factual examination in inquiry, including the identity of the officers who had issued the assessment orders and the alleged overwriting in the assessment records. The Court accepted that the disciplinary proceeding had already commenced and that the allegations could not be conclusively tested in writ jurisdiction at that stage. At the same time, the Court noticed that the writ petitioner had already been allowed to continue in service after revocation of suspension and that the inquiry ought to be completed fairly and without delay.

Conclusion: The interference made by the writ court was not sustained in full, but the order was modified rather than wholly set aside; the departmental inquiry was permitted to proceed, the respondent was allowed to continue in service, and the inquiry authority was directed to conclude the proceeding expeditiously.

Final Conclusion: The appeal resulted in a limited modification of the writ court's order, preserving the ongoing disciplinary process while maintaining the respondent's service status until further lawful orders.

Ratio Decidendi: When a departmental proceeding has already commenced and the disputed allegations turn on factual matters requiring inquiry, writ interference at the charge memo stage is unwarranted, though the Court may issue directions to ensure a fair and time-bound inquiry.

Issues: (i) Whether reassessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when it was initiated beyond four years without recording the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts and without independent verification; (ii) Whether the notice under section 148 and the consequential reassessment were invalid for want of jurisdiction, as the reopening was made by an officer other than the one having jurisdiction and no order under section 127 was shown.

Issue (i): Whether reassessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when it was initiated beyond four years without recording the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts and without independent verification.

Analysis: The reasons recorded did not spell out the specific failure of disclosure required to reopen an assessment after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The reopening was founded on information received from the Investigation Wing and not on any independent enquiry or verification by the Assessing Officer. In such circumstances, the foundational requirement for exercising jurisdiction under the extended period of reassessment was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The reopening on this ground was invalid and went in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the notice under section 148 and the consequential reassessment were invalid for want of jurisdiction, as the reopening was made by an officer other than the one having jurisdiction and no order under section 127 was shown.

Analysis: The record showed that the reassessment was initiated by an officer who did not have jurisdiction over the assessee, while the case was later transferred to the correct jurisdiction. No order under section 127 transferring jurisdiction was placed on record. Jurisdiction to reopen is a condition precedent, and a notice issued by an lacking jurisdiction cannot sustain the reassessment proceedings.

Conclusion: The notice and the reassessment were jurisdictionally defective and went in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were quashed, the Revenue's appeal failed, and the assessee's cross objections succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: For reopening an assessment beyond four years, the reasons must specifically record the assessee's failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts, and reassessment initiated by an officer lacking jurisdiction without a valid transfer order is void.

Issues: Whether Section 96 of the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2024 (Finance Act, 2024) bars eligibility for the DTVSV Scheme of assessees whose reassessments under Section 147/148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 emanate from incriminating material discovered during searches under Section 132/132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether clarificatory Circulars No. 12 of 2024 dated 15.10.2024 and No. 19 of 2024 dated 16.12.2024 permit such assessees to avail the Scheme.

Analysis: Section 96 of the Finance Act, 2024 excludes from the Scheme tax arrears relating to assessment years in respect of which assessments have been made under Section 143(3), Section 144, Section 147, Section 153A or Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the basis of search initiated under Section 132 or Section 132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The clarificatory entries in Circular No. 12 of 2024 (Item 6) and Circular No. 19 of 2024 (Item 40) explain which assessments are to be treated as made on the basis of search and state that such cases are barred under Section 96; they do not expand eligibility beyond the statutory bar. Where reassessment under Section 147/148 is founded on incriminating material discovered in searches of third parties under Section 132/132A and results in tax arrears, those tax arrears fall within the exclusion stipulated by Section 96. The absence of an express temporal cut-off for searches in Section 96 does not permit reading into the statute an entitlement to the Scheme when the plain statutory exclusion applies; the circulars clarify but do not override the statutory exclusion.

Conclusion: Section 96 of the Finance Act, 2024 excludes from the DTVSV Scheme tax arrears arising from assessments (including reassessments under Section 147/148) that are based on incriminating material found during searches under Section 132/132A of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the clarificatory circulars do not render such cases eligible. The writ petitions are dismissed and the petitioners are not entitled to the benefit of the DTVSV Scheme.

Issues: (i) Whether the disallowance under section 40A(ia) for alleged non-deduction of tax at source on contractual payments is sustainable; (ii) Whether the addition made by invoking section 145(3) on account of under-reporting/non-reporting of receipts (based on Form 26AS) is sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether disallowance under section 40A(ia) on payments totalling INR 8,79,35,656/- for alleged non-deduction of TDS is warranted.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the assessment record, the TDS returns and party-wise ledger details submitted by the assessee and noted that the assessing officer had not confronted the assessee with specific queries nor verified the details before making the disallowance. The appellate authority had reviewed the explanations, the TDS returns and audit report which contained no adverse remarks about non-deduction of TDS. The Tribunal found that the appellate authority had carried out verification of the details and that evidence of deduction or non-applicability of TDS was available on record.

Conclusion: Disallowance under section 40A(ia) is not sustained and the deletion by the Commissioner (Appeals) is upheld. Conclusion: in favour of assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessing officer's addition under section 145(3) based on discrepancies between gross receipts in Form 26AS and the assessee's accounts is justified.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the reconciliation and explanations placed before the Commissioner (Appeals) showing errors and omissions in the AO's computation, including incorrect inclusion of amounts (such as amounts subject to TCS or sale deed registrations) and the assessee's consistent application of the percentage of completion method (POCM) as per accounting practice. The Commissioner (Appeals) verified the reconciliations and found that the AO had incorrectly treated certain entries as assessee's receipts, leading to potential double counting. The Tribunal found that the Revenue failed to effectively controvert the appellate findings or to demonstrate absence of proper verification by the Commissioner (Appeals).

Conclusion: Addition under section 145(3) is not sustained and the deletion by the Commissioner (Appeals) is upheld. Conclusion: in favour of assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal finds no error in the Commissioner (Appeals) order on the decided issues and accordingly dismisses the Revenue's appeal, upholding the deletions made by the Commissioner (Appeals).

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee furnishes verifiable documentary evidence and reconciliations (including TDS returns and ledgers) and the appellate authority verifies those details, an assessing officer's additions or disallowances based on unverified entries in Form 26AS or other statements cannot be sustained; estimation under section 145(3) or disallowance under section 40A(ia) requires prior verification and confrontation of the assessee with specific discrepancies.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice issued under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 dated 09.08.2018 is invalid for non-mention of type of scrutiny and non-compliance with CBDT Instruction F. No. 225/157/2017/ITA-II dated 23.06.2017; (ii) Whether the disallowance of depreciation of Rs. 31,41,044/- claimed on second-hand machinery by invoking Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is sustainable where no recorded satisfaction and no prior approval of the Joint Commissioner are on record.

Issue (i): Validity of notice under section 143(2) for non-mention of scrutiny type and alleged non-compliance with CBDT instruction.

Analysis: The notice was issued within the statutory time limit and scrutiny proceedings were conducted (CASS). CBDT Instruction is administrative. The assessee participated in assessment without raising jurisdictional objection before completion. Procedural omission of specifying scrutiny category in the notice does not show prejudice or nullify the statutory notice where selection and scrutiny occurred within time.

Conclusion: The notice under section 143(2) is not invalidated by omission to specify the type of scrutiny or by alleged non-compliance with the CBDT instruction; this ground is dismissed.

Issue (ii): Validity of disallowing depreciation on second-hand machinery by applying Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) without recorded satisfaction and prior approval of the Joint Commissioner.

Analysis: Section 32(1) permits depreciation where the asset is owned and used for business; there is no statutory bar on depreciation for second-hand assets. Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) can be invoked only if (a) the Assessing Officer records satisfaction that the main purpose of transfer was tax reduction by claiming depreciation on an enhanced cost, and (b) the Assessing Officer determines actual cost only after obtaining prior approval of the Joint Commissioner. Both conditions are mandatory. The assessment record and remand report contain no recorded satisfaction, no finding of collusion or inflated price, and no prior approval from the Joint Commissioner; the AO proceeded on an assumption that depreciation is limited to the residual value in the hands of the previous owner without statutory compliance.

Conclusion: Invocation of Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) is legally unsustainable in the absence of recorded satisfaction and prior approval; the disallowance of Rs. 31,41,044/- is deleted and Grounds Nos. 4 to 6 are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed - the challenge to the validity of the notice under section 143(2) is dismissed while the addition relating to depreciation on second-hand machinery is deleted, resulting in a partly favorable outcome for the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be applied to substitute the actual cost declared by the assessee unless the Assessing Officer records the statutory satisfaction regarding the main purpose of transfer and obtains prior approval of the Joint Commissioner; absent these mandatory prerequisites the assessee is entitled to depreciation on the actual cost of the asset.

Issues: Whether the deletion of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified where the assessee declared nil income contending absence of permanent establishment and sought an advance ruling, and income was later assessed under Section 44BB of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The issue turns on whether the facts and particulars furnished in the return were inaccurate or whether there was concealment of income within the meaning of Section 271(1)(c) and its Explanation 1. Explanation 1(A) requires that an explanation offered in respect of a fact material to computation of income be found false to attract penalty; Explanation 1(B) requires that the assessee fail to substantiate that the explanation was bonafide and that all facts were disclosed. The assessee had declared nil income on the bona fide premise of no permanent establishment and had approached the Authority for Advance Rulings for adjudication. The Authority for Advance Rulings held the receipts taxable and the income was later computed under Section 44BB. No finding was recorded that any particulars furnished in the return were incorrect, and the circumstances amount to a difference of opinion on taxability rather than deliberate concealment. The ratio in CIT v. Reliance Petro Products (supra) establishes that an incorrect legal claim alone, if the return particulars are not shown to be false or erroneous, does not constitute furnishing inaccurate particulars attracting Section 271(1)(c).

Conclusion: Deletion of penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is upheld; the assessment of income under Section 44BB does not, by itself, establish concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars where the assessee acted on a bona fide belief and sought an advance ruling.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition challenging the appellate order and seeking release of seized goods could be entertained despite the delay in approaching the statutory revisional remedy under Section 129DD of the Customs Act, 1962 and whether the appellant's medical grounds justified condonation of delay.

Analysis: The appellate remedy against the first appellate order is by revision to the Central Government under Section 129DD of the Customs Act, 1962, to be filed within 90 days with an additional condonable period of 90 days; no condonation beyond the statutory 90+90 days is permissible. The appellant instituted a belated appeal before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal which was returned as defective since revision under Section 129DD was the proper remedy; that order was not challenged. Subsequent initiation of the writ petition occurred only after further delay. The medical justification advanced (diagnosis of cervical cancer) is not supported by the record; available medical records indicate treatment for cervicitis and a laparoscopic surgery, which did not satisfactorily explain the delay in approaching the appropriate statutory forum.

Conclusion: The delay in pursuing the prescribed statutory remedy was not satisfactorily explained and the writ petition could not be entertained; the Writ Court's dismissal of the challenge is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's cancelled GST registration can be restored/revoked following inspection, and whether relief should be granted in terms of the directions in Tvl.Suguna Cut Piece Center.

Analysis: The Court considered that the petitioner's premises were subsequently inspected and that the Electronic Credit Ledger, earlier blocked, has been unblocked after a second inspection. The Court noted established precedent in Tvl.Suguna Cut Piece Center permitting exercise of writ jurisdiction to quash cancellation orders and to allow revival of registration subject to specified conditions (including filing returns, payment of tax, interest, penalties, restrictions on input tax credit utilization and departmental scrutiny). The Court observed that, although an application under Section 30 for revocation ordinarily should be filed, the factual developments and unblocking of the credit ledger justified restoration by exercising Article 226 jurisdiction in line with the referenced precedent.

Conclusion: The Court ordered restoration of the petitioner's GST registration in terms of the directions contained in Tvl.Suguna Cut Piece Center, thereby granting relief in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax (PCIT) could validly cancel the assessee's registration retrospectively from earlier financial years by invoking Section 12AB(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 when the amendment introducing "specified violation" in Section 12AB(4) became effective only from 01.04.2022.

Analysis: The question turns on the temporal applicability of the Finance Act, 2022 amendments introducing the concept of "specified violation" in Section 12AB(4) and related procedural provisions, and whether those provisions justify retrospective cancellation of registration for previous years prior to their effective date. The Tribunal examined the registration history, the show cause notices issued under the post-amendment regime, and coordinate-bench precedents addressing identical facts and legal issues. The Tribunal applied the principle that a statute provision that creates a new ground for cancellation or a new procedural code (here, Section 12AB(4) as amended by Finance Act, 2022) operates prospectively from its effective date unless the statute clearly indicates retrospective effect. The Tribunal also considered authorities and administrative clarifications holding that the concept of "specified violation" and consequent withdrawal of registration under the amended provision are operative only from the date specified by the statute and related circulars, and that invocation of the amended provision to cancel registration with retrospective effect for years prior to AY 2023-24 is not permissible. The Tribunal further found that the show cause notices and the impugned order relied upon a legal regime not in force for the years in question, rendering the proceedings founded on those notices vitiated.

Conclusion: The retrospective cancellation of registration under Section 12AB(4) for years prior to the provision's effective operation is not sustainable; the impugned order cancelling the Society's registration retrospectively is quashed and the registration is restored. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the presence of clause 5(h) in the trust deed (religious activities such as running a mandir, dharamshala, satsang bhawan, gaushala, bhandara, kattha, parvachans) renders the Trust's objects "wholly or substantially the whole of which is of a religious nature" within the meaning of Explanation 3 to Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and thus disentitles the Trust from registration under Section 80G for A.Y. 2023-24.

Analysis: The Trust deed shows multiple objects including relief of the poor, education, medical relief, yoga, preservation of environment and monuments, and advancement of public utility, alongside clause 5(h) relating to certain religious activities. The deed contains an explicit non-discrimination provision making benefits open to all irrespective of caste, creed, religion, race or gender. Financial records indicate expenditure on welfare activities (medical camps, cow feed, schools and related expenses) and do not demonstrate that religious activities are the Trust's sole or overriding purpose. Precedent and statutory context distinguish objects that are charitable (including yoga, relief of the poor, education, medical relief, preservation activities) from objects that are "wholly or substantially" religious. Where religious activities are not exclusive, discriminatory, or shown to be predominant, Explanation 3 to Section 80G does not apply and registration should not be denied on that ground.

Conclusion: Clause 5(h) does not make the Trust's objects wholly or substantially religious in nature; registration under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is to be granted. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Explanation 3 to Section 80G excludes institutions only where their objects are shown to be wholly or substantially of a religious nature; the presence of non-discriminatory charitable objects and evidence of predominant charitable activities means a trust is not excluded merely because it also undertakes some religious activities.