Issues: (i) Whether omission of Section 92BA(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 w.e.f. 01-04-2017 without a saving clause rendered the provision non-existent ab initio and thereby rendered the reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer (TPO) and consequent transfer pricing adjustment invalid; (ii) Whether the reference to the TPO was valid notwithstanding the assessee's disclosure of the purchases as specified domestic transactions in Form 3CEB under Section 92E of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether omission of Section 92BA(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 w.e.f. 01-04-2017 without a saving clause rendered the provision non-existent ab initio and thereby rendered the reference to the TPO and consequent transfer pricing adjustment invalid.

Analysis: The Court examined the effect of legislative omission of Section 92BA(1) with effect from 01-04-2017 and noted absence of any saving clause. The Court considered precedent holding that omission of a provision may render the provision non-existent for all purposes where the statutory scheme and timing indicate such effect, and applied that reasoning to the reference made by the Assessing Officer to the TPO for determining ALP of specified domestic transactions. The Court relied on the reasoning in the cited High Court decision confirming that where the provision is omitted and no saving is provided, the action taken under that provision is without jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The omission of Section 92BA(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 w.e.f. 01-04-2017 without a saving clause rendered the provision non-existent for the purposes considered and the reference to the TPO and the consequential transfer pricing adjustment were invalid.

Issue (ii): Whether the reference to the TPO was valid notwithstanding the assessee's disclosure of the purchases as specified domestic transactions in Form 3CEB under Section 92E of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The Court considered the interaction between statutory disclosure in Form 3CEB under Section 92E and the jurisdictional basis for reference to the TPO. The Court held that where the foundational provision empowering reference (Section 92BA(1)) is absent, the existence of disclosure under Section 92E does not cure the lack of jurisdiction to make the reference or to sustain adjustments made by the TPO.

Conclusion: The disclosure in Form 3CEB under Section 92E does not validate a reference to the TPO or sustain transfer pricing adjustments where the provision empowering such reference is non-existent; the reference was therefore invalid.

Final Conclusion: The appellate order deleting the transfer pricing adjustment was upheld on jurisdictional grounds because the omission of the statutory provision empowering the reference to the TPO removed the jurisdictional basis for the TPO's action; consequently, the revenue's appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a provision authorising reference to a transfer pricing authority is omitted without a saving clause and is therefore non-existent for the purposes at hand, any reference and consequential action taken under that provision are without jurisdiction and invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether interest under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1962 is payable from the expiry of three months from the date of the original refund applications filed during January-March 2003; (ii) Whether interest can be denied on the ground that refund was granted only pursuant to appellate orders passed subsequently.

Issue (i): Whether interest under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1962 is payable from the expiry of three months from the date of the original refund applications filed during January-March 2003.

Analysis: Section 27A mandates payment of interest where duty ordered to be refunded is not refunded within three months from receipt of the refund application. The statutory language is mandatory and the provision operates automatically once its conditions are satisfied. Binding precedent interpreting the pari materia provision confirms that the starting point for computation of interest is the expiry of three months from the date of the original refund application and not the date of an appellate order.

Conclusion: Interest under Section 27A is payable from the expiry of three months from the dates of the original refund applications filed during January-March 2003 until the date of actual refund.

Issue (ii): Whether interest can be denied on the ground that refund was granted only pursuant to appellate orders passed subsequently.

Analysis: Denial of interest on the ground that refunds were ultimately allowed only after appellate or reassessment proceedings is inconsistent with the statutory mandate. Procedural delays, reassessments, or departmental errors cannot postpone the operation of Section 27A. Granting interest in respect of some identical cases but denying it in others is contrary to principles of consistency and fairness in tax administration.

Conclusion: Interest cannot be denied merely because the refund was granted pursuant to appellate orders; such denial is legally unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The Appellant is entitled to interest under Section 27A of the Customs Act, 1962 on the refund amounts sanctioned, computed from the expiry of three months from the respective dates of filing of the original refund applications in 2003 until the date of actual refund; the impugned appellate order is set aside and the adjudicating authority is directed to compute and pay the interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a refund application under Section 27 of the Customs Act is not refunded within three months, Section 27A requires payment of interest from the day after the three-month period irrespective of subsequent appellate or reassessment proceedings.

Issues: (i) Whether the applicant satisfied the twin conditions for grant of bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) Whether the material on record, including the status of the predicate offence and the alleged role attributed to the applicant, justified continued custodial detention.

Issue (i): Whether the applicant satisfied the twin conditions for grant of bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is governed by the stringent requirements that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. At the bail stage, the Court does not undertake a mini-trial, but examines the record on broad probabilities. The alleged proceeds of crime, the connection of the applicant with the laundering chain, and the evidentiary value of co-accused statements were considered only to the extent necessary for a prima facie assessment.

Conclusion: The applicant was found to have satisfied the bail parameters, and the twin conditions did not stand in the way of release on bail.

Issue (ii): Whether the material on record, including the status of the predicate offence and the alleged role attributed to the applicant, justified continued custodial detention.

Analysis: The applicant was not named in the predicate FIR, was not charge-sheeted there, and that FIR had already been quashed on compromise. The Court also noted that the principal witnesses did not name the applicant in their earlier statements, and the later attribution of role appeared materially improved. The connection sought to be drawn from shareholding, common transactions, and statements of co-accused was treated as insufficient at this stage to establish a firm prima facie nexus with the alleged laundering activity. The Court further observed that continued detention served no substantial investigative purpose after filing of the complaint.

Conclusion: The material was held insufficient to justify further custody, and bail was granted.

Final Conclusion: The regular bail application was allowed and the applicant was directed to be released on terms and conditions imposed by the Court.

Ratio Decidendi: For grant of bail under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, the Court must make a prima facie assessment on broad probabilities, and where the applicant is not shown in the predicate case, the predicate FIR has been quashed, and the evidence linking him to proceeds of crime remains weak or improved at a late stage, continued custody is not warranted.

Issues: Whether a writ petition under Article 226 challenging rectification orders issued under Section 161 can be entertained where disputed questions of fact arise, the assessment order was not challenged, rectification applications were considered after personal hearing, and an alternative remedy of appeal is available.

Analysis: Relevant legal framework includes the remedial scope of Section 161 (rectification of errors apparent on the face of the record), the statutory scheme for assessment and appeal under the Central Goods and Services Tax regime, and the limits on exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction where disputed factual issues and alternative statutory remedies exist. The authorities issued pre-intimation and show cause notices, passed an assessment under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and later considered rectification applications filed under Section 161 after providing notice for and conducting a personal hearing. The petitioner did not file objections to the notices nor challenge the original assessment order by the statutory appellate process. The matter before the Court involves contested factual determinations relating to alleged suppression of outward supplies and tax liability, which are suitable for adjudication through the prescribed statutory remedy of appeal rather than by exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The writ petition is not maintainable and is dismissed; the petitioner is left free to pursue the statutory remedies available under law.

Issues: Whether the adhoc disallowance of professional fees of Rs. 17,59,627/- sustained by the Commissioner (Appeals) for A.Y. 2007-08 was justified where the assessee furnished detailed ledger entries, payment vouchers and TDS challans.

Analysis: The assessee, a private limited company with audited accounts for A.Y. 2007-08, placed before the assessing officer and the first appellate authority comprehensive documentary records including ledger accounts, payment vouchers and TDS challans covering the professional fees claimed. Despite these materials and the absence of any pointed discrepancy in the records, the assessing officer made an adhoc disallowance of 50% of the professional expenses. The Commissioner (Appeals) sustained the disallowance after significant delay, including a notice requesting additional evidence many years after the year in question. The Tribunal examined the documentary record in the paper book and found the entries exhaustive and supported by TDS evidence, leaving no reason to doubt the genuineness of the expenditure. The Tribunal therefore evaluated whether the adhoc disallowance was sustainable in the face of the documentary proof tendered by the assessee.

Conclusion: The adhoc disallowance of professional fees of Rs. 17,59,627/- is deleted and the effective grounds of appeal on this issue are allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether delay in filing appeals before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)/NFAC should be condoned; (ii) Whether late fee under Section 234E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 levied by CPC in processing TDS returns under Section 200A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is chargeable for periods prior to 01.06.2015 and/or for defaults from 01.06.2015 onwards.

Issue (i): Whether delay in filing appeals before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)/NFAC should be condoned.

Analysis: The assessee filed an affidavit explaining the sequence of events, reliance on earlier legal advice, misunderstanding about scope of an earlier appellate order, subsequent discovery of the error on receipt of recovery notices, and steps taken thereafter. The facts were examined against the standard for 'reasonable cause' and relevant precedents on condonation of delay.

Conclusion: Delay in filing the appeals before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)/NFAC is condoned; the appeals are admitted for adjudication.

Issue (ii): Whether late fee under Section 234E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 levied by CPC in processing TDS returns under Section 200A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is chargeable for periods prior to 01.06.2015 and/or for defaults from 01.06.2015 onwards.

Analysis: Applying the Tribunal's precedent and considering the Finance Act, 2015 amendment effective 01.06.2015, the question of liability to levy fee under Section 234E when returns are processed under Section 200A was examined. The Tribunal's consistent view and cited authorities treat the Finance Act, 2015 amendment as prospective, limiting the power to impose Section 234E fees to defaults occurring on or after 01.06.2015. Returns processed prior to 01.06.2015 do not attract Section 234E charges; for returns processed on or after 01.06.2015 the fee is leviable but must be computed only from 01.06.2015 until processing.

Conclusion: Fee under Section 234E levied by CPC for defaults in filing TDS returns prior to 01.06.2015 is deleted; fee under Section 234E is leviable only for defaults from 01.06.2015 onwards and must be computed from 01.06.2015 to the date of processing for returns processed on or after that date.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are partly allowed by condoning delay and directing deletion of Section 234E charges for periods prior to 01.06.2015 while confirming and directing reassessment of Section 234E charges, computed from 01.06.2015, for returns processed on or after 01.06.2015.

Ratio Decidendi: The amendment introduced by the Finance Act, 2015 taking effect from 01.06.2015 operates prospectively; therefore Section 234E fees can be imposed only for defaults occurring on or after 01.06.2015 and not for returns processed before that date.

Issues: (i) Whether the penalty levied under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is justified for under-reporting of income for assessment year 2018-19; (ii) Whether the assessee is entitled to immunity from penalty under section 270AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by filing Form No. 68 or otherwise.

Issue (i): Whether the penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rightly imposed for under-reporting of income.

Analysis: The assessee did not file the return under section 139(1) and filed a return only after issuance of notice under section 148. The Assessing Officer computed under-reported income and tax, and levied penalty under section 270A read with section 274. The record shows absence of any contemporaneous production of an immunity application before the Assessing Officer during penalty proceedings. The assessee's submissions about subsequent filings and rectification under section 154 were examined, but the materials relied upon did not contain an acknowledgment or verification establishing an effective filing of immunity application on the ITBA portal. The assessee's contention of a technical glitch was not substantiated by documentary proof before the Tribunal.

Conclusion: The penalty imposed under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is justified and sustainable; this issue is decided against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee is entitled to immunity from penalty under section 270AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by filing Form No. 68.

Analysis: To obtain immunity under section 270AA, the assessee must file the application in the manner and within the time permitted and produce credible evidence of such filing. The record does not establish that Form No. 68 was validly filed and acknowledged online or that any order under section 270AA(4) was passed in favour of the assessee. The alleged manual filing and communications with departmental officers were not supported by documentary acknowledgment or dispositive orders proving compliance with statutory requirements for immunity.

Conclusion: The assessee is not entitled to immunity under section 270AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961; this issue is decided against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upholds the penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and rejects the claim for immunity under section 270AA, resulting in dismissal of the assessee's appeal.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee fails to produce reliable documentary evidence of valid filing and acknowledgment of an immunity application under section 270AA, the claim for immunity cannot succeed and a penalty under section 270A may be sustained for under-reporting of income.

Issues: (i) Whether addition under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of Rs. 2,35,57,411 made by treating revenue from provision of services as unexplained cash credit is sustainable; (ii) Whether addition under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of Rs. 12,78,000 made by treating a recorded trade payable as unexplained cash credit is sustainable; (iii) Whether addition under Section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of Rs. 49,605 on account of alleged unexplained expenditure is sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the revenue receipt of Rs. 2,35,57,411 from provision of marketing and back office support services can be treated as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 68 applies to unexplained cash credits from a creditor or investor and not to revenue receipts arising from provision of services. The amount in question was recorded in the assessee's audited profit and loss account and offered to tax in the return. There is no finding challenging inclusion of this amount in the return, and the identity and creditworthiness of the payer have been established. Treating a taxed revenue receipt as an unexplained cash credit would result in double taxation of the same income.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of Rs. 2,35,57,411 is deleted. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a recorded future liability in the form of trade payable of Rs. 12,78,000 can be treated as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 68's explicit language pertains to unexplained cash credits and does not extend to future liabilities recorded as trade payables. The liability related to auditing expenses recorded towards BSR and did not constitute a cash credit. The assessment record also shows that this addition was not proposed in the show cause notice, indicating lack of proper notice for such an addition.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of Rs. 12,78,000 is deleted. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the difference of Rs. 49,605 in payments to Binary Global Limited constitutes unexplained expenditure chargeable under Section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 69C applies where expenditure is incurred and the source of such expenditure is not satisfactorily explained. The assessee's books and the counterparty's response demonstrate total payments of Rs. 3,62,355, which the AO failed to fully consider and erroneously treated a portion of the recorded payments as unexplained. The disputed amount arises from misclassification/omission in the AO's computation rather than an unexplained source of expenditure.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 of Rs. 49,605 is deleted. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appellate order deletes the impugned additions under Sections 68 and 69C and allows the assessee's appeal in respect of the disputed additions; consequential grounds (interest and penalty) are treated as consequential.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies only to unexplained cash credits from creditors or investors and not to revenue receipts or recorded trade payables; Section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires that unexplained expenditure be based on an inability to explain the source, and miscalculation or omission by the assessing officer does not convert recorded expenditure into unexplained expenditure.

Issues: Whether a show cause notice under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act was issued and served on the importer for re-determination of classification of the imported operating table, and whether absence of such notice vitiates the demand for differential duty.

Analysis: The issue required examination of the documentary record regarding issuance and service of a notice under Section 28(1) vis-a -vis the Original Authority's invocation of Section 28(2). Section 28(1) mandates serving notice within one year of the relevant date for revision of classification leading to duty demand; Section 28(2) operates to preclude service of such notice only where the person has paid the duty and interest and has informed the proper officer in writing. The Original Authority's order was recorded under Section 28(2), but the Commissioner (Appeals) found that the pre-requisites for Section 28(2) were not satisfied and that no show cause notice was shown on the record. The Revenue failed to produce the asserted notice before the Commissioner (Appeals) or before this Tribunal despite ample opportunity and a lengthy lapse of time. The absence of any evidence of service under Section 28(1), together with the failure to place the notice on record over an extended period, left the sole ground of the Revenue's challenge unestablished.

Conclusion: There was no show cause notice served under Section 28(1); absence of such notice vitiates the demand and the Revenue's appeal is not maintainable and is dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether extended period of limitation under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be invoked for alleged mis-classification of imported goods; (ii) Whether goods can be confiscated under Section 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962 for incorrect classification in the Bill of Entry; (iii) Whether penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 could be imposed where extended period of limitation is invoked for alleged willful misstatement or suppression; (iv) Whether demand of duty with interest is sustainable within the normal period of limitation.

Issue (i): Invocation of extended period of limitation under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 for alleged mis-classification of goods.

Analysis: The extended period applies only where non-payment or short payment of duty is by reason of collusion or any willful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. The record showed imports on DDP basis and Bills of Entry filed by the supplier's broker using the appellant's IEC; there was insufficient evidence of active suppression or intent to evade despite departmental classification being undisputed.

Conclusion: Extended period of limitation under Section 28(4) cannot be invoked and this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Confiscation of goods under Section 111(m) of the Customs Act, 1962 for incorrect classification.

Analysis: Section 111(m) applies to goods not corresponding with the declaration in value or particulars. Incorrect classification in a self-assessed Bill of Entry reflects assessment error regarding tariff entry, not a discrepancy in the goods themselves; mere incorrect self-assessment does not establish a ground for confiscation absent active misrepresentation of the goods.

Conclusion: Confiscation under Section 111(m) and consequential redemption fine under Section 125 cannot be sustained; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Imposition of penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 where extended period is invoked for alleged willful misstatement or suppression.

Analysis: The elements required for penalty under Section 114A mirror those for invoking extended limitation under Section 28(4), namely collusion or willful misstatement/suppression with intent to evade. Given absence of sufficient evidence of such elements, penalty cannot stand.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 114A is set aside; this conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Confirmation of demand of duty with interest within the normal period of limitation.

Analysis: Classification and denial of exemption were accepted by the appellant and were upheld; the demand for differential duty subject to the normal two-year limitation period remains sustainable on merits.

Conclusion: Demand of duty with interest confirmed within the normal period of limitation; this conclusion is against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed by upholding the confirmed duty demand within the normal limitation period while setting aside invocation of extended limitation, confiscation, redemption fine and penalty, resulting in consequential relief to the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Absent clear evidence of collusion, willful misstatement or active suppression with intent to evade duty, mere incorrect classification in a self-assessed Bill of Entry does not justify invocation of extended limitation under Section 28(4), confiscation under Section 111(m), or penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: (i) Whether the imported jackets, declared as knitted, are in fact woven and properly classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 6202 93 90 instead of 6102 30 10; (ii) Whether extended period demand under section 28(4) and penalty under section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 are sustainable on the facts.

Issue (i): Classification of the imported jackets as woven or knitted and the correct Customs Tariff Item.

Analysis: The garments declared as knitted jackets were physically found to be of woven fabric on inspection and the importer's authorised representative agreed they were woven. Chapter 61 covers knitted or crocheted articles; Chapter 62 covers articles not knitted or crocheted. Given the woven nature, Chapter 62 applies and the entry under Customs Tariff Item 6202 93 90 is the appropriate classification for the goods as described.

Conclusion: Classification upheld in favour of Revenue; the jackets are classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 6202 93 90.

Issue (ii): Sustenance of demand under extended period (section 28(4)) and penalty under section 114A for fraud, collusion or willful mis-statement.

Analysis: The mis-classification arose from self-assessment and possible misunderstanding of the nature of the fabric. Re-assessment is the statutory remedy for incorrect self-assessment. The facts do not establish the requisite elements of fraud, collusion or willful mis-statement necessary to invoke the extended period of limitation under section 28(4) or to sustain penalty under section 114A.

Conclusion: Extended period demand and penalty set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: the classification and associated duty under the appropriate tariff item are sustained, while demands beyond the normal period of limitation and the penalty under section 114A are set aside, with entitlement to consequential relief if any.

Ratio Decidendi: Where imported garments are found on physical examination to be woven and not knitted, they fall under Chapter 62 (including Customs Tariff Item 6202 93 90), and an incorrect self-assessment of classification does not, without evidence of fraud, collusion or willful mis-statement, justify invocation of extended limitation or penalty under sections 28(4) and 114A of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: (i) Whether the Respondent Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) and NOIDA should be directed to register the sub-leased apartment units in favour of the Appellant after payment of the first instalment under the approved Resolution Plan; (ii) Whether the Appeal challenging approval of the Resolution Plan by the Adjudicating Authority succeeds.

Issue (i): Whether registration of the units in favour of the Appellant should be directed to be effected after payment of the first instalment under the approved Resolution Plan.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the pleadings, the undertaking by the Appellant to withdraw pending complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act upon registration, the NOIDA Authority's position that conveyance/registry will be effected on a pro-rata and phased basis as funds are realised from the SRA, and the SRA's timeline for payment of the first tranche. The record shows an earlier direction for parties to endeavour to complete obligations and the willingness of the SRA to permit registration once conditions are met.

Conclusion: Registration of the units is directed to be executed by the SRA and NOIDA in favour of the Appellant after payment of the first instalment under the Resolution Plan, to be completed within 60 days of such payment; the Appellant shall withdraw the complaints within seven days of registration.

Issue (ii): Whether the Appeal challenging approval of the Resolution Plan should be allowed.

Analysis: In view of the order directing registration upon payment of the first instalment and the Appellant's stated willingness to accept registration and withdraw complaints, the Tribunal found no ground to sustain the challenge to approval of the Resolution Plan. The practical relief granted on registration rendered the challenge to the plan unsustainable.

Conclusion: The Appeal challenging approval of the Resolution Plan is dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal directed implementation of registration-related reliefs in favour of the Appellant contingent on payment under the approved Resolution Plan and dismissed the separate challenge to the plan, permitting parties to file compliance reports.

Issues: Whether the adjudicating authority exceeded its jurisdiction or improperly interfered with the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors by rejecting the resolution plan and directing liquidation under Section 33(1)(b) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The adjudicating authority examined factual and financial material including asset-sale proceeds, liquid cash on hand, absence of business operations and employees, the sequence of transactions leading to formation of a single-member CoC, and the contents of the resolution plan. The authority applied statutory requirements under Section 30(2) and Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the criteria in Regulation 38(3) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016, focusing on whether the plan addressed cause of default, demonstrated feasibility and viability, provided for effective implementation, specified required approvals and timelines, and reflected the applicant's capability to implement the plan. Material findings included that the corporate debtor had largely disposed of tangible assets, retained limited liquid assets, the plan proposed a low realisation value, and the plan lacked measures to revive the corporate debtor as a going concern or to implement a viable revival strategy. The adjudicating authority also relied on concerns of potential collusion, opacity in the CIRP process, and possible non-compliance with other legal regimes as relevant to the integrity of the resolution process. Interference with CoC commercial wisdom was treated as permissible where the approval was patently arbitrary, non-compliant with statutory criteria, or corrosive of the insolvency process.

Conclusion: The adjudicating authority rightly found that the resolution plan failed to satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 30(2), Section 31 and Regulation 38(3) of the CIRP Regulations, 2016, and its rejection of the plan and consequent direction for liquidation under Section 33(1)(b) is upheld; the appeals are dismissed and the adjudicating authority's order is maintained.

Issues: (i) Whether the applications were not maintainable for want of compliance with Rule 55 of the Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction Ownership and Maintenance) Rules, 2010. (ii) Whether, on registration of the apartment owners' association, the maintenance of the project was liable to be handed over to the association under Section 14(5) of the Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction Ownership and Maintenance) Act, 2010.

Issue (i): Whether the applications were not maintainable for want of compliance with Rule 55 of the Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction Ownership and Maintenance) Rules, 2010.

Analysis: Rule 55 concerns the common seal of the association and the attestation of deeds or instruments to which the seal is affixed. The applications were not deeds or instruments executed by the association but applications filed before the Tribunal and supported by affidavits sworn by the presidents of the respective associations. The objection based on absence of seal and attestation was therefore not attracted to the proceedings.

Conclusion: The objection to maintainability was rejected and the applications were held to be maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether, on registration of the apartment owners' association, the maintenance of the project was liable to be handed over to the association under Section 14(5) of the Uttar Pradesh Apartment (Promotion of Construction Ownership and Maintenance) Act, 2010.

Analysis: The associations were registered and their registrations were current. A large majority of allottees had taken possession, and the respondents' objections regarding pending challenges to registration and alleged completion-related requirements were not treated as defeating the statutory position. Section 14(5) contemplates transfer of management of common areas and facilities to the apartment owners' association upon formation of the association, and the Tribunal followed its earlier view that the maintenance agency could not refuse handover once the statutory conditions were met.

Conclusion: The respondents were directed to hand over maintenance to the registered associations within the time fixed by the Tribunal, under the supervision of the IRP.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal granted both applications and directed transfer of maintenance to the respective registered apartment owners' associations, while leaving the respondents free to pursue dues against allottees in accordance with contract.

Ratio Decidendi: Once an apartment owners' association is validly registered and the statute deems the management of common areas and facilities to stand transferred, objections not going to the core statutory entitlement, including those based on the association seal formalities or pending collateral disputes, cannot defeat the obligation to hand over maintenance.

Issues: Whether the complaint under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and the process order issued against the applicant were liable to be quashed for want of material showing that the alleged property or transaction was connected with proceeds of crime and for absence of sufficient ground to proceed.

Analysis: The complaint alleged that the scheduled offence and the alleged generation of proceeds of crime arose during 2020-2021, whereas the property relied on against the applicant had been acquired in 2005-2007. On the material placed, that property could not be linked to the proceeds of crime said to have arisen much later. The existence of proceeds of crime was treated as the foundational requirement for an offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and the material did not disclose that the applicant knowingly assisted concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projection of such proceeds as untainted property. The process order also did not show application of mind to the material against the applicant, so the test of sufficient ground for proceeding was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The complaint and the order issuing process were held unsustainable qua the applicant, and relief was granted in favour of the applicant.

Ratio Decidendi: For an offence under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, there must be material showing a nexus between the applicant's acts and proceeds of crime derived from a scheduled offence, and a process order lacking such material or lacking application of mind to it is liable to be quashed to prevent abuse of process.

Issues: Whether the shortfall in minimum guaranteed CENVAT credit could be deducted from the invoices in the absence of an express contractual clause, and whether the arbitral award rejecting the claim was liable to be set aside for travelling beyond the contract.

Analysis: The contract fixed a gross price with a stipulated minimum CENVAT credit component to be passed on, but the relevant clauses only provided that failure to furnish documents for availing CENVAT credit would disentitle reimbursement of the duty component. The shortfall in CENVAT did not alter the net contract value payable for the work, and the contract contained no clause authorising deduction of the shortfall from invoices. The arbitral tribunal nonetheless proceeded on the basis that the shortfall had to be made good and relied on a non-existent contractual stipulation, which amounted to adding terms to the contract. An arbitral award must remain within the contractual framework and any departure from the express terms attracts patent illegality.

Conclusion: The deduction of the shortfall in minimum guaranteed CENVAT credit from the invoices was impermissible, and the arbitral award was liable to be set aside for patent illegality.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded and the arbitral award rejecting the claim was annulled because the tribunal had gone beyond the contract and upheld a deduction not authorised by its terms.

Ratio Decidendi: An arbitral tribunal cannot add to or rewrite the contract between the parties, and an award founded on a contractual term that does not exist is vitiated by patent illegality.

Issues: (i) whether conviction for the offence under section 135(1)(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained on the basis of statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 along with corroborative material; (ii) whether the sentence of imprisonment deserved reduction to the period already undergone.

Issue (i): whether conviction for the offence under section 135(1)(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained on the basis of statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 along with corroborative material.

Analysis: Statements recorded by duly authorised Customs officers under section 108 are admissible if voluntary. The challenge that the conviction rested only on such statements was rejected because the statements had led to discovery of incriminating articles and money, supported by panchnamas and testimony of Customs officers. Such recoveries constituted independent corroborative evidence, and the concurrent findings of guilt were found to be free from perversity or legal infirmity. The Court found no basis to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: The conviction was upheld and the challenge to guilt failed.

Issue (ii): whether the sentence of imprisonment deserved reduction to the period already undergone.

Analysis: The recovery related to 1985, the goods were found in abandoned condition, several co-accused had been acquitted, some appellants had died, and the surviving appellants were of advanced age. They had already undergone incarceration exceeding the statutory minimum contemplated by the proviso to section 135(1)(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962. In these circumstances, further imprisonment was considered unduly harsh and contrary to the ends of justice.

Conclusion: The sentence was reduced to the period already undergone.

Final Conclusion: The conviction remained intact, but the custodial sentence was brought down to the term already undergone, resulting in partial relief to the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: Voluntary statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 are substantive evidence when corroborated by independent discovery or recovery, and sentence may be reduced to the period already undergone where the overall circumstances make further incarceration unduly harsh.

Issues: (i) Whether a foreign decree passed by a superior court of a reciprocating territory was executable in India under Section 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. (ii) Whether the decree was unenforceable on the ground that the monetary awards for early redemption amount, interest and damages violated FEMA and RBI directions, attracting the exceptions in Section 13(c) and Section 13(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (i): Whether a foreign decree passed by a superior court of a reciprocating territory was executable in India under Section 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The United Kingdom was treated as a reciprocating territory and the English court as a superior court for the purpose of Section 44A. The decree was final under English law and fell within the statutory mechanism for execution of decrees of reciprocating foreign courts. The objections did not displace the statutory basis for execution.

Conclusion: The foreign decree was held executable under Section 44A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (ii): Whether the decree was unenforceable on the ground that the monetary awards for early redemption amount, interest and damages violated FEMA and RBI directions, attracting the exceptions in Section 13(c) and Section 13(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The Court held that the alleged FEMA breach did not make the foreign decree unenforceable. The RBI's stand clarified that payment of the early redemption amount and related sums could be remitted subject to the extant framework, and that damages for breach of contract were not controlled by the ECB ceiling in the manner contended by the judgment debtor. The award of interest at 7.95% was also found to remain within the contractual and regulatory cap. The objections based on absence of a registered account were rejected after RBI clarified that remittance to the disclosed Euro account was not barred.

Conclusion: The decree was not hit by the exceptions in Section 13(c) or Section 13(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the FEMA objections were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The execution petition succeeded, the foreign decree was ordered to be enforced, the objections were dismissed with costs, and the decretal amounts were directed to be remitted to the specified account.

Ratio Decidendi: A foreign decree of a reciprocating superior court remains executable in India unless it squarely falls within Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and alleged FEMA or RBI guideline violations do not by themselves defeat execution where the awarded sums are legally remittable and the decree is otherwise valid.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment notice was issued by an officer lacking pecuniary jurisdiction. (ii) Whether the addition to taxable wealth based on ownership of a property was supported by evidence.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment notice was issued by an officer lacking pecuniary jurisdiction.

Analysis: The applicable CBDT instruction assigned non-corporate returns in Delhi declaring income above Rs. 20 lakh to an Assistant or Deputy Commissioner. The assessee declared income above that limit, but the reassessment notice was issued by an Income-tax Officer. The adopted precedents treated a jurisdictional defect in the initial notice as incurable.

Conclusion: The notice was issued without jurisdiction, and the resulting assessment was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition to taxable wealth based on ownership of a property was supported by evidence.

Analysis: The record contained neither a sale deed nor evidence of payment to substantiate the alleged ownership of the property.

Conclusion: The wealth-tax addition was not supported by evidence, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The income-tax assessment cannot stand, and the deletion of the challenged wealth-tax addition remains undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment notice issued by an officer lacking pecuniary jurisdiction under the applicable CBDT instruction cannot sustain the resulting assessment.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2014-15, following a search conducted on 08.02.2024, was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The limitation framework under Sections 149, 152(3), 153A and 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires distinct computational regimes for the ordinary six-year search-assessment block and the extended ten-year block. While the six-year period comprises assessment years immediately preceding the search assessment year, Explanation 1 to Section 153A computes the extended period from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year of search. On the plain meaning of that expression, the search assessment year is included as the first year of the ten-year block. As the search occurred in Financial Year 2023-24, Assessment Year 2024-25 was the first year and Assessment Year 2015-16 the tenth year; Assessment Year 2014-15 fell outside that period.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2014-15 was barred by limitation.