Issues: Whether the discharge petition was liable to be allowed on the ground that the prosecution materials, including statements under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, approver statements, and CCTV material, did not disclose a prima facie case against the accused.

Analysis: The allegations against the accused included receipt of illegal gratification and criminal breach of trust, and the charge-sheet contained specific materials linking the accused to the alleged acts. The statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 were treated as substantive evidence for the limited purpose of assessing whether a trial should proceed, though their evidentiary value and the need for corroboration were matters for trial. The statements of persons who had been granted pardon assumed the character of approver evidence, which could not be discarded at the discharge stage. The Court also reiterated that the stage of discharge does not permit a meticulous appraisal of evidence or a mini-trial, and the court must only see whether a prima facie case or strong suspicion exists. The CCTV-related contentions and the reliance on the earlier quashment order did not negate the materials available against this accused.

Conclusion: The discharge petition was rightly rejected, as sufficient prima facie materials existed to proceed to trial.

Issues: (i) Whether refund under Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is available only for physical exports or also for deemed exports; (ii) Whether the amendment by Notification No.06/2015 dated 01.03.2015 (inserting explanation 1(1A) to Rule 5) is retrospective or prospective; (iii) Whether the precedent holding deemed exports equivalent to physical exports for refund purposes is applicable in presence of the said amendment.

Issue (i): Whether refund under Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 is available only for physical exports or also for deemed exports.

Analysis: Rule 5 and Notification No.27/2012 compute refund with reference to export turnover and speak of exports made without payment of central excise duty under bond or letter of undertaking; the scheme and allied notifications require proof of physical export such as shipping bills or customs certification; coordinate authorities and precedents applied the statutory wording to require goods to be taken out of India.

Conclusion: Refund under Rule 5 is confined to physical exports (goods taken out of India) and does not extend to deemed exports for the period under consideration.

Issue (ii): Whether the amendment by Notification No.06/2015 dated 01.03.2015 inserting explanation 1(1A) to Rule 5 is retrospective or prospective.

Analysis: The test for a clarificatory explanation requires comparing the meaning of the provision before and after insertion; Rule 5 and Notification No.27/2012, read without the explanation, already indicated coverage of exports under bond or letter of undertaking (physical exports); the inserted explanation restates that 'export goods' means goods to be taken out of India and aligns with the pre-existing statutory scheme.

Conclusion: The insertion of explanation 1(1A) is clarificatory and has retrospective effect.

Issue (iii): Whether decisions treating deemed exports (clearances between export-oriented units) as equivalent to physical exports for refund under Rule 5 remain applicable after insertion of explanation 1(1A).

Analysis: The clarification by explanation 1(1A), having retrospective effect, restricts the scope of Rule 5 to physical exports; earlier decisions that did not consider this explanation or its clarificatory effect are not applicable to alter the statutory requirement of physical export under Rule 5 and the governing notification.

Conclusion: Precedents treating deemed exports as physical exports for refund purposes do not apply where explanation 1(1A) is held to clarify that only physical exports qualify under Rule 5.

Final Conclusion: The statutory scheme and the clarification introduced by explanation 1(1A) limit eligibility for cash refund under Rule 5 to physical exports (goods taken out of India), and claims based on deemed exports between export-oriented units are not entitled to refund under the provision as clarified.

Ratio Decidendi: Rule 5 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004, read with Notification No.27/2012, confines refund entitlement to goods exported without payment of central excise duty under bond or letter of undertaking (i.e., physical export), and the explanation inserted by Notification No.06/2015 dated 01.03.2015 is a clarificatory provision with retrospective effect that limits Rule 5 to physical exports.

Issues: Whether the impugned rejection of the petitioners' refund applications on the ground of delay was sustainable in light of the exclusion of the period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for the purposes of limitation, and whether the deficiency memos and consequent rejection should be quashed and the refund applications reconsidered.

Analysis: The petitioners filed refund applications under the GST regime which were rejected by respondent on the ground that the period of limitation under Section 54(1) had expired. The Supreme Court by its order dated 10.01.2022 directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation and provided for availability of the balance period or a 90-day period from 01.03.2022 as applicable. The exclusion period applies to computation of limitation for judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings including proceedings for refund where limitation is prescribed. The respondent did not dispute the applicability of the Supreme Court's exclusion. In view of the exclusion, the ground of delay relied upon in the impugned deficiency memos and the rejection cannot be sustained and the matter requires fresh adjudication after affording opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned deficiency memos and the order rejecting the refund applications are quashed and the matter is remitted to the respondent to decide the refund applications afresh in accordance with law by a reasoned and speaking order after affording the petitioners a hearing.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a higher court has directed exclusion of a specified period from computation of limitation, that exclusion must be applied in computing limitation for statutory refund proceedings and a dismissal solely on the ground of delay ignoring such exclusion is unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs.50,00,000 made under section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in the individual assessee's hands was justified on substantive basis or ought to have been treated as a protective addition, and whether the assessee proved that the investment originated from HUF funds.

Analysis: The reopening under Section 147 read with Section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was previously upheld and is not reopened. The Assessing Officer recorded factual findings that the LIC policy stood in the individual's name, transactions in the intermediary's bank account preceded the alleged Memorandum of Understanding, and no contemporaneous documentary evidence (books of account, sale records, cash flow, proposal form or MOU) was produced to establish that the funds originated from the HUF. Section 2(31) confirms that HUF is a separate taxable entity but ownership of an asset standing in an individual's name requires cogent proof of source if claimed to be HUF property. The statutory presumption under Section 69 applies where the assessee fails to satisfactorily explain the source of investment. Protective assessment is available only where the Assessing Officer himself entertains doubt as to the person chargeable and proceeds alternatively; it is not a remedy the assessee can invoke to convert a concluded substantive finding into a protective one. Applying these principles to the established facts, the Assessing Officer reached a conclusive satisfaction that the investment was unexplained in the individual's hands and made a substantive addition.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs.50,00,000 under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is justified as a substantive addition in the individual's hands; the plea to treat the addition as protective is rejected.

Issues: Whether the Section 7 application filed by the Financial Creditor was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined whether limitation was extended by (a) fresh period of limitation from the Recovery Certificate dated 26.07.2018, (b) exclusion of period by the Suo Moto orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and (c) acknowledgments constituting extension under Section 18 of the Limitation Act as reflected in the audited financial statements and correspondence. The court applied settled principles that entries in balance sheets may constitute an acknowledgment of liability depending on context and tenor, and considered authoritative precedents holding that such entries require case-by-case scrutiny. The Recovery Certificate triggered a fresh three year limitation from 26.07.2018; the period falling within 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 was excluded under the Suo Moto order, making the balance of limitation available from 01.03.2022. The audited financial statements (notes regarding bank guarantees and counter guarantees) and the settlement correspondence dated 18.04.2022 and 02.06.2022 were held to be clear acknowledgments within the meaning of Section 18, thereby further extending limitation and rendering the Section 7 application filed on 13.06.2024 within time.

Conclusion: The Section 7 application was not barred by limitation; the impugned order admitting the Section 7 application is upheld. In favour of Respondent.

Issues: Whether the Section 9 application filed by the operational creditor should be rejected on the ground that a pre-existing dispute and plausible defence existed between the parties.

Analysis: The record contained an earlier written communication and replies evidencing a dispute prior to or contemporaneous with the demand notice, including an audit confirmation and balance sheet entries showing amounts allegedly payable by the operational creditor to the corporate debtor. The adjudicating authority noted these materials and a prior proceeding in which overlapping invoices had been rejected. Relevant statutory tests require rejection of a Section 9 application if a notice of dispute exists or there is a plausible contention that requires further investigation (as reflected in Section 8 and Section 9(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and the controlling authorities on operational debt). The materials on record raised a defence that was not patently feeble or illusory and included documentary indicia (audit confirmation, audited balance sheet entries and ledger statements) sufficient to constitute a pre-existing dispute or a plausible contention requiring adjudication outside the insolvency process.

Conclusion: The Section 9 application was rightly rejected because a pre-existing dispute and a plausible defence were shown on the record, warranting dismissal of the insolvency petition.

Issues: (i) Whether NCLT, on transfer of a winding-up petition already admitted by a High Court, must proceed from the stage of admission or re-examine admission under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code when the petition is converted into a Section 9 application; (ii) Whether the operational creditor must satisfy the statutory parameters for admission of a Section 9 application after such transfer; (iii) Whether the threshold amount applicable to the transferred petition converted into Section 9 in 2022 is Rs. 1 Lakh or Rs. 1 Crore; (iv) Whether interest claimed unilaterally at 24% per annum can be included in computing the debt for meeting the threshold; (v) Whether there existed a pre-existing dispute justifying rejection of the Section 9 application.

Issue (i): Whether NCLT, on transfer of a winding-up petition admitted by the High Court, must re-examine admission under the IBC or proceed from the stage of admission.

Analysis: The transfer proviso to Section 434(1)(c) and Rule 5 of the Transfer Rules permit transfer of winding-up proceedings to the Tribunal, to be dealt with under the Code. Authoritative decisions hold that petitions transferred must be considered under the IBC; Section 7 and Section 9 proceedings are independent and require adjudication on the IBC parameters even if a winding-up petition was earlier admitted by a court.

Conclusion: After transfer, NCLT must examine the petition under the IBC provisions and is not bound to mechanically treat prior High Court admission as automatic admission under Section 9.

Issue (ii): Whether the operational creditor must satisfy the statutory parameters for admission of a Section 9 application after transfer.

Analysis: The Transfer Rules and the order directing conversion and compliance require submission of information necessary for admission under Sections 7/8/9. Precedent confirms that transferred matters converted to Section 9 must satisfy all parameters for admission under the Code.

Conclusion: The operational creditor must satisfy all parameters for admission of the Section 9 application, including the threshold requirement.

Issue (iii): Applicable threshold amount for the Section 9 application converted in 2022 - Rs. 1 Lakh or Rs. 1 Crore.

Analysis: The statutory threshold under Section 4 of the IBC was increased to Rs. 1 Crore effective 24.03.2020. The petition was converted into a Section 9 application after that date (conversion in 2022), and the adjudicating order directed the applicant to satisfy maintainability under the amended Section 4.

Conclusion: The threshold applicable to the converted Section 9 application is Rs. 1 Crore and the operational creditor must fulfil that threshold.

Issue (iv): Whether unilateral claim of interest at 24% per annum can be included in the debt for meeting the threshold.

Analysis: Invoices unilaterally stating an interest term do not establish an agreed contractual obligation to pay interest unless there is agreement, acceptance, or conduct showing acceptance. Tribunal precedent rejects addition of unilateral interest claims in absence of contractual acceptance; inclusion of such interest for threshold computation is impermissible if not proved.

Conclusion: Interest at 24% per annum, being unaccepted and unproved, cannot be included in the debt; the debt remains the principal of Rs. 7,62,500 which does not meet the Rs. 1 Crore threshold.

Issue (v): Whether there was a pre-existing dispute warranting rejection of the Section 9 application.

Analysis: The corporate debtor executed an account confirmation acknowledging outstanding of Rs. 7,62,500 as on 28.02.2004. A subsequent reconciliation-letter months later alleging exaggerated rates did not provide particulars nor was a claim raised within contractual timelines; earlier judicial findings regarded the dispute as not bona fide. Precedent and record indicate that the post-confirmation letter did not constitute a bona fide pre-existing dispute.

Conclusion: No pre-existing bona fide dispute existed; the objection of pre-existing dispute is rejected.

Final Conclusion: On transfer and conversion of the winding-up petition into a Section 9 application after the amendment raising the threshold, the Tribunal must apply the IBC admission criteria; the operational creditor failed to prove an agreed interest component and failed to meet the Rs. 1 Crore threshold, warranting setting aside of the admission order.

Ratio Decidendi: A winding-up petition transferred to the NCLT and converted into an insolvency application must be adjudicated under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and meet the Code's admission requirements in force on conversion; unilateral invoice terms for interest cannot be added to the debt for threshold computation absent agreement or acceptance by the corporate debtor.

Issues: Whether limitation for filing the appeal against the impugned order commenced from the date of pronouncement in open court or from the later date on which the order was uploaded on the portal, and whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned.

Analysis: The order was found to have been pronounced in open court on 11.06.2025 in the presence of the appellant and its counsel. The appellant's own pleadings and the material from the committee meeting recorded that the matter had been heard and an order was passed on that date. The later uploading of the order on 04.07.2025 did not postpone the commencement of limitation. The authorities relied upon by the appellant were distinguished because they concerned situations where no substantive order had been pronounced on the hearing date. The governing principle applied was that limitation runs from the date of pronouncement, and the time for obtaining a certified copy can be excluded only in accordance with the applicable limitation rules. Since the appeal was filed beyond the permissible period counted from 11.06.2025, the delay exceeded the condonable limit.

Conclusion: Limitation commenced on 11.06.2025, not on 04.07.2025, and the delay was not condonable. The application for condonation of delay was rejected, and the appeal also stood rejected.

Issues: (i) Whether appeals against interlocutory applications I.A. No.2154 of 2024 and I.A. No.1712 of 2024 survive after reconstitution of the committee of creditors and subsequent orders; (ii) Whether the order recording confirmation of the interim resolution professional as resolution professional in I.A. No.1716 of 2024 is liable to be set aside; (iii) Whether the appellant's remedy in respect of disputed claim admission lies in the present appeals or in the pending proceedings arising from reconstitution (I.A. No.76 of 2025).

Issue (i): Whether appeals against I.A. No.2154 of 2024 and I.A. No.1712 of 2024 survive consideration.

Analysis: I.A. No.2154 recorded the constitution of an earlier committee of creditors and I.A. No.1712 recorded a subsequent reconstitution. The adjudicating order in I.A. No.1418 of 2024 set aside the earlier constitution and directed reconsideration and reconstitution. Following that direction the resolution professional reconstituted the committee and initiated fresh proceedings (I.A. No.76 of 2025). The effect of the order in I.A. No.1418 of 2024 is to supersede and merge the earlier I.A.s to the extent they record the now-set-aside constitution; the later reconstitution and pending application supplant the earlier recorded positions.

Conclusion: The appeals against I.A. No.2154 of 2024 and I.A. No.1712 of 2024 do not survive. Conclusion in favour of Respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the order in I.A. No.1716 of 2024 confirming the interim resolution professional as resolution professional is liable to be set aside.

Analysis: The application under Section 22(3) sought recording of the appointment arising from the committee of creditors' decision. The order recording confirmation is procedural in character. The respondent-side position includes that claim admission and voting shares were revisited under the December 18, 2024 direction and the resolution professional reaffirmed his earlier claim admission, a step which has not been challenged separately. The admissibility and quantum of the disputed claim and any allegation of connivance require determination in the proceedings instituted for reconsideration and in the pending I.A. No.76 of 2025 rather than by annulling a procedural confirmation order where no separate challenge has been pursued.

Conclusion: The challenge to I.A. No.1716 of 2024 is without merit. Conclusion in favour of Respondent.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellant's challenge to claim admission can be sustained in these appeals or must be pursued in the pending proceedings.

Analysis: The Adjudicating Authority directed the resolution professional to revisit claim admission and reconstitute the committee; the resolution professional revisited and reaffirmed the admitted amount and has initiated fresh proceedings (I.A. No.76 of 2025). The appellant has not separately challenged the reaffirmation order of the resolution professional. The tribunal indicated that any factual or legal contest on claim admission is to be placed before the pending application arising from the reconstitution process.

Conclusion: The appellant must pursue relief in the pending proceedings (I.A. No.76 of 2025). Conclusion in favour of Respondent.

Final Conclusion: The appeals lack merit and are dismissed; no effective relief arises from the challenged interlocutory orders in view of the reconstitution and pending proceedings, and the appellant's available remedy lies in the ongoing reconstitution-related application.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an adjudicating order directs reconsideration and reconstitution, earlier interlocutory orders recording a superseded constitution merge into and are displaced by the reconsideration process, and procedural confirmations of appointment are not set aside in the absence of a separate successful challenge when substantive claim reconsideration and fresh proceedings are pending.

Issues: (i) Whether the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor could challenge the validity of the equitable mortgage after the award had attained finality; (ii) whether the revision under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 was maintainable despite the earlier liberty to pursue the remedy under Rule 107(13) and (14) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961; (iii) whether non-deposit of the balance purchase money within the period prescribed under Rule 107(11)(h) rendered the auction sale void and whether that requirement could be waived by the creditor bank; (iv) what consequential order should follow once the auction sale was found void.

Issue (i): Whether the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor could challenge the validity of the equitable mortgage after the award had attained finality.

Analysis: The award passed by the Co-operative Court had become final. The judgment-debtor was liable jointly and severally under the award, and the property in dispute formed part of his assets available for execution. Once the award attained finality and the recovery certificate stood as a decree for execution, the property could be proceeded against for realization of the decretal amount. In that setting, the objection based on want of prior governmental permission for mortgage did not affect the recoverability of the property in execution.

Conclusion: The challenge to the auction on the ground of invalid mortgage was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the revision under Section 154 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 was maintainable despite the earlier liberty to pursue the remedy under Rule 107(13) and (14) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961.

Analysis: Section 154 confers wide revisional power on the State Government or the Registrar to examine legality, propriety, and regularity of a decision or proceeding of a subordinate officer. The remedies under Rule 107(13) and (14) are applications to set aside a sale on specified grounds and do not curtail the statutory revisional power. The pre-deposit requirement in Section 154(2A) applies to revisions against recovery certificates, not to a revision challenging confirmation of sale. Accordingly, the revision could be entertained notwithstanding non-availment of the rule-based remedy.

Conclusion: The revision was held maintainable under Section 154.

Issue (iii): Whether non-deposit of the balance purchase money within the period prescribed under Rule 107(11)(h) rendered the auction sale void and whether that requirement could be waived by the creditor bank.

Analysis: Rule 107(11)(g) and (h) require deposit of 15 per cent at the time of purchase and payment of the balance within the stipulated period. The rule does not confer discretion to extend time for the balance purchase money. Non-compliance attracts forfeiture and resale, and the provision serves not only the creditor's interest but also the integrity of public auctions. The record did not show any waiver by the judgment-debtor or his legal representatives, and the principle applied in the SARFAESI context was held inapplicable because the cooperative rules did not contain a comparable enabling provision for extension.

Conclusion: The auction sale and its confirmation were held void and null.

Issue (iv): What consequential order should follow once the auction sale was found void.

Analysis: Since the sale was void, the appropriate consequence was restoration of the parties to the extent possible through a fresh auction in accordance with Rule 107(11)(j). The auction purchaser could not be penalized for the procedural fault in the recovery process, and refund with interest was necessary to balance equities. The Court therefore modified the High Court's operative directions and substituted them with an order setting aside the sale, annulling the confirmation, directing a fresh auction, and requiring refund of the deposit with interest.

Conclusion: The High Court's order was modified, and a fresh auction with refund of the purchaser's money was directed.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of by upholding the finding that the auction sale was void, while altering the consequential relief so that the property would be re-auctioned and the auction purchaser would receive refund with interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Mandatory conditions governing deposit of auction purchase money under the cooperative recovery rules, when not complied with, render the sale a nullity and may be enforced through revisional jurisdiction even if the statutory rule-based sale challenge was not invoked.

Issues: (i) Whether clarificatory circulars dated November 10, 2022 and November 14, 2022 could be applied retrospectively to deny a refund claim of accumulated unutilised input tax credit where the right to claim accrued prior to the circulars and the refund application was filed within the two years' period prescribed by Section 54(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The Court identified Section 54(1) (time limit of two years from the relevant date for filing refund applications), Section 54(3) (refund of unutilised input tax credit) and Explanation 2(e) to Section 54 (defining the relevant date for refund of unutilised input tax credit as the due date for furnishing return under Section 39) as the statutory framework. Applying Explanation 2(e), the Court held that the petitioner's relevant date was June 20, 2021 and the refund application filed on June 16, 2023 fell within the two-year period under Section 54(1). The Court noted the general principle that limitations may operate retrospectively but recognised the exception that a provision or executive act which curtails an already accrued cause of action cannot be given retrospective effect to defeat that accrued right. The Court reviewed consistent High Court decisions holding that if the right to claim refund accrued prior to the circulars, a subsequent clarificatory circular purporting to restrict refunds for applications filed on or after a specified date cannot deny the claim where the statutory limitation period had not expired. The Court found no reason to diverge from those decisions and applied the settled principle to the facts of the petitioner's case.

Conclusion: The clarificatory circulars dated November 10, 2022 and November 14, 2022 cannot be applied retrospectively to curtail the petitioner's statutory right to claim refund which had accrued prior to those circulars; the petitioner's refund application filed within two years of the relevant date is maintainable. The impugned orders of rejection are set aside and the refund application is to be considered on merits by the proper officer without being inhibited by the circulars.

Issues: Whether the denial of exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground of belated filing of Audit Report in Form 10B (acknowledgement generated after the statutory due date due to technical glitches) was justified.

Analysis: Relevant statutory provisions include Section 11 (exemption for charitable purposes) and the filing requirement under Section 12A(1)(b) read with the due date for return under Section 139(1). The assessee availed the extended timeline notified by the competent authority and electronically uploaded Form 10B on 14-02-2022, within the extended timeline, while the system-generated acknowledgement was produced on 25-02-2022 due to technical issues. The assessing authority issued a rectification under Section 154, treating the late system acknowledgement as delayed filing and denying exemption. A coordinate bench of the Tribunal has addressed identical facts and allowed exemption where electronic upload occurred within the prescribed period but system acknowledgement was delayed due to technical glitches. Applying that reasoning to the present facts, the uploading within the extended time and supporting electronic metadata establishes compliance with the filing requirement and defeats the basis for denial under the rectification order.

Conclusion: Exemption under Section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowed; the Revenue's appeal is dismissed and the rectification denial of exemption is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the appeal is barred by delay of 150 days and whether sufficient explanation for the delay has been furnished; (ii) Whether 'Interactive Flat Panel Displays' (IFPDs) are correctly classified as determined in the order under challenge.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal is barred by delay and whether sufficient explanation for the delay exists.

Analysis: The Court recorded that the appeal was filed beyond time by 150 days and found that no sufficient explanation for the delay was shown. The Court noted the delay alongside consideration of merits as part of its disposal.

Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay for which no sufficient explanation has been furnished.

Issue (ii): Whether the classification of Interactive Flat Panel Displays (IFPDs) in the order under challenge is correct.

Analysis: The Court observed that an identical issue had recently been decided against the Revenue in a reported Civil Appeal and applied that decision. Relying on the earlier ruling and on consideration of the merits, the Court found against the Revenue on classification.

Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed on merits; the classification challenged is not sustained in favour of the Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed both on grounds of delay and on merits, following an earlier decision on the identical issue.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an appellant fails to provide sufficient explanation for inordinate delay, the appeal may be dismissed for delay; where the issue is identical to a recently decided matter adverse to the appellant, the Court will follow that decision and dismiss the appeal on merits.

Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority rightly admitted the Section 7 petition by holding that (i) the debentures remained financial debt and (ii) default existed because conversion into equity was not completed by statutory allotment and corporate actions, thereby entitling the financial creditor to exercise the put option and file a petition under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The dispute turns on the construction and operation of the debenture trust deed clauses governing conversion (Clause 6) and put option (Clause 10), and on whether the conversion was completed by actual allotment and statutory compliance. Clause 6(b) contains a deeming statement but must be read with Clause 6(c) which requires completion of statutory steps (e.g., filings, increase of authorised capital, recording in statutory registers) for conversion to take effect. Clause 11.1(xxviii) treats failure to convert upon receipt of notice as an event of default and Clause 11.2 makes remedies, including exercise of put option, available on occurrence of default. The record contains the company's reply to the put notice admitting that conversion could not be effected because ISIN was inactive and there was no actual allotment or ROC filings; there is no evidence of statutory allotment, credit to depository accounts, or update of registers. On these facts, the contractual deeming provision did not operate to extinguish the debenture holder's status absent completion of the required corporate and statutory steps, and the put option could validly be exercised after expiry of the contractual tenor.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority correctly found that the debentures were not converted into equity by completion of statutory allotment and corporate actions, that a default occurred when redemption was not made after the put option was exercised, and that the Section 7 petition was rightly admitted; the appeal is dismissed and the admission under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is upheld in favour of the financial creditor.

Issues: Whether the adjudicating authority was right in allowing the application directing refund of Rs. 39,96,685/- paid under protest towards pre-CIRP municipal property tax and whether the Appellate Tribunal should interfere with the impugned order directing such refund.

Analysis: The dispute centres on payment made by the Successful Resolution Applicant (SRA) under protest towards pre-CIRP municipal property tax and the adjudicating authority's order directing refund of that amount. The Tribunal examined (i) factual matrix showing that the resolution plan proposed a payment to the municipal corporation and that the amount for removal of seal was paid under protest, (ii) that the resolution plan had been approved and its implementation was not under challenge, and (iii) relevant precedents including the Supreme Court authority on extinguishment of claims by approved resolution plans (Ghanshyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd.). The Tribunal distinguished the Madras High Court decision relied on by the appellant on its facts (ongoing litigation and failures in disclosure there) and found those distinctions material. Applying the governing principle that an approved resolution plan, when operative and not successfully challenged, governs treatment of pre-CIRP claims and that payment under protest made pursuant to the approved plan may be refunded where appropriate, the Tribunal concluded there was no error in the adjudicating authority allowing refund under the circumstances of this case.

Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed; no interference is warranted with the adjudicating authority's order directing refund of the amount paid under protest.

Issues: Whether I.A.312/ND/2026 seeking extension of 90 days to the corporate debtor to implement the Settlement Agreement dated 09.05.2025 (and thereby enable payment of the balance amount and consequent termination of the CIRP) should be allowed.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the statutory and regulatory framework under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and allied rules, including Section 12A (withdrawal of CIRP) and the role of financial creditors as recognised by precedents, together with the adjudicating authority's exercise of discretion under Rule 11 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 to grant limited relief pending revival applications. The facts show a bona fide Settlement Agreement for Rs. 210 crore, part payments totalling Rs. 120 crore already made, asserted difficulties in monetisation due to non-availability of original title deeds, subsequent procurement of certified title documents by the RP, and ongoing investor due diligence. The adjudicating authority had earlier allowed revival but stayed RP action for a limited period; the appellant sought a 90-day period to complete monetisation and payment. Applying the objectives of the Code (preservation and revival of the corporate debtor) and recognising that settlements are to be encouraged where bona fide and achievable, the Tribunal found that sufficient cause existed in the facts and that granting the requested limited extension would further the rehabilitative purpose of the Code without prejudicing creditors, especially given the substantial payments already made and the RP's assistance in obtaining title documents.

Conclusion: I.A.312/ND/2026 is allowed and the order dated 21.01.2026 is modified to grant the corporate debtor a period of 90 days (commencing from the date of this order) to make payment of Rs. 90 crore in terms of the Settlement Agreement; if payment is made within that period, the NCLT order dated 31.07.2025 withdrawing the CIRP shall become operative and the CIRP shall stand terminated. The financial creditor and the RP are directed to render necessary assistance to implement the Settlement Agreement.

Issues: (i) Whether the Section 9 petition met the statutory monetary threshold required under Section 4(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 on the initiation date; (ii) Whether a bonafide pre-existing dispute existed between the parties prior to the demand notice; (iii) Whether unilateral payments made by the corporate debtor after issuance of demand notice but before filing could be treated as a device to defeat the threshold requirement and thereby permit admission of the Section 9 petition.

Issue (i): Whether the Section 9 petition met the statutory monetary threshold required under Section 4(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 on the initiation date.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the quantum of operational debt as on the initiation date (date of filing the Section 9 petition). The record shows that after accounting for amounts received by the corporate debtor, the admitted outstanding claim on the initiation date was below the statutory minimum of Rs. 1 Crore. The Tribunal relied on the statutory definition of initiation date and relevant precedent holding that the threshold is to be ascertained on that date.

Conclusion: The petition did not meet the threshold limit required by law and therefore was not maintainable on the initiation date.

Issue (ii): Whether a bonafide pre-existing dispute existed between the parties prior to the demand notice.

Analysis: The Tribunal reviewed communications, regulatory permissions, cancellation letters and facts surrounding alleged violations and the incident of spontaneous combustion. Material on record indicated factual and legal disputes (including cancellation of lifting permission, alleged export violation, and competing claims about liability and salvage) that predated or were established prior to the demand notice and filing. The Tribunal applied established principles that existence of a bona fide dispute precludes invocation of the Code.

Conclusion: A bona fide pre-existing dispute existed between the parties, barring initiation of CIRP under Section 9.

Issue (iii): Whether unilateral payments made by the corporate debtor after issuance of demand notice but before filing could be treated as a device to defeat the threshold requirement and thereby permit admission of the Section 9 petition.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered the payments made by the corporate debtor and their characterization (salvage value/refund) and the admitted outstanding amount on the initiation date. The Tribunal held that the relevant statutory threshold is to be assessed on the initiation date; payments made prior to that date affect the admitted outstanding amount and are to be taken into account when determining maintainability. The Tribunal also noted that regardless of the appellant's allegation of mala fide intent, the admitted figures and supporting material demonstrated that the claim on initiation date was below the statutory threshold.

Conclusion: The post-notice payments reduced the outstanding claim such that on the initiation date the petition fell below the statutory threshold; this did not permit admission of the Section 9 petition.

Final Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed because the Section 9 petition was not maintainable - the admitted operational debt on the initiation date was below the mandatory threshold and a bona fide pre-existing dispute existed between the parties; therefore the impugned order rejecting the petition is upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: The monetary threshold under Section 4(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 for instituting proceedings under Part II must be ascertained on the initiation date defined by Section 5(11); if the admitted operational debt on that date is below the statutory minimum or a bona fide pre-existing dispute exists, a petition under Section 9 is not maintainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned order-in-appeal dated 28.02.2023 was validly served in terms of Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as made applicable under Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994; (ii) Whether the delay of 318 days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal should be condoned.

Issue (i): Validity of service of the order-in-appeal under Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as made applicable under Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The Department produced documentary evidence that the original order-in-appeal was despatched by speed post on 28.02.2023 (returned with postal remark) and thereafter forwarded to the CGST Division-I, Kota for personal delivery. The Department produced an acknowledgement dated 20.04.2023 evidencing in-person delivery to the appellant's address. The statutory provision (Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944) contemplates service by postal dispatch and alternative methods of service; the combination of speed post dispatch and subsequent personal delivery with an acknowledgement satisfies the requirement of proof of service. The appellant's denial of receipt was countered by documentary proof and challenged on grounds of alleged minority of the recipient; documentary records of date of birth were considered but did not negate the acknowledged delivery. The appellate record also showed repeated opportunities for hearing and priordispatches to the same address.

Conclusion: The impugned order-in-appeal was validly served in terms of Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as applied under Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. Conclusion in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Condonation of delay of 318 days in filing the present appeal.

Analysis: The appellant's grounds for delay were examined against the chronology of past notices, opportunities of personal hearing, and the proofs of dispatch and delivery. The appellant offered shifting explanations including non-receipt, reliance on a bank notice and subsequent receipt of an unattested copy; these were evaluated alongside the Department's documentary proof of service and the appellant's prior conduct showing lack of diligence. The appellant failed to demonstrate bona fide reasons sufficient to excuse the long delay.

Conclusion: The application for condonation of delay is rejected. Conclusion against the appellant and in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal finds that service of the order-in-appeal was valid and that the appellant has not shown sufficient cause to condone the delay; accordingly the application for condonation is rejected and the appeal is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Proof of dispatch by speed post followed by in-person delivery with a dated acknowledgement satisfies service requirements under Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (as applied under Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994), and absence of bona fide explanation and lack of due diligence disentitles the appellant to condonation of delay.

Issues: (i) Whether steel superstructure/triangulated steel girders fabricated and erected under the works contract remained declared goods as iron and steel under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and could be taxed only at the restricted rate; (ii) Whether the amounts claimed as deductions towards fabrication, transportation, erection and sub-contractor charges were rightly disallowed while making reassessment under the Bihar Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

Issue (i): Whether steel superstructure/triangulated steel girders fabricated and erected under the works contract remained declared goods as iron and steel under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and could be taxed only at the restricted rate.

Analysis: The taxable event in a works contract is the transfer of property in goods involved in execution of the contract, and such transfer occurs on incorporation of the goods in the works. The Court applied the principle that the value taxable is the value of the goods at the time of incorporation, while charges relatable to labour and services must be excluded. On the facts, the structural steel was fabricated into a different commercial commodity, namely the bridge superstructure/triangulated girder, and the Court held that the process satisfied the transformation and marketability tests. The item transferred was not treated as continuing to retain the character of declared goods under the cited provisions.

Conclusion: The classification adopted by the assessing authority was upheld and the levy at the higher rate was sustained against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the amounts claimed as deductions towards fabrication, transportation, erection and sub-contractor charges were rightly disallowed while making reassessment under the Bihar Value Added Tax Act, 2005.

Analysis: The Court held that deductions which relate to labour and services are deductible, but the expenditure incurred in converting structural steel into the erected steel superstructure, including transportation, launching and installation, formed part of the value of the goods transferred in the works contract. The reassessment notice and order were also held to be within jurisdiction, as the prescribed authority recorded reasons touching escaped turnover, wrong deduction claims and incorrect rate application. The plea based on earlier assessments and alternative remedy did not persuade the Court to interfere.

Conclusion: The disallowance of the claimed deductions and the reassessment order were upheld.

Final Conclusion: The writ applications failed, and the assessment and demand raised by the revenue authorities were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: In a works contract, goods lose their original identity and become taxable at the stage of incorporation if fabrication and erection bring into existence a distinct commercial commodity; labour-only deductions remain excluded, but expenses forming part of the value of the transferred goods are includible for tax purposes.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice to show cause dated February 21, 2023 and the adjudication orders dated May 29, 2023 and June 05, 2023 are valid where the notice and orders lack relevant particulars, reasoning and opportunity of hearing; (ii) Whether the subsequent order dated June 09, 2023 communicating acceptance of the petitioner's reply and the debit of Rs. 2,51,858/- from the petitioner's electronic credit ledger are legally sustainable.

Issue (i): Validity of the show cause notice and adjudication orders dated May 29, 2023 and June 05, 2023 given absence of particulars, absence of reasons and absence of opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The impugned notice to show cause did not set out requisite particulars necessary to enable a meaningful reply. The adjudication order dated May 29, 2023 was unreasoned and did not set out facts or basis for the conclusion, and the orders were passed without affording an opportunity of hearing as envisaged by the statutory scheme. The subsequent re-uploading of the same adjudication order on June 05, 2023 replicated the same defects. The combination of omission of particulars in the notice, absence of reasons in the adjudication order and failure to afford hearing engages the statutory provisions requiring reasoned adjudication and procedural fairness under the Act.

Conclusion: The notice to show cause and the adjudication orders dated May 29, 2023 and June 05, 2023 are set aside as invalid. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Validity of the order dated June 09, 2023 communicating acceptance of the petitioners' reply and the consequential debit of Rs. 2,51,858/- from the petitioners' electronic credit ledger.

Analysis: The order dated June 09, 2023 could not validly be issued after the adjudicating officer had become functus officio by passing the May 29, 2023 adjudication order; accordingly that communication is without jurisdiction. The debit of Rs. 2,51,858/- arose from the invalid adjudication order and, per the respondents' own affidavit admitting inadvertent uploading, lacks legal basis. Equity and statutory consistency require reversal of an unauthorized debit to the electronic credit ledger and recredit of the same amount.

Conclusion: The order dated June 09, 2023 is without jurisdiction and the debit of Rs. 2,51,858/- is invalid; the revenue is directed to reverse and recredit the debited amount. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed by setting aside the adjudication orders dated May 29, 2023 and June 05, 2023 and the order dated June 09, 2023; the notice-issuing authority must provide all relevant particulars supporting the show cause notice dated February 21, 2023 and permit the petitioners to file a fresh reply; the respondent GST authorities shall reverse and recredit the amount debited from the petitioners' electronic credit ledger within two weeks of communication of this order.

Ratio Decidendi: A show cause notice under the Goods and Services Tax scheme must set out relevant particulars and an adjudication order imposing tax must be reasoned and preceded by opportunity of hearing; orders issued without such particulars, reasons or hearing, and any consequential unauthorized debit to electronic ledgers, are invalid and must be set aside with restoration of the affected amounts.