Issues: Whether an application by a party under Section 420 of the Companies Act, 2013 seeking recall or review of an order was maintainable, and whether the provision permits reconsideration on merits beyond rectification of a mistake apparent from the record.

Analysis: Section 420 confers power on the Tribunal to amend its own order within two years to rectify a mistake apparent from the record. That power is confined to obvious errors and cannot be used as a substitute for review or for reappreciation of the merits of a concluded order. The provision is not available as an independent remedy to a party seeking substantive reconsideration of an order already passed on merits, and an application styled as rectification but seeking review in substance falls outside its scope.

Conclusion: The application was not maintainable and the refusal to recall the earlier order was ; the challenge failed.

Issues: Whether the claim filed by the customs department before the liquidator after a delay of 787 days could be entertained, and whether the rejection of the belated claim under the liquidation regulations called for interference.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code and the liquidation regulations requires claims to be lodged within the time prescribed in the public announcement, and the liquidation process is intended to proceed within strict timelines. The Court held that the prescribed period under Regulation 12(2)(b) could not be treated as a basis for entertaining an inordinate and unexplained delay. Even assuming the timeline to be directory, a claimant was still required to furnish a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The pendency of customs proceedings, the fact that the claimant was a authority, and reliance on general principles of limitation did not furnish a valid basis to revive a stale claim in a liquidation process that had already advanced substantially.

Conclusion: The belated claim remained barred and the rejection of the claim was upheld; no interference was called for.

Ratio Decidendi: In liquidation proceedings, a claim filed beyond the prescribed period cannot be entertained merely because the claimant is a governmental authority or because related recovery proceedings were pending, unless the delay is satisfactorily explained within the statutory framework.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax could be levied on notional interest computed on a refundable security deposit collected for locker services.

Analysis: The taxable value under section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994 is confined to the consideration actually received for the service. The security deposit was taken for a collateral purpose and not as consideration for the service. In the absence of any express statutory provision permitting addition of notional interest to the value of the taxable service, such deemed interest cannot be brought to tax. The issue stood covered by the Tribunal's earlier decision in the appellant's own case.

Conclusion: Service tax could not be levied on the notional interest calculated on the refundable security deposit, and the demand was unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: For service tax valuation, only the actual consideration for the service is taxable, and notional interest on a refundable security deposit cannot be added to the taxable value unless the statute expressly so provides.

Issues: Whether the demand notice, adjudication order, and appellate order were liable to be quashed for service at the old address after the assessee had intimated a change of address.

Analysis: The record showed that the assessee had informed the department of the change of address in 2017 and the revised address was reflected in the GST registration particulars. The show-cause cum demand notice and the subsequent proceedings were nevertheless sent to the old address, and the appellate authority also failed to deal with the grievance that the notices and orders were never received. Service at the wrong address deprived the assessee of a real opportunity to defend the proceedings and vitiated the process.

Conclusion: The impugned notice and orders were quashed and the matter was remanded for fresh proceedings in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the application seeking recall of the order dated 19.02.2024 was wrongly treated as a review, and whether the absence of a proper hearing and failure to follow the prescribed procedural course vitiated the impugned order.

Analysis: The Tribunal's procedure in insolvency and company matters is governed by the principles of natural justice and the procedural framework under Section 424 of the Companies Act, 2013, read with the applicable NCLT Rules and the corresponding civil procedure principles. Where a party has not been afforded a proper hearing, and the record does not show that the matter was validly taken ex parte or that arguments were concluded before pronouncement, an application complaining of such procedural infirmity is a recall application and not a review on merits. The failure to separately deal with the application for taking additional documents on record further indicated a procedural defect and non-application of mind.

Conclusion: The impugned order was held unsustainable, the application was directed to be considered as a recall application, and the matter was remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration of the pending applications, subject to costs.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 27 days in refiling the appeal should be condoned; (ii) whether the delay of 57 days in filing the company appeal could be condoned under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 27 days in refiling the appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: The Registry reported a 27-day delay in refiling. The defect was treated as not fatal, and the grounds in support of refiling were accepted.

Conclusion: The delay in refiling was condoned, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the delay of 57 days in filing the company appeal could be condoned under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The impugned order was pronounced on 17.11.2023 in proceedings in which the appellant had participated. Limitation was held to run from the date of pronouncement and not from the date of uploading. The application for certified copy was made after expiry of limitation, and the explanation offered for the delay was found unsatisfactory. The delay exceeded the permissible condonable period under the statute.

Conclusion: The delay in filing the appeal was not condoned, against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was held to be barred by limitation and was dismissed, while the delay in refiling stood condoned.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, where the party participated in the proceedings, limitation runs from the date of pronouncement of the order, and delay beyond the statutory condonable limit cannot be excused on the basis of belated procurement of the certified copy or the date of uploading.

Outcome: The two company appeals were closed in view of the dissolution of the corporate debtor and no adjudication on merits was undertaken.

Issues: (i) Whether the admission by the first appellate authority of fresh documentary evidence (profit & loss account, balance-sheet, bank statements, Form 26AS) without affording an opportunity to the Assessing Officer violated Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962; (ii) Whether the company being struck off under Section 248 of the Companies Act, 2013 affects the competence of the Assessing Officer to proceed with reassessment initiated prior to struck-off date and the appropriate remedial order.

Issue (i): Whether the first appellate authority properly admitted fresh documentary evidence without providing opportunity to the Assessing Officer under Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the appellate record, the documents filed before the first appellate authority and the absence of any opportunity recorded given to the Assessing Officer to examine or comment on the newly filed documentary material. The Tribunal noted that admission of fresh documentary evidence in appeal proceedings requires adherence to Rule 46A and that the Assessing Officer must be given a reasonable opportunity to examine such material before any conclusive deletion or modification of assessment is directed.

Conclusion: The first appellate authority's admission of the fresh documentary evidence without providing an opportunity to the Assessing Officer was not appropriate; the matter is remanded for fresh assessment after allowing the Assessing Officer reasonable opportunity to examine the evidence.

Issue (ii): Whether the fact that the company was struck off under Section 248 of the Companies Act, 2013 invalidates or vitiates reassessment proceedings initiated prior to the struck-off date.

Analysis: The Tribunal observed that reassessment proceedings were initiated on 31.03.2021, prior to the company's struck-off date (Form STK-7 dated 11.10.2021). The Tribunal held that dissolution by striking off post-initiation does not automatically extinguish liabilities or proceedings that commenced while the company was in existence, and that provisions of Section 248(7) read with Section 252 of the Companies Act, 2013 operate for practical purposes where relevant.

Conclusion: The company's subsequent struck-off status does not invalidate the reassessment initiated before the struck-off date; liabilities and the assessment process survive and the Assessing Officer may proceed to determine tax liability after affording opportunity of hearing.

Final Conclusion: The consolidated effect of the decision is that both the revenue's and the assessee's appeals are directed to be remitted to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment; the Tribunal has not expressed any opinion on the merits but requires the Assessing Officer to examine the documentary evidence after allowing proper and reasonable opportunity of being heard.

Ratio Decidendi: Fresh documentary evidence filed before the appellate authority cannot be admitted to the detriment of the assessing process without giving the Assessing Officer a reasonable opportunity to examine and reconsider the assessment; reassessment proceedings initiated while a company existed remain valid despite subsequent striking off.

Issues: Whether the State had shown sufficient cause to condone the delay in filing the revision petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: The delay was substantial and was not explained satisfactorily. The Court reiterated that condonation depends on the acceptability of the explanation and not merely on the length of delay. Even so, a long delay places a heavier burden on the applicant to furnish cogent and credible reasons. The explanation that the Law Officer was on medical leave was unsupported by material, and the State had already taken considerable time even after approval to file the petition. In the absence of a plausible or acceptable explanation, the delay could not be excused.

Conclusion: The State was not entitled to condonation of delay, and the application for condonation was rejected.

Issues: Whether the learned Single Judge was justified in setting aside the order dated 24.04.2023 of the Appellate Commissioner and remitting the matter to the Appellate Commissioner for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The writ petition sought quashing of the Appellate Commissioner's order dated 24.04.2023 which dismissed the appeal for non-compliance with the mandatory pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The record shows that the writ prayer was confined to the appellate order and did not directly challenge the original order dated 01.04.2021. The impugned order of the Single Judge set aside only the Appellate Commissioner's order and remitted the matter to the Appellate Commissioner for fresh consideration. The Court observed that any reconsideration by the Appellate Commissioner must be undertaken in accordance with the statutory pre-deposit requirement prescribed by the Act.

Conclusion: The Single Judge was justified in setting aside the Appellate Commissioner's order dated 24.04.2023 and remitting the matter to the Appellate Commissioner for fresh consideration; such reconsideration is subject to compliance with Section 107(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. This conclusion is in favour of the respondent (assessee).

Ratio Decidendi: Where an appellate order dismisses an appeal for non-compliance with the mandatory pre-deposit, the appellate authority's reconsideration on remand must be conducted subject to the statutory pre-deposit requirement under Section 107(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: Whether rubber rings manufactured for use in sprinkler or drip irrigation systems and supplied separately are classifiable as parts suitable for use solely or principally with sprinklers/drip irrigation systems under Heading 8424 (tariff item 84249000) and thereby eligible for the concessional GST rate; or whether they fall under Heading 4016 as other articles of vulcanised rubber attracting the general GST rate.

Analysis: The question is one of tariff classification under the HSN rules and Section/Chapter notes. Note 2(b) to Section XVI and Rule 1-3 of the tariff interpretation framework govern whether an article is a part suitable for sole or principal use with a particular machine/system and thus classifiable with that machine under Heading 8424. Circular No. 81/55/2018-GST and Circular No. 155/11/2021-GST provide administrative clarification that laterals and parts suitable solely or principally with sprinklers/drip irrigation systems are classifiable under Heading 8424 even when supplied separately, whereas parts of general use are excluded. Chapter 40 (articles of rubber) is relevant for items that are rubber articles of general use; classification therefore depends on the material character (hard rubber versus other than hard rubber) and the suitability for sole/principal use with HSN 8424 goods. The factual record shows the rings are vulcanised rubber, dimension- and application-specific, and intended for sealing in irrigation systems; however, the record does not conclusively establish whether they are made of hard rubber or of other than hard rubber, and whether any are of general use.

Conclusion: Rubber rings that are established to be made of hard rubber and are suitable for use solely or principally with sprinkler/drip irrigation systems are classifiable under Heading 8424 and eligible for the concessional rate. Rubber rings that are made of other than hard rubber or that are parts of general use do not qualify for classification under Heading 8424 and are to be classified under their appropriate heading (including Heading 4016 where applicable) attracting the general rate.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an article is shown to be a part suitable solely or principally for a specific machine/system as per Note 2(b) to Section XVI and supporting administrative clarifications, it shall be classified with that machine under the relevant HSN heading; otherwise, the article is to be classified under its own material heading (e.g., Chapter 40 for articles of vulcanised rubber).

Issues: (i) Whether incentives/discounts received by an authorised motor vehicle dealer from the manufacturer for achieving sales targets are leviable to service tax under the category of Business Auxiliary Service; (ii) Whether the cenvat credit claimed on various input services by the dealer is admissible.

Issue (i): Whether target-based incentives paid by the manufacturer to the dealer constitute taxable consideration for Business Auxiliary Service.

Analysis: Relevant legal framework includes the definition of taxable consideration and the negative list regime under Section 66D of the Finance Act, 1994. Precedent decisions examining dealership agreements where transactions operate on a principal-to-principal basis have held that target incentives are trade discounts forming part of the sale price, not payments for specific services. Authorities analysing incentives have applied the principle that consideration for service must be attributable to a specific supply and that overall performance-based incentives are not transaction specific.

Conclusion: Incentives/discounts received by the dealer for achieving sales targets are trade discounts forming part of the sale transaction and are not leviable to service tax under Business Auxiliary Service. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the cenvat credit claimed on various input services is admissible.

Analysis: The claim is supported by input invoices and related documents submitted with the appeal. The adjudicating authority had denied credit alleging absence of supporting documents at the adjudication stage. The admissibility requires verification of the submitted invoices and documents by the field formation against statutory requirements for input tax credit.

Conclusion: The question of admissibility of the claimed cenvat credit is remitted for verification of the submitted input invoices and documents and for decision on admissibility. This issue is not decided in favour of either party at this stage and is remanded for fresh adjudication.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed demands of service tax, education cess and secondary and higher education cess on incentives/discounts are set aside; the demands relating to cenvat credit are set aside and remitted to the adjudicating authority for verification and fresh decision on admissibility.

Ratio Decidendi: Target-based incentives paid by a manufacturer to an authorised dealer operating on a principal-to-principal basis are trade discounts forming part of the sale price and, being non-transaction-specific, do not constitute consideration for a taxable service under Section 66D of the Finance Act, 1994.

Issues: (i) Whether under Section 80-IA(9) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, after claiming deduction under Section 80-IA or 80-IB, an assessee can again claim deduction under Section 80-HHC on the same profits and whether such deduction must be computed independently or is to be restricted.

Analysis: The issue involves statutory construction of Section 80-IA(9) vis-a -vis Section 80-HHC(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the interaction between deductions under Part C of Chapter VI-A. Prior authoritative rulings addressing the same question have been considered, including the view approved by a Three Judges Bench that distinguished computation of deduction from allowance of deduction and upheld the Bombay High Court approach in Associated Capsules (P) Ltd. The analysis recognises that Section 80-HHC(3) prescribes a self-contained formula for computing eligible deduction and that treating a deduction under Section 80-IA as reducing the gross total income for computing Section 80-HHC would produce anomalous and impracticable results. The correct construction, as affirmed by precedent, is that deductions under Sections 80-IA/80-IB and Section 80-HHC are computed by their respective statutory provisions and that subsection (9) of Section 80-IA operates to restrict the aggregate allowance so that the combined deductions do not exceed the profits of the eligible business.

Conclusion: The deduction under Section 80-HHC is to be computed independently of the deduction under Section 80-IA/80-IB, and subsection (9) of Section 80-IA only restricts the aggregate allowance so that the total of deductions under Sections 80-IA/80-IB and 80-HHC shall not exceed the profits and gains of the eligible business. The appeals filed by the assessee are allowed in accordance with this conclusion.

Issues: (i) Whether the transfer pricing adjustment of Rs.130.97 crore requires contest before the High Court; (ii) Whether separate transfer pricing adjustments in respect of various transactions must be contested when entity-level benchmarking is accepted or rejected; (iii) Whether the ITAT was correct in restricting disallowance under section 14A to the suo motu disallowance made in the return of income when the assessee could not substantiate the same before the Assessing Officer and the DRP; (iv) Whether the ITAT was correct in relying on tribunal decisions to restrict disallowance under section 14A to the suo motu disallowance made in the return of income.

Issue (i): Whether the transfer pricing adjustment of Rs.130.97 crore requires contest before the High Court.

Analysis: The question is addressed in light of the Court's prior decision reported at [2016] 72 taxmann.com 325 (Bombay) and the order dated 03/04/2025 recording that the earlier appeal had been dismissed and related SLP was dismissed. The Court treated the question in the factual matrix of the earlier assessment year and applied that precedent to the present appeal.

Conclusion: Issue (i) is dismissed and decided against the appellant; in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether separate transfer pricing adjustments for various transactions must be contested upon acceptance or non-acceptance of entity-level benchmarking.

Analysis: The matter was considered in the context of the Tribunal and High Court's earlier reasoning for the relevant assessment year and the Court applied the same precedent to the present facts, treating the issue as settled by the prior decision.

Conclusion: Issue (ii) is dismissed and decided against the appellant; in favour of the respondent.

Issue (iii): Whether the ITAT was correct in restricting disallowance under section 14A to the suo motu disallowance made in the return of income when the assessee could not substantiate the same before the Assessing Officer and the DRP.

Analysis: The ITAT's findings, endorsed by the Court, examine whether the Assessing Officer gave any adverse finding on the assessee's suo motu disallowance and whether Rule 8D of the Rules was applied mechanistically. The Court reviewed ITAT's reliance on precedent (including Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Company Ltd. (394 ITR 449) (SC), Aditya Birla Finance Ltd., and Smartchem Technologies Ltd.) and accepted that AO/DRP must record clear reasons and satisfaction founded on material before making additions beyond the suo motu disallowance.

Conclusion: Issue (iii) is decided in favour of the respondent (assessee).

Issue (iv): Whether the ITAT was correct in relying on tribunal decisions to restrict disallowance under section 14A to the suo motu disallowance made in the return of income.

Analysis: The Court examined the tribunal authorities relied upon by ITAT and found that they require the AO to provide justifiable reasons and not apply section 14A read with Rule 8D mechanically; where AO/DRP did not point out defects or give reasons for rejecting the assessee's claim, further disallowance is not sustainable. The ITAT's reasoning on allocation of interest to export units and restriction of disallowance was considered and endorsed.

Conclusion: Issue (iv) is decided in favour of the respondent (assessee).

Final Conclusion: The appeal lacks merit on the decided issues and the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is upheld; the challenge by the revenue is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 cannot be applied mechanically; the Assessing Officer must record a clear, material-based satisfaction explaining why the assessee's suo motu disallowance is unacceptable before making any addition beyond that suo motu disallowance.

Issues: (i) Whether the goods were classifiable as medicaments under Chapter 30 or as cosmetics under Chapter 33 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. (ii) Whether duty liability for the period prior to August 2011 could be fastened on the loan licence holder when the goods were manufactured by the job worker. (iii) Whether the appellant was entitled to SSI exemption for the period September 2011 to February 2012 and, consequently, whether any differential duty or penalty survived.

Issue (i): Whether the goods were classifiable as medicaments under Chapter 30 or as cosmetics under Chapter 33 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.

Analysis: The goods were manufactured under Ayurvedic drug licences issued by the competent drug licensing authority, and the record showed that the products were described and approved as Ayurvedic medicines. The classification dispute was resolved by applying the therapeutic and prophylactic character of the products, the licensed Ayurvedic formulation framework, and the principles recognised in classification jurisprudence for distinguishing medicaments from cosmetics. The revenue's reliance on cosmetic classification was found inapposite on the facts.

Conclusion: The goods were held to be medicaments classifiable under Chapter 30, not cosmetics under Chapter 33.

Issue (ii): Whether duty liability for the period prior to August 2011 could be fastened on the loan licence holder when the goods were manufactured by the job worker.

Analysis: Duty under central excise is fastened on the manufacturer. The manufacturing for the relevant period was carried out by the job worker under the loan licence arrangement, and the fact that the loan licence holder had obtained drug licence recognition did not convert it into the manufacturer for excise purposes. The circumstance that the job worker was treated as not liable in the impugned order could not be used to shift duty liability to the loan licence holder.

Conclusion: The loan licence holder was not liable for central excise duty for the period prior to August 2011.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellant was entitled to SSI exemption for the period September 2011 to February 2012 and, consequently, whether any differential duty or penalty survived.

Analysis: For the relevant period, the turnover remained within the SSI exemption limit under the notification relied upon, and once the goods were held to be medicaments, the concessional regime applied. After registration, duty was being paid on the correct classification, so no differential demand survived. In the facts found, the demand and the consequential penalties could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The appellant was entitled to SSI exemption for September 2011 to February 2012, and no differential duty or penalty survived.

Final Conclusion: The classification adopted by the appellant was accepted, the pre-August 2011 demand was unsustainable against the loan licence holder, the SSI benefit was available for the relevant intermediate period, and the connected penalties were set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods manufactured under a valid Ayurvedic drug licence and shown to possess therapeutic or prophylactic character are classifiable as medicaments under Chapter 30, and excise duty cannot be shifted to a loan licence holder unless it is the manufacturer in law for central excise purposes.

Issues: Whether the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 levied for alleged concealment of income and furnishing of inaccurate particulars in respect of claimed business losses was rightly deleted by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

Analysis: The question was examined on the facts and in law with reference to the return filed and the findings of the Assessing Officer, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal. Precedents establish that section 271(1)(c) requires either concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income; mere claiming of an item or a claim unsustainable in law does not by itself constitute inaccurate particulars. The authorities below recorded that no specific detail in the return was shown to be incorrect, nor was there evidence of suppression of particulars; the Assessing Officer's treatment of the loss as speculative or a valuation loss did not automatically establish concealment or inaccurate particulars. The courts relied on the principle that penalty provisions must be strictly construed and that absence of findings showing incorrect or erroneous particulars in the return precludes invocation of section 271(1)(c).

Conclusion: The deletion of the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) is upheld; the appeal by the Revenue is dismissed, which is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 11,31,282 made under Section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of alleged bogus purchases from M/s Shubham Agro India is sustainable on merits.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the material placed on record, including ledger account, bank statements, purchase invoices, stock register, party-wise and month-wise purchase/sale details, VAT returns and comparative rate charts. The Assessing Officer did not dispute the sales figures or point to any defect in the books of account and did not reject the books under Section 145(3). The AO's primary basis for addition was the statement of a third party from a search and the fact that purchase rates from the vendor were lower than other suppliers. The Tribunal found that payments were made through banking channels, purchases were recorded in regular books, tax audit had been conducted without adverse remarks and overall turnover and profit ratios did not indicate suppression. In these circumstances the preconditions for invoking the deeming provision of Section 69C (expenditure incurred outside books of account or unexplained source) were not satisfied and the addition rested on suspicion and conjecture.

Conclusion: The addition of Rs. 11,31,282 under Section 69C is deleted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the penalties imposed under Sections 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 are justified, or whether penalty should be waived by invoking Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the undisputed facts that the appellant received a one time payment pursuant to an MOU, that tax was deducted at source and the receipts were disclosed in income tax returns, and that the appellant, upon being informed, paid the service tax and interest before issuance of the show cause notice and further paid additional interest during the appeal. The Tribunal applied the statutory test in Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 which disallows imposition of penalty where the assessee proves reasonable cause for failure, and considered the appellant's bona fide belief that he was not carrying on real estate agency services, the solitary nature of the transaction, disclosure in income tax returns, and voluntary payment of tax and interest.

Conclusion: Penalties imposed under Sections 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 are set aside by invoking Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994; decision is in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: The petition was disposed of after the grievance regarding release of goods and demurrage waiver stood satisfied, while all other contentions remained open.

Issues: Whether GST could be levied on tariff petition fee and licence fee received by the Electricity Regulatory Commission for performing statutory regulatory functions under the Electricity Act, 2003.

Analysis: The fee collected by the Commission was linked to the discharge of statutory regulatory powers, including tariff regulation and grant of licences, and not to any trade, commerce, profession, vocation, or other similar activity. The expressions "business" and "consideration" in the CGST Act must be read with Section 7, which requires a supply of goods or services for consideration in the course or furtherance of business. The Commission's regulatory functions were held to be an extension of statutory obligation and not an activity in furtherance of business. Schedule III, which excludes services rendered by a court or tribunal, was applied to treat the functions of the Commission as outside the taxable supply framework. The definition of "services" could not override that exclusion.

Conclusion: GST was not leviable on the amount received by the Commission as tariff petition fee and licence fee, and the show cause notice could not stand.

Final Conclusion: The statutory fees received for regulatory functions of the Electricity Regulatory Commission were held to be outside the scope of taxable supply under the GST regime, and the impugned notice was quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: Statutory fees received by a quasi-judicial regulatory commission for performing functions imposed by law are not received in the course or furtherance of business and therefore do not constitute taxable supply under the CGST Act.