Issues: Whether the goods manufactured by the appellants were classifiable as Ayurvedic medicines under Chapter 30 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, or as cosmetics and toilet preparations under Chapter 33, and whether the resulting demands of duty, interest, penalties, and confiscation of seized goods were sustainable.

Analysis: The appellants held a valid drug manufacturing licence and GMP certificate for Ayurveda, Siddha or Unani drugs. The record also contained an opinion from the Directorate of ISM Drugs Control indicating that the products were Ayurvedic medicines, and that opinion had not been relied upon in the show-cause notice. The decisive consideration was that the Revenue did not produce any test report or other documentary evidence to establish that the products were cosmetics or toilet preparations. In classification disputes of this nature, the burden lies on the Revenue to prove that the goods fall within the competing tariff entry invoked by it. The absence of contrary scientific evidence, coupled with the licensing material and the Ayurvedic character of the goods, supported classification as Ayurvedic medicines.

Conclusion: The products were held to be Ayurvedic medicines falling under Chapter 30 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, and not cosmetics or toilet preparations under Chapter 33. The demand of duty, interest, penalties, and confiscation of seized goods was held unsustainable.

Issues: Whether penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 could be sustained against the respondents when the show cause notice did not propose confiscation of the goods and there was no allegation of financial enrichment.

Analysis: The respondents were proceeded against as persons connected with the assessee's operations, but the notice did not contain a proposal for confiscation of the goods. Penalty under Rule 26 is attracted only where the goods are liable to confiscation. In the absence of such a foundation in the notice, and without any allegation of personal monetary gain, the requisite conditions for imposing personal penalty were not met.

Conclusion: The penalty on the respondents was unsustainable and the Revenue's appeals were liable to be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Personal penalty under Rule 26 of the Central Excise Rules, 2002 cannot be imposed unless the goods are liable to confiscation and the statutory basis for such liability is expressly made out.

Issues: Whether the guarantors/sureties are discharged under Section 139 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 by reason of the creditor's acts or omissions, or remain liable to the extent of the original sanctioned amount under Section 133 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 where the principal debtor overdrew funds in excess of the sanctioned cash-credit facility.

Analysis: Chapter VIII of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 governs guarantee and discharge of surety. Section 133 provides that any variance in the terms of the contract between principal-debtor and creditor made without the surety's consent discharges the surety as to transactions subsequent to the variance. Section 139 provides that a surety is discharged where the creditor does an act inconsistent with the surety's rights or omits a duty which results in impairment of the surety's eventual remedy against the principal-debtor. Applying these provisions to the facts, the principal-debtor was originally sanctioned a cash-credit facility of Rs. 4,00,000; amounts in excess were subsequently withdrawn without the sureties' consent. That overdraw constituted a variance in the original contract permitting discharge only as to transactions after the variance under Section 133. For Section 139 to apply, there must be not only an act inconsistent with the surety's rights but also impairment of the surety's eventual remedy against the principal-debtor; no such impairment is shown on these facts. Authorities establish that the creditor may proceed against sureties and need not first exhaust remedies against the principal-debtor, and that discharge under Section 133 operates only for transactions subsequent to unauthorized variation.

Conclusion: The sureties are liable to the extent of the original sanctioned amount of Rs. 4,00,000 with applicable interest and are not liable for amounts overdrawn without their consent; this conclusion is in favour of the Appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether the contractual clauses barred the arbitral tribunal from awarding pre-award or pendente lite interest, including amounts characterised as compensation; (ii) Whether post-award interest was permissible and, if so, whether its rate required modification; (iii) Whether the orders declining to interfere with the arbitral award warranted interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issue (i): Whether the contractual clauses barred the arbitral tribunal from awarding pre-award or pendente lite interest, including amounts characterised as compensation.

Analysis: Section 28(3) requires an arbitral tribunal to decide in accordance with the contract, and Section 31(7)(a) makes the grant of pre-award interest subject to the parties' agreement. Clause 16(3) separately and broadly excluded interest on amounts payable under the contract; the use of the word "or" prevented the expression from being confined, by ejusdem generis, to earnest money or security deposits. Clause 64(5) additionally excluded interest until the date of the award. A contractual prohibition on interest could not be avoided by describing the amount as compensation.

Conclusion: Pre-award and pendente lite interest, including amounts in the nature of interest awarded as compensation, was impermissible, and the awards under Claim Nos. 1, 3 and 6 were set aside to that extent.

Issue (ii): Whether post-award interest was permissible and, if so, whether its rate required modification.

Analysis: Section 31(7)(b) creates a statutory regime for interest from the date of the award until payment, distinct from pre-award interest under Section 31(7)(a). The contractual bar applied only until the award date and contained no express exclusion of post-award interest. The conditional grant of post-award interest was therefore sustainable, but the 12% rate lacked stated justification and was excessive in the prevailing economic context.

Conclusion: Post-award interest was payable from the date of the award until realisation, but its rate was reduced from 12% per annum to 8% per annum.

Issue (iii): Whether the orders declining to interfere with the arbitral award warranted interference under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Analysis: Although judicial interference with arbitral awards is limited, an award granting interest contrary to an express contractual prohibition and Section 31(7)(a) warrants correction. The erroneous pre-award component could be severed without disturbing the remainder of the award, while the post-award interest rate could be modified.

Conclusion: The orders sustaining the barred pre-award interest component involved serious error and required interference to that extent.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral award remains operative after deletion of the impermissible pre-award interest components under Claim Nos. 1, 3 and 6 and substitution of the post-award interest rate with 8% per annum.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an express contractual exclusion of interest governs pre-award and pendente lite interest, but does not exclude post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) unless such exclusion is unequivocally stipulated.

Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit availed on courier services is allowable as input service under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004; (ii) Whether Cenvat credit availed on record keeping services is allowable as input service under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004; (iii) Whether Cenvat credit availed on goods transport agency (GTA) / freight services is allowable where receipt of services up to the place of removal is disputed.

Issue (i): Whether courier services qualify as input services for claiming Cenvat credit under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined precedent and the appellant's use of courier services for delivery of documents and business correspondence in relation to manufacture and clearance of final products up to the place of removal. The Tribunal noted prior holdings by various benches and earlier orders in the appellant's own matters treating courier services as input services and applying the definition in Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Conclusion: The denial of Cenvat credit on courier services is set aside and the appellant is entitled to Cenvat credit on courier services (in favour of the assessee).

Issue (ii): Whether record keeping services qualify as input services for claiming Cenvat credit under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: The Tribunal considered authorities and facts showing record keeping services are used for storing data and records necessary for accounting, auditing and tax compliance, and found consistent judicial and departmental determinations treating such services as input services under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004.

Conclusion: The denial of Cenvat credit on record keeping services is set aside and the appellant is entitled to Cenvat credit on record keeping services (in favour of the assessee).

Issue (iii): Whether Cenvat credit on GTA/freight services is allowable where the Commissioner held the appellant failed to prove receipt of services up to the place of removal.

Analysis: The Tribunal found that documentary evidence relating to receipt of GTA services up to the place of removal was placed before the Commissioner but was not examined and no finding recorded. Given the factual nature of the determination (receipt up to place of removal) and applicable principles concerning place of removal, the Tribunal concluded that the matter requires fresh examination by the Commissioner rather than a factual finding by the Tribunal on the record before it.

Conclusion: The issue regarding entitlement to Cenvat credit on GTA/freight services is remanded to the Commissioner for fresh adjudication after examining the documentary evidence (neutral as to favour until decided).

Final Conclusion: The appeal is partly allowed: Cenvat credit on courier and record keeping services is upheld for the appellant while the question of Cenvat credit on GTA/freight services is remanded to the Commissioner for fresh decision after consideration of the documentary evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: Where services are shown to have a sufficient nexus with manufacture or clearance up to the place of removal, they qualify as input services under Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004; factual disputes about receipt of services up to the place of removal must be examined and decided on evidence by the adjudicating authority and cannot be conclusively determined by the Tribunal without such examination.

Issues: (i) Whether the processes undertaken by the principal unit amount to "manufacture" for the purposes of levy under Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944; (ii) Whether the assessee/job-worker is entitled to benefit of Notification No. 214/86-CE dated 25.03.1986 (and alternatively Notification No. 56/2002-CE) for the disputed period; (iii) Whether the demand (and consequential penalties) confirmed in the Order-in-Original can be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the processes undertaken by the principal unit amount to "manufacture" under Section 3 of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied the established tests distinguishing processes that leave goods the same or transform them into a different, marketable product. Reference was made to the earlier Final Order of the Tribunal holding that purification to refined lead and subsequent alloying produces a commercially usable product with distinct character and specifications (including standards of purity), and that identical processes elsewhere were recognised as manufacture. The Tribunal also relied on precedent principles that an activity resulting in a different product that is marketable amounts to manufacture.

Conclusion: The processes amount to manufacture. The conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee/job-worker is entitled to benefit of Notification No. 214/86-CE dated 25.03.1986 (and alternatively Notification No. 56/2002-CE).

Analysis: The Tribunal treated the earlier Final Order in the assessee's own case as binding and final for the period under consideration and held that the goods produced qualify as being used "in relation to manufacture" of final products; the phrase was given an expansive interpretation consistent with precedent. The Tribunal further held that the department cannot take inconsistent positions between units producing identical goods and therefore cannot deny the exemption to the present assessee where similar processes were treated as manufacture elsewhere.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to benefit of Notification No. 214/86-CE dated 25.03.1986; alternatively, if that benefit were denied, entitlement to Notification No. 56/2002-CE would be available. The conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the demand and consequential penalties confirmed in the Order-in-Original can be sustained.

Analysis: The Commissioner (Appeals) relied on the Tribunal's earlier final order and dropped the demand; the present Tribunal found no infirmity in that approach and noted that the earlier Tribunal order has neither been reversed nor stayed. Given the legal characterisation favourable to the assessee, imposition of penalty for the legal issue was not warranted.

Conclusion: The demand and consequential penalties cannot be sustained. The conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned Order-in-Appeal which allowed the assessee and set aside the Order-in-Original is upheld; the Revenue appeal is dismissed, and the assessee's entitlement to the exemption is confirmed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a process transforms input into a different, commercially usable and marketable product with distinct character and use, that process constitutes "manufacture" for purposes of excise duty and entitles the party to applicable exemption notifications when statutory conditions are met.

Issues: Whether a reassessment can be sustained where no addition is made on the income-escaping information forming the recorded reasons for reopening, but additions are made on other matters.

Analysis: The recorded reasons under the reopening proceedings concerned specified cash withdrawals and cash deposits. The reassessment, however, made additions towards estimated net profit and alleged unaccounted purchases, neither of which arose from the recorded reasons. The jurisdictional principle applied was that where the reopening does not survive on the recorded reasons, other additions cannot be sustained through the reassessment proceedings.

Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid in law and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to the enhanced exemption limit of Rs. 25,00,000 for leave encashment under section 10(10AA); (ii) Whether the additional ground claiming that the ex-gratia received under BSNL's retirement scheme was retrenchment compensation exempt under section 10(10B) could be admitted and required fresh examination.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to the enhanced exemption limit of Rs. 25,00,000 for leave encashment under section 10(10AA).

Analysis: The appeal on this issue turned on the effect of CBDT Notification No. 31/2023 enhancing the ceiling for exemption on leave encashment. The Tribunal noted that coordinate Benches had applied the revised limit to earlier assessment years, and no contrary authority was cited. In the circumstances, the assessee's claim was treated as covered by the enhanced limit, warranting recomputation of the exempt amount.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee, and the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer for limited recomputation of exemption under section 10(10AA) on the basis of the enhanced ceiling.

Issue (ii): Whether the additional ground claiming that the ex-gratia received under BSNL's retirement scheme was retrenchment compensation exempt under section 10(10B) could be admitted and required fresh examination.

Analysis: The Tribunal accepted that an additional legal ground may be entertained where it is bona fide and where correct tax liability requires adjudication. It noted the assessee's plea that the scheme, though styled as voluntary retirement, was asserted to be in substance a retrenchment-driven closure measure, and also noted the reliance placed on earlier decisions allowing similar claims. However, since this characterisation had not been examined at the assessment stage and required factual verification, the proper course was to admit the ground and remit the matter for de novo consideration.

Conclusion: The additional ground was admitted and the issue was remanded to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the extent of reopening both disputed tax claims for limited or fresh examination, with the leave-encashment issue remitted for recomputation and the ex-gratia classification issue remitted for de novo decision.

Ratio Decidendi: An appellate tribunal may admit a bona fide additional legal ground, and where the claim requires factual inquiry not undertaken below, it may remand the matter for fresh adjudication; similarly, an enhanced statutory exemption notified later may be applied to earlier years where coordinate precedent so holds.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 was invalid as time-barred where the escaped income was below fifty lakh rupees.

Analysis: The notice was issued under the new reassessment framework after the earlier notice under the old regime was treated as a show-cause notice under section 148A. The governing time-limit under section 149 permits notice beyond three years only where the escaped income represented in the prescribed form is fifty lakh rupees or more. On the admitted facts, the escaped income in the assessee's case was less than fifty lakh rupees. The statutory limit therefore barred initiation of reassessment beyond three years, and the notice issued on 30.07.2022 could not survive.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 dated 30.07.2022 was invalid and the reassessment proceedings were quashed. The assessee succeeded on the limitation issue, and the remaining challenge was left open.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the reassessment regime, a notice under section 148 issued after three years is invalid unless the escaped income represented in the prescribed form is fifty lakh rupees or more.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition arising from revaluation of damaged guar gum closing stock after rejection of books under Section 145(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable; (ii) Whether cash deposits during demonetisation, recorded as cash sales in the books, were taxable as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the addition arising from revaluation of damaged guar gum closing stock after rejection of books under Section 145(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable.

Analysis: The inventory had been valued consistently at cost or net realisable value, whichever was lower, in accordance with the disclosed accounting method. The stock had deteriorated while the factory premises were under the bank's possession and was capable of realisation only after processing as a by-product. The revaluation based on internet prices did not displace the disclosed method or establish that the reduced inventory value was incorrect. Damaged inventory or inventory with a declined selling price may be valued at its recoverable realisable value.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition for revalued closing stock was upheld, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether cash deposits during demonetisation, recorded as cash sales in the books, were taxable as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The cash deposits were reflected as cash sales in audited books and were supported by sale bills, delivery challans, sale registers and stock registers. The deposits at Mumbai were explained by the non-performing bank account and takeover of the business and residential premises at Phalodi. No contrary material established that the recorded receipts represented unaccounted funds.

Conclusion: The cash deposits recorded as cash sales could not be assessed as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961; deletion of the addition was upheld, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additions based on revaluation of damaged inventory and on cash deposits already recorded as business receipts were unsustainable.

Issues: Whether reassessment under Sections 147 and 148, following a completed scrutiny assessment, could rest on a loan transaction already examined and reasons identifying a creditor from whom no loan was received.

Analysis: The original assessment under Section 143(3) had examined the unsecured loan from one creditor on the basis of confirmation and supporting details, with no adverse finding. The recorded reasons also attributed a second loan to an entity from which no loan had in fact been received. Substitution of that entity with another creditor during remand could not cure the defect, since recorded reasons cannot be supplemented or improved subsequently. The reasons and reassessment order did not disclose transaction-specific fresh tangible material establishing the alleged layering or otherwise displacing the earlier scrutiny of the loan.

Conclusion: The reopening was invalid as a change of opinion founded on reasons not applicable to the assessee's actual transactions, and the consequential addition under Section 68 was deleted.

Issues: Whether the alleged involvement in gold and cigarette smuggling can be established on the statements relied upon, including allegedly retracted statements, and electronic communications said to provide corroboration.

Analysis: Documentary proof of the asserted retractions and proof of their delivery to the customs authority were sought. Production of the WhatsApp messages and emails referred to in the statements, along with information concerning the arrest and prosecution status of a relevant person, was also sought.

Outcome: Further submissions and documents were permitted within two weeks, and the order was reserved.

Issues: Whether Social Welfare Surcharge is payable where basic customs duty is exempted through debit of a MEIS duty credit scrip under Notification No. 24/2015-Customs dated 08.04.2015.

Analysis: Section 25(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 authorises exemption from customs duty. The notification grants exemption from basic customs duty, while debit in the MEIS scrip merely records the quantum of exemption availed and does not constitute payment of duty. Since Social Welfare Surcharge is computed with reference to basic customs duty, no surcharge arises where the basic customs duty itself stands exempt.

Conclusion: Social Welfare Surcharge is not payable on the imported goods where basic customs duty is exempted through debit of a MEIS duty credit scrip; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the applications for regular registration under Section 12AB and approval under Section 80G, filed on 22.09.2024, were within the statutory period applicable to a provisionally registered institution.

Analysis: A provisionally registered trust or institution must apply either at least six months before expiry of provisional registration or within six months from commencement of its activities, whichever is earlier. The provisional registration remained valid up to A.Y. 2025-26, making 30.09.2024 the first deadline. As activities commenced on 28.03.2024, the alternative six-month deadline was 28.09.2024. The application dated 22.09.2024 was therefore filed before the earlier applicable deadline. The corresponding procedure for provisional approval under Section 80G was treated as pari materia.

Conclusion: The applications under Section 12AB and Section 80G were timely; the rejection on limitation was unsustainable, and both applications must be considered on merits.

Issues: Whether the services of connecting taxi drivers with customers through a controlled room and providing related training and coordination fell within "Support Services of Business or Commerce" under Section 65(104c) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The appellant's activity was limited to receiving customer requests, connecting them with affiliated taxi drivers, and facilitating the service, while the fare was paid directly to the driver. The appellant did not operate a call centre or provide the kind of infrastructural or administrative assistance contemplated by the statutory definition. The mere existence of telephonic coordination, driver affiliation, and training did not convert the activity into infrastructural support services or business support services.

Conclusion: The services rendered did not fall under "Support Services of Business or Commerce" under Section 65(104c) of the Finance Act, 1994, and the demand could not be sustained.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to succeed in the appeal in view of the original notification dated 30.04.2001 and the clarificatory notification dated 28.06.2001, and whether the concurrent findings recorded by the authorities below and affirmed by the High Court called for interference.

Analysis: The Court took note of the original notification and the subsequent clarificatory notification and accepted the concurrent findings returned by the Commissioner, the Tribunal, the CESTAT and the High Court on the facts arising from those notifications. On that basis, the Court found no merit in the challenge.

Conclusion: The appeal was rejected and the findings in favour of the revenue were left undisturbed.

Issues: Whether the Principal Commissioner could invoke revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the assessment order, and whether the appeal disclosed any substantial question of law warranting interference with the Tribunal's order.

Analysis: The dispute turned on the settled requirement that an order can be revised under Section 263 only if it is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of revenue. The Court noted that the Tribunal had found the issue to be covered by the assessee's own case and that the Assessing Officer had followed an earlier view accepted by the department itself. The Court treated the Principal Commissioner's objection as no more than a difference of opinion and held that a mere change of opinion does not satisfy the conditions for revision. The Court further found that the facts relied upon by the Revenue were distinguishable from the cited Supreme Court decision, where the assessment order was demonstrably erroneous and prejudicial.

Conclusion: The invocation of Section 263 was not justified on the facts, and no substantial question of law arose for consideration. The challenge failed and the assessee succeeded.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal's order quashing the revision was left undisturbed, and the Revenue's appeal did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is permissible only where the order is simultaneously erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of revenue, and it cannot be sustained on a mere change of opinion or where the issue is already covered by a consistent earlier view.

Issues: Whether the assessment order required to be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication after affording the petitioner an opportunity to file a reply and supporting documents.

Analysis: The writ petition was disposed of at the admission stage. The impugned assessment had been passed without a reply to the show cause notice, and the record indicated that the disputed tax had subsequently been recovered through bank attachment and recovery notice. In these circumstances, the matter was sent back to the respondent for reconsideration on merits. The petitioner was directed to file a reply to the show cause notice along with necessary documents within the stipulated time, and the impugned order was to be treated as an addendum to the notice. If the petitioner complied, the respondent was required to pass a fresh order on merits after due notice.

Conclusion: The matter was remitted for fresh decision after granting the petitioner an opportunity to respond, and the assessment order was not finally sustained at this stage.

Issues: (i) Whether penalties under Sections 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were leviable when the service tax and interest had been paid before issuance of the show-cause notice; (ii) Whether Section 73(4A) of the Finance Act, 1994 could be applied to a period prior to its commencement on 08.04.2011.

Issue (i): Whether penalties under Sections 76, 77 and 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were leviable when the service tax and interest had been paid before issuance of the show-cause notice.

Analysis: The liability had been discharged after the discrepancy was pointed out and before the show-cause notice, along with interest. The statutory scheme under Section 73(3) bars issuance of notice for the amount so paid, and the Department had to establish suppression of material facts with intent to evade payment in order to sustain penal action. On the facts recorded, such suppression was not proved.

Conclusion: The penalties were not leviable and the refusal to impose penalties was correct.

Issue (ii): Whether Section 73(4A) of the Finance Act, 1994 could be applied to a period prior to its commencement on 08.04.2011.

Analysis: Section 73(4A) was introduced with effect from 08.04.2011 and the dispute period was prior to that date. The provision was not shown to have retrospective operation, and in any event the absence of suppression rendered it inapplicable on the recorded facts.

Conclusion: Section 73(4A) was not applicable to the dispute period.

Final Conclusion: The order declining penalty was upheld, and the Revenue's challenge failed in entirety.

Ratio Decidendi: Where service tax and interest are paid before show-cause notice and suppression with intent to evade is not established, penal provisions under the Finance Act, 1994 cannot be invoked, and a later-enacted penalty provision cannot be applied retrospectively to an earlier period.

Issues: (i) Whether management, maintenance or repair services relating to roads were exempt from service tax for the relevant period under the retrospective special provision; (ii) Whether the activities of handling, loading, unloading, haulage, cartage and clearing work under the contract were liable to service tax as manpower recruitment or supply agency service.

Issue (i): Whether management, maintenance or repair services relating to roads were exempt from service tax for the relevant period under the retrospective special provision.

Analysis: A special statutory provision was inserted granting exemption from levy or collection of service tax on management, maintenance or repair of roads for the specified past period. The disputed period fell within that covered window, so the demand based on road-related services could not survive.

Conclusion: The demand under management, maintenance or repair service was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the activities of handling, loading, unloading, haulage, cartage and clearing work under the contract were liable to service tax as manpower recruitment or supply agency service.

Analysis: The contract required performance of integrated work for the bottling plant, compliance with labour-law conditions, and payment linked to the quantum of work rather than the number of workers deployed. On that factual matrix, the activity was not a mere supply of manpower but a composite work-oriented arrangement, and the characterization as manpower recruitment or supply agency service was not sustainable.

Conclusion: The demand under manpower recruitment or supply agency service was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The demand was sustained only to the extent of the unchallenged works contract liability, and the remaining demands were deleted, resulting in partial relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A work-oriented contract cannot be taxed as manpower supply merely because labour is deployed to perform it, and a retrospective statutory exemption governs road-related services for the covered period.