Issues: (i) Whether receipts from title process services were taxable as royalty under the Income-tax Act and the India-US DTAA; (ii) Whether receipts from marketing support services were taxable as fees for included services under the India-US DTAA.

Issue (i): Whether receipts from title process services were taxable as royalty under the Income-tax Act and the India-US DTAA.

Analysis: The services consisted of collating and providing access to information already available in public databases relating to title, mortgage and tax status of properties in the United States. No material showed that the assessee transferred its own commercial experience, methodology or know-how, or granted any right to use industrial, commercial or scientific equipment or information. Mere access to extracted public-domain data did not amount to consideration for use of commercial experience within the treaty definition of royalty.

Conclusion: The title process service receipts were not royalty and the addition made on that basis was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether receipts from marketing support services were taxable as fees for included services under the India-US DTAA.

Analysis: The marketing support services were advisory and promotional in nature, consisting of identifying customers, assisting with marketing, and responding to customer queries. For such consultancy services to be taxable as fees for included services under the treaty, they had to make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes. The services rendered did not transfer such technical capability to the recipient, and the make available condition was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The marketing support service receipts were not fees for included services and the addition made on that basis was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The tax additions on both disputed streams of receipts were set aside, while the remaining grounds were not sustained, resulting in only partial success for the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the India-US DTAA, mere access to public-domain data does not constitute royalty, and advisory or consultancy services are taxable as fees for included services only if they make available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how or processes.

Issues: (i) Whether additions towards unexplained investment and unexplained expenditure, made on the basis of seized loose sheets and a retracted statement, could be sustained without corroborative evidence; (ii) Whether disallowance of interest expenditure under section 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified where the assessee had sufficient own funds and the expenditure was only partly relatable to the claimed borrowing.

Issue (i): Whether additions towards unexplained investment and unexplained expenditure, made on the basis of seized loose sheets and a retracted statement, could be sustained without corroborative evidence.

Analysis: The additions rested on loose sheets said to contain project-related entries and on a statement later retracted. The material did not establish any direct linkage between the assessee and actual transactions of investment or expenditure. The seized papers were unsigned, undated, and unsupported by any agreement, payment proof, or other independent evidence. A retracted admission could not, by itself, sustain the addition in the absence of corroboration. On these facts, the loose sheets were treated as dumb documents and the burden of proof was not discharged by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The additions for unexplained investment and unexplained expenditure were not sustainable and were deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether disallowance of interest expenditure under section 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified where the assessee had sufficient own funds and the expenditure was only partly relatable to the claimed borrowing.

Analysis: The record showed that the assessee had sufficient owned funds to advance the loans and that the Revenue did not controvert that factual position. The assessee also demonstrated that the interest claim was only to the extent of the actual net outgo after adjusting interest income, and that the portion of borrowing used for the relevant purpose was limited. In these circumstances, the entire disallowance could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The disallowance of interest expenditure was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additions on account of unexplained investment, unexplained expenditure, and the disallowance of interest expenditure were set aside, and the appeals were partly allowed overall.

Ratio Decidendi: Additions based on seized loose sheets or a retracted statement cannot stand without independent corroborative evidence, and interest expenditure cannot be disallowed where the assessee shows sufficient own funds and a reasonable nexus for the claimed expenditure.

Issues: (i) whether foreign exchange loss incurred on repayment of a foreign currency loan taken for acquisition of shares of a subsidiary company was allowable as business expenditure; (ii) whether the contribution to the approved Employees Group Gratuity Trust Fund was deductible or required fresh examination.

Issue (i): whether foreign exchange loss incurred on repayment of a foreign currency loan taken for acquisition of shares of a subsidiary company was allowable as business expenditure.

Analysis: The loan had been taken for a business purpose connected with acquisition and control of the subsidiary, and the interest on the same borrowing had already been accepted as business expenditure. On that basis, the same commercial character was applied to the foreign exchange loss arising on repayment of the very loan. The loss was treated as incidental to the business borrowing and not as a capital outlay.

Conclusion: The foreign exchange loss was allowable as business expenditure and the disallowance was deleted.

Issue (ii): whether the contribution to the approved Employees Group Gratuity Trust Fund was deductible or required fresh examination.

Analysis: The claim depended upon the approval history of the gratuity trust and the effect of correspondence, applications, and the subsequent approval order. The existing record did not clearly establish whether the approval granted later was in continuation of the original application or related to a fresh fund, and the relevant records required verification.

Conclusion: The issue was restored for fresh adjudication and the relief was granted only for statistical purposes.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the foreign exchange loss issue, while the gratuity trust deduction issue was remanded for reconsideration, resulting in a partial allowance of the appeals.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a borrowing is accepted as having been taken for business purposes, a loss arising on repayment of that borrowing in foreign exchange retains the same business character and is allowable as a business expenditure.

Issues: Whether an unsigned and blank notice issued under section 143(2) was valid, and whether such invalidity deprived the Assessing Officer of jurisdiction to complete the assessment under section 143(3).

Analysis: The notice under section 143(2) was found to be left unsigned and blank. Section 282A(1) requires that a notice or other document issued by an income-tax authority shall be signed, whether issued in paper form or communicated electronically. The deeming authentication under section 282A(2) does not dispense with the mandatory requirement of signature under section 282A(1). As the notice was not signed, it was not a valid notice in law and could not confer jurisdiction for completion of assessment under section 143(3).

Conclusion: The unsigned notice was invalid and void ab initio, and the assessment framed on that basis was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A notice required by the Act must be signed as mandated by section 282A(1); an unsigned notice is invalid and cannot confer jurisdiction for assessment.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the section 9 application for alleged non-service of the demand notice was sustainable when the operational creditor claimed service by registered post and email, and whether the creditor ought to have been afforded an opportunity to meet the objection before dismissal.

Analysis: The demand notice under section 8 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 serves to put the corporate debtor on notice of the default and the proposed insolvency action. Service sent to the email address reflected in the Ministry of Corporate Affairs master data was treated as sufficient for the purpose of notice. The dismissal of the section 9 application was found unsustainable because the objection regarding proof of service was acted upon without giving the operational creditor an opportunity to substantiate service, particularly when the respondent had remained ex parte.

Conclusion: The rejection order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for fresh decision after granting the appellant an opportunity to establish service of the demand notice.

Ratio Decidendi: A section 9 application cannot be rejected on an untested objection as to service of demand notice when the operational creditor was not given a fair opportunity to establish compliance with section 8 and the notice was sent to the official email address reflected in the corporate records.

Issues: Whether the delay of 186 days in filing the company appeal could be condoned and whether the appeal was barred by limitation under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The delay application did not furnish any satisfactory explanation for the entire period of delay. The grounds in the application were found to be a mere repetition of the appeal pleadings and did not disclose any real cause for the late filing. The appeal was filed long after the certified copy of the impugned order had been made available, and the limitation for appeal under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was treated as a self-contained statutory regime. In that setting, the general law of limitation or a liberal approach could not override the prescribed limitation period in the absence of sufficient justification.

Conclusion: The delay was not condoned, the appeal was held to be barred by limitation, and the company appeal was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: When an appeal under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is filed beyond the prescribed limitation period, delay can be condoned only on a satisfactory explanation establishing sufficient cause; absent such explanation, the special statutory limitation prevails and the appeal is not maintainable.

Issues: (i) Whether the disallowance of depreciation on vehicles on the ground of alleged personal use was sustainable; (ii) Whether donation and charity expenses were allowable as business expenditure; (iii) Whether the disallowance relating to fine and penalty expenses required interference.

Issue (i): Whether the disallowance of depreciation on vehicles on the ground of alleged personal use was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee produced its explanation that the vehicles were used for business and that log books were maintained, while the Department brought no contrary material to establish non-business use or absence of log books. The disallowance was made on an ad hoc basis without a specific factual foundation. The reasoning that a company is an artificial person did not by itself exclude examination of business use, but the absence of adverse evidence made the addition unsustainable.

Conclusion: The disallowance of depreciation was held to be arbitrary and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether donation and charity expenses were allowable as business expenditure.

Analysis: The expenditure was stated to have been incurred for local festivities and community-related activities connected with the assessee's business location and day-to-day functioning. Binding CBDT circulars were relied upon to show that such expenditures, when incurred for business convenience and local relations, fall within allowable business outgoings. The Revenue did not rebut the factual explanation or the applicability of the circulars.

Conclusion: The donation and charity expenses were held allowable and the disallowance was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the disallowance relating to fine and penalty expenses required interference.

Analysis: The issue turned on verification of the nature of the expenses and their treatment under Section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. As the first appellate authority had already remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer for factual verification, no infirmity was found in that course.

Conclusion: The remand order was upheld and the ground was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only in part, with relief granted on the depreciation and donation issues, while the remand relating to fine and penalty expenses was sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A disallowance cannot be sustained on an ad hoc basis without adverse material when the assessee substantiates business use, and expenditure covered by binding administrative circulars and incurred for business expediency is allowable, while a verification-based remand on a separate issue calls for no interference.

Issues: Whether the addition of unaccounted interest income based on the presumption that the figures in the diary were deficient by two zeros, and the consequential additions for the relevant assessment years, could be sustained.

Analysis: The diary found during search was treated as belonging to the assessee and its contents were taken to be true under the presumption applicable to seized material. However, the Assessing Officer's assumption that the recorded figures were short by two zeros was held to be unsupported by any concrete material. The assessee had furnished confirmations and affidavits from the concerned parties, and the statements recorded during investigation also supported the figures as written. In these circumstances, the presumption under the seized-material provisions could not be inverted into a power to rewrite the entries on conjecture. The estimated interest addition, being entirely dependent on that unsupported assumption, could not survive.

Conclusion: The addition of unaccounted interest income and the related consequential additions were deleted, and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: The Special Leave Petition was dismissed on the ground of delay and as having been rendered infructuous.

Issues: (i) Whether the demand of duty on the alleged clandestine removal of coke was barred by limitation and the extended period could be invoked. (ii) Whether Cenvat credit of CVD paid on imported coal was admissible on the strength of invoices issued by the importer and whether the 2014 registration requirement applied retrospectively.

Issue (i): Whether the demand of duty on the alleged clandestine removal of coke was barred by limitation and the extended period could be invoked.

Analysis: The demand covered the period January 2013 to January 2014, while the notice was issued by invoking the extended period. The appellant had been filing ER-1 returns and had disclosed availment of the benefit of Notification No. 67/1995-CE. Since the relevant facts were already within the knowledge of the Revenue, the foundation for invoking the extended period was absent.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invokable and the duty demand on this issue failed; the confirmed demand and consequential penalty were set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether Cenvat credit of CVD paid on imported coal was admissible on the strength of invoices issued by the importer and whether the 2014 registration requirement applied retrospectively.

Analysis: The credit denial was based on Notification No. 8/2014-Central Excise (N.T.), which introduced a separate registration requirement for importers issuing cenvatable invoices from 01.04.2014. The disputed credit related to a prior period, so the notification could operate only prospectively. On that basis, the invoice issued by the importer remained a valid document for credit availment for the period in dispute.

Conclusion: The credit was rightly allowed, the Revenue's challenge failed, and the denial of Cenvat credit was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on both the limitation issue and the credit eligibility issue, and the Revenue's appeal did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: When the relevant facts are disclosed in statutory returns, the extended period cannot be invoked without suppression or concealment; and a notification imposing a new registration condition for availing credit operates prospectively unless expressly made retrospective.

Issues: Whether a scheme of arrangement or settlement approved in company proceedings can provide for quashing, compounding, dismissal, or discharge of pending criminal proceedings and thereby dilute the effect of criminal prosecution.

Analysis: The scheme clause seeking joint applications for quashing or dismissal of criminal proceedings was found impermissible. Serious offences alleged in the case were required to be carried to their logical conclusion before the competent criminal court. A civil forum could not determine or dilute the consequences of criminal prosecution by incorporating or accepting a settlement covenant to that effect. The clarification was also recorded that lifting of attachment or disbursement of settlement amounts would not affect the criminal case.

Conclusion: Such a covenant in the scheme could not be sustained to the extent it sought to affect criminal proceedings, and the criminal prosecution would continue independently.

Issues: (i) Whether Riddhi Siddhi complied with the minimum public shareholding requirements; and (ii) Whether the appellants indulged in fraudulent trading in the scrip for the purpose of reverse book building.

Issue (i): Whether Riddhi Siddhi complied with the minimum public shareholding requirements.

Analysis: The determination turned on whether Stuti, Siwana and Vital formed part of the promoter group under the ICDR Regulations. The Court applied the definition of promoter group, including immediate relatives and body corporates holding at least 20% in the issuer and in the other entity. On the shareholding material, the promoter-linked entities held more than 20% in Stuti and Siwana, and the promoter holding in Riddhi Siddhi exceeded the prescribed threshold if those entities were included. Vital was also treated as part of the promoter group on the basis of connected fund movements and surrounding circumstances, assessed on preponderance of probability.

Conclusion: Riddhi Siddhi did not comply with the minimum public shareholding norms, and this issue was decided against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellants indulged in fraudulent trading in the scrip for the purpose of reverse book building.

Analysis: The trading pattern, the low liquidity of the scrip, the large volume of inter se trades among connected persons, and the timing of the trades around the delisting exercise were treated as indicia of a scheme to project the scrip as liquid. The Court held that, once the connections and trades were established, the inference of fraudulent conduct was justified on the standard of preponderance of probability. The proportionality plea was accepted only to a limited extent for some appellants, given the quantity of trades and the absence of completed delisting.

Conclusion: The appellants were found to have indulged in illegal trades to project the scrip as liquid, and this issue was decided against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the regulatory findings substantially failed, but the debarment directions were moderated for certain appellants, resulting in only partial relief.

Ratio Decidendi: For determining promoter-group status and market misconduct in securities matters, the Court may rely on statutory definitions and surrounding circumstances, and may infer control or fraudulent design on the basis of preponderance of probability where the transaction pattern and connected dealings support that inference.

Issues: Whether disallowance of interest under section 94B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was barred by the non-discrimination clause in Article 24(4) of the India-Denmark DTAA and whether the disallowance could be sustained on the basis of Article 12(7) of the DTAA.

Analysis: Article 24(4) requires that interest paid by an enterprise of one contracting state to a resident of the other contracting state be deductible under the same conditions as if paid to a resident of the first state. Section 94B restricts interest deduction only where the borrowing is from a non-resident associated enterprise, and no corresponding restriction applies to resident associated enterprise borrowings. The differential treatment therefore turns on residence. Article 12(7) concerns excess interest arising from a special relationship and an arm's length deviation. Here, the transfer pricing order accepted the arm's length nature of the interest and made no adjustment on that basis; the impugned disallowance arose only from the statutory EBITDA-based limitation. In the absence of a treaty carve-out for thin capitalisation, the domestic restriction could not override the treaty protection. The alternative computational objections were treated as academic once the legal ground succeeded, though the claimed concerns on EBITDA and double inclusion of non-deductible items were also found to be sustainable.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 94B could not be sustained in view of Article 24(4) read with section 90(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the entire addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the treaty-based non-discrimination protection prevailed over the domestic thin-capitalisation disallowance in the facts of the case.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a domestic interest-limitation provision discriminates against payments to non-residents but the relevant treaty does not carve out thin-capitalisation rules, the treaty non-discrimination clause prevails and the restriction cannot be applied merely on residence-based differential treatment.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellate authority erred in admitting and relying upon documentary evidence produced for the first time at the appellate stage without following the procedure under Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962; (ii) Whether the deletion of the addition under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 treating the assessee's share of investment as unexplained was justified in view of the documentary evidence explaining source of funds.

Issue (i): Whether the appellate authority erred in admitting and relying upon documentary evidence produced for the first time at the appellate stage without following the procedure under Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Analysis: Rule 46A prescribes procedure for additional evidence at the appellate stage. The appellate authority possesses plenary, co-terminus powers with the assessing officer to examine and evaluate evidence placed before it. The documents produced at the appellate stage were documentary, self-explanatory and went to the root of the source of funds issue. The nature of the evidence and the authority's power to make enquiries and examine material are relevant factors in determining whether omission of a remand vitiates the appellate decision.

Conclusion: The appellate authority did not err in admitting and relying upon the documentary evidence at the appellate stage and the absence of a remand report under Rule 46A does not vitiate the order in the present facts.

Issue (ii): Whether the deletion of the addition under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 treating the assessee's share of investment as unexplained was justified in view of the documentary evidence explaining source of funds.

Analysis: The assessing officer's addition was founded on absence of supporting evidence. The appellate record contained a housing loan sanction letter in joint names, agreement evidencing sale proceeds received by the co-owner, property purchase agreements and bank statements reflecting transactions. These documents, taken together, explained the source of funds for the acquisition and addressed the core issue of fund flow. The assessee's plausible explanation and the character of the documents informed the appellate finding on the disputed addition under Section 69.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition under Section 69 was justified; the source of investment was satisfactorily explained in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: On the issues decided, the appellate authority rightly examined and accepted the documentary evidence produced at the appellate stage and correctly concluded that the investment was explained, resulting in lawful deletion of the addition under Section 69.

Ratio Decidendi: Where documentary evidence produced for the first time at the appellate stage is self-explanatory and goes to the root of the issue, the appellate authority, exercising its co-terminus powers, may examine and accept such evidence without a remand; acceptance of such evidence can justify deletion of an addition under Section 69 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessments framed under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the earlier assessment years were unsustainable in the absence of incriminating material qua the assessee; (ii) whether the assessments for assessment years 2020-21 and 2021-22 were liable to be quashed for having been framed under section 143(3) instead of the statutory scheme triggered by section 153C read with section 153A.

Issue (i): Whether the assessments framed under section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the earlier assessment years were unsustainable in the absence of incriminating material qua the assessee.

Analysis: The assessments for the relevant years had attained finality, and the additions were founded on material arising from search proceedings in the case of a third person. The legal position applied was that completed assessments under section 153C cannot be disturbed unless incriminating material belonging to, or relatable to, the assessee is found during search. The reasoning followed the settled principle that mere ledgers, disclosed entries, or general seized material do not by themselves establish the requisite jurisdictional basis in the absence of specific incriminating material.

Conclusion: The assessments under section 153C for the earlier assessment years were held to be bad in law and were quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessments for assessment years 2020-21 and 2021-22 were liable to be quashed for having been framed under section 143(3) instead of the statutory scheme triggered by section 153C read with section 153A.

Analysis: The date relevant for computing the block period in the case of a person other than the searched person was treated as the date on which the seized material was received by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, not the date of search in the case of the searched person. On that basis, the assessments for the later years fell within the six-year block and had to proceed under the search assessment framework. Framing the assessments under section 143(3) was treated as a fatal jurisdictional error.

Conclusion: The assessments for assessment years 2020-21 and 2021-22 were quashed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: All the challenged assessments were set aside on jurisdictional grounds, and the connected grounds on merits were left academic.

Ratio Decidendi: In a case relating to a person other than the searched person, the block period under section 153C is computed from the date the seized material is received by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, and completed assessments cannot be disturbed under section 153C without incriminating material found qua the assessee.

Issues: Whether the applicable GST rate on two men's pyjama sets packed in a single pack must be determined per pack (treating the multi-pack as a single retail unit) or per piece/set (treating each pyjama set as a separate piece for the purpose of Notification No. 1/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28.06.2017 and Notification No. 9/2025-Central Tax (Rate) dated 17.09.2025).

Analysis: The Appellate Authority examined the nature of the product (a pyjama set consisting of one top and one bottom), the packing (two such sets in a single pack per buyer instruction), the language of the relevant notifications and schedules which prescribe rates based on sale value "per piece", and the ordinary meaning and commercial understanding of "pyjama set" as a piece comprising top and bottom. The Authority considered whether a multi-pack containing multiple sets should be treated as a single retail unit for rate threshold purposes and observed that a pack containing multiple sets does not necessarily become a single retail unit; the relevant determination under the Notifications is the sale value per piece, where a piece is an independently usable apparel (here, one pyjama set). The Authority applied the notified schedules (Schedule I and Schedule II of Notification No. 1/2017 and the amended thresholds in Notification No. 9/2025) to the facts: the pack price of Rs. 1,371 represents two pieces (two pyjama sets), producing a per-piece price below the notified threshold, and therefore falling within the lower rate entry.

Conclusion: The Appellate Authority upheld the AAR ruling that each pyjama set (one top and one bottom) is a "piece" for the purposes of the Notifications; since the effective sale value per piece is Rs. 686 (less than the notified threshold), the transaction is liable to GST at 5% (CGST 2.5% + SGST 2.5%) and the appeal is dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner has locus standi to challenge the show-cause notice proposing confiscation in Form GST MOV-10 relating to the intercepted consignment; (ii) Whether the writ court should interfere with the show-cause notice under Section 130 of the Gujarat Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 proposing confiscation, on the factual matrix presented.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner has locus standi to challenge the show-cause notice proposing confiscation in Form GST MOV-10 relating to the intercepted consignment.

Analysis: The impugned documents show dispatch from Maharashtra and delivery in Gujarat and are not bill-to-ship transactions linking the petitioner, who is registered in a different jurisdiction, to the consignment as supplier, recipient, or transporter. The material on record raises doubt as to whether the petitioner is directly connected to the goods or the conveyance, and no attempt by the supplier, recipient, or transporter to seek release is recorded. Where the connection between the petitioner and the intercepted movement is not established by supporting statutory documents or by the E-way bill showing bill-to-ship linkage, the petitioner's standing to challenge confiscation proceedings is weak.

Conclusion: The petitioner does not have locus standi to sustain the challenge to the show-cause notice; this conclusion is adverse to the petitioner and in favour of the revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ court should interfere with the show-cause notice under Section 130 of the Gujarat Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 proposing confiscation, on the factual matrix presented.

Analysis: The impugned notice invokes confiscation grounds under Section 130(1) where document irregularities, mismatch in transaction particulars, and indicia of evasion are alleged. Precedent establishes that writ interference with a show-cause notice under Section 130 is inappropriate where the notice is issued to investigate evasion and where factual materials disclose possible forged or deceptive documentation, absence of proper dealer particulars, or similar indicia of intent to evade tax. The record contains discrepancies in e-way bill particulars and other documentary materials that raise serious doubts about the movement and the transaction, justifying adjudicatory proceedings under the statute rather than preemptive writ relief.

Conclusion: Interference with the show-cause notice is not warranted on the record; this conclusion is adverse to the petitioner and in favour of the revenue.

Final Conclusion: The petition challenging the show-cause notice is without merit on both standing and substance and is dismissed, leaving the statutory confiscation proceedings to be adjudicated by the prescribed authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the petitioner lacks a direct statutory connection to an intercepted consignment and the material discloses documentary discrepancies or indicia of evasion, writ jurisdiction should not be exercised to quash a show-cause notice under Section 130 of the Gujarat Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; such matters are to be decided in the statutory adjudication process.

Issues: (i) Whether an application for registration or renewal under section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be rejected merely because the trust deed does not contain an express irrevocability or dissolution clause. (ii) Whether treating a compelled "Yes" answer in Row 6 of Form 10AB, in the absence of an express irrevocability clause, as false or incorrect information and a specified violation can justify rejection of registration.

Issue (i): Whether an application for registration or renewal under section 12AB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be rejected merely because the trust deed does not contain an express irrevocability or dissolution clause.

Analysis: The statutory requirements under section 12AB are confined to satisfaction about the objects of the trust, genuineness of its activities, and compliance with material laws. The provision does not prescribe an express irrevocability clause as a condition precedent. Section 63 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 creates a deeming fiction for revocable transfers and must be strictly construed; absence of an irrevocability clause does not make a trust revocable. The trust law framework under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950, including the mechanisms for de-registration, disposal of assets, and application of the cy-pres doctrine, shows that public trust property cannot revert to the settlor. The absence of an express dissolution clause was also held earlier to be no ground for refusing registration, and the same logic applies to renewal under section 12AB.

Conclusion: The absence of an express irrevocability or dissolution clause is not a valid ground to reject registration or renewal under section 12AB.

Issue (ii): Whether treating a compelled "Yes" answer in Row 6 of Form 10AB, in the absence of an express irrevocability clause, as false or incorrect information and a specified violation can justify rejection of registration.

Analysis: The online utility required applicants to answer in a manner that did not reflect their deeds and then used that compelled response against them. A procedural form cannot override the statute or compel a declaration inconsistent with the legal position. Since the absence of an irrevocability clause does not make the trust revocable, a bona fide answer based on that position cannot be treated as false or incorrect information. Using the form-generated response as a specified violation was held to be arbitrary and unsustainable.

Conclusion: The compelled "Yes" answer in Form 10AB cannot be treated as false or incorrect information and cannot support rejection of registration.

Final Conclusion: The rejection orders were quashed, the challenged registrations were restored for reconsideration in accordance with law, and the revenue authorities were directed not to insist on an express irrevocability or dissolution clause as a threshold requirement for section 12AB registration.

Ratio Decidendi: A charitable trust is to be treated as irrevocable unless the instrument expressly reserves a power of revocation, and registration under section 12AB cannot be denied on the basis of a condition not found in the statute or on a form response compelled by an erroneous online utility.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2014-15 is barred by limitation.

Analysis: The statutory scheme prescribes two distinct computational regimes for search-triggered assessments: a six-year period described as "six assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which such search is conducted" and an extended ten-year period described as "not later than ten assessment years from the end of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted" (Explanation 1 to Section 153A(1)(b)). The differing phraseology is deliberate and requires different anchoring points. The six-year block excludes the search assessment year by virtue of the phrase "immediately preceding", whereas the ten-year block is to be reckoned from the end of the search assessment year and therefore includes the search assessment year as the first year of the ten-year block. Prior authorities applying the same interpretive approach are on point and the ten-year computation that includes the search year results in an outer limit which, in the present facts, excludes the Assessment Year 2014-15 from the permissible ten-year window.

Conclusion: The notice dated 26.03.2025 issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2014-15 is barred by limitation and is quashed and set aside.

Issues: Whether receipts under Annual Maintenance Contracts (AMC) for Assessment Year 2022-23 should be recognised and taxed upfront in the year of receipt or recognised over the period of the contract on a straight-line basis in view of Section 43CB of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and applicable ICDS.

Analysis: Section 43CB prescribes that profits and gains from a contract for providing services involving an indeterminate number of acts over a specific period of time shall be determined on the basis of the straight line method and that contracts of specified shorter duration are to be handled by the project completion method; ICDS notified under section 145 prescribes revenue recognition for such contracts. The AMC here involves rendering maintenance services over a defined tenure with an indeterminate number of service acts and contains clauses permitting cancellation and proportionate refund; the provision was inserted with effect from 01.04.2017 and therefore governs AY 2022-23. Earlier decisions under a different legal regime or for prior assessment years do not override the statutory mandate applicable for the relevant assessment year. The authorities below relied on prior judicial decisions in the assessee's own case without applying Section 43CB and ICDS to the facts of the impugned year; that approach failed to apply the statutory framework operative for AY 2022-23.

Conclusion: The recognition of AMC revenue over the period of the contract on a straight-line basis is legally correct for Assessment Year 2022-23 and the addition made by the Assessing Officer is to be deleted; the assessee's appeal is allowed.