Issues: (i) Whether the assessment and recovery proceedings arising from GST notices and assessment orders issued for alleged non-registration and non-payment of GST on seigniorage fee/royalty should be kept in abeyance pending the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and whether interim relief in the form of a conditional deposit is appropriate.

Analysis: The proceedings under challenge arise from assessment and summary orders under the GST enactments concerning levy of GST on seigniorage fee/royalty and alleged non-compliance under the reverse charge mechanism. The question of levy is pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and there exists a prior High Court order in closely similar facts directing that proceedings be kept in abeyance until the Supreme Court decides the issue, with an interim condition that the petitioner deposit a portion of the disputed tax as security. The present petition involves substantially identical factual and legal issues and no new legal controversy has been raised that would require a different course of action.

Conclusion: (i) The assessment and recovery proceedings are to be kept in abeyance pending the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court on the levy of GST on seigniorage fee/royalty; the petitioner is directed to deposit 10% of the disputed tax as security. The writ petition is disposed of on the same terms as the earlier decision.

Issues: Whether the re-assessment proceedings initiated by notice dated 04.02.2020 for Assessment Year 2015-16 are barred by limitation under the first proviso to Section 153(2) read with the first proviso to Explanation 1 to Section 153 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the extended limitation under Section 153(6)(i) applies by reason of the High Court's order dated 29.08.2023 (i.e., whether that order contains any 'finding' or 'direction' within the meaning of Section 153(6)(i)).

Analysis: The legal framework comprises Section 148 (notice for reopening), Section 153(2) and Explanation 1 provisos (ordinary limitation and exclusions/extensions) and Section 153(6)(i) (extended limitation where assessment is in consequence of or to give effect to a finding or direction contained in specified orders). For Section 153(6)(i) to apply, the prerequisite is that the principal order must contain a 'finding' or 'direction' that is necessary for disposal of the relevant case and that governs or controls the course of assessment, reassessment or recomputation. Orders that merely remand the matter with timelines, permit filing of objections, direct personal hearing or lay down procedural steps without expressing findings or mandatory directions do not qualify. Applying these principles, the High Court's order dated 29.08.2023 only remitted the matter to the Assessing Officer with timelines for supply of reasons, filing and disposal of objections, and for personal hearing; it expressly disclaimed any observation on merits. Such procedural remand does not amount to a 'finding' or 'direction' within the meaning of Section 153(6)(i). Computing limitation with exclusion period and the additional sixty-day extension as per the provisos yields the last date for passing assessment as 19.02.2024, by which no assessment order was passed; accordingly the re-assessment is time-barred.

Conclusion: The re-assessment proceedings are barred by limitation; Section 153(6)(i) does not apply because the High Court's order dated 29.08.2023 contains no 'finding' or 'direction' as required; the writ petition is allowed in favour of the petitioner (assessee) and the rule is made absolute disposing the petition on the ground of limitation.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax paid on sales/agency commission paid to sole selling agents qualifies as Cenvat creditable input service under Rule 2(1) and Rule 3 of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004; (ii) Whether demands confirmed (including interest and penalty) for the periods in issue are sustainable having regard to limitation.

Issue (i): Whether service tax paid on sales/agency commission paid to sole selling agents qualifies as input service eligible for Cenvat credit.

Analysis: The definition of "input service" in Rule 2(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 includes services used "in or in relation to the manufacture of final products and clearance of final products up to the place of removal" and expressly includes "advertisement or sales promotion". The agreement governing the agency/marketing arrangement shows that the agent performed marketing functions that encompassed promotion, identification of prospective customers, negotiation, order forwarding and collection, maintenance of sales network and related activities. Administrative and statutory clarifications and amendments (Circular No. 943/4/2011-CX dated 29.04.2011; F. No. 96/85/2015-CX1 dated 07.12.2015; Notification No. 2/2016-CE (NT) dated 03.02.2016) treat sales promotion to include sale of dutiable goods on commission basis and explain that where the agent undertakes sales promotion activities, the service falls within the input service definition. Tribunal and appellate precedents applying these principles where promotional elements are present were followed, and prior adverse authority limited to pure trading agents was distinguished.

Conclusion: The service tax paid on sales/agency commission is an input service and Cenvat credit is allowable where the agency services include sales promotion and marketing activities; decision is in favour of the assessee on this issue.

Issue (ii): Whether demands (including interest and penalty) for the periods in issue are sustainable having regard to limitation.

Analysis: The orders confirming demands for certain subsequent periods were set aside on appeal by the tax authority and were not challenged further. There is no finding of suppression warranting invocation of extended limitation in the record relied upon by the adjudicating authority for the periods under appeal.

Conclusion: The demands with interest and penalty for the periods under challenge are unsustainable; conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeals are allowed and the impugned orders confirming denial of Cenvat credit on sales/agency commission and imposing related demand, interest and penalty are set aside; the assessee is entitled to consequential relief in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where agency/commission arrangements demonstrably include sales promotion and marketing functions, service tax on commission constitutes an "input service" under Rule 2(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 and is eligible for Cenvat credit; amendments and board circulars clarifying that sales on commission can amount to sales promotion are applicable.

Issues: Whether the omission/repeal by Notification No.20/2024 dated 08.10.2024 of Rule 96(10) (and Rule 89(4B)) of the Central Goods and Service Tax Rules, 2017 applies to pending proceedings and thereby renders impugned show-cause notices and orders liable to be quashed, entitling petitioners to maintain refund claims of IGST.

Analysis: The matter was decided following a prior decision rendered on 20.11.2025 which interpreted Notification No.20/2024 as omitting Rule 96(10) prospectively and holding that omission without a saving clause applies to pending proceedings that have not reached finality. The prior reasoning, supported by authority on the legal consequences of repeal without saving clauses, explains that repeal in the absence of a saving clause results in the obliteration of the repealed provision except insofar as it governs transactions that are past and closed; proceedings not finalised at the time of omission therefore do not survive. Applying those conclusions to the present petitions, the impugned show-cause notices and orders that remained pending or not finally adjudicated as on 08.10.2024 are not preserved and stand lapsed; the petitioners are entitled to prosecute refund claims under the remaining operative provisions and to have pending refund applications processed. The order implements reliefs granted in the lead decision, including quashing of impugned actions and directions for processing refunds within a specified time frame.

Conclusion: The omission/repeal effected by Notification No.20/2024 dated 08.10.2024 of Rule 96(10) and Rule 89(4B) of the Central Goods and Service Tax Rules, 2017 applies to pending proceedings which had not attained finality as on 08.10.2024; the impugned show-cause notices and orders are quashed and set aside, and the petitioners are entitled to maintain and have processed their IGST refund claims. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Order-in-Original dated 26 December 2023 confirming a demand of Rs. 12,66,19,880/- under Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 (read with corresponding provisions) against the petitioner in respect of transactions in vouchers is sustainable.

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory definition of "voucher" (Section 2(118) of the CGST Act, 2017) and the definition of "money" (Section 2(75) of the CGST Act, 2017), and considered relevant authority and administrative clarification. The Board's Circular No. 243/37/2024-GST dated 31.12.2024 was relied on to clarify that transactions in vouchers themselves are instruments creating an obligation to accept them as consideration or part consideration and, therefore, transactions in vouchers are not themselves supplies of goods or services; rather the supply of the underlying goods or services for which vouchers are used as consideration may be taxable. The Court noted paragraph 4.3 of the circular which treats distributors/sub-distributors/agents as acting on a principal-agent basis and makes commission/fee payable to such agents taxable as services. The impugned order treated voucher sale/purchase as within the scope of supply under Section 7 of the CGST Act, 2017 and confirmed tax demand on the petitioner's entire turnover. The Court found that, prima facie, where the petitioner receives commission/fees in dealing with vouchers, only such commission/fees would be liable to GST and not the entire turnover. The Court also noted the subsequent legislative change by deletion of sub-section (4) of Section 12 of the CGST Act, 2017 by the Finance Act, 2025 (notified 17.09.2025), affecting the time of supply treatment of vouchers. In view of these considerations, the Court held that the specific portion of the impugned order confirming the stated demand requires fresh examination by respondent no. 2 after affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The portion of the Order-in-Original dated 26 December 2023 confirming the demand of Rs. 12,66,19,880/- under Section 73 of the CGST Act, 2017 is quashed and set aside and remitted to respondent no. 2 for de novo consideration in accordance with law after granting the petitioner an opportunity of hearing; the petition is disposed of accordingly (favouring the assessee on this issue).

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the search and seizure action under the GST law and the consequent seizure of goods and records was maintainable at the stage when proceedings under Section 74 had already been initiated, and whether the petitioner was entitled to immediate release of the seized goods in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The petition arose from search and seizure proceedings conducted by GST under the statutory power of search. The Court noted that, after completion of the search and seizure, a notice under Section 74 had already been issued and the petitioners were required to participate in those proceedings before assailing any eventual order in accordance with law. Applying the principles of judicial restraint and limited review under Article 226, the Court held that the sufficiency of the material or reasons leading to the search authorization could not be examined as if in appeal. On the request for release of seized goods, the Court recorded that the respondents were willing to release the goods on production of valid documents, but such documents had not been produced.

Conclusion: The challenge to the search and seizure was held to be premature and no interference under Article 226 was warranted. The claim for release of the seized goods was also not accepted on the facts placed before the Court.

Issues: Whether the seized imported consignment of multifunctional devices may be provisionally released pending adjudication and, if so, on what conditions.

Analysis: The petition challenges a seizure memo seeking interim release of the imported goods. The Court relied on precedent of similar writ petitions where conditional interim release was ordered and the Supreme Court declined to interfere with that interim relief while permitting adjudication to proceed. The Court noted that the present stage concerns only provisional release and that the adjudicating authority's right to decide the matter on merits remains reserved. The Court identified practical conditions to protect revenue interests consisting of (i) deposit/payment of the enhanced duty amount following customs quantification within specified timelines, (ii) provision of a bank guarantee equal to 10% of the total price of the goods, (iii) maintenance and production of transaction details if the goods are provisionally sold, and (iv) objective consideration of any application for waiver of demurrage charges.

Conclusion: The writ petition is allowed and the respondent authorities are directed to pass an order for provisional release of the goods subject to the conditions of prompt customs quantification, payment/deposit of the enhanced duty within the prescribed period, provision of a bank guarantee equal to 10% of the total price, maintenance and production of customer transaction details if sales occur, and consideration of any demurrage waiver application; the adjudicating authority remains at liberty to decide the adjudication proceedings on merits without being influenced by this order.

Issues: Whether the show-cause notices and the consequent proceedings under the foreign exchange law were liable to be quashed on the ground of inordinate delay, having regard to the period of the transactions, the date of issuance of notices, and the applicable record-preservation rules.

Analysis: The appeals concerned transactions that had occurred years before the show-cause notices were issued, and the notices were served close to the expiry of the sunset period. The governing principle applied was that where no express limitation period is prescribed, proceedings must still be initiated within a reasonable period, the reasonableness of which depends on the facts of each case. The record-preservation framework for banks required preservation only for specified periods, unless a longer period had been directed by the Reserve Bank of India, and no such direction was shown. The gap between the transactions, the initiation of inquiry, and the issuance of the notices was treated as excessive and unfair in the circumstances.

Conclusion: The show-cause notices and the proceedings founded on them were liable to be quashed for delay, and the impugned orders of the Appellate Tribunal could not stand.

Ratio Decidendi: Even where the statute does not prescribe a limitation period, proceedings must be initiated within a reasonable time, and a notice issued after the legally relevant record-preservation period and close to the expiry of the enforcement regime may be struck down as delayed and unreasonable.

Issues: (i) Whether M/s Zaveri Exports Pvt. Ltd. and its director contravened Sections 3(a), 3(b) and 42(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999; (ii) Whether the penalties imposed under Section 13(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 required reduction.

Issue (i): Whether M/s Zaveri Exports Pvt. Ltd. and its director contravened Sections 3(a), 3(b) and 42(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.

Analysis: The decision examines contemporaneous entries in a seized spiral pad, WhatsApp chats, and voluntary statements recorded under Section 37 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999. The entries in the company records are corroborated by admissions that payments were made in cash to agents on instructions of Dubai-based dealers and by electronic contemporaneous material identifying a specific payment. The standard of proof applicable to adjudicatory proceedings under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 is preponderance of probabilities. The phraseology of Section 3(b) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 covers payments made in India to agents acting on behalf of persons resident outside India, and such payments fall within the prohibition unless routed through an authorised person. Evidence of unaccounted sales and unexplained excess stock buttress the inference that the transactions were not conducted through authorised import channels. The director's position as promoter, major shareholder, and person in charge, together with his admissions, establishes knowledge and involvement relevant to liability under Section 42(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.

Conclusion: The contraventions of Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 by M/s Zaveri Exports Pvt. Ltd. and the imposition of liability on Shri Sunil Kumar Tayal under Section 42(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 are upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalties imposed under Section 13(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 require reduction.

Analysis: While the adjudicatory finding of contravention is maintained, the record does not contain an adequate, reasoned quantification explaining exercise of discretion to impose maximum penalties. Principles of proportionality andreasoned exercise of discretion in penalty imposition require that the quantum be related to the amount of contravention, nature of the contravention, and admissions on record. Having regard to established contraventions quantified from the material on record, a reduction of penalty to an amount equivalent to the proved contravention on the corporate respondent and a proportionate reduction for the director is warranted.

Conclusion: The penalty on M/s Zaveri Exports Pvt. Ltd. is reduced to Rs. 13,00,00,000 and the penalty on Shri Sunil Kumar Tayal is reduced to Rs. 3,00,00,000; the remainder of the penalties as originally imposed are set aside.

Final Conclusion: The adjudicatory findings of contravention under the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 are affirmed while the penalties are moderated on grounds of proportionality and inadequate quantification by the Adjudicating Authority; the appeals are disposed of accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: Admissions recorded under Section 37 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 together with contemporaneous business records and electronic communications can constitute sufficient corroborative evidence under the preponderance of probabilities to establish payments made for or on behalf of persons resident outside India, and penalties under Section 13(1) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 must be quantified by a reasoned exercise of discretion proportionate to the established contravention.

Issues: Whether the impugned order-in-original dated 21.08.2025 confirming service tax, interest and penalty against the petitioner (for tax periods 2016-17 and 2017-18 up to June 2017) could be sustained where (i) the petitioner had undergone a change of name, (ii) claimed exemption for export of services under special economic zone arrangements, and (iii) there existed a second service tax registration which the petitioner was directed to cancel.

Analysis: The proceedings involved two registrations and alleged undeclared taxable receipts attributable to the second registration. The adjudicating authority's treatment of documents filed in the name reflecting the changed corporate name was examined in the context of whether the authority applied independent mind to the name change and the petitioner's claim of exemption for export of services under SEZ-related law. The relevance of non-filing under the second registration, the question of invocation of extended limitation on the basis of alleged willful suppression, and the availability of statutory appellate remedy were addressed. It was observed that if the transactions relevantly relate to the first registration and exports from SEZ, liability under the second registration would not properly attach; accordingly, the matter required fresh consideration after the petitioner places relevant materials and takes steps to cancel the second registration so that adjudication proceeds on correct factual and legal basis. Directions were given for cancellation of the second registration within a specified time and for completion of fresh adjudication within a reasonable timeline after such steps.

Conclusion: The impugned order-in-original dated 21.08.2025 is set aside and the matter is remitted to the adjudicating authority to decide afresh after considering the materials placed by the petitioner and upon cancellation of the second registration; petitioner to cancel the second registration within four weeks and the adjudicating authority to conclude proceedings preferably within eight weeks thereafter. No order as to costs.

Issues: Whether the show cause notice dated 30 December 2020 issued without issuing a pre-show cause consultation notice (as mandated by Board circulars) was valid.

Analysis: The Court examined the applicability of Section 37B and Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (as applied via the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017) and the Master Circular dated 10 March 2017 and Circular dated 19 November 2020 which mandate pre-show cause consultations in cases of demands above Rs. 50 lakhs. The Court noted that the Board, under Section 37B, can issue binding instructions to Central Excise officers and that Section 37C prescribes modes of service of summons and notices. The Court found that the circulars require a distinct pre-consultation notice/consultation process prior to issuance of a show cause notice in specified cases and that the Department's reliance on issuing a summons or other intimation in lieu of the mandated pre-consultation notice was inconsistent with the mandatory requirements of the circulars. The Court also considered precedent of the Division Bench in Rochem Separation Systems (India) Pvt. Ltd., which quashed similar show cause notices and directed issuance of pre-consultation notices with specified timelines, and applied the same principles to the facts of the present petition.

Conclusion: The impugned show cause notice dated 30 December 2020 is quashed and set aside; the Department is directed to issue a pre-consultation notice within three weeks and complete the pre-consultation process within six weeks of receipt, after which it may take further steps. The petition is allowed in favour of the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the High Court can entertain a writ petition under Article 226 seeking waiver of the mandatory pre-deposit required by Section 107(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 in respect of an appeal against an order passed under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The Court examined the statutory scheme of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, in particular Section 107(6) which mandates deposit of ten percent of the remaining amount of tax in dispute (subject to the stated cap) as a condition precedent to filing an appeal under Section 107. The petition sought advance waiver of that statutory pre-deposit condition so as to enable filing of an appeal. The Court noted that the statutory provision prescribes the pre-deposit as a mandatory pre-condition for filing an appeal and that there is no provision for a prior application to the High Court to dispense with or waive that condition. The High Court held that it cannot assume the role of the Appellate Authority to grant relief which the statute prescribes as a prerequisite to an appeal; the proper forum for contesting the pre-deposit requirement is the appellate process provided under the Act and not by circumventing the statutory condition through a writ petition seeking an advance waiver.

Conclusion: The writ petition seeking waiver of the mandatory pre-deposit under Section 107(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is misconceived and is dismissed.

Issues: Whether the High Court was correct in reversing the findings of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and affirming the assessment/decision of the Assessing Officer and Commissioner of Income Tax.

Analysis: The Supreme Court examined the High Court's reversal of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision and the High Court's affirmation of the Assessing Officer's and Commissioner of Income Tax's determination. The Court found the High Court's legal conclusion to be correct and justified on the record, thereby endorsing the High Court's conclusion that the assessment/decision under challenge was sustainable.

Conclusion: The High Court's reversal of the Tribunal and affirmation of the Assessing Officer's and Commissioner of Income Tax's decision is upheld; the civil appeals are dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether gratuity and leave encashment paid on voluntary retirement were deductible only as part of the voluntary retirement scheme under section 35DDA, or were separately allowable business expenditure; (ii) whether the consideration received for transfer of self-generated trademarks along with goodwill prior to the amendment to section 55(2)(a) was a capital receipt or revenue receipt; (iii) whether the consideration received for transfer of marketing rights and know-how was a capital receipt or revenue receipt.

Issue (i): Whether gratuity and leave encashment paid on voluntary retirement were deductible only as part of the voluntary retirement scheme under section 35DDA, or were separately allowable business expenditure.

Analysis: The terminal benefits of gratuity and leave encashment were treated as post-retirement benefits arising from service conditions, distinct from the compensation paid under the voluntary retirement scheme. Section 35DDA applied to expenditure incurred in connection with voluntary retirement, and the separate benefits could not be merged into the amortisable VRS expenditure. The later insertion of section 43B(f) did not alter the treatment of pre-amendment expenditure for the relevant year.

Conclusion: The disallowance was not sustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the consideration received for transfer of self-generated trademarks along with goodwill prior to the amendment to section 55(2)(a) was a capital receipt or revenue receipt.

Analysis: The trademarks were self-generated intangible assets transferred under a deed of assignment before the statutory amendment that brought trademarks and brand names within the capital gains computation scheme. The legal position applied was that an asset with no ascertainable cost of acquisition could not be charged to capital gains under sections 45 and 48 in the absence of an enabling amendment. The assignment of trademarks, even with associated goodwill, was therefore not taxable as business income or capital gains for the relevant period, and sections 28(iv) and 41(1) were inapplicable.

Conclusion: The amount received for transfer of trademarks was held to be a capital receipt and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the consideration received for transfer of marketing rights and know-how was a capital receipt or revenue receipt.

Analysis: Marketing rights were treated as an income-earning apparatus and not as stock-in-trade. Their transfer resulted in cessation of the source of revenue, so the compensation received was linked to relinquishment of a capital source rather than to ordinary trading profits. The separate transfer of know-how was also treated as part of the capital arrangement and not as a revenue inflow.

Conclusion: The receipts for transfer of marketing rights and know-how were held to be capital in nature and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The substantial questions of law were answered for the assessee, the revenue's challenge failed, and the connected tax matters were finally disposed of by sustaining relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For periods prior to the statutory amendment, self-generated trademarks with no ascertainable cost of acquisition are not chargeable to capital gains, and compensation for relinquishment of an income-earning apparatus is capital in nature rather than business income.

Issues: Whether gain arising from trading in stock derivatives is taxable in India under Article 13(3A) of the India-Mauritius DTAA as gain from alienation of shares, or whether such gain falls under Article 13(4) and is taxable only in the State of residence.

Analysis: Shares and derivatives are legally and commercially distinct assets. A derivative is a separate financial contract deriving value from an underlying asset, but it is not itself a share or an interest in share capital. The treaty language in Article 13(3A) refers specifically to "shares", and cannot be expanded to cover derivative transactions merely because the underlying reference asset is shares. Where the treaty does not define the term with sufficient breadth, the ordinary legal meaning and the domestic law understanding support treating derivatives as separate from shares. Consequently, gains from alienation of stock derivatives do not fall within the specific charging limb for shares under Article 13(3A).

Conclusion: Gain from trading in stock derivatives is not taxable in India under Article 13(3A) of the India-Mauritius DTAA and is covered by Article 13(4), making it taxable only in the State of residence. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a donation made in discharge of corporate social responsibility (CSR) obligations (and disallowed as business expenditure under Explanation 2 to section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961) can nevertheless qualify for deduction under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the donee institution satisfies the conditions of section 80G.

Analysis: The Tribunal examined the interplay between Explanation 2 to section 37(1) and Chapter VI-A, particularly section 80G and its sub provisions. The Court noted that Explanation 2 to section 37(1) operates to disallow CSR expenditure as a business deduction but does not, by its language, expressly restrict or override specific deductions provided in Chapter VI-A. The decision relied on consistent precedents of coordinate benches of the Ahmedabad Tribunal which held that Chapter VI-A deductions operate independently and that donations meeting the statutory conditions of section 80G (including approval under section 80G(5) and payment through banking channels, and not falling within exclusions in section 80G(2)) are eligible for deduction even if they also discharge CSR obligations under section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013. Applying these principles to the facts where the assessee had not claimed the amount as a business deduction but sought deduction under section 80G and the donees were duly approved under section 80G(5), the Tribunal found no statutory bar to allow the section 80G deduction.

Conclusion: Deduction under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is allowable for donations that satisfy the statutory requirements of section 80G even if those donations were made in discharge of CSR obligations and disallowed as business expenditure under Explanation 2 to section 37(1). The disallowance by the Assessing Officer and its confirmation by the CIT(A) are set aside; the addition of Rs.2,88,00,000 is deleted and the Department's appeal is dismissed (in favour of the assessee).

Ratio Decidendi: Explanation 2 to section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 bars CSR expenditure as a business deduction but does not, in itself, negate or restrict separate deductions under Chapter VI-A; where statutory conditions of section 80G are satisfied, section 80G deduction must be allowed.

Issues: Whether the penalty and allied customs consequences imposed on the petitioner were unsustainable for want of sufficient incriminating material and whether parity could be claimed from relief granted to the carrier.

Analysis: The statement of the passenger recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 was found to be consistent across multiple occasions and was supported by collateral material, including the statement of the other noticee and forensic extraction from the mobile phone, which connected the petitioner with the smuggling and exchange arrangement. The Court treated the Section 108 statement as admissible material capable of being used as substantive evidence in customs proceedings. On that basis, the petitioner's involvement in acts rendering the goods liable to confiscation and the imposition of penalty under the Customs Act, 1962 were held to be justified. The plea of parity based on the relief granted to the carrier was rejected, as Article 14 could not be invoked to seek equal treatment with a person who had violated the law.

Conclusion: The challenge to the customs penalties and related findings failed, and the petitioner was not entitled to relief on the ground of alleged insufficiency of evidence or parity.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to pre-arrest bail in a customs investigation alleging undervaluation and mis-declaration of imported goods, and whether custodial interrogation was necessary.

Analysis: The application was considered under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, on principles governing anticipatory bail and the need to balance personal liberty against the requirements of investigation. The allegations arose from documentary material, a statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962, and a seizure of cash, but the record showed that the imported goods had been examined and cleared by the proper customs officer, and no strong prima facie material independently established undervaluation at the applicant's instance. The Court also noted the absence of past antecedents, the applicant's readiness to join investigation, and the availability of the relevant records with the respondents, which reduced the necessity for custodial interrogation.

Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to pre-arrest bail, and custodial interrogation was found unnecessary; the relief was granted with conditions.

Ratio Decidendi: In a predominantly documentary customs investigation, anticipatory bail may be granted where custodial interrogation is not shown to be necessary, the accused is willing to cooperate, and no substantive material justifies arrest at the stage of pre-arrest protection.

Issues: (i) Whether the recall application should be allowed to set aside the Tribunal's judgment dated 25.07.2025 insofar as it held the applicant to be ineligible under Section 29A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether proceedings of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of the corporate debtor should continue from the stage of issuance of a fresh Form-G.

Issue (i): Whether the Applicant Cosmic CRF Limited is ineligible to be a resolution applicant under Section 29A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and whether the Tribunal's earlier findings to that effect should be recalled.

Analysis: The Tribunal reviewed expert reports, statutory provisions, and judicial precedents addressing the temporal test for clause (c), the scope of connected persons and persons acting in concert, and the purposive object of Section 29A. The material on record showed cross-shareholding, directorships and post-resolution asset transfers connecting the applicant and its promoters with a previously NPA entity (CFAL), retention of operational roles post-resolution, and corporate guarantees linked to entities in the same group. The Committee of Creditors had relied heavily on a senior counsel's opinion in reaching eligibility, but the Tribunal examined the underlying facts and reports, applied the see-through / de facto control approach, considered the first proviso to clause (c) and the requirement that overdue amounts must be paid to remove disqualification, and observed incomplete disclosure and unresolved factual gaps (including invocation/enforcement status of guarantees). On balance and adopting a purposive interpretation of Section 29A informed by precedent, the Tribunal found that disqualifying connections and factual indicia of continued de facto control existed such that ineligibility attached under the provisions considered.

Conclusion: The recall application insofar as it sought to set aside the Tribunal's holding that Cosmic CRF Limited was ineligible under Section 29A is dismissed; the earlier findings of ineligibility are retained.

Issue (ii): Whether the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process of Amzen Transportation Industries Ltd. should be directed to continue from the stage of issuance of a fresh Form-G.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted compliance steps already undertaken by the resolution professional following the earlier order and the existence of received EOIs and pending resolution-plan related timelines. Given the dismissal of the recall on eligibility grounds and the need to progress CIRP, the Tribunal considered continuation appropriate while also directing an independent inquiry by the Insolvency regulator into related procedural and disclosure issues.

Conclusion: Proceedings of the CIRP shall continue with immediate effect and further processing, including issuance of a fresh Form G and related steps, is directed to proceed.

Final Conclusion: The recall application is dismissed; the Tribunal's earlier determination that the applicant is ineligible under Section 29A stands and the CIRP process for the corporate debtor is ordered to continue without interruption while regulatory inquiry is permitted.

Ratio Decidendi: Where material facts and documentary indicia show substantive (de facto) connections, control or continuing involvement of a resolution applicant or its connected persons with an entity whose account was classified as NPA, and the statutory gateway in Section 29A (including its proviso) is not satisfied, the resolution applicant can be held ineligible; eligibility must be assessed on substance (de facto control and acting in concert) at the plan submission date and through purposive application of Section 29A.

Issues: (i) Whether the material on record established the appellant's contravention of the foreign exchange provisions invoked in the show cause notice. (ii) Whether the penalty imposed required interference in view of the long delay in adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether the material on record established the appellant's contravention of the foreign exchange provisions invoked in the show cause notice.

Analysis: The seized documents, the statements of the co-noticees, and the surrounding enquiries were found to disclose the modus operandi of the transactions and the appellant's role in converting and transferring funds through the Indo-Bangladesh border. The appellant did not produce evidence to rebut the material relied upon. The finding of contravention was therefore sustained.

Conclusion: The contravention was held to be established.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty imposed required interference in view of the long delay in adjudication.

Analysis: The delay in conclusion of the adjudication was treated as a relevant mitigating circumstance. The Tribunal considered that the earlier dispensation of pre-deposit did not terminate the proceedings, but the lapse of time and the mitigating effect of delay justified interference with the quantum of penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty was reduced.

Final Conclusion: The adjudication on merits was upheld, but the penal consequence was substantially moderated on account of the delay, resulting in partial relief to the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Where contravention is otherwise established on the basis of seized documents and corroborated statements, the quantum of penalty may still be reduced if protracted delay in adjudication constitutes a material mitigating factor.