Issues: (i) Whether the assessment order passed under Section 73 of the U.P. GST Act, 2017 was sustainable when the date of hearing was fixed anterior to the last date for filing reply, thereby denying a fair opportunity of hearing; (ii) Whether the appellate order rejecting the appeal on limitation was sustainable when the explanation for delay was not considered.

Issue (i): Whether the assessment order passed under Section 73 of the U.P. GST Act, 2017 was sustainable when the date of hearing was fixed anterior to the last date for filing reply, thereby denying a fair opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: The notice and hearing dates reflected an inconsistency, as the date of personal hearing preceded the last date for submission of reply. Such a course could not afford a meaningful opportunity to respond before the order was passed. The resulting ex parte assessment was therefore inconsistent with fair procedure.

Conclusion: The assessment order was not sustainable and was liable to be set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate order rejecting the appeal on limitation was sustainable when the explanation for delay was not considered.

Analysis: The appeal memo contained a specific plea that the assessment order had not been personally served and that the appeal was filed upon knowledge of the order. The appellate authority rejected the appeal without dealing with that explanation and without recording a reasoned consideration of the request for condonation.

Conclusion: The appellate order was unsustainable and was liable to be set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned assessment and appellate orders were quashed, and the matter was remitted for fresh hearing and decision after affording the petitioner an effective opportunity of being heard.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudication under GST that fixes a hearing before the expiry of the reply period, or rejects a limitation plea without considering the explanation offered, violates fair procedure and cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the reversal of ineligible input tax credit, the payment of interest and penalty, and the declaration seeking closure under Section 74(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were voluntary or were made under coercion, and whether the closure order under Section 74(6) was liable to be set aside with consequential restoration of proceedings and exclusion of time for limitation.

Analysis: The reversal of input tax credit was made during the inspection and in the presence of the inspecting authorities. The mere allegation of coercion was held insufficient by itself and had to be supported by corroborative material and surrounding circumstances. The absence of any complaint to higher authorities for a considerable period weighed against the plea of involuntariness, but the timing of the reversal during the ongoing inspection provided some support to the assessee's case. The Court applied the test that voluntariness must be assessed from attending circumstances, and that coercion cannot be presumed only from a later assertion. At the same time, the Court recognised that if the closure under Section 74(6) were set aside, the position must be restored so that the Revenue is not deprived of the opportunity to proceed under Section 73 or 74 and the statutory time limit is not defeated.

Conclusion: The finding that the reversal was not voluntary was not disturbed, but the relief was modified by restoring the proceedings to the stage prior to the declaration under Section 74(5), permitting the Proper Officer to proceed under Sections 73 or 74, and excluding the intervening period for limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: A declaration under Section 74(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 can be treated as involuntary only when coercion or pressure is established from corroborative surrounding circumstances; if such declaration is set aside, the proceedings must be restored so that the statutory scheme and limitation under Sections 73 and 74 are not defeated.

Issues: Whether the provision for interest payable to members of a co-operative society was disallowable under section 43B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and if not, whether the amount was allowable on accrual basis and the assessee could claim deduction on the enhanced profits.

Analysis: Section 43B is a special provision governing deduction only for liabilities specifically enumerated in clauses (a) to (f). In respect of interest, clause (e) applies only to interest payable on loans or advances from a scheduled bank, co-operative bank, public financial institution, State financial corporation or State industrial investment corporation. The liability in question related to deposits received from members of the assessee co-operative society, and no material showed that the payments were made to any institution covered by section 43B(e). The statutory condition for invoking section 43B therefore was not met. Once section 43B was found inapplicable, the expenditure had to be tested under the normal provisions, and the accrued interest liability accounted for in the books was allowable on accrual basis. The alternative contention was also accepted that, since deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) was held to be available, any enhancement in business profits on account of the addition would also qualify for deduction.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 43B was unsustainable, the addition of the provision for interest payable was directed to be deleted, and the assessee succeeded.

Issues: Whether the rectification under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, denying exemption under section 11 on the ground of alleged belated filing of Form 10B was valid.

Analysis: The return of income had been filed within the extended time granted by CBDT Circular No. 01/2022, and the assessee had taken steps to file Form 10B on the same date. The earlier processing under section 143(1) had accepted the assessee's explanation regarding technical difficulties on the e-filing portal and allowed the exemption. The subsequent rectification merely revisited the same disputed factual issue and effectively reviewed the earlier acceptance, which is beyond the scope of section 154. The rectification was also made without granting an opportunity of hearing as required under section 154(3).

Conclusion: The rectification order was invalid and the denial of exemption under section 11 could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to restoration of the original intimation allowing the exemption, and the appeal succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 154 cannot be used to reopen or review a concluded position on a disputed factual issue, especially where the assessee was not given the mandatory opportunity of being heard.

Issues: Whether a restaurant service provider paying service tax on the service portion under Rule 2C of the Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 is required to make further reversal of CENVAT credit under Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.

Analysis: The valuation scheme under Rule 2C fixes the taxable value of the service portion in restaurant supplies at 40% of the total amount charged. The remaining 60% cannot, by itself, be treated as an abatement or as exempted goods or exempted service for the purpose of Rule 6. The Board's clarification in Circular No. 213/3/2019-Service Tax stated that no further reversal of credit is required for a restaurant service provider paying tax under Rule 2C. The same view was supported by the cited Tribunal decision, which held that the balance value is not exempt turnover and that Rule 6 does not apply.

Conclusion: No further reversal of CENVAT credit under Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 was payable, and the demand, interest, and penalty were unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute itself prescribes a percentage of the total value as the taxable value of restaurant service, the balance portion is not automatically exempted turnover, and Rule 6 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 does not apply.

Issues: Whether the segregation of Off-grade High Carbon Ferro Chrome from Ferro-Chrome Slag through manual washing amounts to manufacture for levy of central excise duty.

Analysis: The process undertaken only removes extraneous and unwanted material from the slag by washing and separation, without bringing into existence a new product with a distinct name, character or use. The earlier Tribunal decisions on removal of foreign matter or gangue from ore and similar segregation processes were applied to hold that such activity does not transform the material into a different commercial commodity and is not manufacture.

Conclusion: The activity does not amount to manufacture and central excise duty is not leviable.

Issues: Whether earthen roofing tiles manufactured by a unit recognized and financed by the Kerala Khadi and Village Industries Board are exempt from tax as "pottery" under Entry 55 of the First Schedule to the Kerala Value Added Tax Act, 2003, or are taxable under Entry 18 of the Third Schedule to that Act as kiln-burnt flooring, roofing and earthen tiles.

Analysis: Entry 55 of the First Schedule was construed as a specially designed exemption for products notified for manufacturing units approved by the Khadi and Village Industries Board and the Commission, reflecting the social object of supporting khadi and village industries. The Board's statutory functions under the Kerala Khadi and Village Industries Board Act, 1957 were treated as central to that purpose. The Court held that the term "pottery" in this setting is of wide import and covers all articles made of clay and hardened by heat, including earthen roofing tiles. The specific fiscal entry in the Third Schedule was not treated as overriding the exemption where the product was made by a Board-recognized unit and certified for the benefit under the notification.

Conclusion: Earthen roofing tiles manufactured by the petitioner were held to fall within "pottery" under Entry 55 of the First Schedule and to be exempt from tax, not taxable under Entry 18 of the Third Schedule.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a fiscal exemption entry is enacted to protect products of Board-approved khadi and village industries, the term "pottery" must receive a broad contextual meaning that includes clay articles hardened by heat, including earthen roofing tiles.

Issues: Whether the penalty imposed for non-compliance with statutory notices under section 272A(1)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was liable to be sustained.

Analysis: The penalty had been imposed for alleged failure to comply with notices issued during assessment proceedings. The Tribunal noted that the quantum assessment had already been restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration. It also took into account the assessee's overall conduct and found that the circumstances justified interference with the penalty order in the interests of justice.

Conclusion: The penalty was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: The petition was not finally adjudicated and was directed to be heard along with a connected matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the refund claim was vitiated for non-compliance with Rule 92(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, including denial of the statutory reply period and opportunity of hearing.

Analysis: Rule 92(3) requires the proper officer, upon proposing rejection of refund, to issue notice, allow the applicant fifteen days to reply, consider the reply, and afford an opportunity of hearing before rejecting the claim. The show cause notice granted only seven days and the rejection order was passed without properly considering the petitioner's email reply and without granting a hearing. The statutory safeguard is mandatory and forms part of the refund adjudication process; its breach renders the rejection unsustainable.

Conclusion: The rejection order was quashed and set aside for violation of Rule 92(3), and the matter was directed to be reconsidered afresh after issuing a fresh notice and granting hearing in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The refund rejection could not stand because the prescribed refund procedure was not followed and the petitioner was denied the protection mandated by the rules.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund claim cannot be rejected unless the proper officer follows the mandatory procedure under Rule 92(3), allows the prescribed time to reply, considers the reply, and affords an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: (i) Whether provisional attachment could be sustained even though the appellants were not named as accused in the FIR or charge-sheet. (ii) Whether the appellants established a lawful source for the remittances and property purchases, so as to displace the finding that the attached properties represented proceeds of crime.

Issue (i): Whether provisional attachment could be sustained even though the appellants were not named as accused in the FIR or charge-sheet.

Analysis: The legal position applied was that attachment under the money-laundering law is not confined to persons arraigned in the scheduled offence. The decisive question is whether the person is in possession of proceeds of crime or has received property connected with such proceeds. A person may be proceeded against if the material indicates possession or receipt of tainted property, even without being an accused in the predicate case.

Conclusion: The objection based on non-impleadment as an accused was rejected and the attachment was held sustainable against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellants established a lawful source for the remittances and property purchases, so as to displace the finding that the attached properties represented proceeds of crime.

Analysis: The explanations regarding the alleged earnings in Dubai and the transfer of large sums to India were not supported by documentary proof such as bank statements or reliable accounts. The contemporaneous SMS trail, the unexplained cash component, the timing of purchases, and the failure to prove the source of funds led to the inference that the assets were acquired from tainted funds and projected as untainted property. The tribunal also treated properties acquired around the relevant period as liable to attachment where their value was linked to the proceeds of crime or its equivalent value.

Conclusion: The source of funds was not proved and the finding that the properties were proceeds of crime was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The attachment order and its confirmation were sustained, and the appeals were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: For provisional attachment under the money-laundering law, it is sufficient if material shows possession or receipt of proceeds of crime; formal accusation in the scheduled offence is not necessary, and unexplained assets traced to tainted funds or their equivalent value are liable to attachment.

Issues: (i) Whether the loan credited in the assessee's books could be sustained as an addition by invoking section 69A, and whether the addition was nevertheless maintainable as an unexplained cash credit under section 68; (ii) Whether the addition based on the lender's statement and the denial of cross-examination was vitiated, and whether the reopening under section 148A was without due application of mind; (iii) Whether the estimated commission expenditure under section 69C was sustainable; (iv) Whether the interest disallowance under section 37 was justified.

Issue (i): Whether the loan credited in the assessee's books could be sustained as an addition by invoking section 69A, and whether the addition was nevertheless maintainable as an unexplained cash credit under section 68.

Analysis: The amount received from the lender was reflected in the books, so section 69A was not the appropriate provision because that section applies where unexplained money is found to be owned by the assessee and not recorded in the books. The enquiry, however, went to the identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the lender and the transaction, which are the core ingredients of section 68. The evidence showed that the lender was a paper entity engaged in accommodation entries, and the assessee failed to establish that the transaction was a genuine loan supported by independent financial capacity.

Conclusion: The invocation of section 69A was incorrect, but the addition was rightly sustained as an unexplained cash credit under section 68, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition based on the lender's statement and the denial of cross-examination was vitiated, and whether the reopening under section 148A was without due application of mind.

Analysis: The lender's controller admitted that the concern was a paper company used for accommodation entries, and that admission was treated as material affecting the genuineness of the assessee's loan. The assessee's contention that the statement did not specifically name it did not dislodge the evidentiary value of the admission regarding the lender entity itself. The assessee also did not discharge the statutory burden of proving creditworthiness and genuineness. As to reopening, the material received was treated as tangible material, and the procedure under section 148A was followed; the assessing authority was not required to conduct a mini-trial at the stage of reopening.

Conclusion: The addition was not vitiated by denial of cross-examination, and the reassessment initiation was valid, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the estimated commission expenditure under section 69C was sustainable.

Analysis: Once the principal loan transaction was found to be an accommodation entry, an associated commission payment was inferred as a natural corollary. The estimate was based on the admitted standard commission rate used in such transactions and on the finding that the underlying transaction was bogus.

Conclusion: The addition under section 69C was upheld, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the interest disallowance under section 37 was justified.

Analysis: Since the loan itself was held to be non-genuine and an accommodation entry, interest paid on such a loan could not be treated as expenditure laid out wholly and exclusively for business purposes. The disallowance followed from the character of the underlying transaction.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 37 was upheld, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additions and disallowance were sustained in full, and the assessee's appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a credit in the books is shown to be a sham accommodation entry, the correct test is section 68 and the assessee must prove identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness; failure to do so permits addition notwithstanding a wrong statutory label, and consequential commission and interest claims arising from the bogus transaction may also be disallowed.

Issues: Whether the addition made under section 69 on account of alleged on-money payment could be sustained solely on the basis of third-party statements and electronic data recovered from a third party, without corroborative material, confrontation of adverse material, or opportunity of cross-examination.

Analysis: The addition was founded only on statements recorded during search in the case of the builder group and on excel data recovered from a pen drive seized from a third party. No independent material was brought to show that the assessee had actually paid any cash over and above the registered consideration, and no seized document specifically linking the assessee to the alleged on-money payment was confronted. The assessee consistently denied payment of cash, while the Revenue failed to establish the evidentiary nexus or to afford cross-examination of the persons whose statements were relied upon. In the absence of corroboration, third-party statements and electronic material could not by themselves discharge the Revenue's burden under section 69.

Conclusion: The addition was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether disallowance under section 14A read with rule 8D could be sustained in respect of interest and administrative expenditure where the assessee had sufficient own funds and earned exempt income from investments; (ii) Whether notional interest on advances to a group concern was disallowable under section 36(1)(iii) when the assessee's interest-free funds exceeded the advances and there was no fresh advance during the year; (iii) Whether expenditure incurred for obtaining scientific research reports, though wrongly claimed as weighted deduction, was allowable as business expenditure.

Issue (i): Whether disallowance under section 14A read with rule 8D could be sustained in respect of interest and administrative expenditure where the assessee had sufficient own funds and earned exempt income from investments.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied the settled presumption that where interest-free funds are sufficient to cover the investments, the investments are presumed to have been made out of such funds and no proportionate interest disallowance is warranted under rule 8D(2)(ii). The Tribunal also accepted the restricted administrative disallowance computed with reference to investments that yielded exempt income under rule 8D(2)(iii), as upheld by the first appellate authority.

Conclusion: The interest disallowance under rule 8D(2)(ii) was deleted and the administrative disallowance under rule 8D(2)(iii) was sustained; the issue was decided partly in favour of the assessee and partly in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether notional interest on advances to a group concern was disallowable under section 36(1)(iii) when the assessee's interest-free funds exceeded the advances and there was no fresh advance during the year.

Analysis: The Tribunal accepted the factual finding that the advances originated in earlier years, no fresh advance was made during the year, repayment was received, and the assessee's share capital and reserves were higher than the advances. On that basis, the presumption that the advance came out of interest-free funds was held to apply, and the Revenue's insistence on direct fund tracing was rejected.

Conclusion: The deletion of the notional interest disallowance under section 36(1)(iii) was upheld in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether expenditure incurred for obtaining scientific research reports, though wrongly claimed as weighted deduction, was allowable as business expenditure.

Analysis: The Tribunal found that the assessee had actually incurred expenditure for specialised reports directly relevant to its business. It held that while the claim for weighted deduction under section 35 was not tenable in the absence of the requisite approval, the underlying expenditure was wholly and exclusively for business purposes and fell within the ambit of business deduction.

Conclusion: The disallowance was restricted to the excess weighted claim and the actual expenditure was allowed as business deduction, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the core disputes relating to interest disallowance, notional interest, and allowance of the scientific-research-related expenditure as business deduction, while the administrative component under section 14A remained sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: When sufficient interest-free funds are available, a presumption arises that investments and advances are made from those funds, and expenditure incurred for a business-related report may be allowed as revenue deduction even if the assessee's weighted-deduction claim fails.

Issues: Whether properties acquired prior to the check-period and before the alleged commission of the scheduled offence could be provisionally attached as equivalent-value property under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The attachment was examined in the context of the definition of "proceeds of crime" and the object of the statute. The Tribunal held that the definition is not confined to tainted property directly or indirectly derived from the scheduled offence, but also extends to the value of such property where the original proceeds are not available. On that footing, if the proceeds of crime are not traceable, attachment of other property of equivalent value is permissible. The Tribunal further held that the distinction between the check-period for determining disproportionate assets and the period relevant for provisional attachment does not prevent attachment under the second limb of the definition, and that the impugned attachment was supported by the value of the proceeds of crime and the overall asset position.

Conclusion: The challenge to attachment of the two properties acquired before the check-period was rejected; such properties could validly be attached as equivalent-value property.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, where the proceeds of crime are unavailable, attachment may extend to other property of equivalent value even if it was acquired prior to the commission of the scheduled offence, provided the statutory conditions are satisfied.

Issues: (i) Whether the transfer pricing adjustment on export transactions to foreign associated enterprises was sustainable on rejection of the assessee's tested-party selection; (ii) whether additions under section 41(1), disallowance under section 35(2AB), apportionment of research and development expenses, allocation of interest to eligible units, disallowance of gifts and promotional expenses under section 37(1), and disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D were justified; (iii) whether deduction under section 32AC could be denied on the ground of amalgamation and fresh claim procedure; and (iv) whether excise duty exemption and export incentives were taxable as revenue receipts and includible in book profit under section 115JB.

Issue (i): Whether the transfer pricing adjustment on export transactions to foreign associated enterprises was sustainable on rejection of the assessee's tested-party selection.

Analysis: The tested-party selection was accepted in the assessee's own earlier year on the same type of export transaction. The foreign associated enterprise was found to be the least complex party for benchmarking, and the Revenue did not show any distinguishing feature to dislodge the consistent approach already accepted in earlier years.

Conclusion: The transfer pricing adjustment was rightly deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether additions under section 41(1), disallowance under section 35(2AB), apportionment of research and development expenses, allocation of interest to eligible units, disallowance of gifts and promotional expenses under section 37(1), and disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D were justified.

Analysis: For section 41(1), mere pendency of creditors did not establish remission or cessation of liability. For section 35(2AB), prior to the amendment to Rule 6(7A), approval of the R&D facility by DSIR was sufficient and separate approval of each expense was not required. The contract research issue followed the accepted net-cost approach. The R&D expense apportionment issue required factual verification and was therefore restored. Interest allocation to eligible units was not warranted where the units had sufficient own funds and no direct nexus with borrowed funds was shown. The gifts and promotional expense issue was remitted for fresh examination on the adopted methodology. For section 14A, the disallowance could not exceed the exempt income, and no addition was permissible while computing book profit under section 115JB.

Conclusion: The section 41(1), section 35(2AB), contract research, interest allocation, and section 14A findings were sustained in substance in favour of the assessee, while the R&D apportionment and gifts and promotional expense issues were restored for limited reconsideration.

Issue (iii): Whether deduction under section 32AC could be denied on the ground of amalgamation and fresh claim procedure.

Analysis: The merged entity was treated as entitled to the claim on merits by the first appellate authority, but the Tribunal considered it appropriate to send the matter back for a fresh decision in light of the pending position in the related litigation and the amalgamation-related factual setting.

Conclusion: The issue was remitted to the Assessing Officer and was not finally decided in favour of either side.

Issue (iv): Whether excise duty exemption and export incentives were taxable as revenue receipts and includible in book profit under section 115JB.

Analysis: Excise duty exemption granted for setting up units in specified backward areas was treated as a capital receipt and not as income, and the same treatment applied for book-profit purposes. For export incentives, the excise-duty-linked exemption aspect was accepted as capital in nature, but the FMS and MEIS components were remitted because the amended definition of income under section 2(24)(xviii) required reconsideration in light of the then pending legal position.

Conclusion: The excise duty exemption issue was decided in favour of the assessee, while the export incentive issue was partly restored for fresh consideration.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeals were only partly successful, with most substantive additions and disallowances deleted or sustained in favour of the assessee, while a limited set of issues were remanded for fresh adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: A receipt retains its capital character where the subsidy or exemption is granted to promote industrial development rather than to meet operational costs, and a section 14A disallowance cannot exceed exempt income nor be imported into section 115JB computation absent statutory basis.

Issues: (i) whether cross-charges paid under a cost-sharing arrangement, without markup or profit element, were purely reimbursement and therefore not liable to tax deduction at source under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) whether, in view of the first proviso to Section 201(1) and the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia), disallowance could be made where the payee had filed its return, accounted for the amount, paid due tax, and furnished the prescribed accountant's certificate.

Issue (i): whether cross-charges paid under a cost-sharing arrangement, without markup or profit element, were purely reimbursement and therefore not liable to tax deduction at source under Section 40(a)(ia) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The payment arose from a cost-sharing agreement under which services and facilities were shared on a cost-to-cost basis. The relevant expenditure was classified as staff cost, travelling, advertising and promotional expense, and other miscellaneous expense. The recipient had deducted tax at source where applicable on third-party payments and had not claimed any deduction for the expenditure in question. On these facts, the payment was held to be reimbursement of expenditure without any income or profit component. The charging of service tax did not alter the intrinsic character of the payment, and the nature of the transaction remained reimbursement rather than consideration for income-bearing services.

Conclusion: The payment was not liable to tax deduction at source and no disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) was warranted on this ground, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether, in view of the first proviso to Section 201(1) and the second proviso to Section 40(a)(ia), disallowance could be made where the payee had filed its return, accounted for the amount, paid due tax, and furnished the prescribed accountant's certificate.

Analysis: The provisos were treated as beneficial, declaratory, and curative in nature. Their effect is that where the payee has filed its return under Section 139, included the relevant income, paid the due tax, and the prescribed certificate is furnished, the payer is not to be treated as an assessee in default and is deemed to have deducted and paid the tax for the purposes of Section 40(a)(ia). The factual position satisfied these conditions, and the proviso operated retrospectively.

Conclusion: No disallowance could be sustained on this ground either, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's challenge failed because the impugned cross-charge was a reimbursement without income element and the statutory relief under the provisos also applied, so the disallowance was not sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A reimbursement paid on a cost-to-cost basis without any income or profit element is not subject to tax deduction at source under Section 40(a)(ia), and where the payee has returned the income, paid tax, and furnished the prescribed certificate, the payer cannot be treated as an assessee in default by reason of the retrospective, curative provisos to Sections 201(1) and 40(a)(ia).

Issues: Rectification of a typographical mistake apparent on the record in the Tribunal's earlier order under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The order dated 25.11.2025 contained an inadvertent clerical error in the concluding paragraph, where the result of the revenue's appeal was recorded as "allowed" despite the body of the order having dismissed the appeal. As the mistake was evident from the record and the correct result was already reflected in the reasoning, the error was fit for rectification under the rectification jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The mistake was rectified, and the concluding paragraph of the earlier order was amended to state that the appeal for AY 2010-11 is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: A clerical or typographical mistake that is apparent from the record may be rectified under section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the corrected operative result must conform to the order's substantive reasoning.

Issues: Whether the impugned GST demand orders were liable to be quashed and the matters remitted for fresh adjudication on the ground that the petitioner was not afforded a personal hearing before the orders were passed.

Analysis: The writ petitions challenged GST demand orders passed in Form GST DRC-07. The record showed that the petitioner had filed replies to the show cause notices and had sought a personal hearing. The respondent accepted that the matters could be sent back on the limited ground that the petitioner was not heard after seeking adjournment. In these circumstances, the denial of hearing vitiated the adjudication and warranted interference at the admission stage. The appropriate course was to quash the orders and direct a fresh decision after hearing the petitioner and considering any additional written submissions.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were quashed and the matters were remitted for fresh adjudication after granting the petitioner a personal hearing.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained relief on the ground of breach of natural justice, and the tax demands will be reconsidered by the respondent in de novo proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudication that is completed without affording a requested personal hearing is vitiated for breach of natural justice and can be quashed with a direction for fresh consideration on merits.

Issues: Whether the impugned GST order dated 22.08.2024 should be quashed and remitted for fresh adjudication subject to conditions including a pre-deposit by the petitioner, in view of delay and expired statutory appeal period.

Analysis: The Court examined the factual timeline showing non-compliance by the petitioner with the show cause notice and missed personal hearings, noted that the statutory period for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the GST enactments, 2017 has expired, and considered the petitioner's offer to pre-deposit 50% of the disputed tax to enable de novo adjudication. The Court referred to precedents and practice where matters delayed in approaching the Court are remitted for fresh adjudication on terms requiring deposit of a part of the disputed tax, with the quantum linked to length of delay, to balance revenue and assessee interests. The Court imposed time-bound conditions for deposit, filing of reply to the show cause notice treating the impugned order as an addendum, and directed final adjudication within a specified period, while providing for lifting of bank attachment upon compliance.

Conclusion: The Court quashed the impugned order and remitted the matter to the respondent for fresh adjudication on merits, subject to the petitioner depositing 50% of the disputed tax within thirty days and filing a reply to the show cause notice; bank attachment to be vacated on compliance; failure to comply permits the respondent to proceed as if the petition were dismissed.