Issues: Whether payments made to Singapore-based entities for architectural, consultancy, and structural design services constituted fees for technical services under Article 12(4) of the India-Singapore Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement so as to trigger tax deduction under section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and disallowance under section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The services were confined to drawings, designs, and consultancy for a specific real estate project. The relevant treaty provision applied only where managerial, technical, or consultancy services also made available technical knowledge, experience, skill, know-how, or processes enabling independent use by the recipient, or involved development and transfer of a technical plan or technical design. The services here were project-specific and were not shown to have transferred any such usable technical knowledge or skill to the assessee. The factual position was found to be identical to the assessee's earlier year, where the same issue had been decided in its favour.

Conclusion: The payments did not constitute fees for technical services under Article 12(4) of the treaty, no liability to deduct tax at source arose under section 195 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the disallowance under section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was rightly deleted.

Issues: Whether a return filed in response to a notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, though beyond the time mentioned in the notice, remained a valid return and whether the Assessing Officer could frame reassessment without issuing notice under section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: A return furnished in response to a notice under section 148 is to be treated as a return required under section 139 and does not become non-est merely because it is filed belatedly, provided the assessment proceedings are still pending. Once such a return is filed, the statutory procedure for framing assessment applies, and notice under section 143(2) is mandatory before completing the reassessment. The failure to issue that notice goes to the root of jurisdiction and cannot be treated as a curable irregularity.

Conclusion: The reassessment framed without issuing notice under section 143(2) was invalid and was quashed, with the appeal allowed.

Issues: Allowability of ESOP expenditure as deductible business expenditure under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The issue was already decided in the assessee's own case for earlier assessment years and that view had been affirmed by the jurisdictional High Court. In view of the binding decision covering the same question, the disallowance of ESOP expenditure could not be sustained merely because the Revenue had carried the matter further before the Supreme Court in another case.

Conclusion: ESOP expenditure was allowable, and the Revenue's objection to its deduction failed.

Issues: Whether amendment of the shipping bills to change the reward column from "No" to "Yes" for claiming MEIS benefit could be allowed on the basis of documentary evidence existing at the time of export.

Analysis: Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962 permits amendment of shipping bills on the strength of documentary evidence that existed when the goods were exported. The dispute concerned an inadvertent omission in the reward column, while the exports themselves were admitted to be genuine and eligible for the MEIS scheme. The record showed that the exporters had manifested their claim through surrounding export documents and that the competent authority had already issued MEIS scrips. The Tribunal held that such an error was procedural and could not defeat the substantive benefit of a beneficial export incentive scheme. Reliance was placed on the consistent approach that technical lapses, once supported by contemporaneous evidence and corrected in accordance with law, should not override the exporter's entitlement.

Conclusion: Amendment of the shipping bills was permissible and the rejection of the request was unsustainable. The appeals succeeded in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: An inadvertent and rectifiable error in a shipping bill cannot defeat entitlement to an export incentive where contemporaneous documentary evidence supports the claim and the amendment is sought under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: Whether the direction requiring the Resolution Professional to ensure full access to the premises could be sustained when the Resolution Professional's possession and access had already attained finality.

Analysis: The possession and access secured by the Resolution Professional were treated as final by the earlier order and the dismissal of the appeal against that order. In that setting, the Respondent could not re-agitate the same question of possession and access. The order under challenge, so far as it required the Resolution Professional to ensure full access, could not stand. At the same time, any separate grievance of third parties claiming access to conduct business from the premises was left open to be pursued before the Adjudicating Authority in appropriate proceedings.

Conclusion: The direction to ensure full access was set aside and the appeal was partly allowed in favour of the Appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether the personal guaranty stood invoked so as to sustain the proceedings under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. (ii) Whether service of the demand notice and the notice issued by the Resolution Professional was valid and in compliance with the applicable rules and the guarantee deed.

Issue (i): Whether the personal guaranty stood invoked so as to sustain the proceedings under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The debt against the personal guarantors had already been the subject of proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, which culminated in a decree holding the defendants jointly and severally liable and permitting recovery against the person and properties of the guarantors. The decree remained operative and had not been shown to have been set aside. In these circumstances, the contention that the personal guarantee was never invoked could not be accepted.

Conclusion: The objection failed and was decided against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether service of the demand notice and the notice issued by the Resolution Professional was valid and in compliance with the applicable rules and the guarantee deed.

Analysis: The guarantee deed contained a deeming clause that treated dispatch of notice by registered post or certificate of posting to the guarantor's address, or any other address intimated to the bank, as sufficient service. The record showed dispatch to the Masab Tank address, which was treated as the correct address in the earlier decree, and the postal tracking report was read with the notice itself. On that basis, service was held to be complete. The subsequent filing of material relating to the alternate address did not vitiate the proceedings, and no non-compliance with the service requirements was found. The Resolution Professional's notice under Section 99(2) was also treated as duly dispatched and served.

Conclusion: The objection to service was rejected and held to be without merit.

Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge to the admission of the personal guarantor insolvency application failed, while the Resolution Professional was expected to afford the appellants an opportunity to place a repayment plan in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a guarantee deed provides for deemed service on dispatch to the guarantor's address, and the record shows dispatch to the correct address supported by the decree and postal record, service cannot be defeated by disputing actual receipt; an operative decree fixing liability against the personal guarantor also defeats the plea that the guarantee was never invoked.

Issues: Whether the demand of central excise duty and penalty for alleged clandestine removal was sustainable when the case rested mainly on third-party records and statements, and whether such statements could be relied upon without compliance with the mandatory procedure under Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: The proceedings were founded on records recovered from a buyer and statements recorded during investigation, while no incriminating material, stock discrepancy, excess raw material consumption, transport evidence, sale proceeds trail, or power-consumption evidence was gathered from the appellant's premises. The statements relied upon were not tested in the manner required by Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and the adjudication also lacked the broader corroboration necessary to establish clandestine removal, which is a serious charge requiring cogent evidence rather than assumption and presumption. The absence of proper investigation into production, procurement, movement and clearance of goods further weakened the demand.

Conclusion: The demand of duty and the consequential penalty were unsustainable. The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment notice for AY 2013-14 was valid when the reasons recorded did not show income escaping assessment in the nature of an asset; (ii) Whether the reassessment notice for AY 2015-16 was barred by limitation; (iii) Whether the special audit direction for AY 2013-14 could survive after the reassessment notice for that year was set aside; (iv) Whether the special audit direction for AY 2015-16 was justified under the statutory preconditions.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment notice for AY 2013-14 was valid when the reasons recorded did not show income escaping assessment in the nature of an asset.

Analysis: The reasons recorded for AY 2013-14 referred to the allowability and genuineness of the provision for customer claims, but did not record any material showing escapement of income represented as an asset. The Court held that reassessment beyond three years required the jurisdictional condition under the fourth proviso to Section 153A to be satisfied, namely that escaped income must be in the form of an asset. Since the recorded reasons did not identify any receivable or other asset for AY 2013-14, and the Revenue could not rely on reasons recorded for a different year to cure that defect, the notice lacked jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice for AY 2013-14 was invalid and was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the reassessment notice for AY 2015-16 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The reasons recorded for AY 2015-16 stated that the provision for warranty expenses gave rise to a corresponding receivable from the Associated Enterprise, and that such receivable constituted an asset. The Court held that receivables arising from a contractual right to reimbursement are assets for the purpose of the limitation condition. On that footing, the notice fell within the permissible extended period and satisfied the statutory threshold for reopening.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice for AY 2015-16 was within limitation and was upheld against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the special audit direction for AY 2013-14 could survive after the reassessment notice for that year was set aside.

Analysis: The special audit direction for AY 2013-14 was issued in aid of the reassessment proceedings for that year. Once the reassessment notice itself was held to be without jurisdiction, the consequential special audit direction for the same year could not stand independently.

Conclusion: The special audit direction for AY 2013-14 was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the special audit direction for AY 2015-16 was justified under the statutory preconditions.

Analysis: The Court held that Section 142(2A) applies to reassessment proceedings as well, and that the statutory triggers include volume of accounts, doubts about correctness, multiplicity of transactions, specialised nature of business activity, and the interests of revenue. On the facts, the ERP data, discrepancies, duplication and missing entries, inability to produce proper books in the manner required, and the revenue's doubts about the correctness of the accounts furnished sufficient basis for directing special audit.

Conclusion: The special audit direction for AY 2015-16 was upheld against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded only in part: the reassessment and special audit for AY 2013-14 were quashed, while the reassessment and special audit for AY 2015-16 were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: For reassessment beyond three years in search cases, the recorded reasons must themselves show that the escaped income is represented in the nature of an asset for the relevant year, and a later year's reasoning cannot cure the absence of such jurisdictional material; however, receivables arising from an enforceable right to reimbursement may constitute an asset, and special audit may validly be ordered in reassessment proceedings where the statutory conditions of complexity, volume, or doubtful correctness of accounts are objectively met.

Issues: Whether the amount transferred by the assessee to the credit of the Central Government under section 23(2) of the Export-Import Bank of India Act, 1981 constituted dividend so as to attract dividend distribution tax under section 115-O of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The assessee's transfer to the Central Government was held to be a statutory and mandatory transfer of funds under section 23(2) of the Export-Import Bank of India Act, 1981, and not a distribution of profit to shareholders. The Tribunal noted that dividend, in its ordinary and statutory sense, presupposes share capital and shareholders, which were absent in the present facts. The conclusion of the Commissioner (Appeals) was consistent with the Tribunal's own earlier decision in the assessee's case, and no change in facts or law was shown for the years under appeal.

Conclusion: Section 115-O was not applicable to the impugned transfer, the amount was not taxable as dividend under section 2(22), and the Revenue's challenge to the deletion failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A compulsory statutory transfer to the Central Government, made otherwise than by way of distribution to shareholders, does not constitute dividend and therefore does not attract dividend distribution tax under section 115-O of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: (i) Whether a jurisdictional objection to reopening could be entertained despite the assessee not pressing it before the first appellate authority; (ii) whether the reassessment proceedings were invalid for want of approval from the correct specified authority under section 151(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether a jurisdictional objection to reopening could be entertained despite the assessee not pressing it before the first appellate authority.

Analysis: A defect going to jurisdiction strikes at the root of the proceedings and cannot be cured by consent, waiver, acquiescence, or abandonment of a ground before an earlier appellate authority. Where the objection concerns the very authority to initiate reassessment, it remains open to be raised at a later appellate stage on the basis of the existing record.

Conclusion: The jurisdictional objection was rightly entertained and was not barred by the earlier non-pressing of the ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the reassessment proceedings were invalid for want of approval from the correct specified authority under section 151(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: For the relevant assessment year, the order under section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under section 148 were issued after the expiry of three years from the end of the assessment year. In such a case, the statute required approval of the higher specified authority under section 151(ii), and approval by the Principal Commissioner was insufficient. Since valid sanction from the prescribed authority is a condition precedent for assumption of jurisdiction to reopen, non-compliance vitiates the proceedings.

Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid and the notice and consequential proceedings were void ab initio.

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional challenge succeeded, the reassessment proceedings were quashed, and the revenue's appeal ceased to survive on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: A reopening of assessment is void where the sanction for issuance of notice is obtained from an authority not competent under the applicable clause of section 151, and such a jurisdictional defect may be raised notwithstanding an earlier waiver or non-pressing of the ground.

Issues: Whether reassessment was vitiated for want of notice under section 143(2) after the assessee filed return in response to notice under section 148, and whether section 292BB could cure the complete absence of such notice.

Analysis: Once the assessee filed return in response to notice under section 148, the Assessing Officer could not complete reassessment to the assessee's detriment without issuing notice under section 143(2). The requirement of notice under section 143(2) is jurisdictional and mandatory in reassessment as well, and delay in filing the return does not dispense with that obligation. Section 292BB cures defects in service of notice only where a notice has in fact been issued; it does not cure complete non-issuance of notice. Since no notice under section 143(2) was issued before the assessment order, the reassessment suffered from a jurisdictional defect.

Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid and was rightly annulled; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: In reassessment proceedings, once a return is filed in response to notice under section 148, issuance of notice under section 143(2) is a mandatory jurisdictional requirement, and section 292BB cannot cure the complete absence of such notice.

Issues: Whether the addition of interest income on fixed deposits required interference, and whether the matter should be restored for de novo assessment after granting reasonable opportunity to the assessee.

Analysis: The record showed that the assessee was not given an effective opportunity before the Assessing Officer or the first appellate authority to establish that its facts were distinguishable and that the controversy was not fully covered by the cited Supreme Court decisions. In these circumstances, the appellate order could not be sustained without affording the assessee an opportunity to place its case on facts and law. The matter therefore required fresh examination by the Assessing Officer in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The impugned appellate order was set aside and the addition was restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo assessment after granting reasonable opportunity to the assessee.

Issues: Whether, in reassessment proceedings, the assessee could raise a claim for deduction under section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the consideration receivable under a joint development agreement, in the form of allotted residential units, could qualify as investment in the construction of a new residential house for the purposes of section 54F.

Analysis: Reassessment proceedings under section 147 are confined to escaped income and do not permit an assessee to reopen concluded matters unrelated to the escapement. However, a claim that is directly relatable to the income brought to tax in reassessment may be examined, even if it was not raised in the original return, where the relevant material is already on record or can be considered in appeal. On the substantive exemption issue, the share in the residential units agreed to be allotted under the development arrangement was treated as consideration invested in construction of a residential house. The agreed allotment of constructed residential units under the development arrangement was held to fall within the scope of section 54F.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to raise the section 54F claim in relation to the reassessed capital gains, and the allotment under the development agreement could qualify for exemption under section 54F, but the matter required fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer on the remaining conditions.

Final Conclusion: The addition was not finally sustained on the exemption issue, and the matter was sent back for reconsideration with directions to examine the assessee's claim under section 54F.

Ratio Decidendi: In reassessment, an assessee may raise a claim that is directly connected to the escaped income, and consideration receivable as allotted residential units under a development agreement can constitute investment in construction of a residential house for section 54F purposes.

Issues: Whether reassessment initiated beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was valid when the recorded reasons did not allege any failure by the assessee to fully and truly disclose all material facts necessary for assessment.

Analysis: The reassessment was initiated after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year. In such a case, the first proviso to Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires not only tangible material for reopening but also a recorded allegation that the assessee failed to fully and truly disclose all material facts necessary for assessment. The reasons recorded for reopening referred only to information from the Investigation Wing and did not state any such failure on the part of the assessee. The absence of this jurisdictional requirement in the recorded reasons went to the root of the validity of the reopening.

Conclusion: The reopening was invalid and the reassessment order was quashed for want of valid assumption of jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: Where reassessment is initiated beyond four years from the end of the relevant assessment year, the recorded reasons must expressly disclose failure by the assessee to fully and truly disclose all material facts necessary for assessment; in the absence of such a jurisdictional allegation, the reopening is void.

Issues: (i) whether the reassessment was validly initiated under the reopening provisions; (ii) whether the assessee was entitled to exemption for the capital gains claimed in respect of the residential house investment; (iii) whether the amount treated as income from other sources, including rent from agricultural land, was liable to be added as taxable income.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment was validly initiated under the reopening provisions.

Analysis: The reopening was made after the expiry of four years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The recorded reasons did not disclose any failure by the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of material facts, and the reopening was founded on a reappraisal of the existing assessment record rather than fresh tangible material. The approval under the sanction provision was also found to be mechanical.

Conclusion: The reassessment initiation was invalid and failed on jurisdictional grounds, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption for the capital gains claimed in respect of the residential house investment.

Analysis: The record showed that the assessee had disclosed the capital gains computation and the house investment details during the original assessment proceedings. The entitlement to the exemption was not defeated merely because the claim was reiterated in reassessment proceedings or because the exemption was not separately claimed in the return in the manner suggested by the Revenue. The appellate authority was competent to entertain and grant the lawful claim on the materials already on record.

Conclusion: The exemption claim was allowable and the disallowance was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the amount treated as income from other sources, including rent from agricultural land, was liable to be added as taxable income.

Analysis: The assessee produced material to show agricultural operations and lease of agricultural land for agricultural purposes. The treatment of the receipts as unexplained or as income from other sources was not supported by the evidence. The estimated disallowance made by the appellate authority was therefore unsustainable on the facts recorded.

Conclusion: The addition was not justified and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned reassessment and the related additions could not be sustained, and the assessee succeeded on all substantive grounds.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment beyond four years requires a demonstrable failure to disclose material facts fully and truly, and a reopened assessment cannot rest on mere reappraisal of the existing record or change of opinion; appellate authorities may also allow a lawful exemption claim supported by the record.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the rectification application under section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, seeking deletion of surcharge and education cess on income taxed under the India-USA Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, was justified.

Analysis: The request made in rectification was in substance an attempt to revisit the merits of the earlier appellate order, which had already considered and rejected the claim against levy of surcharge and education cess. Such a dispute did not disclose any mistake apparent from the record. A rectification jurisdiction cannot be used for reappreciation of the issue or for modification of a concluded view. The decision also noted that the levy issue had been decided against the assessee in the applicable precedent and that the treaty position did not warrant interference in rectification.

Conclusion: The rejection of the rectification application was upheld and the challenge to the levy failed.

Issues: (i) Whether interest was payable on refunds granted in the first set of petitions where the refund was sanctioned within the statutory period after the refund applications were filed; (ii) Whether interest was payable in the connected petitions where reassessment was sought years earlier, the refunds were granted only after prolonged delay, and the refund orders were passed beyond the statutory period.

Issue (i): Whether interest was payable on refunds granted in the first set of petitions where the refund was sanctioned within the statutory period after the refund applications were filed.

Analysis: The refunds in the first set of petitions followed reassessment or directions issued in earlier proceedings, and the refund applications were processed and sanctioned within three months of their filing. Interest under the statutory scheme becomes payable only when a duty ordered to be refunded is not refunded within three months from receipt of the application. The record also showed that the Department acted upon the reassessment and refund proceedings without undue delay once the applications were made in the manner contemplated by law.

Conclusion: Interest was not payable on the refunds in the first set of petitions.

Issue (ii): Whether interest was payable in the connected petitions where reassessment was sought years earlier, the refunds were granted only after prolonged delay, and the refund orders were passed beyond the statutory period.

Analysis: In the connected petitions, the importers had sought reassessment long before the refund orders were passed, and the reassessment itself was completed only after a substantial lapse of time. After reassessment, the Department ultimately accepted that the excess duty was not payable and sanctioned refund, but the refunds were issued well after the statutory three-month period from the refund applications in several matters. Since the delay in completing reassessment and in granting refund was attributable to the Department, the importers could not be deprived of compensation for being kept out of their money.

Conclusion: Interest was payable in the connected petitions from the date of the first reassessment application until the date of actual refund.

Final Conclusion: The challenge succeeded only in part. The claim for interest was rejected in the first set of petitions, but allowed in the connected petitions where prolonged departmental delay in reassessment and refund justified payment of statutory interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Interest on customs refund is payable only when the refund is not made within the statutory period after a valid refund application, and where departmental delay in reassessment postpones the refund beyond that period, the claimant is entitled to statutory interest for the delayed period.

Issues: Whether the custodian was liable to pay duty under section 45(3) of the Customs Act, 1962 and the connected penalties were sustainable, when the disputed containers had earlier examination reports showing cement blocks and no evidence that the seals were broken, tampered with, or substituted while in custody.

Analysis: Custody of imported containers moves on a said-to-contain basis until customs opens and examines them. The custodian is liable only if imported goods are pilfered while in its custody or if there is evidence that the seal was broken and the contents were substituted during such custody. The record contained prior examination reports for the same containers signed by customs officers and the custodian's representative, and those reports did not show broken seals or tampering. The later inventory report and discrepancy with the IGM, without proof of pilferage in custody, was insufficient to fasten duty liability on the custodian.

Conclusion: The duty demand and the consequential penalties were unsustainable and the appeal succeeded in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Duty under section 45(3) of the Customs Act, 1962 can be fastened on a custodian only on proof that imported goods were pilfered or substituted while in its custody, and a mere discrepancy between the IGM description and later found contents, without evidence of tampering or seal breakage during custody, is insufficient.

Issues: Whether the demand of customs duty, confiscation and penalties were sustainable on the allegation that the ISO certificate and in-house test reports were forged, and whether the exports made under DFIA and Advance Authorisation schemes could be denied benefit in the absence of diversion of imported materials.

Analysis: The export promotion schemes and the Board circular permitted reliance on in-house test results for manufacturer-exporters having ISO certification, and also permitted reliance on test reports drawn by Customs, provided the reports disclosed the required technical characteristics. The record showed that samples were in fact drawn by the Department and test reports were available, with no adverse finding that the exported goods failed the applicable norms or that the imported raw materials were diverted. The ISO certificate was treated as a procedural facilitation document and not a substantive condition for availing advance authorisation benefits. The prior action taken for the same alleged lapse, including imposition of penalty under the Customs Act, also indicated that the controversy concerned procedural irregularity rather than a basis to sustain repeated penal consequences and duty demand.

Conclusion: The allegation of forged ISO certification and test reports did not justify denial of exemption benefits, nor sustain the demand, confiscation or penalties. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders could not be sustained, and the appeals succeeded with consequential relief.

Ratio Decidendi: Where exports under DFIA or Advance Authorisation are supported by Customs-drawn test reports and there is no allegation of diversion of imported inputs, a procedural defect in ISO-related testing facilities cannot by itself justify denial of exemption benefits, duty demand or penalties.

Issues: Whether the conversion or amendment of shipping bills after export could be allowed despite the time limit in the Board circular, and whether the exporter was entitled to the benefit of duty drawback on that basis.

Analysis: The dispute turned on the scope of amendment of shipping bills under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962. The Board circular prescribing a three-month time limit was treated as non-statutory and, therefore, not binding so as to defeat a request otherwise eligible under the statute. The decision also proceeded on the principle that a clerical or procedural error in the shipping bill should not deprive the exporter of a substantive drawback benefit where the export was otherwise eligible.

Conclusion: The amendment or conversion of the shipping bills was validly allowed, and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The order permitting conversion of the shipping bills was sustained, and the Revenue appeal was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A time limit contained only in a Board circular cannot override the statutory power to amend shipping bills under Section 149 of the Customs Act, 1962, and a procedural or clerical omission should not by itself defeat an otherwise admissible drawback claim.