Issues: (i) Whether a complaint can be returned under Section 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after cognizance has been taken and process issued; (ii) Whether the Special Court lacked territorial jurisdiction merely because certain alleged properties were situated in another State.

Issue (i): Whether a complaint can be returned under Section 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after cognizance has been taken and process issued.

Analysis: Sections 200 to 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 form a complete framework for cognizance and issuance of process. Once process has issued under Section 204, the Magistrate is functus officio concerning reconsideration of that stage and cannot recall, review, or return the complaint under Section 201. The objection was also raised after substantial delay, following the accused's participation in the proceedings and pursuit of discharge remedies.

Conclusion: The application under Section 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not maintainable after cognizance and issuance of process, against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the Special Court lacked territorial jurisdiction merely because certain alleged properties were situated in another State.

Analysis: Money laundering is a distinct and continuing offence involving activities connected with proceeds of crime, including concealment, possession, acquisition, use, or projection as untainted property. The location of particular properties in another State does not by itself negate the Special Court's jurisdiction where the complaint discloses such continuing activities. The territorial objection was raised belatedly after prolonged participation in the proceedings.

Conclusion: The territorial-jurisdiction objection was untenable, against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: No jurisdictional error, illegality, or perversity was established in the challenged order.

Ratio Decidendi: After cognizance and issuance of process, a criminal court cannot invoke Section 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to return the complaint; the situs of individual properties does not alone defeat jurisdiction in a continuing money-laundering offence.

Outcome: Writ petition dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to pursue the statutory appellate remedy before the CESTAT.

Issues: (i) Whether rejection of registration under Section 12AB was sustainable when the Commissioner relied on the Assessing Officer's report without independently applying his mind and providing an effective hearing; (ii) whether the application for approval under Section 80G(5) could be decided before determination of eligibility for registration under Section 12AB.

Issue (i): Whether rejection of registration under Section 12AB was sustainable when the Commissioner relied on the Assessing Officer's report without independently applying his mind and providing an effective hearing.

Analysis: The Commissioner may obtain a report from the jurisdictional Assessing Officer, but must disclose its substance to the applicant, provide an opportunity to rebut it, and independently determine the application under Section 12AB. The Commissioner failed to follow this procedure and relied substantially on the Assessing Officer's report. The reasoning that the trust's objects included teaching the Vedas and Upanishads and promoting Sanatan Dharma was also not, by itself, a valid basis for rejecting registration under Section 12AB.

Conclusion: The rejection of registration under Section 12AB was unsustainable and was set aside for fresh adjudication after an effective hearing and independent consideration.

Issue (ii): Whether the application for approval under Section 80G(5) could be decided before determination of eligibility for registration under Section 12AB.

Analysis: Approval under Section 80G(5) was dependent on the applicant first establishing eligibility for registration under Section 12AB. Since the Section 12AB application was remanded for fresh consideration, the Section 80G(5) application also required reconsideration after the Section 12AB issue was determined and the necessary details were furnished.

Conclusion: The rejection of approval under Section 80G(5) was remanded for fresh consideration consequential to the determination of registration under Section 12AB.

Final Conclusion: Both matters require fresh consideration by the Commissioner in accordance with the statutory procedure, after hearing the applicant and considering the relevant material independently.

Ratio Decidendi: A registration application under Section 12AB cannot be rejected solely on an Assessing Officer's report without disclosure of the report, an effective opportunity of hearing, and independent application of mind by the competent authority; an application under Section 80G(5) must be considered in light of the determination under Section 12AB.

Issues: Whether the assessment under Section 143(3) was invalid because the initial scrutiny notice under Section 143(2) was issued by an officer lacking pecuniary jurisdiction.

Analysis: The returned income exceeded the monetary limit prescribed for an Income-tax Officer under the applicable CBDT Instruction. The initial scrutiny notice under Section 143(2) was nevertheless issued by the ITO, Ward-7(1), Kolkata, who lacked the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction. A notice issued by an officer without jurisdiction is an inherent defect and cannot validly support the ensuing assessment under Section 143(3). The objection concerned pecuniary jurisdiction and was not barred by the limitation applicable to challenges based only on territorial jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The assessment order under Section 143(3) was illegal and void ab initio.

Final Conclusion: The assessment having been quashed on the jurisdictional ground, the original grounds and remaining additional grounds were left open as academic.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment under Section 143(3) cannot be sustained when the foundational scrutiny notice under Section 143(2) was issued by an officer lacking the requisite pecuniary jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether the charges collected by MeeSeva for services rendered to non-business entities, business entities, and Government entities were exempt under S.No. 6(d), S.No. 7, or S.No. 9 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) dated 28-06-2017.

Analysis: The services were rendered through electronic service delivery centres functioning under the Telangana Information Technology (Electronic Service Delivery) Rules, 2011, and the applicant collected amounts over and above the statutory charges payable to the concerned departments. The relevant exemption entries apply only to services actually provided by the Central Government, State Government, Union territory, or local authority within the scope of the notification. The charges collected by the applicant were not confined to statutory government charges and also related to services for entities other than Government departments. The exemption for low-value services and for services to smaller business entities was therefore not attracted on the facts found.

Conclusion: The applicant was not eligible to claim exemption under the cited entries of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), and the charges collected were liable to tax under the GST regime.

Issues: (i) Whether the distribution segment profitability could be reworked by applying Safe Harbour rules and a sales-based allocation when the assessee had not opted for Safe Harbour. (ii) Whether the transfer pricing adjustments for intra-group services and lump sum licence fee/royalty could be sustained by determining the arm's length price at nil under the Other Method without bringing comparable uncontrolled transactions on record. (iii) Whether the trademark fee could be separately benchmarked and adjusted when it had already been included in the TNMM-based cost base, resulting in a double adjustment.

Issue (i): Whether the distribution segment profitability could be reworked by applying Safe Harbour rules and a sales-based allocation when the assessee had not opted for Safe Harbour.

Analysis: The assessee had furnished segmental accounts and a cost allocation mechanism based on actuals and reasonable allocation keys. The reassessment of segment profitability by invoking Rule 10TA(j) and Rule 10TA(k) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, and reallocating costs on a sales-ratio basis was found unsustainable, as those Safe Harbour provisions were not applicable absent an election by the assessee. The Tribunal also noted that the lower authorities had not given a cogent basis for rejecting the assessee's method.

Conclusion: The assessee's segmental allocation was accepted and the reworking based on Safe Harbour rules was rejected, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the transfer pricing adjustments for intra-group services and lump sum licence fee/royalty could be sustained by determining the arm's length price at nil under the Other Method without bringing comparable uncontrolled transactions on record.

Analysis: The assessee had produced documentary evidence of the services received and had benchmarked the transactions under TNMM on an aggregation basis. The Tribunal held that the Other Method under Rule 10AB of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, requires reference to a comparable uncontrolled transaction and that a nil ALP could not be fixed on an ad hoc basis. It further held that separating the related payments for standalone testing, after they had already been taken into the segmental TNMM analysis, would lead to an impermissible double adjustment.

Conclusion: The transfer pricing adjustments for intra-group services and lump sum licence fee/royalty were deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the trademark fee could be separately benchmarked and adjusted when it had already been included in the TNMM-based cost base, resulting in a double adjustment.

Analysis: The trademark fee formed part of the same technology access / royalty arrangement and had already been absorbed in the TNMM analysis. The Tribunal held that separate benchmarking under CUP or any other method for the same embedded cost would amount to cherry-picking and an impermissible double adjustment. The assessee's TNMM approach was therefore required to be respected, subject to verification.

Conclusion: The separate adjustment for trademark fee was deleted and the TNMM treatment was accepted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on the core transfer pricing issues concerning segmental allocation, intra-group services, lump sum licence fee and trademark fee, while the penalty ground was not adjudicated on merits and was treated as premature.

Ratio Decidendi: Transfer pricing adjustment cannot be made on an ad hoc basis or by invoking a method without satisfying its legal preconditions, and where closely linked transactions are already benchmarked under TNMM, their separate re-testing may amount to an impermissible double adjustment.

Issues: (i) whether the contract executed for NTPC was classifiable as Works Contract Service in view of the supply of materials, civil construction work, and erection and commissioning components; (ii) whether the appellant was entitled to abatement and consequential relief against the service tax demand confirmed in the impugned order.

Issue (i): whether the contract executed for NTPC was classifiable as Works Contract Service in view of the supply of materials, civil construction work, and erection and commissioning components.

Analysis: The contract in dispute was found to contain distinct components, including installation and commissioning of electro-mechanical equipment and civil construction of a pump house, with supply of materials also established. The appellant produced VAT-related documents showing payment of VAT on materials. In such a composite arrangement, the appropriate classification was held to be Works Contract Service.

Conclusion: The contract was held to be classifiable as Works Contract Service, and not as a pure service arrangement.

Issue (ii): whether the appellant was entitled to abatement and consequential relief against the service tax demand confirmed in the impugned order.

Analysis: The record showed that abatement had been claimed only for the civil construction component, while CENVAT credit was availed only for the installation and commissioning component. The later clarification from NTPC was accepted as reflecting the true contractual breakup, and the earlier adverse confirmation was treated as insufficient to deny abatement. The demand had been confirmed without properly accounting for the composite nature of the contract and the documentary evidence on record.

Conclusion: The appellant was held entitled to the claimed abatement and the confirmed demand of service tax, interest, and penalties was held to be unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded in full and the impugned order was set aside, with consequential relief as permissible in law.

Ratio Decidendi: A composite contract involving supply of materials along with construction and installation activity is to be treated as a works contract where the factual record supports that character, and abatement cannot be denied by ignoring the contractual breakup and corroborative evidence such as VAT payment and later clarification from the recipient.

Issues: Whether the final assessment order was liable to be quashed for having been passed without giving effect to the Dispute Resolution Panel's directions and contrary to the mandatory procedure under section 144C.

Analysis: The directions issued under section 144C(5) were binding on the Assessing Officer under section 144C(10), and the final order had to be passed in conformity with those directions within the time prescribed by section 144C(13). The order passed in the case was treated as a mere repetition of the draft assessment order, despite the DRP having granted relief and issued directions affecting the transfer pricing computation. On this basis, the order was held to be not in accordance with the statutory scheme governing the faceless assessment and DRP process.

Conclusion: The final assessment order was held illegal and bad in law and was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the transfer pricing comparables selected in the subscription segment were to be modified by excluding functionally dissimilar companies and applying working capital adjustment, (ii) whether the comparables in the services, software development, and IT enabled services segments were to be reworked by excluding non-comparable entities and including valid comparables, and (iii) whether the assessee was entitled to correction of margin computation, TDS credit, and consequential interest relief.

Issue (i): Whether the transfer pricing comparables selected in the subscription segment were to be modified by excluding functionally dissimilar companies and applying working capital adjustment.

Analysis: The subscription segment was benchmarked under TNMM. The disputed comparables were examined on functional profile, and companies engaged in product development or otherwise dissimilar activity were held not comparable to a limited-risk reseller. The Tribunal also accepted the principle that working capital differences materially affect comparability and that adjustment is required to place the assessee and comparables on a level playing field.

Conclusion: The challenged comparables were directed to be excluded, the working capital adjustment claim was accepted, and the ground was allowed for statistical purposes in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the comparables in the services, software development, and IT enabled services segments were to be reworked by excluding non-comparable entities and including valid comparables.

Analysis: In the services segment, education-based entities and entities failing the TPO's own turnover or related party transaction filters were held unsuitable, while a valid software-related comparable was directed to be included. In the software development segment, product companies, diversified service providers, and entities lacking segmental data were excluded, while software programming and testing entities were accepted subject to verification of functional parity. In the IT enabled services segment, diversified publishing/analytics entities and other non-matching comparables were excluded. The Tribunal applied consistency with earlier years where the assessee's FAR profile remained unchanged.

Conclusion: The comparables were reconstituted by excluding non-comparable entities and including suitable comparables where indicated, and the grounds were allowed partly for statistical purposes in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the assessee was entitled to correction of margin computation, TDS credit, and consequential interest relief.

Analysis: The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to adopt correct figures for comparable margins, to grant TDS credit after verification, and to recompute interest in accordance with law, while the penalty initiation ground was treated as premature and consequential.

Conclusion: The margin-computation and TDS-credit grievances were allowed for statistical purposes, interest was to be recomputed, and the penalty ground did not survive.

Final Conclusion: The transfer pricing adjustments were substantially re-examined, several comparables were excluded or included as directed, working capital adjustment was upheld, and the matter resulted in relief to the assessee with consequential recomputation by the lower authorities.

Ratio Decidendi: For transfer pricing benchmarking, functionally dissimilar companies must be excluded, comparable analysis must respect applied filters and segmental relevance, and working capital differences must be neutralised where they materially affect comparability.

Issues: (i) whether the activity of melting and converting bullion into bars, coins, medals and medallions amounted to manufacture; (ii) whether gold bars, gold/silver coins, medals, medallions and gift items were correctly classifiable and whether exemption was available in respect of gold bars and coins; and (iii) whether the demand for the extended period and the penalties were sustainable.

Issue (i): whether the activity of melting and converting bullion into bars, coins, medals and medallions amounted to manufacture.

Analysis: The process resulted in goods with a distinct commercial character and use, and the special excise procedure applicable to gold articles supported treatment of the activity as manufacture. The argument that the activity was mere trading was not accepted.

Conclusion: The activity amounted to manufacture and the finding was against the assessee.

Issue (ii): whether gold bars, gold/silver coins, medals, medallions and gift items were correctly classifiable and whether exemption was available in respect of gold bars and coins.

Analysis: Gold bars of 10/20/50 grams were held to fall under primary gold and not under heading 7114, and were entitled to exemption under Notification No. 12/2012-CE. Gold/silver coins were held classifiable under heading 7114, but remained exempt under entry 200 of Notification No. 12/2012-CE. Medals, medallions and gift items were held classifiable under heading 7114 and liable to duty at 1% for the normal period.

Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on gold bars and gold/silver coins, but not on medals, medallions and gift items.

Issue (iii): whether the demand for the extended period and the penalties were sustainable.

Analysis: The record did not establish wilful suppression, fraud or intent to evade duty, and the dispute turned on classification and interpretation of the law. The extended period invocation and consequential penalties were therefore not sustainable.

Conclusion: The extended period demand and penalties were set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded substantially for gold bars and gold/silver coins, while duty was sustained only on medals, medallions and gift items for the normal period, with remand limited to quantification of that liability.

Ratio Decidendi: A process that brings bullion into a distinct commercially identifiable product may constitute manufacture, but classification and exemption must follow the tariff description and notification text; in the absence of wilful suppression, the extended limitation period and penalties cannot be invoked.

Issues: (i) Whether the challenge to the order-in-original could succeed on the ground of non-service of the show cause notice. (ii) Whether the proceedings and the order-in-original were barred by limitation under the Goods and Services Tax law.

Issue (i): Whether the challenge to the order-in-original could succeed on the ground of non-service of the show cause notice.

Analysis: The petitioners' own admission showed that the notice was available on the official portal when the matter was checked through the tax consultant after the garnishee notice was issued. The failure to respond to the notice led to best judgment assessment, and service was treated as duly effected in the manner contemplated by the statute.

Conclusion: The plea of -service of the show cause notice was rejected and is against the petitioners.

Issue (ii): Whether the proceedings and the order-in-original were barred by limitation under the Goods and Services Tax law.

Analysis: The Court accepted that the petitioners had paid lesser tax despite being aware of the applicable rate, amounting to suppression so as to attract the extended period under Section 74(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. It also relied on the extension of time for annual returns by Notification No. 6/2020 dated 03.02.2020, which kept the impugned order within time.

Conclusion: The limitation challenge failed and is against the petitioners.

Final Conclusion: No ground was made out to interfere with the order-in-original, and the writ petition was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the record shows portal availability of the notice and the taxpayer's conduct attracts suppression, the Court may uphold deemed service, apply the extended limitation under the GST framework, and refuse writ interference with the assessment order.

Issues: (i) whether the supply of 19 MHADA-reserved flats to MHADA-identified allottees after issuance of the Occupancy Certificate was a taxable works-contract service or a sale of immovable property outside GST; (ii) if taxable, whether the value of supply was the MHADA-prescribed price or the open market value.

Issue (i): whether the supply of 19 MHADA-reserved flats to MHADA-identified allottees after issuance of the Occupancy Certificate was a taxable works-contract service or a sale of immovable property outside GST.

Analysis: The construction and transfer obligation arose at the stage of plan sanction and Commencement Certificate, not only after the Occupancy Certificate. The applicant received additional FSI as non-monetary consideration for undertaking the inclusive-housing obligation, and the identified flats were earmarked in the sanctioned plan itself. Since the entire consideration was not received only after completion, the exception in Paragraph 5(b) of Schedule II did not apply. Paragraph 5 of Schedule III, being subject to Paragraph 5(b) of Schedule II, did not exclude the transaction. The supply was in the course of business and answered the statutory description of supply and works contract.

Conclusion: The supply was taxable as a works-contract service and was not outside GST as a sale of immovable property.

Issue (ii): if taxable, whether the value of supply was the MHADA-prescribed price or the open market value.

Analysis: Section 15(1) was inapplicable because price was not the sole consideration; additional FSI was also received as consideration. The supply was therefore valued under Rule 27. The MHADA-administered price was not open market value because it was a regulated price linked to the inclusive-housing arrangement, whereas comparable flats sold to non-MHADA buyers in the same project on arm's-length terms provided the proper benchmark. The subsidy exclusion under Section 15(2)(e) was not attracted.

Conclusion: The value of supply had to be determined under Rule 27(a) as open market value based on comparable flats in the same project, and not at the MHADA-prescribed price.

Final Conclusion: The application failed on the taxability issue, and the ruling proceeded in the Revenue's favour by holding the MHADA flats taxable and directing valuation on an open-market basis.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a builder undertakes a statutorily mandated construction obligation in exchange for non-monetary consideration such as additional development rights or FSI, the transaction remains a taxable works-contract supply under Schedule II, and valuation must proceed on open market value under Rule 27 when consideration is not wholly in money.

Issues: (i) Whether the sewerage scheme contract was a pure service or a composite supply in the nature of a works contract; (ii) whether the recipient, Katol Nagar Parishad, was a local authority; (iii) whether the supply was in relation to a function entrusted to a Municipality under the Constitution; and (iv) whether the applicant was eligible for exemption under Entry 3A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).

Issue (i): Whether the sewerage scheme contract was a pure service or a composite supply in the nature of a works contract.

Analysis: The contract covered design, construction, installation, testing, commissioning and allied civil and electro-mechanical work for an underground sewerage system, with transfer of property in goods involved in execution. The supply was held to be a composite supply of goods and services in the nature of a works contract and not a pure service. The exclusion in Entry 3 for works contract service or composite supplies involving goods was therefore attracted.

Conclusion: The supply was not a pure service, but a composite supply in the nature of a works contract.

Issue (ii): Whether the recipient, Katol Nagar Parishad, was a local authority.

Analysis: A Nagar Parishad is a municipality within the constitutional scheme and falls within the definition of local authority. On the facts, the recipient was held to satisfy Section 2(69) of the CGST Act, 2017.

Conclusion: The recipient was a local authority.

Issue (iii): Whether the supply was in relation to a function entrusted to a Municipality under the Constitution.

Analysis: Underground sewerage infrastructure was held to relate to public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management, which are municipal functions under the Twelfth Schedule and Article 243W of the Constitution of India. The phrase "in relation to" was applied broadly to cover the activity.

Conclusion: The supply was in relation to a municipal function under Article 243W.

Issue (iv): Whether the applicant was eligible for exemption under Entry 3A of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate).

Analysis: Entry 3A applies to composite supplies of goods and services where the value of goods does not exceed 25% of the value of the composite supply, and the supply is made to a specified recipient for a qualifying municipal function. On the record, the aggregate goods component was 11.17%, the recipient was a local authority, and the activity related to a municipal function. The exemption was therefore available on the facts presently on record, subject to the statutory quantitative condition at the time of conclusion of the contract.

Conclusion: The applicant was eligible for exemption under Entry 3A on the facts presently on record.

Final Conclusion: The ruling determined that the contract is a composite works contract supply, that the recipient is a local authority, that the activity is connected with a municipal function, and that the exemption under Entry 3A is available on the present record subject to the quantitative threshold being satisfied at the relevant time.

Ratio Decidendi: For Entry 3A, the 25% goods threshold is assessed on the composite supply as a whole, and exemption depends on strict satisfaction of all cumulative statutory conditions.

Issues: Whether the outward supplies of warehoused goods from a bonded warehouse to ocean-going merchant vessels on foreign run, Indian Navy ships and Indian Coast Guard ships, before clearance for home consumption, constitute export of goods and zero-rated supply under the IGST Act, or whether such transactions fall within Schedule III to the CGST Act and are outside the scope of supply.

Analysis: Export of goods under Section 2(5) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires taking goods out of India to a place outside India. The territorial definition of India under Section 2(56) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with Section 11(b) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, shows that a supply completed within India does not satisfy the destination-based requirement of export. The customs provisions relied upon by the applicant grant exemption from import duty for warehoused goods or ship stores, but they do not alter the GST definition of export. The goods remained warehoused goods and were supplied before clearance for home consumption, bringing the transactions within paragraph 8(a) of Schedule III to the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Section 7(2)(a) thereof.

Conclusion: The supplies do not qualify as export of goods or zero-rated supply and are treated as neither a supply of goods nor a supply of services for GST purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: Supply of warehoused goods before clearance for home consumption is excluded from the scope of supply under Section 7(2)(a) read with Schedule III, and a transaction completed within India cannot be treated as export of goods under Section 2(5) of the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: (i) Whether construction and development of commercial units on the vacant plot, and the sale and leasing of such units, constitute activities in the course or furtherance of business and amount to supply under GST; (ii) whether input tax credit is admissible on inputs and input services used for construction of the commercial units, particularly in relation to units sold before completion and units leased on rent.

Issue (i): Whether construction and development of commercial units on the vacant plot, and the sale and leasing of such units, constitute activities in the course or furtherance of business and amount to supply under GST.

Analysis: The expression "business" under the GST law is wide enough to cover trade, commerce and analogous activities, whether or not undertaken with volume, frequency or continuity. A commercial construction project undertaken for sale of units and letting out of the remaining units was treated as a commercial activity. The source of funds used for construction was held to be irrelevant. Sale of under-construction commercial units and leasing of commercial units were both treated as supplies made in the course or furtherance of business.

Conclusion: Yes. Sale of commercial units to prospective buyers and rent received on leasing of commercial units are activities in the course or furtherance of business and amount to supply under GST.

Issue (ii): Whether input tax credit is admissible on inputs and input services used for construction of the commercial units, particularly in relation to units sold before completion and units leased on rent.

Analysis: Input tax credit is generally available only for goods or services used in the course or furtherance of business, but it is blocked where goods or services are received for construction of an immovable property on one's own account, other than plant and machinery. Since building and civil structures are excluded from plant and machinery, credit on construction inputs for the leased commercial property was denied. For units sold before receipt of the completion or occupation certificate, credit was allowed proportionately to the extent of such pre-completion supplies.

Conclusion: ITC is available on inputs and input services used for construction of commercial units sold before completion, but no ITC is available on inputs and input services used for construction of commercial units leased out on rent.

Final Conclusion: The ruling treats the commercial development activity as taxable business activity, while permitting only limited input credit for pre-completion sales and denying credit for the portion used to create leased immovable property.

Ratio Decidendi: A commercial construction project intended for sale and leasing is a business activity under GST, but credit on construction of immovable property on one's own account is blocked by the statute except to the extent the units are sold before completion.

Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition challenging the rectified GST demand order should be withdrawn in view of the available statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. (ii) Whether the appellate order dismissing the appeal as time-barred was liable to be quashed for non-consideration of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. (iii) Whether the recovery order founded on the disputed dues was liable to be quashed when the petitioner intended to pursue the statutory appellate remedy and make the prescribed pre-deposit.

Issue (i): Whether the writ petition challenging the rectified GST demand order should be withdrawn in view of the available statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The impugned demand order stood rectified, and the petitioner elected to pursue the statutory appellate remedy. The availability of appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 provided an efficacious alternate remedy for challenging the demand and the rectification order.

Conclusion: The writ petition was permitted to be withdrawn with liberty to file an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and all contentions were kept open.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate order dismissing the appeal as time-barred was liable to be quashed for non-consideration of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: The appellate authority rejected the appeal only on limitation without considering the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Since the plea of exclusion of time was not examined, the dismissal on limitation could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The appellate order was quashed and set aside, and the matter was remanded to the appellate authority for reconsideration on the limited ground of limitation, with merits left open.

Issue (iii): Whether the recovery order founded on the disputed dues was liable to be quashed when the petitioner intended to pursue the statutory appellate remedy and make the prescribed pre-deposit.

Analysis: The recovery action was founded on dues arising from the impugned assessment orders, one of which was already under challenge and another stood rectified. In view of the proposed appeal and the statutory pre-deposit, the recovery could not survive independently.

Conclusion: The recovery order and the consequential order were quashed and set aside.

Final Conclusion: The petitions were disposed of by granting withdrawal with liberty in one matter, remanding the limitation-based appellate dismissal in another, and quashing the recovery-related orders, while keeping all substantive contentions open in the appellate forum.

Ratio Decidendi: When an appellate rejection is founded solely on limitation, failure to consider the statutory plea for exclusion of time vitiates the order, and where an efficacious statutory appeal is available, the writ court may decline merits adjudication and leave the parties to pursue that remedy.

Issues: Whether the annual letting value of the disputed property could be taken at nil under section 23(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the property was claimed to have been let out in earlier years but remained vacant during the relevant year.

Analysis: The claim rested on vacancy allowance under section 23(1)(c), which applies where a property let out in an earlier year remains vacant during the previous year and, because of such vacancy, no actual rent is received or receivable. The Tribunal accepted the principle that a taxpayer should get the benefit of vacancy allowance if the factual foundation is established. At the same time, the record did not clearly show whether rental income from the property was offered in the immediately preceding assessment year, which was material to applying the provision.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee in principle, but the addition was not finally deleted. The matter was set aside to the Assessing Officer for verification of the relevant facts and for a fresh order.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded to the limited extent of remand, with the assessee being granted the benefit of a fresh factual examination on the vacancy claim.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a property is shown to have been let out in an earlier year and remains vacant in the relevant year, section 23(1)(c) can justify nil annual value, but the factual predicate for vacancy allowance must be established before relief is granted.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80P despite not claiming it in the return of income and filing the return beyond the due date under section 139(1); (ii) Whether any addition or disallowance had been made in processing the return under section 143(1).

Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80P despite not claiming it in the return of income and filing the return beyond the due date under section 139(1).

Analysis: The relevant provisions were read together to hold that a deduction under Chapter VI-A can be allowed only if it is claimed in the return of income and the return is furnished within the prescribed due date. The assessee had not claimed deduction under section 80P in the return and the return was filed after the due date. Both statutory conditions were therefore not satisfied.

Conclusion: The claim for deduction under section 80P was rightly disallowed and the finding was against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether any addition or disallowance had been made in processing the return under section 143(1).

Analysis: The processed return reflected the same income as declared by the assessee, and no adjustment or disallowance was made in the intimation under section 143(1). The grievance alleging an arbitrary addition was factually unsustainable.

Conclusion: No addition or disallowance was made under section 143(1), and this ground failed against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge failed on all material grounds, and the disallowance of the deduction claim as well as the dismissal of the remaining grounds were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: A deduction under Chapter VI-A cannot be granted unless it is claimed in the return of income filed within the statutory due date, and a ground alleging an addition fails where the processed return makes no adjustment to the returned income.

Issues: (i) Whether section 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to the transfer of the sites sold by the assessee, or whether the matter required verification of the assessee's claim that the sites were held as business inventory in the course of real estate business; (ii) Whether the penalty matters under sections 271D and 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 required fresh adjudication in view of the remand of the quantum issue.

Issue (i): Whether section 50C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to the transfer of the sites sold by the assessee, or whether the matter required verification of the assessee's claim that the sites were held as business inventory in the course of real estate business

Analysis: Section 50C operates in the field of computation of capital gains and applies where consideration is received or accruing as a result of transfer of a capital asset. If the lands or sites were held as stock in trade or business inventory in the ordinary course of a real estate business, the transfer would fall under business income and the deeming fiction in section 50C would not apply. The assessee, however, had not established before the lower authorities, with supporting books and records, that the sites formed part of business inventory. The claim therefore required factual verification by the Assessing Officer, along with examination of books of account, land records and other supporting material.

Conclusion: The issue was remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination. If the sites are found to be business inventory held in the course of real estate business, section 50C will not apply and the addition is to be deleted.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty matters under sections 271D and 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 required fresh adjudication in view of the remand of the quantum issue

Analysis: The penalty matters arose from the same set of facts and the quantum determination was sent back for fresh consideration. In such circumstances, the penalty issues could not be finally sustained or reversed without the outcome of the restored quantum proceedings. Fresh decision-making by the Assessing Officer after giving reasonable opportunity was therefore necessary.

Conclusion: The penalty matters were also remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh decision in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of by restoring the core quantum dispute and the connected penalty issues to the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration, with directions to grant the assessee a reasonable opportunity and to decide the applicability of section 50C on the basis of proper evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 50C applies only to transfers of capital assets for capital gains computation and does not govern transfers of stock in trade or business inventory.

Issues: Whether absence of an explicit irrevocability and dissolution clause in the trust deed, and the answer given in Form 10AB, could justify rejection of registration under section 12AB and approval under section 80G.

Analysis: The application for registration and renewal was rejected solely because the trust deed did not expressly state that the trust was irrevocable and did not contain a dissolution clause. The Tribunal noted that the jurisdictional High Court had already examined the same issue in detail and held that a public charitable trust is deemed irrevocable by operation of law unless the instrument expressly provides a power of revocation. On that basis, absence of an explicit irrevocability clause is not a valid ground to deny registration or renewal under section 12AB. The Tribunal also accepted that the response in Form 10AB could not be treated as false or incorrect information amounting to a specified violation when the utility itself compelled the declaration in that form.

Conclusion: The rejection of registration under section 12AB and approval under section 80G was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.