Issues: Whether the show-cause notices issued after expiry of the 12-week period fixed by the Court in the earlier remand order were liable to be quashed for non-compliance with the Court's directions.

Analysis: The earlier order had quashed the penalty order under Section 271D of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and remanded the matter to the Assessing Officer with a specific direction to complete the exercise within 12 weeks from receipt of the order. The record showed that no final order was passed within that period, and no application seeking extension of time was filed. In these circumstances, the subsequent show-cause notices could not be sustained, as the authorities had failed to comply with the time-bound judicial direction.

Conclusion: The show-cause notices dated 27.10.2025 and 13.02.2026 were quashed and set aside, and the petition was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a remand order fixes a mandatory time limit for completion of proceedings and the authority fails to act within that period without seeking extension, subsequent notices issued in the purported continuation of those proceedings are liable to be quashed for breach of the Court's directions.

Issues: Whether the impugned import restriction notification could be applied to consignments that had already arrived before the notification was digitally signed and published, thereby denying the petitioner transitional benefits and clearance without import authorisation.

Analysis: The sequence of events showed that the goods had already arrived at the airport before the notification was digitally signed and brought into force. The legal effect of delegated legislation depends upon publication in the manner prescribed by the parent statute, and a notification cannot acquire enforceability before such publication. The statutory scheme under the Foreign Trade enactment required the restriction order and the Foreign Trade Policy to operate through official notification in the Gazette. The notification itself stated that it would come into force with immediate effect and would override transitional benefits, but that effect could not travel backwards to goods that had already landed before promulgation. The Supreme Court authorities relied upon were applied for the principle that unpublished or later-published delegated legislation cannot retrospectively burden completed transactions unless the statute authorises such operation.

Conclusion: The notification could not be applied retrospectively to the petitioner's consignment, and the petitioner was entitled to clearance without insisting on import authorisation under the impugned restriction.

Ratio Decidendi: Delegated legislation regulating imports becomes enforceable only upon publication in the mode prescribed by the parent statute, and in the absence of express statutory authorisation it cannot operate retrospectively to impair rights in goods already in transit or already arrived before such publication.

Issues: (i) Whether an appeal under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944 was maintainable when the proposed substantial question of law concerned the taxability of the transaction and, consequently, fell within the scope of Section 35L(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Section 35G permits an appeal to the High Court only where the order of the Tribunal does not relate to questions having a relation to the rate of duty or the value of goods for assessment. Section 35L(2) enlarges that exclusion by providing that determination of taxability or excisability of goods for assessment is included within questions relating to the rate of duty. The issue raised in the appeal was whether the transaction amounted to sale of goods or service under the Finance Act, 1994, which was treated as a taxability question falling within the statutory exclusion. The cited precedents were applied to reinforce that such disputes lie in the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and not the High Court.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable under Section 35G and lay, if at all, under Section 35L before the Supreme Court; the appeal was rejected on the ground of maintainability.

Ratio Decidendi: A dispute that directly concerns taxability or excisability for assessment purposes is a question relating to the rate of duty and is excluded from High Court appellate jurisdiction under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Outcome: Delay condoned. The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed. Liberty was left open to the revenue to raise all objections, including questions of law and fact, in the writ proceedings before the High Court.

Outcome: Delay condoned. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed and the impugned judgment/order was left undisturbed.

Issues: Whether the approval granted under section 153D of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the search assessments was mechanical and without application of mind, and whether the consequent assessments were valid.

Analysis: Section 153D requires prior approval before completion of a search assessment, and the approval must reflect independent application of mind to the material for each assessment year. A consolidated approval given on the same day as the request, without year-wise reasoning and without showing examination of the draft orders, seized material, or appraisal report, does not satisfy the statutory safeguard. The approval cannot be treated as a mere formality or rubber stamp, since it is meant to protect the assessee against arbitrary exercise of power and to ensure that the superior officer actually scrutinises the material before granting consent.

Conclusion: The approval under section 153D was held to be mechanical and invalid, and the assessments founded on such approval were held unsustainable in law.

Ratio Decidendi: Prior approval under section 153D is a mandatory jurisdictional safeguard and is valid only when the approving authority independently applies mind to the material for each assessment year; a non-speaking or consolidated approval granted mechanically vitiates the assessment.

Issues: (i) whether the jurisdiction assumed under section 153C was validly founded on the seized material allegedly relating to the assessee; (ii) whether the addition based on diaries, notebooks and digital references to "DD" could be sustained in the absence of direct identification and independent corroboration.

Issue (i): whether the jurisdiction assumed under section 153C was validly founded on the seized material allegedly relating to the assessee.

Analysis: The seized documents were found from the possession of a third party and did not bear the assessee's name, PAN, address or any other direct identifier. The only link relied upon was the initials "DD", supported by mobile contacts, Truecaller data and electronic references, but these materials did not establish a clear and demonstrable nexus with the assessee. The satisfaction recorded for section 153C did not show a live, cogent connection between the seized material and the assessee, and the statutory presumption attached to documents found in search could not be transposed to a third party without independent evidence.

Conclusion: The assumption of jurisdiction under section 153C was invalid and the notice and consequential assessment could not be sustained.

Issue (ii): whether the addition based on diaries, notebooks and digital references to "DD" could be sustained in the absence of direct identification and independent corroboration.

Analysis: The entries in the loose diaries and notebooks were private notings of a third party and, by themselves, lacked evidentiary value against the assessee. The author of the diaries did not identify the assessee as "DD" and explained the code as a transaction identifier. The digital material, including contact lists and Truecaller information, was regarded as too tenuous to prove authorship or receipt of undisclosed cash. Human probabilities could assist appreciation of evidence, but could not replace proof, and additions could not rest on suspicion or conjecture without corroborative material linking the transactions to the assessee.

Conclusion: The addition for unexplained cash transactions was not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional foundation having failed, the consequential assessment and the impugned addition were both set aside, and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: For invoking section 153C and sustaining a related addition, the seized material must disclose a clear, direct and corroborated nexus with the other person sought to be assessed; loose third-party documents and unverified digital references, without independent evidence, are insufficient to establish that nexus.

Issues: Whether voluntary contributions received for construction of a community hall could be treated as corpus donation and, if so, whether such receipt was taxable merely because the trust did not have registration under section 12AA for the relevant assessment year.

Analysis: The contribution was found to have been collected from devotees through a donation box and not through any specific written direction of donors. The amount was used for construction of a community hall, which was treated as capital expenditure. The Tribunal held that corpus donation is a capital receipt and, on the facts of the case, its taxability did not depend upon registration under section 12AA for the relevant year.

Conclusion: The receipt of Rs. 88,20,088/- was held to be a capital receipt not liable to tax, and the disallowance was deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether additional grounds and the claim for depreciation or, in the alternative, revenue deduction on conversion charges and related interest were maintainable and allowable where the expenditure was incurred for change of land use in respect of land not owned by the assessee; (ii) Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable on the disallowance relating to conversion charges.

Issue (i): Whether additional grounds and the claim for depreciation or, in the alternative, revenue deduction on conversion charges and related interest were maintainable and allowable where the expenditure was incurred for change of land use in respect of land not owned by the assessee?

Analysis: The additional grounds raised a mixed question of law and fact because the nature of the conversion charges, the rights acquired, and the effect of the payment on the asset structure required fresh factual inquiry. The assessee had consistently treated the outlay as capital in the earlier stages and sought to change its stand at a later stage, which was held impermissible as approbation and reprobation. On merits, the conversion charges were linked to land use rights attached to the landowner, not to any depreciable asset in the hands of the assessee. Explanation 1 to section 32 was held inapplicable because it applies only to capital expenditure on a building or work in relation to a building, and cannot be extended to expenditure intrinsically connected with land. The claim for deduction of the interest component also failed because the expenditure did not satisfy the requirements of section 36(1)(iii) or section 37(1) for the assessee.

Conclusion: The additional grounds were not maintainable, and the claims for depreciation and alternative revenue deduction were rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable on the disallowance relating to conversion charges?

Analysis: The penalty issue was governed by the consistent view taken in the assessee's own earlier years, where the same controversy was treated as debatable and penalty was deleted. The disallowance arose from a difference of opinion on allowability of the expenditure, and no fresh concealment or furnishing of inaccurate particulars was established. In such circumstances, penalty could not be sustained merely because the underlying claim was rejected.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 271(1)(c) was not sustainable and was deleted.

Final Conclusion: The batch of appeals was disposed of with dismissal of the depreciation and related expenditure claims and allowance of the penalty appeals, resulting in partial success for the assessee overall.

Ratio Decidendi: Expenditure for change of land use in respect of land not owned by the assessee does not fall within the depreciable capital expenditure contemplated by Explanation 1 to section 32, and penalty under section 271(1)(c) cannot survive where the disallowance turns only on a debatable claim without proof of concealment or inaccurate particulars.

Issues: Whether a legal representative aggrieved by an arbitral award must challenge it under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or may invoke Article 227 of the Constitution of India or Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a complete code for arbitral remedies. Section 34 provides the exclusive statutory route for setting aside an arbitral award, and the scheme of the Act contemplates continuity of arbitral proceedings despite the death of a party. The definition of legal representative, the binding effect of awards on persons claiming under parties, and the enforceability of arbitration agreements against legal representatives together indicate that such representatives step into the shoes of the deceased party. Denying them access to Section 34 would leave them remediless while still binding them to the award, which would be contrary to the statutory scheme.

Conclusion: A legal representative seeking to challenge an arbitral award must proceed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and not under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The legal position affirmed the High Court's view against the appellant.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the arbitration statute makes the award binding on parties and persons claiming under them, a deceased party's legal representative inherits both the burden and the remedy under Section 34, which is the exclusive route for challenge.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail should be granted to the applicants in a GST fake invoice and wrongful ITC case involving alleged control over firm operations, circulation of bogus invoices, and large revenue loss.

Analysis: The allegations were supported by statements under Section 70, GST portal data, bank records, and WhatsApp communications, which prima facie showed that the firm was used for issuing fake invoices and passing on ITC without actual supply of goods. The Court treated the matter as an economic offence involving a large-scale GST fraud and observed that such offences require a strict approach at the bail stage. It also noted that Section 132(1)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 had been made non-compoundable, and that the documentary nature of the evidence did not by itself negate the need for custodial interrogation while the investigation was still ongoing.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was declined because the applicants were found not entitled to pre-arrest protection at this stage.

Issues: Entitlement to refund of excess tax with interest under the Jharkhand Value Added Tax Act, 2005 despite administrative delay.

Analysis: The refund had already been granted earlier and the subsequent challenge to that grant had failed. The statutory scheme under Section 52 required refund of excess tax, while Section 55 provided interest where refund remained unpaid beyond the prescribed period. The reasons advanced for non-payment, namely vacancy in office and deputation of an officer on election duty, were held to be neither legal nor satisfactory. The prolonged inaction after the refund order and after dismissal of the challenge justified a time-bound direction for payment, together with interest from the statutorily relevant date.

Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to refund of the excess tax amount with interest at 6% per annum from the stipulated period, and the refund was directed to be made by the specified date.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing Form 10 for Assessment Year 2022-23 ought to be condoned under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the rejection of the application was justified in view of the delayed return of income and Section 13(9)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The delay was supported by an affidavit explaining the failure of the professional entrusted with compliance, and the petitioner had no apparent benefit from the delay. The same authority had already accepted the explanation and condoned the delay in filing the return of income, which supported acceptance of the explanation for Form 10 as well. The Court found that refusal of condonation would expose the petitioner to grave hardship and a substantial tax burden for a procedural default in filing Form 10, despite the surrounding circumstances.

Conclusion: The delay in filing Form 10 was liable to be condoned, and the order rejecting condonation was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether the Committee of Creditors and the resolution professional could withdraw a resolution-plan approval application after the plan had been approved by the Committee of Creditors and submitted to the adjudicating authority, on the basis of delay, cash surplus, and alleged concerns regarding feasibility.

Analysis: A resolution plan approved by the Committee of Creditors and submitted for approval has binding statutory effect between the Committee of Creditors and the successful resolution applicant even before approval under Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The explanation to Regulation 18(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 permits meetings only for matters that do not affect a resolution plan already submitted before the adjudicating authority. No breach of the plan or undertaking by the successful resolution applicant was alleged. Delay, accrued cash surplus, or a perceived change in commercial feasibility did not create jurisdiction for the Committee of Creditors or the resolution professional to withdraw the pending plan-approval application. The adjudicating authority had not determined the plan's viability on merits and was required to consider the pending plan-approval application and other maintainable pleas in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The Committee of Creditors and the resolution professional lacked jurisdiction to seek withdrawal of the plan-approval application. The withdrawal order was invalid, and the plan-approval application stood revived for adjudication in accordance with law; the separate application seeking withdrawal of the insolvency process remained open for consideration in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether two assessment orders could survive for the same tax period and same discrepancies against the same assessee; (ii) whether the ex parte assessment order deserved to be set aside and remanded to afford the assessee an opportunity to place materials.

Issue (i): Whether two assessment orders could survive for the same tax period and same discrepancies against the same assessee.

Analysis: The assessment period was the same and the overlapping discrepancies could not be dealt with through two orders against the same assessee for the same year. The existence of an additional discrepancy in one order justified retaining that order while the overlapping order could not stand independently.

Conclusion: The order challenged in the first writ petition was unsustainable and was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the ex parte assessment order deserved to be set aside and remanded to afford the assessee an opportunity to place materials.

Analysis: The assessment was completed without effective participation of the assessee, and the dispute involved turnover mismatch, input tax credit mismatch, and late fee claims that required consideration of the assessee's explanation and supporting records. In the circumstances, and having regard to the partial recovery already made, an opportunity was warranted to enable a fresh decision on the merits.

Conclusion: The ex parte assessment order was set aside and the matter was remanded for fresh consideration, with consequential lifting of the bank attachment.

Final Conclusion: The assessee obtained relief against the overlapping order and a fresh opportunity before the assessing authority in the remanded matter, while the department was left free to proceed afresh in accordance with law on the surviving assessment.

Ratio Decidendi: Where overlapping assessment orders cover the same tax period and discrepancies, the unsustainable order may be quashed, and an ex parte tax assessment involving disputed turnover and input tax credit mismatches may be remanded to ensure a fair opportunity of hearing and fresh adjudication on merits.

Issues: Whether the petitioner could be permitted to submit a manual application for revocation of cancellation of GST registration after the portal time limit had expired.

Analysis: The registration had been cancelled for non-filing of returns for six consecutive months. The Court took note of the time-bar on the electronic portal and the petitioner's request to submit the revocation application physically. Considering the circumstances, the Court directed the competent authority to accept a physical application if filed within the stipulated period and to decide it in accordance with law within three weeks thereafter.

Conclusion: The petitioner was granted limited relief by being allowed to approach the authority with a manual application, and the authority was directed to consider it on merits.

Issues: Whether the delay of 430 days in filing Form No. 10 for claiming accumulation under Section 11(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 ought to be condoned under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The application for condonation was required to be examined on whether there was reasonable cause and genuine hardship. The record showed that the omission to file Form No. 10 in time was inadvertent and that the assessee had otherwise been regularly complying with exemption-related requirements. It was held that furnishing Form No. 10 before completion of assessment constituted sufficient compliance, and that similar delays had earlier been condoned on a liberal, equitable and justice-oriented approach to avoid denial of exemption on a merely technical ground. Refusal to condone would result in genuine hardship by depriving the assessee of the benefit under Section 11.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the rejection of the condonation application was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded, the impugned order was quashed, and the respondents were directed to give effect to the condonation while processing the return in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where delay in filing Form No. 10 is shown to be bona fide and denial of condonation would cause genuine hardship, the discretionary power under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 should be exercised liberally to permit substantial compliance for claiming exemption under Section 11(2).

Issues: Whether the addition made under section 11(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of accumulated income of an earlier year, utilised in assessment year 2023-24, was rightly deleted on the ground that the amendment brought by the Finance Act, 2022 could not be applied to past accumulations and that the assessee was entitled to utilise the accumulated income in the sixth year.

Analysis: The accumulation had been made in assessment year 2017-18 under section 11(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, when the prevailing position permitted utilisation within five years and also in the immediately succeeding year. The amendment to section 11(3) brought by the Finance Act, 2022 was applicable from assessment year 2023-24, but it could not be read so as to take away a vested right already accrued at the time of accumulation. The time of the amendment also left practically no effective opportunity to comply within a truncated period, and the law does not compel performance of an impossible act. The Tribunal also followed coordinate-bench decisions recognising utilisation in the immediately succeeding year after expiry of the prescribed period.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to apply the accumulated income in assessment year 2023-24, and the deletion of the addition under section 11(3) was upheld.

Ratio Decidendi: An amendment to the law governing utilisation of charitable accumulation cannot retrospectively defeat a vested entitlement already accrued on the date of accumulation, and where the statutory change leaves no real opportunity for compliance, the accumulated amount cannot be treated as taxable merely because the later assessment year falls under the amended provision.