Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority could reject the Committee of Creditors' choice of replacement resolution professional and appoint another person of its own choice under Section 27 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Section 27 permits the Committee of Creditors to replace the resolution professional if the proposal carries the requisite voting share and the proposed professional gives written consent, subject to forwarding of the name and absence of pending disciplinary proceedings. The record showed that the Committee of Creditors had approved replacement with 100% voting share and the proposed professional had given consent. The grounds relied upon to infer "extraordinary interest" were not supported by any specific legal violation. Seeking project-related assurances, giving a qualified legal opinion in an independent professional capacity, and engaging counsel after being impleaded did not, by themselves, show bias, conflict of interest, or misconduct. The Adjudicating Authority was not empowered to substitute its own nominee for the one chosen by the Committee of Creditors.

Conclusion: The rejection of the Committee of Creditors' nominee and the appointment of a different resolution professional were held unsustainable, and the interference was found to be beyond jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether testing and analysis services rendered to foreign clients, with reports delivered abroad and consideration received in convertible foreign exchange, constituted export of service under the Export of Service Rules, 2005. (ii) Whether the demand could be confirmed for the domestic clearances without granting cum-duty benefit. (iii) Whether invocation of the extended period and imposition of penalty were sustainable. (iv) Whether the mandatory penalty could be recomputed by excluding the amount already paid before initiation of investigation.

Issue (i): Whether testing and analysis services rendered to foreign clients, with reports delivered abroad and consideration received in convertible foreign exchange, constituted export of service under the Export of Service Rules, 2005.

Analysis: The services were held to fall under Technical Testing and Analysis Service. The activity involved research and testing performed in India, but the resulting reports, data and deliverables were furnished to clients outside India for use abroad. The delivery of the final report abroad formed an integrated part of the work order and amounted to part performance outside India. Receipt of consideration in convertible foreign exchange further satisfied the export conditions. The prior and subsequent legal position under the Export of Service Rules supported the view that such services are exported when the deliverables are used outside India.

Conclusion: The services qualified as export of service and were not liable to service tax to that extent.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand could be confirmed for the domestic clearances without granting cum-duty benefit.

Analysis: The claim for cum-duty benefit required examination of the demand computation on the basis of the materials and submissions before the adjudicating authority. Since the relevant supporting documentation had not been properly considered, the question of correct quantification of demand was not finally settled at the appellate stage and required fresh examination.

Conclusion: The matter was remanded for reconsideration of cum-duty benefit and recomputation of demand.

Issue (iii): Whether invocation of the extended period and imposition of penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: In respect of the assessee's challenge, the record showed nondisclosure of taxable service receipts in the statutory returns and payment of tax only after investigation commenced. While there was some interpretational controversy regarding services to foreign clients, no such ambiguity existed for services provided domestically. On those facts, the extended period and penalty were found to be justified.

Conclusion: The challenge to invocation of the extended period and penalty was rejected.

Issue (iv): Whether the mandatory penalty could be recomputed by excluding the amount already paid before initiation of investigation.

Analysis: The amount paid before investigation did not justify proportionate reduction in the statutory penalty where the penalty was to be imposed with reference to the total confirmed liability. The earlier payment could be appropriated, but it did not erase the basis for reworking the mandatory penalty in accordance with the statute.

Conclusion: The penalty was directed to be recomputed on remand.

Final Conclusion: The departmental challenge to export treatment failed, the assessee's plea succeeded only to the extent of remand on cum-duty computation, and the remaining challenges relating to limitation and penalty were not accepted.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the deliverable of a service rendered in India is contractually required to be supplied to a foreign client and is in fact used abroad, with payment received in convertible foreign exchange, the service may constitute export under the Export of Service Rules by reason of part performance outside India.

Issues: (i) Whether the amounts received by the appellant for recovery work undertaken for Barclays constituted consideration for taxable service and not a joint venture arrangement. (ii) Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation and imposition of interest and penalty were justified.

Issue (i): Whether the amounts received by the appellant for recovery work undertaken for Barclays constituted consideration for taxable service and not a joint venture arrangement.

Analysis: The appellant had acted as a recovery agent for Barclays and received commission for the service rendered. No documentary material showed the existence of any joint venture, separate entity, or revenue-sharing arrangement between the parties. A joint venture requires an agreement between principals acting on a principal-to-principal basis with shared costs, efforts, and returns. The facts showed that Barclays was the lender and the appellant merely recovered amounts from borrowers for commission, which constituted a service rendered to Barclays. The alleged absence of TDS did not alter the character of the transaction.

Conclusion: The activity was taxable service rendered by the appellant and not a joint venture; this issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended period of limitation and imposition of interest and penalty were justified.

Analysis: The appellant had not declared the recovery agency receipts or paid service tax on them despite being registered under service tax. The non-disclosure supported invocation of the extended period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994. Once the tax demand was sustainable, interest under Section 75 of the Finance Act, 1994 followed. The circumstances also justified penalty under Section 78(1) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period, levy of interest, and penalty were upheld; this issue was decided against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The tax demand and consequential interest and penalty were sustained, and the appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Receipt of commission for recovery work, without proof of a genuine joint venture arrangement, constitutes taxable service; non-disclosure of such receipts justifies the extended limitation period and consequential penalty.

Issues: Whether the impugned adjudication and appellate orders were vitiated for non-supply of relied upon documents and breach of the principles of natural justice, warranting remand.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the appellant had sought supply of relied upon documents to prepare his defence, but the request was not complied with at the adjudication stage and was again ignored in appeal. Since the case turned on documents recovered from the appellant's premises and his statements, denial of access to the relied upon material deprived him of an effective opportunity to defend the proceedings. In these circumstances, the defect was treated as a violation of natural justice requiring a fresh decision after supplying the documents.

Conclusion: The matter was remanded to the adjudicating authority to supply the relied upon documents and decide the case afresh in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the extent that the matter was sent back for de novo consideration after curing the procedural defect.

Ratio Decidendi: Where relied upon documents are withheld and the party is thereby denied an effective opportunity of defence, the proceedings are vitiated for breach of natural justice and remand is justified.

Issues: Whether, for the period prior to 01.03.2008 and before the later restriction introduced in 2016, Cenvat credit of basic excise duty could be utilised for payment of National Calamity Contingent Duty (NCCD).

Analysis: Rule 3(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 formed the credit pool from which credit could be taken, and Rule 3(4) permitted utilisation of such credit for payment of any duty of excise on any final product, subject to the restrictions contained in the Rules. The Tribunal noted that prior to the insertion of the restrictive fifth proviso in 2008 and the later absolute restriction in 2016, no provision barred utilisation of basic excise duty credit for payment of NCCD. It further distinguished the precedent concerning exemption notifications, holding that the question there was different from the present question of credit utilisation under the Cenvat Credit Rules. The Tribunal relied on the earlier view that the converse restriction on NCCD credit did not imply a prohibition on using basic duty credit for NCCD.

Conclusion: The respondent was entitled to utilise Cenvat credit of basic excise duty for payment of NCCD for the relevant period; the Revenue's challenge failed.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order sustaining the assessee's utilisation of credit was upheld and the Revenue appeals were dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of a specific restriction under the Cenvat Credit Rules for the relevant period, credit of basic excise duty could be used to discharge NCCD liability on the final product.

Issues: (i) Whether the penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained despite the importer opting for re-export after confiscation and redemption fine. (ii) Whether the amount paid towards customs duty could be appropriated when the goods were not cleared for home consumption but were allowed to be re-exported.

Issue (i): Whether the penalty under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 could be sustained despite the importer opting for re-export after confiscation and redemption fine.

Analysis: The import was found to involve deliberate misdeclaration of the vehicle's description, country of origin, value and seating capacity. The statutory scheme treats improper importation, confiscation, redemption fine and penalty as distinct consequences. Section 114AA applies where a person knowingly or intentionally uses false or incorrect declarations or documents in any material particular. The fact that re-export was permitted on payment of redemption fine did not extinguish the independent penal consequence arising from the false declarations used in the import transaction.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 114AA was rightly held to be sustainable and the Tribunal erred in setting it aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the amount paid towards customs duty could be appropriated when the goods were not cleared for home consumption but were allowed to be re-exported.

Analysis: The Court held that once confiscated goods are redeemed, Section 125 of the Customs Act, 1962 recognises liability to duty and charges in addition to the fine. The importer had opted for redemption and re-export, and the duty-related consequence was therefore not negated merely because the goods were not retained for home consumption. The Court further held that the duty liability and the confiscation/redemption mechanism operate independently and can coexist under the Act.

Conclusion: The appropriation of the duty amount was valid and the Tribunal erred in setting it aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the Tribunal's interference with the penalty and duty appropriation was contrary to the statutory scheme governing misdeclaration, confiscation, redemption fine and duty liability.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases of deliberate misdeclaration of imported goods, the consequences of confiscation, redemption fine, duty liability and penalty under Section 114AA are distinct and independent, and permission to re-export does not by itself erase the liability for penalty or duty under the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: (i) whether the appellant's training courses were eligible for exemption under Notification No. 24/2004-ST for the pre-amendment period; (ii) whether the amendment brought in by Notification No. 03/2010-ST became effective only on publication in the Official Gazette on 22.01.2011; (iii) whether, from 01.07.2012, the impugned courses fell within the negative list as education forming part of an approved vocational education course; and (iv) whether invocation of the extended period and penalties was justified.

Issue (i): whether the appellant's training courses were eligible for exemption under Notification No. 24/2004-ST for the pre-amendment period.

Analysis: The exemption notification covered vocational training institutes imparting skills enabling employment or self-employment. The courses in film direction, cinematography, editing and sound design were held to be skill-intensive vocational courses. The exclusionary approach adopted by the Revenue, requiring proof of actual employment after training, was rejected. The notification was construed as a beneficial provision and given a purposive interpretation.

Conclusion: The appellant was held entitled to exemption for the pre-amendment period.

Issue (ii): whether the amendment brought in by Notification No. 03/2010-ST became effective only on publication in the Official Gazette on 22.01.2011.

Analysis: The amended notification itself provided that it would take effect from the date of publication in the Official Gazette. On the material placed, the amendment was found to have been published only on 22.01.2011. The appellant obtained NCVT registration on 10.11.2010, before the amendment became operative, and the pre-publication period could not be governed by the amended conditions.

Conclusion: The amendment was held effective only from 22.01.2011.

Issue (iii): whether, from 01.07.2012, the impugned courses fell within the negative list as education forming part of an approved vocational education course.

Analysis: Section 66D(l)(iii) excluded education as part of an approved vocational education course from tax, and Section 65B(11) treated a course run by an NCVT-affiliated institute offering designated trades as sufficient. The appellant was found to satisfy the statutory test through NCVT affiliation and notified designated trades, without any need for separate MES approval.

Conclusion: The appellant was held entitled to the benefit of the negative list for the post-01.07.2012 period.

Issue (iv): whether invocation of the extended period and penalties was justified.

Analysis: The dispute was found to be interpretational, with no established wilful misstatement or suppression of facts. In the absence of a positive act showing intent to evade tax, the extended period could not be sustained and the consequential penalties also failed.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period and penalties was held unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demands were set aside, and the appellant was granted consequential relief in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A vocational training exemption must be construed purposively as a beneficial provision, and eligibility is satisfied where the course imparts employable skills and meets the statutory conditions; actual proof of post-training employment is not required.

Issues: Whether restoration of an appeal dismissed for non-removal of defects, including non-compliance with statutory pre-deposit, could be granted after an unexplained delay of about five years.

Analysis: The appeal had been dismissed after the appellant failed to comply with the mandatory pre-deposit requirement despite service of the Registry's communications and failed to appear on the listed dates. The restoration request was made nearly five years later. The explanation for delay was neither specific nor supported by material. Sufficient cause requires a bona fide, diligent and documented explanation proportionate to the delay; the recorded grounds did not meet that standard. No perversity or substantial question of law arose from rejection of restoration.

Conclusion: Restoration was rightly refused; the appellant failed to establish sufficient cause for the prolonged delay and non-compliance with the statutory pre-deposit requirement.

Issues: Whether the cancellation of GST registration for non-filing of returns and non-payment of taxes should be addressed through revocation proceedings.

Analysis: The writ petition was disposed of by following the directions adopted in a similar matter. The petitioner was required to seek revocation, furnish proposed returns, and deposit the taxes due; the registering authority was directed to receive payment and decide the revocation request within the prescribed period, including by accepting a manual application if online filing posed difficulty.

Conclusion: The challenge was disposed of by directing consideration of the petitioner's application for revocation of registration in accordance with the stipulated process.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to provisional release of the seized imported goods subject to conditions, while leaving the adjudication proceedings open.

Analysis: The writ petition challenged the seizure memo and sought release of the imported consignment. The Court noted that similar writ petitions involving identical facts had already been dealt with by granting conditional release of the seized goods. Following that approach, and while preserving the authority of the adjudicating officer to proceed in accordance with law and to consider the parties' objections, the Court directed provisional release of the goods on payment of the enhanced duty, furnishing of a bank guarantee, and compliance with the other stipulated conditions.

Conclusion: The petitioner was held entitled to provisional release of the seized goods on the conditions imposed, and the adjudication proceedings were left open to be decided independently in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether initiation of proceedings under Section 153C for Assessment Year 2009-10 was barred by the ten-year limitation period applicable to search assessments.

Analysis: For proceedings against a person other than the searched person, the date of receipt of seized material or recording of satisfaction by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer is treated as the relevant search date. The ten-year block is computed by including the assessment year relevant to that date. Even by treating 18.02.2021, the date of the searched person's satisfaction note, as the relevant date, Assessment Year 2009-10 fell outside the permissible ten-year block. Initiation of proceedings for that year was therefore beyond the statutory jurisdiction conferred for search assessments.

Conclusion: The notice, assessment order and consequential demand for Assessment Year 2009-10 were time-barred and invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether bad debts relating to loan accounts classified as NPAs before 01.04.2006 were deductible on actual write-off under section 36(1)(vii); (ii) Whether recovery of loans earlier written off could be added again where it had already been credited to profit and loss account and offered to tax; (iii) Whether disallowance of delayed employees' provident fund contributions required factual verification.

Issue (i): Whether bad debts relating to loan accounts classified as NPAs before 01.04.2006 were deductible on actual write-off under section 36(1)(vii).

Analysis: Deduction under section 36(1)(vii) is available in the year in which a debt is written off in the accounts; the precise time at which the debt became bad need not be established. Cooperative banks were not eligible for deduction under section 36(1)(viia) before assessment year 2007-08. Consequently, no credit balance in a statutory provision for bad and doubtful debts existed in respect of these pre-01.04.2006 NPAs. The applicable RBI instructions for cooperative banks required approval before write-off and did not mandate an automatic write-off merely upon classification as a loss asset. Sections 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) operate independently, with the limitation concerning the provision account applying only to debts covered by section 36(1)(viia).

Conclusion: The bad debts written off in the relevant years were deductible under section 36(1)(vii), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether recovery of loans earlier written off could be added again where it had already been credited to profit and loss account and offered to tax.

Analysis: The section 143(1) intimation merged into and was superseded by the subsequent scrutiny assessment under section 143(3). The recovered amount had already been credited to the profit and loss account and included in the returned taxable income. Its further addition on the basis of return disclosures resulted in taxation of the same income twice.

Conclusion: The addition for recovery of loans written off was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether disallowance of delayed employees' provident fund contributions required factual verification.

Analysis: The disallowance was made through automatic adoption of tax-audit-report data and was repeated in the scrutiny assessment without verification of the supporting details. Verification was required while applying the statutory provisions governing employees' contributions and the applicable Supreme Court ruling.

Conclusion: The issue was remitted to the Assessing Officer for limited verification and fresh determination in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The claims for bad-debt write-offs were sustained, the duplicated taxation of loan recovery was removed, and the provident-fund contribution adjustment requires fresh factual verification.

Ratio Decidendi: A cooperative bank may claim deduction for pre-2006 NPA debts when actually written off where no statutory provision account under section 36(1)(viia) existed; an amount already included in taxable income cannot be assessed again.

Issues: (i) Whether the circular governing rejection of refund claims permitted proceedings under sections 73 or 74 where the dispute concerned ineligibility of input tax credit. (ii) Whether the impugned order could be kept in abeyance until disposal of the petitioner's second appeal, which had not been taken on file due to portal glitches.

Issue (i): Whether the circular governing rejection of refund claims permitted proceedings under sections 73 or 74 where the dispute concerned ineligibility of input tax credit.

Analysis: The circular contemplated that where refund of unutilized or accumulated input tax credit is rejected on the ground of ineligibility, the proper officer may issue notice under section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with sections 73 or 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and proceed accordingly. Clause 22 applied only where refund was rejected for reasons other than ineligibility of credit. Since the dispute in hand concerned alleged ineligibility of credit, that clause could not be invoked.

Conclusion: The objection based on Clause 22 was rejected, and the circular was held applicable to the dispute.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned order could be kept in abeyance until disposal of the petitioner's second appeal, which had not been taken on file due to portal glitches.

Analysis: The petitioner had already deposited the required 10% and had attempted to file the second appeal, but it was not taken on file because of a portal glitch. In those circumstances, the impugned order was directed to remain in suspense until the appellate authority decided the second appeal, with the order to operate only according to the result of that appeal.

Conclusion: Interim protection was granted by keeping the impugned order in abeyance until the second appeal is decided.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was disposed of by upholding the applicability of the recovery mechanism under the refund circular, while granting conditional protection to the petitioner by deferring the operation of the impugned order until the second appeal is decided.

Ratio Decidendi: Where rejection of refund is founded on alleged ineligibility of input tax credit, the circular permits recovery proceedings under the GST recovery provisions, and the coercive order may be kept in abeyance where the statutory appeal could not be filed due to a technical portal failure.

Issues: (i) whether the enhanced compensation received through the impugned transactions constituted money-laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) whether properties, including ancestral and pre-existing properties, could be provisionally attached as proceeds of crime or their equivalent value under Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; and (iii) whether the preconditions for provisional attachment under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were satisfied.

Issue (i): whether the enhanced compensation received through the impugned transactions constituted money-laundering under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The compensation was disbursed after dismissal of the relevant SLPs and was obtained by relying on unrelated proceedings and incorrect use of judicial references. The receipt and retention of the amounts, coupled with their projection as lawful compensation, brought the matter within the statutory concept of money-laundering.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellants.

Issue (ii): whether properties, including ancestral and pre-existing properties, could be provisionally attached as proceeds of crime or their equivalent value under Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The definition of proceeds of crime was treated as wide enough to include not only property directly or indirectly derived from criminal activity, but also property of equivalent value where the tainted assets were not traceable or had been dissipated. On that basis, attachment of ancestral or earlier-acquired properties was held permissible when used only as equivalent-value assets. The challenge that such properties lacked nexus with the scheduled offence was rejected.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellants.

Issue (iii): whether the preconditions for provisional attachment under Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were satisfied.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that the statutory threshold is met where the authority has material showing possession of proceeds of crime and a likelihood that they may be concealed, transferred, or dealt with so as to frustrate confiscation. The requirement does not depend on proof of imminent alienation already having occurred; a reasonable apprehension on the material was sufficient.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal upheld the provisional attachment and confirmed that the appeals disclosed no merit, leaving the impugned attachment order intact.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, proceeds of crime includes equivalent-value property when the tainted asset is not traceable, and provisional attachment is justified on material showing a likelihood of concealment or transfer frustrating confiscation.

Issues: (i) Whether the petitioner was supplied the grounds of arrest and connected arrest documents in compliance with law; (ii) Whether the remand order was vitiated for being mechanical and without application of mind, making the habeas corpus petition maintainable.

Issue (i): Whether the petitioner was supplied the grounds of arrest and connected arrest documents in compliance with law.

Analysis: The arrest memo did not show that the grounds of arrest were annexed to it or that they were supplied as a separate, duly identified document. The record also did not show a separate DIN on the grounds of arrest, and the jama-talashi memo was left materially incomplete. On this record, the requirement of furnishing the grounds of arrest was not shown to have been complied with in the manner required by law.

Conclusion: The supply of grounds of arrest was not satisfactorily established, and the arrest procedure was held to be unlawful.

Issue (ii): Whether the remand order was vitiated for being mechanical and without application of mind, making the habeas corpus petition maintainable.

Analysis: The remand order recorded only a general allegation of serious economic offence and did not address whether the grounds of arrest had been served or whether the arrest documents were duly supplied. The remand was thus passed in a cursory manner without meaningful consideration of the legality of the arrest and custody. Such a remand order could not sustain continued detention and did not bar habeas corpus relief.

Conclusion: The remand order was held to be mechanical and illegal, and the habeas corpus petition was maintainable.

Final Conclusion: The detention, arrest, and remand were quashed, and release from custody was directed forthwith, leaving it open to proceed afresh in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the grounds of arrest are not shown to have been duly supplied and the remand order is passed mechanically without application of mind, the resulting custody is illegal and amenable to habeas corpus relief.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be condoned by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was treated as a special limitation provision forming part of a self-contained fiscal code. The appellate forum could extend time only to the extent permitted by Section 107(4), and there was no statutory basis for invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The appeal had been filed beyond the outer permissible period, and the absence of an express or implied incorporation of the Limitation Act excluded condonation beyond that limit.

Conclusion: The delay was not condonable under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the challenge to the appellate order failed.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition was rejected as having no merit, leaving the impugned appellate order and cancellation of registration undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the GST appellate provision prescribes a complete and self-contained limitation scheme without expressly extending the benefit of the Limitation Act, general condonation provisions do not apply beyond the statutory outer limit.

Issues: Whether properties purchased during the crime period, though argued to have been acquired prior to the commission of the scheduled offence, could validly be treated as proceeds of crime and remain subject to provisional attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: The attachment challenge rested only on the contention that the subject properties were acquired before the commission of the offence and therefore could not fall within the expression "proceeds of crime" under Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The acquisition dates, however, showed that the properties were purchased during the crime period and around the time of the appellant's involvement in the scheduled offence. The appellant failed to establish a legitimate source for the purchases. The definition of "proceeds of crime" was applied broadly, consistent with the later judicial understanding that property of equivalent value may also be proceeded against where direct proceeds are not traceable. On the facts, the attachment was sustained.

Conclusion: The objection to provisional attachment was rejected, and the subject properties were held to be liable to attachment as proceeds of crime.

Ratio Decidendi: Property acquired during the crime period, without a proved lawful source and in the context of a scheduled offence, may be treated as proceeds of crime for the purpose of provisional attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Issues: Whether the addition of Rs. 59,97,950 made under section 68 on the basis of an alleged accommodation entry could be sustained when the assessment order did not disclose the exact transactions, the source details, or supporting evidence and no proper enquiry was made.

Analysis: The addition was made on the footing that the assessee had received an accommodation entry from a third party, but the assessment order did not mention the precise date of the transactions, the persons or concerns involved, or any supporting material showing receipt of the alleged amount. The assessee had denied the transaction, yet the assessing authority made the addition without verifying the factual position or confronting the denial with evidence. The first appellate authority found that the addition was based on a bare reference to search findings, without discussion of the evidence, statement under section 132(4), or any enquiry establishing the credit as unexplained. The appellate findings were not controverted by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The deletion of the addition was upheld and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Issues: Whether the reassessment proceedings initiated by the erstwhile Assessing Officer were invalid for want of jurisdiction after transfer of the assessee's case under section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the additions on merits could survive once the reassessment was held void.

Analysis: The jurisdiction over the assessee had already been transferred by an order under section 127 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. After such transfer, the original Assessing Officer became functus officio and had no authority to issue notice under section 148 or complete reassessment under section 143(3) read with section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Since assumption of jurisdiction is a condition precedent, the reassessment initiated and completed by the officer lacking jurisdiction was held to be without authority of law and void ab initio. Once the reassessment was quashed, the additions made in the assessment did not survive for adjudication.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were invalid for want of jurisdiction, and the consequential additions became academic.

Issues: Whether reassessment under section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when approval for issuance of notice under section 148 was granted by an authority higher than the authority specified under section 151 for the relevant period.

Analysis: The notice under section 148 was issued within four years from the end of the assessment year, so the approval contemplated by section 151(2) was required from the Joint Commissioner. The recorded reasons showed that sanction was instead obtained from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. The statutory requirement having to be satisfied in the manner prescribed was treated as mandatory. The challenge based on CBDT scrutiny instructions was rejected, since that instruction did not override the legal defect in the sanction for reopening.

Conclusion: The approval for reopening was invalid, the reassessment assumed without valid jurisdiction, and the assessment order was quashed. The appeal was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: When the statute prescribes approval for reassessment by a specified authority, sanction by a different authority does not cure the jurisdictional defect and the reopening is invalid.