Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the order-in-original, including on the ground of delayed adjudication and inability to make pre-deposit, should be entertained or the petitioner should be relegated to the statutory appeal remedy.

Analysis: The order-in-original was appealable, and the Court treated the existence of a statutory appeal as the normal rule barring direct invocation of writ jurisdiction. It noted that the petition raised multiple grounds beyond delay, many of which would require factual examination better suited to appellate scrutiny. The Court also held that inability to pay pre-deposit was not established merely from the audited accounts and that such a requirement did not make the alternate remedy inefficacious. In fiscal matters, departure from the rule of exhaustion of alternate remedy is to be made only in extraordinary cases, which was not found here.

Conclusion: The Court declined to entertain the writ petition and relegated the petitioner to the statutory appeal remedy, while keeping all contentions open and directing the Appellate Authority to consider any appeal on its own merits without going into limitation if filed within the stated time.

Final Conclusion: The challenge was not adjudicated on merits in writ jurisdiction, and the petitioner was left to pursue the appellate forum as the proper statutory remedy.

Ratio Decidendi: In fiscal matters, where an efficacious statutory appeal is available, writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not be used to bypass the statutory regime unless an extraordinary case is made out.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's claim for input tax credit for the relevant financial year was hit by the time limit under Section 16(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, or was saved by the retrospective insertion of Section 16(5), and whether the impugned order and show cause notice required interference.

Analysis: The dispute turned on the effect of Section 16(5), which begins with a non-obstante clause and was inserted with retrospective effect by Section 118 of the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2024. That provision extends entitlement to input tax credit for specified financial years where the return under Section 39 is filed up to 30 November 2021, thereby overriding the earlier restriction under Section 16(4). The order-in-original had denied the credit only on the ground of delay, but the petitioner's returns were filed within the extended period recognised by the amended provision. The subsequent clarification issued by the tax administration was also consistent with that interpretation.

Conclusion: The petitioner's claim for input tax credit could not be rejected solely on the ground of delay, and the matter required reconsideration in light of Section 16(5). The impugned order and show cause notice were set aside and the matter was remitted for fresh adjudication.

Issues: Whether the fresh company petition seeking reliefs identical to those claimed in the earlier proceedings was barred by res judicata and amounted to abuse of process, and whether the dismissal of the prior appeal as withdrawn prevented finality of the earlier adjudication.

Analysis: The reliefs in the later petition were substantially identical to those already pursued in the earlier company petition, which had been dismissed and whose dismissal had attained finality. The withdrawal of the subsequent appeal before the Supreme Court did not revive the same cause or permit re-agitation of issues already concluded. Once the earlier adjudication had attained finality, the same dispute could not be reopened through a fresh petition, as judicial proceedings must reach an end and repeated litigation on the same cause is impermissible.

Conclusion: The fresh petition was barred by res judicata and was correctly dismissed as not maintainable; the challenge before the Appellate Tribunal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A finally concluded adjudication on the same cause of action cannot be re-litigated through a fresh petition, and withdrawal of a subsequent appeal does not undo the finality of the earlier decision.

Issues: Whether demand and assessment notices raising claims that arose prior to initiation of the CIRP and were not part of the approved resolution plan could be enforced against the successful resolution applicant.

Analysis: Once a resolution plan is approved under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the claims covered by the plan become binding and all claims not forming part of the plan stand extinguished. The successful resolution applicant takes over the corporate debtor on a fresh slate, and prior liabilities that were not factored into the approved plan cannot be recovered later. The impugned demands here related to periods anterior to the CIRP and fell within the class of pre-resolution claims barred by the clean slate principle.

Conclusion: The impugned pre-CIRP demand notices could not be sustained and were liable to be set aside in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: After approval of a resolution plan, any claim not included in the plan stands extinguished and cannot be enforced against the corporate debtor or the successful resolution applicant for a pre-approval period.

Issues: Whether a recall application under Rule 11 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 was maintainable to reopen an order rejecting a Section 9 application on merits, on the ground of subsequently discovered documents, particularly after the principal order had been affirmed in appeal.

Analysis: The recalled order was a merits-based adjudication, and the asserted basis for recall was only the later discovery of documents said to support the original claim. Such a ground does not disclose an apparent procedural error or any inherent defect in the order sought to be recalled. The inherent powers under Rule 11 cannot be converted into a power of review, nor used to supply material that was not produced in the original proceeding. The Tribunal also noted that once the merits order had been affirmed in appeal, reopening it by recall was impermissible. The exceptions traditionally recognised for recall, such as fraud, collusion, inherent lack of jurisdiction, or mistake of the court, were not attracted.

Conclusion: The recall application was not maintainable, and the dismissal of the recall by the Tribunal was correct.

Ratio Decidendi: Inherent recall powers cannot be used to review or reopen a merits-based order, especially by relying on subsequently discovered documents or after the order has been affirmed in appeal.

Issues: Whether the ex parte order-in-original, passed without a reply to the show cause notice and on the basis of material drawn from income-tax records, should be set aside and the matter remitted for fresh adjudication from the stage of reply to the show cause notice.

Analysis: The order-in-original was noticed to have been passed ex parte, the petitioner having not filed a reply to the show cause notice. The material relied upon by the authority was stated to include inputs and declarations under the Income Tax Act, and the petitioner's contention was that rental income had been treated as service income. Taking note of the prior order of the Court in connected matters and the directions contained therein, the Court found that the controversy warranted remand so that the authorities could reconsider the matter after affording an opportunity to reply. The Court also directed that the authorities keep in mind the earlier observations regarding the applicability of Section 65B(44) of the Finance Act, 1994, the negative list, exemption notifications, liability under the service tax rules, and limitation, as applicable.

Conclusion: The order-in-original was set aside and the matter was remitted to the stage of reply to the show cause notice. The petitioner was permitted to file a fresh reply and all contentions were kept open.

Final Conclusion: The impugned adjudication did not survive, and the dispute was restored to the pre-adjudication stage for reconsideration after opportunity of reply.

Ratio Decidendi: An ex parte tax adjudication, where the assessee has not been afforded effective opportunity to answer the show cause notice, may be set aside and remitted for fresh consideration in order to secure a fair adjudicatory process.

Issues: Whether the refund claims under Rule 5 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 could be denied on the ground that the disputed services were not input services, and whether services received prior to 01.04.2011, including outdoor catering, club or association, general insurance, cafeteria rent, rent-a-cab, bus/car hire charges, and support services to business or commerce, qualified as input services.

Analysis: The definition of input service applicable prior to 01.04.2011 had a wide inclusive scope and covered services having nexus with business activities, including activities relating to business. The credit taken on the disputed services had not been questioned at the time of availment, no recovery proceedings under Rule 14 were shown to have been initiated, and the Board circular clarified that the same yardstick applies for credit eligibility and refund eligibility. The services were received before the restrictive amendment and were shown to have a business nexus, while the cited precedents supported credit on each category of service in similar factual settings.

Conclusion: The disputed services qualified as input services, the denial of refund was not sustainable, and the refund claims were held allowable in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where CENVAT credit on input services was validly availed under the pre-01.04.2011 inclusive definition and was not disputed at the stage of availment, refund under Rule 5 cannot be denied later by re-testing the same credit on a narrower standard, if the services have nexus with business operations.

Issues: Whether the rejection of the refund claim and the subsequent corrigendum and show cause notices were liable to be quashed for want of a reasoned decision and whether the matter required remand for de novo consideration after hearing the petitioner.

Analysis: The impugned refund rejection did not record a specific finding dealing with the petitioner's principal contention that it was not acting as an agent of the overseas entity and that the refund claim was maintainable. The order was found to be non-speaking and lacking in application of mind. The corrigendum introduced a fresh basis relating to exemption without that point having been part of the original show cause notice, and the later notices for earlier years were also issued without properly considering the petitioner's submissions. In these circumstances, a fresh decision after hearing the petitioner was required.

Conclusion: The impugned order and corrigendum were quashed and set aside, and the matter was remanded to the authority for de novo adjudication with an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The refund dispute and the related earlier-period notices were sent back for fresh determination, leaving the parties' substantive contentions open.

Ratio Decidendi: A refund rejection that does not address the assessee's material submissions and is unsupported by specific findings is a non-speaking order liable to be set aside, and the matter must be reconsidered afresh after giving the assessee a hearing.

Issues: Whether the assessment orders passed almost ten years after issuance of the Form-H notices were liable to be quashed for unreasonable delay and as being contrary to Rule 25 of the Cess Rules, 1996.

Analysis: The challenge turned on the inordinate gap between the issuance of the Form-H notices and the eventual assessment orders. The governing rule required the assessment process to be carried out within the framework of Rule 25, and the earlier binding decision in Siemens Limited had already held that such proceedings cannot be allowed to remain pending for an indefinite period and must be completed within a reasonable time. The Court found that the respondent-authority had remained inactive for years after the notices, and that the delay was not justified by any legally sustainable explanation. The subsequent binding rejection of the review petition reinforced that the earlier ruling continued to govern the issue. The same delay-based defect was present in the connected petitions as well.

Conclusion: The assessment orders were held to be unsustainable and liable to be quashed on account of inordinate and unreasonable delay.

Final Conclusion: The petitions succeeded because the delayed assessments could not be sustained, and the connected matters were disposed of in the same manner.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory assessment that is left pending for an inordinate and unjustified period, beyond what is reasonable under the governing scheme, is liable to be quashed for unreasonableness and denial of fair adjudication.

Issues: Whether the rectification order was liable to be quashed for want of hearing and non-consideration of the petitioner's submissions, and whether the matter should be remanded for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The rectification order was challenged on the ground that it had been passed without granting an opportunity of being heard and without considering the legal and factual material placed by the petitioner. The authorities fairly accepted that the proceedings could be restored for a fresh hearing. In these circumstances, the appropriate course was to set aside the impugned order and direct de novo consideration by the designated authority, with liberty to issue a fresh notice, grant a personal hearing, and pass a reasoned and speaking order within the stipulated time.

Conclusion: The rectification order was quashed and the proceedings were remanded for fresh consideration after affording the petitioner an opportunity of hearing.

Final Conclusion: The dispute was sent back to the designated authority for reconsideration on merits with procedural safeguards, while all substantive contentions were kept open.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudicatory order that is passed without affording a hearing and without considering the party's material is liable to be set aside and remitted for fresh determination in accordance with natural justice.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned order, passed after remand, was liable to be quashed for failure to consider the petitioner's replies and submissions and for want of reasons; (ii) Whether the matter required to be sent back for fresh consideration with a reasoned order after hearing the parties.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned order, passed after remand, was liable to be quashed for failure to consider the petitioner's replies and submissions and for want of reasons.

Analysis: The order under challenge did not deal with the submissions made during the personal hearing or with the earlier replies furnished by the petitioner. The matter had already been remanded for de novo consideration with a direction to pass a reasoned order dealing with all submissions. In spite of that direction, the authority again proceeded without addressing the petitioner's contentions, rendering the order unsustainable.

Conclusion: The impugned order was rightly quashed and set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the matter required to be sent back for fresh consideration with a reasoned order after hearing the parties.

Analysis: Since the dispute had not been decided on merits in a manner consistent with the earlier remand directions, and the petitioner had not received meaningful consideration of its submissions, a fresh adjudication was necessary. The appropriate course was to restore the proceedings to the authority for de novo determination after giving hearing to both sides and for passing a reasoned order in accordance with law.

Conclusion: The matter was remanded for fresh consideration and a reasoned decision after hearing the parties.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded in part, with the challenged order set aside and the proceedings restored for fresh adjudication, while the merits of the dispute were left open.

Ratio Decidendi: An adjudicatory order that fails to consider the party's submissions, especially after an earlier remand requiring a reasoned decision, violates the requirement of fair hearing and cannot be sustained; the proper course is quashing and remand for de novo consideration.

Issues: Whether the impugned demand order was liable to be quashed for being non-speaking and for failing to consider the petitioner's factual and legal submissions, and whether the matter should be remanded for fresh consideration.

Analysis: The challenge arose from a tax demand made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The order under challenge was examined against the requirement that administrative and quasi-judicial determinations affecting civil consequences must deal with the material submissions placed before the authority and must disclose reasons. As the impugned order did not consider the petitioner's legal and factual contentions, it was treated as suffering from a lack of reasons and from procedural unfairness. In consequence, the proper course was fresh adjudication by the authority after notice and hearing.

Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed and set aside, and the proceedings were remanded for de novo consideration with a fresh show cause notice, hearing, and a reasoned speaking order.

Issues: Whether the order cancelling the GST registration could be sustained when it disclosed no reasons and whether the matter should be remanded for fresh adjudication after notice and hearing.

Analysis: The cancellation order was found to be unsupported by reasons, and the requirement to record reasons while passing such an order was treated as settled. The absence of a proper opportunity of hearing and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure rendered the impugned action unsustainable. Since the petitioner supplied current contact details, the matter could be sent back to the designated authority to issue a fresh show cause notice, grant a personal hearing, and pass a reasoned order in accordance with law within a fixed time.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was quashed and set aside, the proceedings were remanded for fresh consideration, and the GST registration stood restored, subject to any fresh action permissible in law.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to writ relief against the detention notice and consequential recovery demands when the order-in-original had not been challenged and the liability under that order had not been fully complied with.

Analysis: The order-in-original had already adjudicated the customs liability by reclassifying the goods, confirming differential duty with interest, ordering confiscation, imposing redemption fine, and levying penalty, while also providing for reduction of penalty on timely payment. The petitioner's grievance against the detention notice was therefore considered in the context of that prior adjudication. The Court noted that the differential duty was stated to have already been paid and that the amount of penalty had to be examined in light of the operative part of the order-in-original and the reported withdrawal of the detention notice issued under the Customs recovery provision. At the same time, the petitioner had not challenged the order-in-original by appeal.

Conclusion: The Court declined to entertain a challenge to the order-in-original in the present writ petition and left the customs authority to consider the petitioner's compliance and the extent of further action on the detention notice issue. The petition was dismissed.

Issues: Whether the credit of Rs. 91 lakhs representing realization of export sale proceeds, already recorded as turnover and offered to tax in the immediately preceding year, could be assessed as unexplained cash credit under section 68.

Analysis: The assessee produced export and commercial invoices, customs-verified shipping documents, bills of lading, bank advices and FIRCs to show that the remittance was linked to genuine export sales made in the earlier year. The same export turnover had already been accepted in the preceding assessment and taxed as business receipts. On those facts, the receipt during the year under consideration was only realization of an already accounted trade debt and not a fresh unexplained credit. A sum that is referable to an accepted export transaction cannot be brought to tax again as unexplained cash credit merely because the remittance was received later.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 read with section 115BBE was deleted and the assessee succeeded on the merits of this issue.

Issues: Whether the impugned order was liable to be quashed for want of competence of the officer passing it under the GST statutory scheme.

Analysis: The statutory framework requires a function under the GST enactment to be performed by the Commissioner or an officer of the relevant tax administration duly assigned that function. Under the provision authorising State tax or Union territory tax officers to act as proper officers, such authorisation depends upon the prescribed conditions and notification issued on the basis of the Council's recommendation. On the admitted position that no such recommendation existed for the respondent officer, the order could not be sustained as one passed by a duly competent authority. The existence of an alternate appellate remedy did not bar writ relief where the order was challenged as wholly without jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The impugned order was quashed as having been passed by an incompetent authority, and the petitioner succeeded.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to avail input tax credit in view of the retrospective insertion of section 16(5) of the CGST Act, notwithstanding the restriction in section 16(4), and whether the impugned orders disallowing the credit could stand.

Analysis: The entitlement to input tax credit was examined against the later amendment inserting section 16(5), which operates notwithstanding section 16(4) and extends the time for availing credit for invoices or debit notes pertaining to the specified financial years up to 30.11.2021. The returns in question had been filed within the relevant extended period, and the legislative amendment, as clarified by the departmental circular and notification, was treated as applicable to the claim. On that basis, the disallowance of credit solely on limitation under section 16(4) was not sustainable.

Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to have the input tax credit claim reconsidered in the light of section 16(5), and the orders rejecting the claim were set aside with a remand for fresh adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether the proposed questions raised by the appellant involved a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. (ii) Whether the appeal was liable to be dismissed on the ground that the tax effect was below the threshold prescribed by the CBDT circulars.

Issue (i): Whether the proposed questions raised by the appellant involved a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The proposed questions were held to relate essentially to appreciation of evidence and findings of fact. In the limited jurisdiction under Section 260A, interference is warranted only when a substantial question of law arises, and factual reappraisal is not permissible where the dispute turns on the Tribunal's evaluation of material on record.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose on the first issue; the challenge to the Tribunal's factual findings was not entertainable in appeal.

Issue (ii): Whether the appeal was liable to be dismissed on the ground that the tax effect was below the threshold prescribed by the CBDT circulars.

Analysis: The Court recorded that the tax effect in the appeal fell below the limits prescribed by CBDT Circular No. 5/2024 dated 15.03.2024 read with Circular No. 9/2024 dated 17.09.2024. On that basis, the appeal could not be maintained.

Conclusion: The appeal was barred by the applicable tax-effect threshold and was liable to be dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the Tribunal's order failed both because it raised no substantial question of law and because the tax effect was below the prescribed limit.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, interference is confined to substantial questions of law, and an appeal is not maintainable where the tax effect falls below the CBDT-prescribed threshold.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal was required to consider the effect of the certificate issued under Section 269UD of the Income Tax Act, 1961 while deciding the computation of capital gains and the cost of acquisition of the land.

Analysis: The certificate issued by the appropriate authority under Section 269UD of the Income Tax Act, 1961 fixed the value of the land and had a material bearing on the controversy regarding the cost of acquisition. Since that certificate had been relied upon before the Assessing Officer and was also placed before the Tribunal, the Tribunal was obliged to examine its effect before affirming the capital gains addition. The Tribunal's failure to deal with that aspect warranted interference, without expressing any view on the merits of the valuation dispute.

Conclusion: The issue was remitted to the Tribunal for fresh decision after considering the certificate dated 19.05.1998 and the appellant's submissions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory certificate fixing land value under Section 269UD of the Income Tax Act, 1961 has a direct bearing on the computation of capital gains, the appellate fact-finding authority must adjudicate its effect before sustaining the assessment.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal was justified in remanding the matter to the Assessing Officer on the ground of breach of Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, when additional evidence had been filed before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) without being furnished to the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The appeal turned only on the question whether the additional material placed directly before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had been supplied to the Assessing Officer as required by Rule 46A of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. The Court declined to enter into the merits of the assessment or the quantum dispute, since the Tribunal had not decided those issues and had remanded the matter solely on the basis of the procedural lapse. The appellant was unable to show that the additional evidence had been furnished to the Assessing Officer, and the breach of the mandate of Rule 46A was therefore established. In these circumstances, the remand ordered by the Tribunal was held to be legally justified.

Conclusion: The remand to the Assessing Officer for de novo consideration was upheld, and no error of law was found in the Tribunal's order.