Issues: (i) Whether the disallowance of employee benefit expense and ESOP-related expenditure required fresh examination for want of proper factual verification; (ii) Whether loss on sale of investment in a subsidiary could be treated as business loss and whether additional evidence was rightly considered without compliance with Rule 46A; (iii) Whether the share premium received by the assessee could be brought to tax as unexplained money and whether the assessee had discharged the onus under the law governing issue of shares at premium.

Issue (i): Whether the disallowance of employee benefit expense and ESOP-related expenditure required fresh examination for want of proper factual verification.

Analysis: The disallowance of employee benefit expense was based on an ad hoc comparison between revenue and salary cost, while the assessee had furnished employee-wise details, salary records and TDS particulars. At the same time, the record showed a mismatch between the gross salary figures in the filings and the audited accounts, and the supporting material was not comprehensively verified. As to ESOP expenditure, the legal position recognises discount on ESOP as employee compensation and an allowable business expense, but its quantification must be supported by proper valuation, vesting-wise working and other primary evidence. The factual foundation for a final decision on these claims was therefore incomplete.

Conclusion: The issue was set aside for fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer and no final allowance or disallowance was affirmed.

Issue (ii): Whether loss on sale of investment in a subsidiary could be treated as business loss and whether additional evidence was rightly considered without compliance with Rule 46A.

Analysis: The claim of business loss turned on whether the investment was made for commercial expediency and whether the subsidiary investment was integral to the assessee's business. The appellate record indicated that a valuation report and other material were filed at the appellate stage, but the Assessing Officer was not given the required opportunity to examine that additional evidence. Since the question of commercial expediency and the evidentiary basis of the claim had not been properly verified, the matter could not be conclusively decided on the existing record.

Conclusion: The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for de novo examination after considering the evidence and giving due opportunity to the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the share premium received by the assessee could be brought to tax as unexplained money and whether the assessee had discharged the onus under the law governing issue of shares at premium.

Analysis: The substance of the addition was not the label of section 69A, but the assessee's failure to justify issue of shares at premium in accordance with the statutory scheme governing taxation of excess share premium and valuation of shares. No valuation report was produced before the authorities, and the assessee did not substantiate the fair market value of the shares as required. The absence of the mandated valuation support, coupled with the assessee's loss-making position, meant that the onus under the governing provisions was not discharged.

Conclusion: The addition on account of share premium was sustained.

Final Conclusion: The decision leaves the share-premium addition intact, while the issues relating to employee benefit expense, ESOP expenditure, and loss on sale of investment were reopened for fresh adjudication at the assessment stage.

Ratio Decidendi: A wrong statutory label does not govern the tax consequence where the substance of the transaction is clear, and claims requiring factual or valuation-based substantiation must be supported by the requisite evidence before relief can be granted.

Issues: Whether disallowance of employees' contribution to PF/ESI could be made as a prima facie adjustment while processing the return under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, for assessment years preceding the Supreme Court ruling in Checkmate Services.

Analysis: The additions were made while processing the returns under section 143(1). The Tribunal noted that the impugned adjustments related to an issue arising in assessment years prior to the Supreme Court's decision and that the disallowance under section 36(1)(va) had been sustained by treating it as a processing-time adjustment. On the facts, the Tribunal held that such a disallowance did not fall within the permissible scope of adjustments under section 143(1), and followed co-ordinate bench decisions taking the same view in similar matters.

Conclusion: The disallowance could not be sustained under section 143(1), and the addition was deleted. The appeals were allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A disallowance involving employees' contribution to PF/ESI cannot be made as a prima facie adjustment under section 143(1) where it falls outside the limited scope of processing-based adjustments.

Issues: Whether a charitable trust, not claiming exemption under section 11, could be assessed in the status of an association of persons at the maximum marginal rate or whether tax was leviable at the normal slab rates applicable to an individual.

Analysis: The trust was engaged in charitable ies for the benefit of the public at large and had no defined members or ascertainable shares in income. The Tribunal followed its coordinate bench decisions and relied on Circular No. 320 dated 11-01-1982, which clarifies that in cases of charitable or religious trusts and similar bodies where members or trustees are not entitled to shares in the income, the provisions for maximum marginal rate are not attracted and tax is payable at the rate ordinarily applicable to the total income of an association of persons.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to be taxed at the normal slab rates and not at the maximum marginal rate; the ground was allowed.

Issues: Whether the assessee acquired the premises in 1991-92 on the basis of the initial allotment so as to treat the asset as a long-term capital asset, or whether the acquisition had to be reckoned from the year 2010 when the lease deed was registered and possession was granted, resulting in short-term capital gain.

Analysis: The initial allotment was held to be provisional and only a letter of intent, not a firm or final allotment conferring enforceable rights. The identity and extent of the premises also changed through subsequent allotments over time, and the final allotment crystallized only upon issuance of the share certificate, occupancy certificate, execution of the lease deed, registration of documents, and grant of possession in 2010. The cited precedents were distinguished on the ground that they involved final allotments or crystallized rights at an earlier stage. In the absence of a registered instrument, legal title and enforceable ownership rights were treated as arising only upon registration.

Conclusion: The holding period was to be computed from financial year 2010-11, not from 1991-92. The property was therefore a short-term capital asset and the resultant gain was taxable as short-term capital gain, against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the disallowance of royalty expenditure required fresh verification on the basis of the contract terms and the manner in which the receipts were accounted for; and (ii) whether the addition relating to subcontract expenditure for alleged non-deduction of tax at source, and the consequential penalty issue, required re-examination in light of the joint venture agreement and the evidence of execution of work.

Issue (i): Whether the disallowance of royalty expenditure required fresh verification on the basis of the contract terms and the manner in which the receipts were accounted for.

Analysis: The royalty claim turned on whether the amount was actually deducted from the running bills and whether the assessee had offered gross or net receipts from the PWD contract. The record also showed a dispute about the supporting evidence and the terms of the agreement, which had not been fully verified at the assessment stage.

Conclusion: The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh examination.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition relating to subcontract expenditure for alleged non-deduction of tax at source, and the consequential penalty issue, required re-examination in light of the joint venture agreement and the evidence of execution of work.

Analysis: The validity of the subcontract claim depended on the genuineness of the unregistered joint venture agreement, the actual execution of work by the subcontractor, and the effect of the TDS material filed by the assessee. In view of the unresolved factual questions, the matter needed reconsideration. The penalty issue was left to follow the outcome of the fresh assessment, if required.

Conclusion: The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication.

Final Conclusion: The quantum disputes were remanded for de novo assessment after giving the assessee an opportunity of hearing, and the penalty matter was left open to be examined in the fresh proceedings if necessary.

Ratio Decidendi: Where material factual disputes remain unresolved on the accounting treatment of expenditure and on the genuineness and effect of contractual and TDS evidence, the proper course is fresh adjudication by the Assessing Officer after due opportunity to the assessee.

Issues: Whether the writ petition was maintainable when a statutory alternative remedy of appeal under the CGST Act was available.

Analysis: The petitioner challenged the show cause notice and the adjudication order, but the Court noted that the petitioner had an alternative statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 before the appellate authority. On that basis, the Court declined to exercise writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The writ petition was not entertained and was dismissed in view of the availability of the statutory appeal remedy.

Issues: Whether the addition of cash deposits as unexplained money under section 69A was sustainable when the assessee produced sale registers, purchase registers, sample sale bills and a cash flow statement to explain the source of deposits during the demonetisation period.

Analysis: The assessee had claimed to be carrying on imitation jewellery business on a small scale and to have maintained sales and purchase registers, supported by sample bills and cash flow details. These materials were found sufficient to show the availability of cash in hand and to explain the deposits made in the bank accounts. The factual explanation furnished by the assessee was not rebutted by the revenue authorities with contrary material, and the explanation regarding the source of the deposits was treated as having discharged the assessee's onus.

Conclusion: The addition made under section 69A was not justified and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment initiated under Section 147 read with Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was liable to be interfered with; (ii) Whether the addition made on account of cash deposits in bank accounts was required to be restricted on an estimated profit basis.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment initiated under Section 147 read with Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was liable to be interfered with.

Analysis: The assessee's bank deposits were not disclosed in the original return, and reasons were recorded before issuance of notice. The reassessment was based on information indicating escapement of income and was proceeded with after obtaining the requisite approval. No legal infirmity in the reopening was found.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were upheld, and the challenge to reopening failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition made on account of cash deposits in bank accounts was required to be restricted on an estimated profit basis.

Analysis: The assessee itself had admitted business turnover and profit at 12.7% in respect of the relevant accounts. The disputed cash deposits were treated as part of business turnover to the extent accepted, and the balance was re-computed by applying the same profit rate. The restriction of the addition by the first appellate authority was found to be justified.

Conclusion: The restriction of the addition to 12.7% of the disputed amount was sustained.

Final Conclusion: No interference was called for with the first appellate order, and the assessee did not succeed on either the reopening or the quantum addition.

Ratio Decidendi: Where bank deposits are linked to undisclosed business transactions and the assessee has itself accepted a profit rate for part of the turnover, the addition may be sustained on an estimated profit basis and reassessment based on recorded reasons and approved notice remains valid.

Issues: Whether the disallowance sustained by the first appellate authority in respect of alleged bogus purchases called for interference.

Analysis: The addition originated from reassessment proceedings based on third-party information regarding accommodation bills. The assessment record did not disclose independent enquiry by the Assessing Officer into the alleged bill providers. The sales were not disputed, the books of account were audited, and a substantial part of the impugned purchases had already been offered to tax in subsequent years under section 41(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. In these circumstances, the first appellate authority restricted the disallowance on an estimated basis, and no infirmity was found in that approach.

Conclusion: The restricted disallowance was upheld and the Revenue failed to establish any ground for enhancement.

Final Conclusion: The relief granted at the first appellate stage was sustained, and the Revenue's challenge to the estimated disallowance was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: Where sales are not in dispute, books are audited, and the assessment is based only on third-party information without independent enquiry, an estimated restriction of disallowance in respect of alleged bogus purchases is sustainable, especially when part of the amount has already been taxed in later years.

Issues: Whether the surrendered income offered during survey for assessment year 2017-18 could be subjected to the enhanced tax rate under section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961, or was taxable at normal rates as business income.

Analysis: The surrendered sum had been offered by the assessee and tax at normal rates had already been paid by treating it as business income. The enhanced rate under section 115BBE was invoked by the Assessing Officer and sustained in appeal, but the Tribunal followed the view that the enhanced rate became applicable only from 01.04.2017, corresponding to assessment year 2018-19 onwards, and not to earlier years. On that basis, the surrendered amount for assessment year 2017-18 could not be brought to tax at the enhanced rate.

Conclusion: The enhanced tax rate under section 115BBE could not be applied to the surrendered income for assessment year 2017-18, and the amount was liable to be taxed at normal rates. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: The enhanced rate of tax under section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies prospectively from assessment year 2018-19 onwards and cannot be applied to surrendered income pertaining to earlier assessment years.

Issues: Whether the assessments for Assessment Years 2014-15 and 2015-16 were barred by limitation under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the basis of the date on which the satisfaction note was recorded.

Analysis: The satisfaction note under Section 153C was recorded on 29.09.2021, relatable to Assessment Year 2022-23. On that basis, only the immediately preceding six assessment years would ordinarily be within the permissible reach of the provision. The record did not show recording of satisfaction for the extended ten assessment years pleaded by the Revenue. Following the binding principle applied from the cited Delhi High Court decision, the assessments for the two years under appeal fell outside the permissible period and could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The assessments for Assessment Years 2014-15 and 2015-16 were time barred and stood quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) whether section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied prospectively to the assessment year in question; (ii) whether the addition made under section 68 could be sustained in respect of the partner's capital balance converted into unsecured loan without cash inflow.

Issue (i): whether section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied prospectively to the assessment year in question.

Analysis: The applicability of section 115BBE for the relevant assessment year was treated as a question governed by the prospective nature of the amendment. The Department's challenge on this point was found to be covered against it by the binding precedent relied upon by the Tribunal, and the contrary position was not shown to survive in the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The issue was decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issue (ii): whether the addition made under section 68 could be sustained in respect of the partner's capital balance converted into unsecured loan without cash inflow.

Analysis: The assessee had placed additional evidence, including the partner's capital account and audited balance-sheet material, showing that the retired partner's capital balance stood converted into an unsecured loan. The Tribunal noted that these materials were not adversely dealt with in remand and that the transaction reflected a mere journal entry with no cash entry or actual credit inflow. In such circumstances, the basic premise for treating the amount as unexplained cash credit was not made out.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 was not sustainable and was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the substantive addition, while the Revenue's challenge to the prospective application of section 115BBE failed; the net result was that the assessee's appeal was allowed and the Revenue's appeal did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A transfer of a partner's capital balance into an unsecured loan by a mere journal entry, without any actual cash inflow, does not by itself justify an addition as unexplained cash credit under section 68.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment initiated for assessment year 2013-14 was invalid as the notice under section 148 was issued on or after 01.04.2021, attracting the new reassessment regime. (ii) Whether the reassessment for the remaining assessment years was invalid because the approvals under section 151 were accorded mechanically without application of mind.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment initiated for assessment year 2013-14 was invalid as the notice under section 148 was issued on or after 01.04.2021, attracting the new reassessment regime.

Analysis: The record showed that the notice said to have been issued on 31.03.2021 was in fact issued only on 01.04.2021. That date was the commencement of the new reassessment scheme under section 148A. Since the reassessment was sought to be pursued under the old scheme despite issuance falling after the cut-off date, the reopening could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The reassessment for assessment year 2013-14 was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the reassessment for the remaining assessment years was invalid because the approvals under section 151 were accorded mechanically without application of mind.

Analysis: The sanction orders under section 151 were found to have been recorded mechanically. Such approval did not reflect due application of mind and therefore could not support the reopening. The later amendments in the reassessment regime also did not save those approvals because they predated the cut-off date of 01.04.2021.

Conclusion: The reassessment for the remaining assessment years was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: All three reassessment proceedings were invalid and the assessee succeeded on the challenge to reopening, with the merits rendered academic.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment notice issued on or after the commencement of the new reassessment regime must be tested under that regime, and a reopening cannot be sustained where the statutory approval for sanction is granted mechanically without application of mind.

Issues: Whether the assessee development authority was entitled to exemption under section 11 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the proviso to section 2(15) of that Act was attracted.

Analysis: The appeal was decided by following the binding precedent in the assessee's own earlier years and other coordinate bench decisions dealing with similar development authorities. The governing view applied was that a statutory development authority, when pursuing its object of planned development and public welfare, is not to be treated as carrying on commercial activity merely because it undertakes development functions or earns receipts from such activity. On that basis, the proviso to section 2(15) was held inapplicable and the claim for exemption under section 11 was sustained. The decision also rested on the principle of consistency, as no materially different facts were shown for the year under consideration.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee; exemption under section 11 was upheld and the proviso to section 2(15) was held not to apply.

Issues: (i) Whether the cancellation of GST registration could be sustained when the cancellation order contained no reasons and did not conform to the prescribed procedure; (ii) whether the writ petition should be rejected on the ground of delay despite the alleged statutory breach in the cancellation order.

Issue (i): Whether the cancellation of GST registration could be sustained when the cancellation order contained no reasons and did not conform to the prescribed procedure.

Analysis: Cancellation of registration under the CGST regime has adverse civil consequences and must conform to the statutory procedure under Section 29(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Rule 22 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017. The prescribed form for cancellation requires the proper officer to record the reasons for cancellation. An order that merely notes non-response to notice or non-appearance, without disclosing the basis for the conclusion, is a non-speaking order and indicates absence of due application of mind. Recording reasons is part of fair procedure and an important safeguard against arbitrariness.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition should be rejected on the ground of delay despite the alleged statutory breach in the cancellation order.

Analysis: Delay by itself did not justify refusing relief where the impugned order was found to suffer from a fundamental legal defect for want of reasons. The statutory infraction in the cancellation process was treated as outweighing the belated approach to the Court, particularly because the order affected the petitioner's ability to carry on business.

Conclusion: The petition was not defeated by delay and relief was granted in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned cancellation was quashed, the matter was restored to the stage of show-cause notice, and the petitioner was given an opportunity to respond or regularise dues before fresh action in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: An order cancelling GST registration must be a reasoned order passed in conformity with the statutory procedure, and absence of reasons vitiates the cancellation for want of application of mind and breach of fair procedure.

Issues: Whether a single composite assessment order covering more than one financial year under the GST regime is valid.

Analysis: The assessment order covered multiple financial years. The governing view applied was that a single show-cause notice or a single composite assessment order cannot be issued for more than one tax period in the manner contemplated under the GST framework. Since the petitioner pressed this ground as the primary challenge, the writ petition was disposed of on that basis, without adjudicating the remaining grounds.

Conclusion: The composite assessment order was held unsustainable and was set aside, with liberty to initiate separate proceedings for each assessment year.

Ratio Decidendi: A single show-cause notice or composite assessment order cannot validly cover multiple tax periods or financial years where separate assessment treatment is required under the GST regime.

Issues: Whether reassessment initiated after four years from the end of the relevant assessment year was valid when the recorded reasons were founded on facts already examined in the original scrutiny assessment and the Revenue failed to show any failure by the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts.

Analysis: The reopening was based on material already on record, as reflected in the notice beginning with the recital that the records were perused. The assessee had furnished detailed particulars relating to the sale of development rights, receipt of consideration, fixed deposits, and the claimed exemption before completion of the original assessment under section 143(3). In such a situation, the statutory precondition for reopening beyond four years under the proviso to section 147 was not satisfied, because the Revenue had to establish a failure of full and true disclosure of material facts. Reappraisal of the same material, without new tangible material, amounted to a mere change of opinion. The record also showed that the reopening objection was not met by a reasoned response demonstrating any statutory lapse by the assessee.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were invalid, and the finding in favour of the assessee on the reopening issue was upheld.

Issues: Whether the assessments framed under section 153C for assessment years 2010-11 to 2013-14 were barred by limitation as they fell outside the ten-year block period computed from the date of recording of satisfaction in the assessee's case.

Analysis: A search under section 132 had taken place in another group case, and seized documents relating to the assessee were later handed over to the assessee's Assessing Officer. The satisfaction note in the assessee's case was recorded on 07.02.2023, and the assessments were completed under section 143(3) read with section 153C. Applying the jurisdictional High Court ruling governing the computation of the block period under section 153C, the relevant ten assessment years were held to run from assessment year 2024-25 backwards, which would not cover assessment years 2010-11 to 2013-14.

Conclusion: The assessments for assessment years 2010-11 to 2013-14 were rightly quashed as time-barred, and the revenue's challenge failed.

Issues: (i) Whether the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 barred termination of the lease deed and eviction proceedings under the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972 against property in possession of the corporate debtor during the corporate insolvency resolution process. (ii) Whether the Explanation to Section 14(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 permitted termination and recovery on the ground of breach of lease conditions or non-payment of dues, and whether Section 238 gave the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code overriding effect over the Public Premises Act.

Issue (i): Whether the moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 barred termination of the lease deed and eviction proceedings under the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972 against property in possession of the corporate debtor during the corporate insolvency resolution process.

Analysis: Section 14(1)(d) prohibits recovery of any property by an owner or lessor where the property is occupied by or in the possession of the corporate debtor. The Court treated the leasehold interest as part of the corporate debtor's property within the inclusive meaning of property under Section 3(27). The moratorium is intended to preserve the assets of the corporate debtor, maintain status quo, and keep it as a going concern during the resolution process. On that basis, both the re-entry under the lease and the eviction proceedings under the Public Premises Act could not be undertaken during the moratorium period.

Conclusion: The moratorium barred both the termination of the lease and the eviction proceedings, and the impugned actions were impermissible during CIRP.

Issue (ii): Whether the Explanation to Section 14(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 permitted termination and recovery on the ground of breach of lease conditions or non-payment of dues, and whether Section 238 gave the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code overriding effect over the Public Premises Act.

Analysis: The Explanation to Section 14(1) was treated as clarificatory and inserted to prevent suspension or termination of governmental grants on the ground of insolvency, subject to current dues, and not as an enabling provision to defeat the moratorium. The Court held that reading the Explanation as permitting lease termination during CIRP would render Section 14 nugatory. It further held that Section 238 gives the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code overriding effect over any inconsistent law, including the Public Premises Act, and that the resolution professional's duties under Section 25 and the binding nature of the approved resolution plan under Section 31 support protection of the corporate debtor's assets.

Conclusion: The Explanation did not authorise termination or eviction during CIRP, and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code prevailed over the Public Premises Act.

Final Conclusion: The lease termination and eviction orders were held unsustainable because the corporate debtor's possession and leasehold rights were protected during moratorium, and the insolvency framework prevailed over the contrary recovery mechanism.

Ratio Decidendi: During the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, property in the possession of the corporate debtor cannot be recovered by the lessor or owner, and the Explanation to Section 14(1) is only clarificatory and cannot be used to justify termination or eviction in derogation of the moratorium; by virtue of Section 238, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code overrides inconsistent proceedings under other laws.

Issues: (i) Whether the show cause notice was validly served when service was effected by affixation without first establishing that the other modes of service under the statute were impracticable; (ii) whether recovery of the demanded amount could validly be made on the same day as the demand order, before expiry of the statutory period of three months and without reasons recorded in writing.

Issue (i): Whether the show cause notice was validly served when service was effected by affixation without first establishing that the other modes of service under the statute were impracticable.

Analysis: The statutory framework requires service of notice through the modes prescribed under the service provision, and affixation is to be used only when the other modes are not practicable. The notice in question was served only by affixation, and it was not shown that the preceding modes had been found impracticable. This rendered service contrary to the statutory mode of service and inconsistent with the requirements of fair procedure.

Conclusion: The show cause notice was not validly served and the demand order founded on it was illegal.

Issue (ii): Whether recovery of the demanded amount could validly be made on the same day as the demand order, before expiry of the statutory period of three months and without reasons recorded in writing.

Analysis: The recovery provision grants the taxable person three months from service of the order to pay the amount before recovery proceedings are initiated. A shorter period can be fixed only if the proper officer records reasons in writing in the interest of revenue. Recovery was made on the very day of the order and no written reasons were recorded. The statutory precondition for immediate recovery was therefore not satisfied.

Conclusion: The recovery was illegal and liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The impugned demand and recovery were quashed, and restitution of the recovered amount was directed, while leaving the State free to proceed again in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Service by affixation is valid only after the statutory alternatives are found impracticable, and recovery before the expiry of the statutory waiting period is permissible only on recorded reasons in writing.