Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on 25.07.2022 was barred by limitation under section 149, and whether the reassessment proceedings and the assessment orders could survive.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied the Supreme Court's exposition on the interaction between the deemed notices under the reassessment regime and the time available under the extended limitation framework. It held that, after exclusion of the period during which the deemed show-cause notice remained stayed and the further two weeks allowed for response, only the surviving balance period could be used for issuing the fresh notice under section 148. On the facts, the surviving period had expired before 25.07.2022. Even with the benefit of the additional seven days contemplated by the fourth proviso to section 149, the notice was still beyond time. Since the jurisdictional notice itself was time-barred, the reassessment proceedings and the consequential assessment orders could not stand.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 dated 25.07.2022 was held to be time-barred and void ab initio, and the reassessment proceedings and assessment orders were quashed in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: In reassessment cases governed by the new regime, the limitation for issuing the section 148 notice must be computed by excluding the stayed period for the deemed show-cause notice and the time allowed for the assessee's reply, and a notice issued beyond the surviving balance period is without jurisdiction and invalid.

Issues: Whether a person can be treated as a member of a company for the purposes of Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, despite the absence of formal entry of his name in the register of members.

Analysis: The expression "member" in Section 2(27) has a wider ambit, while Section 41 lays down the modes by which membership may arise. The jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 398 is equitable in nature and is intended to protect shareholders against oppression and mismanagement. Membership for the purpose of maintainability cannot be confined in a rigid or technical manner to formal entry in the register where the company's conduct and contemporaneous materials show that the person was treated as a stakeholder or shareholder. On the facts, the respondent's investment was accepted and utilised, contemporaneous correspondence and conciliation material recognised his proprietary interest, and the company's conduct supported the conclusion that he had been treated as a member.

Conclusion: The respondent was entitled to be treated as a member for the purpose of maintaining proceedings under Sections 397 and 398, notwithstanding the absence of formal entry in the register of members.

Ratio Decidendi: For proceedings under Sections 397 and 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, the term "member" is not restricted to formal registration alone and may be established by the company's recognition of the person's shareholder status and substantive proprietary interest.

Issues: (i) Whether the corporate debtor's guarantee dated 30.06.2010 obliged it to discharge the principal borrower's debt, (ii) whether the subsequent guarantee dated 11.01.2012 discharged the corporate debtor and limited its obligations, (iii) whether the undertakings, including the cost overrun undertaking, created a liability to repay the principal borrower's financial debt, (iv) whether the Section 7 application was barred by Section 10A, and (v) whether the admission order could stand when a connected Section 7 application on the same recall notice had been rejected by the same Bench.

Issue (i): Whether the corporate debtor's guarantee dated 30.06.2010 obliged it to discharge the principal borrower's debt.

Analysis: The guarantee was examined along with the sanction letter and related clauses. The obligation undertaken by the corporate debtor was to infuse equity share capital and meet cost overrun funding from equity or sponsor funds, without recourse to the lenders or project assets. The document did not create an undertaking by the corporate debtor to repay the principal borrower's loan. The recall notice also proceeded on an incorrect premise by demanding repayment of the principal borrower's outstanding debt from the guarantor, rather than seeking only compliance with the limited guarantee obligations.

Conclusion: The guarantee dated 30.06.2010 did not oblige the corporate debtor to discharge the principal borrower's financial debt.

Issue (ii): Whether the subsequent guarantee dated 11.01.2012 discharged the corporate debtor and limited its obligations.

Analysis: The later deed expressly recorded that it was executed to release the corporate debtor from its earlier guarantee obligations and to substitute equivalent guarantees from the new guarantors. It further stated that, save as expressly preserved, no obligations were retained by the corporate debtor after the scheme, and its continuing responsibility was only conditional and secondary, arising if the substituted primary obligor failed to perform within the limited framework of the new arrangement.

Conclusion: The subsequent guarantee deed discharged the corporate debtor from the earlier guarantee, subject only to limited contingent obligations.

Issue (iii): Whether the undertakings, including the cost overrun undertaking, created a liability to repay the principal borrower's financial debt.

Analysis: The undertakings relied upon by the financial creditor related to equity infusion, maintenance of shareholding, management control, indemnity obligations, and funding of cost overruns. These instruments were distinct from a debt repayment guarantee and did not contain any clear covenant by the corporate debtor to repay the principal borrower's loan obligations. They could not be expanded to convert a limited project-support undertaking into a financial debt liability.

Conclusion: The undertakings did not oblige the corporate debtor to discharge the principal borrower's financial obligation.

Issue (iv): Whether the Section 7 application was barred by Section 10A.

Analysis: The date relevant to the guarantor's default was the invocation of guarantee on 30.09.2020, followed by a demand to pay within three days, which meant the alleged default arose on 04.10.2020. That date fell within the Section 10A suspension period. The date of NPA of the principal borrower in 2017 could not be treated as the default date of the corporate guarantor. The default of the guarantor arises only upon invocation and non-payment in response to the demand.

Conclusion: The Section 7 application was barred by Section 10A.

Issue (v): Whether the admission order could stand when a connected Section 7 application on the same recall notice had been rejected by the same Bench.

Analysis: A connected proceeding arising from the same debt, same recall notice, and materially identical facts had been dismissed by the same Bench on the same day. The impugned order, however, reached the opposite result without reconciling the earlier decision or addressing the common factual and legal matrix. This inconsistency showed non-application of mind and undermined the sustainability of the admission order.

Conclusion: The admission order could not be sustained in view of the contrary same-day decision on identical material.

Final Conclusion: The corporate debtor was not shown to owe a financial debt under the relied documents, the alleged default arose during the Section 10A period, and the admission order was vitiated by non-application of mind; the appeal succeeded and the Section 7 proceeding was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A limited equity-infusion or cost-overrun undertaking cannot be treated as a guarantee to repay the borrower's debt, and for a corporate guarantor the default occurs on invocation of the guarantee and non-payment thereafter, not on the principal borrower's earlier NPA date.

Issues: (i) whether the amount claimed for supply of materials under the inter se arrangement between consortium members constituted operational debt so as to sustain a Section 9 application; (ii) whether the application was barred by Section 10A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (iii) whether there was any pre-existing dispute defeating admission.

Issue (i): whether the amount claimed for supply of materials under the inter se arrangement between consortium members constituted operational debt so as to sustain a Section 9 application

Analysis: The parties had entered into a consortium arrangement only for bidding and execution of the OPTCL work, but their internal agreement and addendum specifically segregated responsibilities. The operational creditor was assigned the supply component, while the corporate debtor was obliged to make payment for such supplies after receiving amounts from OPTCL. The claim in the Section 9 application was confined to unpaid supply invoices and not to any profit-sharing entitlement. The corporate debtor's own letter acknowledged receipt of funds from OPTCL, part payment to the operational creditor, and an outstanding balance for supply of materials. These facts established a debtor-creditor relationship in relation to the supply component.

Conclusion: The claim arose from an operational debt and was maintainable under Section 9.

Issue (ii): whether the application was barred by Section 10A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Analysis: Section 10A bars initiation for defaults occurring during the protected period. The pleadings before the adjudicating authority did not lay a factual foundation for a Section 10A objection. The unpaid claim was linked to invoices and default asserted beyond the protected period, and the relevant default was treated as the non-payment due after receipt of funds from OPTCL. Mere reference to invoices issued during the protected period was insufficient to dislodge the claim in the absence of material showing that the default itself occurred within that period.

Conclusion: The Section 10A objection was rejected and did not bar admission.

Issue (iii): whether there was any pre-existing dispute defeating admission

Analysis: The correspondence relied upon by the appellant did not disclose a genuine dispute as to the supply component debt. On the contrary, the corporate debtor had acknowledged liability in writing, including the unpaid balance for materials supplied. The letter addressed to OPTCL also referred to the operational creditor's dues as outstanding and sought intervention for payment. In these circumstances, the dispute projected by the appellant was not a pre-existing dispute concerning the operational debt claimed in the Section 9 application.

Conclusion: No pre-existing dispute was established.

Final Conclusion: The Section 9 admission order was affirmed, the appeal failed, and the corporate insolvency resolution process was allowed to proceed, with liberty to seek withdrawal under Section 12A in the event of settlement.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an internal consortium arrangement specifically allocates a supply obligation to one member and obliges the other to make payment for such supplies, unpaid invoices supported by acknowledgment of liability constitute operational debt, unless a genuine pre-existing dispute or a statutory bar under Section 10A is shown.

Issues: (i) Whether a demand notice in Form 3 under the insolvency framework was valid when the operational debt was founded on invoices but the invoices were not enclosed. (ii) Whether the email relied upon by the appellant amounted to acknowledgment of liability so as to save limitation. (iii) Whether the reply to the demand notice constituted a notice of dispute requiring rejection of the Section 9 application.

Issue (i): Whether a demand notice in Form 3 under the insolvency framework was valid when the operational debt was founded on invoices but the invoices were not enclosed.

Analysis: The operational creditor stated in the demand notice that the debt arose from invoices, yet the notice did not set out the invoice particulars and did not attach the invoices. The notice also relied only on an email and a prior legal notice, neither of which was annexed. Applying the governing rule on Form 3 and Form 4, the relevant form depends on the nature of the operational debt, and where the debt is invoice-based, the supporting invoices are required to be placed with the notice.

Conclusion: The demand notice was defective and the finding of non-compliance with the prescribed notice requirements was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether the email relied upon by the appellant amounted to acknowledgment of liability so as to save limitation.

Analysis: The email was addressed to a different proprietary concern and the corporate debtor disputed that it was sent to the operational creditor. The surrounding correspondence showed interchange of email addresses, but the reply to the insolvency notice specifically denied the debt, denied purchase of goods, and disputed the very nature of the transaction. In these circumstances, the email was not treated as a clear acknowledgment of liability extending limitation.

Conclusion: The email was not accepted as an acknowledgment of debt for limitation purposes.

Issue (iii): Whether the reply to the demand notice constituted a notice of dispute requiring rejection of the Section 9 application.

Analysis: The corporate debtor's reply categorically denied liability, disputed the claimed amount, and asserted that the operational creditor was only a commission agent. The dispute was not found to be a sham, feeble, or unsupported assertion. Once such a dispute exists, the insolvency application cannot proceed on the merits of the debt claim and must be rejected under the statutory gatekeeping provision.

Conclusion: A genuine pre-existing dispute was established and rejection of the Section 9 application was justified.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the demand notice was not in proper form for an invoice-based claim and a real dispute existed between the parties, so insolvency initiation was not maintainable on the facts presented.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an operational debt is founded on invoices, the creditor must serve the notice in the manner prescribed for invoice-based claims, and where the debtor raises a genuine pre-existing dispute, the adjudicating authority must reject the insolvency application.

Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to permission to travel abroad on the basis of the purchase order relied upon, and whether the appeal could still grant such relief when the period sought in the application had already expired.

Analysis: The appeal was examined in the light of the purchase order and the dates for which travel permission had originally been sought. The purchase order described the work period as 13 months plus six months, but the Tribunal read the document as showing that the parallel run period was to operate concurrently with the principal ERP implementation period, not as a separate consecutive period. The appellant's own pleading also referred to the purchase order as having a duration of 13 months. The Tribunal held that the basis for seeking travel permission had lapsed with the expiry of the work period and that the appeal could not be used to revive a stale request, though a fresh application could be made if later circumstances justified travel abroad.

Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to the claimed travel permission on the basis of the expired purchase order, and the appeal did not merit grant of the relief sought.

Issues: (i) Whether the email forwarding the addendum amounted to a clarification or a modification of the submitted resolution plan; (ii) Whether the committee of creditors' decision not to consider the addendum was invalid; (iii) Whether the committee of creditors' decision to approve a lower-valued plan was arbitrary or perverse in view of value maximisation; (iv) Whether the plan of the unsuccessful resolution applicant was considered independently and the committee of creditors abdicated its function in favour of the professional advisor; (v) Whether any material irregularity was committed by the resolution professional in conducting the resolution process; (vi) Whether the adjudicating authority erred in rejecting the application and approving the successful resolution plan.

Issue (i): Whether the email forwarding the addendum amounted to a clarification or a modification of the submitted resolution plan.

Analysis: The addendum changed the commercial terms of the final signed plan by increasing the upfront cash component and the equity infusion. It was not merely explanatory, because it sought to alter the financial proposal after closure of the challenge process. The process note prohibited any upward or downward revision after the final proposal had become binding, and the addendum would have improved the bidder's ranking under the evaluation matrix.

Conclusion: The email and addendum constituted a modification of the resolution plan, not a mere clarification.

Issue (ii): Whether the committee of creditors' decision not to consider the addendum was invalid.

Analysis: The challenge process and process note made the final financial proposal binding after closure, and expressly barred later modification. The addendum was unsolicited and was submitted after the voting process had been set in motion. The committee of creditors considered the addendum, discussed the legal position, and recorded reasons for declining to reopen the process. The decision fell within its commercial discretion and did not violate the governing framework.

Conclusion: The decision not to consider the addendum was valid and tenable in law.

Issue (iii): Whether the committee of creditors' decision to approve a lower-valued plan was arbitrary or perverse in view of value maximisation.

Analysis: Although value maximisation is an important objective of the insolvency process, the committee of creditors is not bound to approve the highest net present value or the highest gross value. The evaluation matrix gave weight to multiple quantitative and qualitative parameters, including upfront recovery, deferred payments, equity infusion, feasibility, viability, and turnaround capability. The committee of creditors evaluated all plans on the prescribed matrix and approved the plan that obtained the highest overall score and was found commercially preferable.

Conclusion: The decision to approve the successful resolution plan was not arbitrary or perverse.

Issue (iv): Whether the plan of the unsuccessful resolution applicant was considered independently and the committee of creditors abdicated its function in favour of the professional advisor.

Analysis: The minutes showed that the committee of creditors discussed the professional advisor's report, raised queries, sought revised qualitative scoring, and then considered all resolution plans before voting. The advisor assisted the committee of creditors, but the final decision was taken by the committee itself. The unsuccessful applicant's plan, without the addendum, was factored into the evaluation matrix and deliberated upon.

Conclusion: The plan was considered and there was no abdication of jurisdiction by the committee of creditors.

Issue (v): Whether any material irregularity was committed by the resolution professional in conducting the resolution process.

Analysis: The resolution professional circulated the addendum to the committee of creditors and sought its views. His observation that the addendum appeared to violate the process note was tentative and linked to the committee of creditors' eventual decision. No breach of the Code, the regulations, or the process documents was shown, and no material irregularity in conduct of the process was established.

Conclusion: No material irregularity was committed by the resolution professional.

Issue (vi): Whether the adjudicating authority erred in rejecting the application and approving the successful resolution plan.

Analysis: The adjudicating authority upheld the committee of creditors' commercial decision after finding compliance with the Code and the regulations. The successful resolution plan satisfied the statutory requirements, had the requisite voting support, and was approved after due evaluation. No ground for appellate interference was made out.

Conclusion: The adjudicating authority did not err in rejecting the challenge and approving the successful resolution plan.

Final Conclusion: The appellate tribunal reaffirmed the limited scope of judicial review over the commercial wisdom of the committee of creditors and upheld the resolution process, evaluation matrix, and approval of the successful resolution plan.

Ratio Decidendi: After closure of a challenge process, a resolution applicant cannot unilaterally modify its final commercial proposal; the committee of creditors may evaluate plans on a multi-factor evaluation matrix and approve any compliant plan in its commercial wisdom, subject only to limited statutory review for compliance and material irregularity.

Issues: Whether the applicants were entitled to regular bail in a prosecution under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002, in the light of the twin conditions under Section 45, the statutory presumption under Section 24, and the right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The applications were considered on the basis that bail under the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 is governed by the special restrictions in Section 45, which require reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of money-laundering and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The Court held that the statutory presumption under Section 24 arises only after the prosecution establishes foundational facts, namely the commission of the scheduled offence, derivation of the property as a result of that offence, and involvement of the accused in any process or activity connected with the property. The Court found that the self-incriminating statements recorded under Section 50 while the accused were in custody could not safely be treated as voluntary and were liable to be discarded. The Court also found the WhatsApp material insufficient to outweigh liberty at the bail stage and noted that the investigation had not firmly connected the alleged monetary trail with the predicate offence. The prolonged incarceration of the applicants, coupled with the continuing investigation and the absence of any apparent likelihood of early trial conclusion, was held to engage Article 21.

Conclusion: The applicants satisfied the bail standard under Section 45 and were held entitled to release on bail.

Issues: Whether a demand-cum-show cause notice issued beyond the period prescribed under Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 could sustain the ensuing adjudication, and whether the availability of an appellate remedy under the CGST Act barred recourse to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The limitation prescribed for issuance of notice under Section 73(1) was treated as a condition precedent to the exercise of power and not as a mere procedural timeline. On the facts, the notice related to the financial year 2016-2017 but was issued on 11.04.2022, beyond the statutory period. The Court held that, once the notice was time-barred, the proceedings founded on it lacked foundational jurisdiction and the adjudicating order based on such notice could not stand. The availability of an alternative remedy did not preclude writ interference because the case fell within the established exception where the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The notice was held to be barred by limitation, the consequent proceedings were held to be without jurisdiction, and the adjudicating order was held liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The writ court interfered because the initiation itself was jurisdictionally invalid, and the impugned adjudication was quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute makes timely issuance of a demand notice a condition for the assumption of jurisdiction, a notice issued beyond the prescribed period is without jurisdiction, and the rule of alternative remedy does not bar writ relief against the resulting void proceedings.

Issues: Whether the Rectification of Mistake application disclosed any mistake apparent on the face of the record so as to justify modification of the final order, particularly in relation to the Goods Transport Agency service demand and the plea on limitation.

Analysis: The power of rectification under Section 35C(2) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 is confined to correcting an obvious, patent and self-evident mistake and cannot be used to review the earlier decision or to re-open findings on merits. The Tribunal found that the applicant was in substance seeking reconsideration of the confirmed GTA demand by inviting re-appreciation of facts and evidence, including the absence of proof that the service recipient had discharged tax or that the conditions for reverse charge were established. It also held that the limitation plea in respect of GTA service could not be automatically imported from the separate finding on Mining Service, as the two issues rested on different factual and legal foundations.

Conclusion: No mistake apparent from the record was shown, and the request for rectification was not maintainable. The application was rejected.

Issues: (i) Whether the show cause notices were vitiated for want of specific statutory basis and adequate particulars to support the service tax demand; (ii) whether the same service activity could be taxed again in the hands of the appellant when tax had already been discharged by MAAC on the course fee collections.

Issue (i): Whether the show cause notices were vitiated for want of specific statutory basis and adequate particulars to support the service tax demand.

Analysis: The notices merely alleged that the appellant rendered commercial coaching and training services, but did not clearly identify the precise taxable service or the statutory definition under which the activity was sought to be classified. The first notice did not even invoke the charging provision in a legally sustainable manner. In the absence of the basic statutory foundation necessary to sustain the levy, the notices failed to give proper notice of the case to be met.

Conclusion: The show cause notices were fundamentally defective and the demand could not be sustained on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the same service activity could be taxed again in the hands of the appellant when tax had already been discharged by MAAC on the course fee collections.

Analysis: The record indicated that the course fees were collected in MAAC's account and that MAAC had discharged service tax on the relevant collections. The appellant's contention that it provided infrastructural support under the business arrangement remained consistent with the material on record. The Court also relied on the principle that a transaction or service cannot be subjected to service tax twice.

Conclusion: The demand amounted to taxation of the same service twice and was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeals were allowed with consequential relief in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A service tax demand cannot be upheld unless the show cause notice specifically discloses the statutory basis and taxable category invoked, and the same service cannot be taxed again in the hands of another person once tax has already been discharged on that service.

Issues: (i) whether the sugar syrup captively consumed in the manufacture of biscuits was classifiable under tariff item 17029090 as a marketable product, and (ii) whether duty could be sustained on the basis of its alleged marketability and the available test reports.

Issue (i): whether the sugar syrup captively consumed in the manufacture of biscuits was classifiable under tariff item 17029090 as a marketable product

Analysis: The disputed product was an in-process sugar syrup prepared for captive use in biscuit manufacture. The finding recorded was that the syrup was specific to the appellant's own manufacturing requirement and was not shown to be comparable with commercially sold syrup. The Tribunal relied on the settled principle that classification under the relevant tariff entry required the product to satisfy the description of sugar syrup blends containing 50% by weight of fructose in the dry stage, and the record showed only 31% fructose as certified by the scientific report. In the absence of proof that the product answered the tariff description, the classification adopted by the Department could not stand.

Conclusion: The product was not sustainable for classification under tariff item 17029090.

Issue (ii): whether duty could be sustained on the basis of its alleged marketability and the available test reports

Analysis: The Tribunal applied the settled test that marketability must be proved in the condition in which the product emerges. The syrup was consumed captively, had no demonstrated shelf life in the form in which it emerged, and the test reports did not establish individual constituents or marketability. The absence of evidence showing that the product, as manufactured in the appellant's factory, was capable of being sold in the market defeated the demand. The reliance placed by the Department on reports referring to invert sugar did not cure the lack of proof of marketability or establish excisability for the product as found on the facts.

Conclusion: Marketability was not established, and the demand of duty and penalty could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the appeals succeeded on merits, with the disputed sugar syrup held not liable to central excise duty on the facts proved.

Ratio Decidendi: An in-process product captively consumed within the factory is not exigible to central excise duty unless the Department proves, by reliable evidence, that it answers the tariff description and is marketable in the condition in which it emerges.

Issues: Whether the order taking cognizance under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act could be sustained in the absence of previous sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 makes previous sanction a condition precedent before a court can take cognizance of offences alleged against a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty. The accused were public servants, and the sanction was not obtained on the date cognizance was taken. The settled position that Section 197(1) applies to proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act by virtue of Section 65 of that Act, and is not displaced by the overriding clause in Section 71, governed the decision.

Conclusion: The cognizance order and process could not be sustained and were set aside for want of prior sanction.

Ratio Decidendi: Where prior sanction under Section 197(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is required, cognizance taken against a public servant in proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act without such sanction is invalid, and the special statute does not override that requirement where the Criminal Procedure Code is made applicable by Section 65.

Issues: Whether the acquittal in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act required interference on the ground that the cheque was issued towards an enforceable debt or liability and that the statutory presumptions stood unrebutted.

Analysis: The contract between the parties did not refer to the cheque, and the cheque was treated as a security instrument unconnected with any admitted or crystallised liability. The complainant took inconsistent stands regarding the manner in which the cheque came into possession, and the non-examination of the person said to have handed over the cheque justified an adverse inference. The cheque was presented before the report relied upon to establish inferior quality of goods, so the complainant had not shown that any liability had crystallised by the date of presentation or dishonour. In an appeal against acquittal, interference is warranted only when the trial court's view is perverse or legally untenable, and the view taken below was a possible one supported by the record.

Conclusion: The acquittal was not liable to be interfered with, and the cheque was not shown to have been issued against an existing enforceable debt or liability.

Issues: Whether the order directing deposit of 20% of the compensation amount during the pendency of the appeal under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 warranted interference.

Analysis: The appeal concerned suspension of sentence in a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The governing principle is that the appellate court may ordinarily insist on deposit of at least 20% of the fine or compensation, while retaining discretion to waive or relax the condition in an exceptional case for recorded reasons. On the facts recorded by the appellate court, the proceedings had been repeatedly delayed by the applicants, the case was not found to fall within the exception recognised by the Supreme Court, and the deposit condition was imposed after consideration of the material and the relevant legal position.

Conclusion: The deposit condition was upheld and no interference was called for.

Issues: (i) Whether continuation of the criminal proceeding for alleged environmental violations committed prior to commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process was barred by Section 32A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 after approval of the resolution plan and change in management. (ii) Whether the subsequent decriminalisation of offences under Section 15 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 by the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023 rendered the pending prosecution unsustainable.

Issue (i): Whether continuation of the criminal proceeding for alleged environmental violations committed prior to commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process was barred by Section 32A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 after approval of the resolution plan and change in management.

Analysis: Section 32A grants immunity to the corporate debtor for offences committed before commencement of the corporate insolvency resolution process once the resolution plan is approved and control shifts to a person unconnected with the erstwhile management. The allegations in the complaint related to a period long before the insolvency resolution process and arose from the acts of the former management. In such circumstances, continuation of prosecution against the corporate debtor was treated as inconsistent with the statutory clean-slate protection.

Conclusion: The criminal proceeding was held unsustainable to the extent it was founded on pre-CIRP allegations and was barred by operation of Section 32A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issue (ii): Whether the subsequent decriminalisation of offences under Section 15 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 by the Jan Vishwas (Amendment of Provisions) Act, 2023 rendered the pending prosecution unsustainable.

Analysis: The judgment treated the later legislative change as materially affecting the continuance of the prosecution, since the penal character of the alleged contravention stood replaced by a civil penalty regime. Applying the principle of beneficial construction, the Court held that insisting on continuation of a criminal prosecution after decriminalisation would not subserve the ends of justice.

Conclusion: The pending prosecution was held liable to be quashed in view of the changed statutory regime.

Final Conclusion: The proceedings were found incapable of being sustained in law and the petition was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a corporate debtor undergoes a successful resolution process with a genuine change in management, prosecution for pre-CIRP offences cannot continue against it, and a subsequent statutory decriminalisation may independently justify quashing of the pending criminal case.

Issues: Whether, in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the accused was entitled to be heard before cognizance was taken and whether the cognizance order ought to be set aside on the basis of the written objection filed by the accused.

Analysis: The proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 are intended to follow the statutory scheme of speedy disposal, and the earlier objection of the accused could not be used to require a pre-cognizance hearing in the manner suggested. The materials relied upon by the accused were held to be matters that could be pressed during trial, and the Court declined to interfere with the cognizance order. The challenge based on Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 was not accepted as a ground to invalidate the impugned order in the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The challenge to the cognizance order failed, and the revision was dismissed against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the connected sanction note were liable to be quashed on the ground that the reopening was based on the same material already considered and adjudicated in earlier proceedings, without any fresh tangible information suggesting escapement of income.

Analysis: The assessee's entitlement to TDS credit and the treatment of the underlying interest income had already been examined in the earlier appellate proceedings, and the appellate order had attained finality. The sanction note relied on information from the Insight Portal and the same figures that were already on record, without disclosing any new material or independent basis for reopening. Reassessment under the Act cannot be used to revisit concluded issues on a mere change of opinion, and the existence of fresh tangible material is an in-built check on the power to reopen. Since the impugned notice was founded on the very same facts that had already been adjudicated, the jurisdictional requirement for reopening was not satisfied.

Conclusion: The reopening was invalid and without jurisdiction; the notice under Section 148 and the sanction note were liable to be set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is unconstitutional or requires reading down so as to exclude bona fide purchasers where the supplier fails to remit tax to the Government.

Analysis: The provision was examined in the light of the statutory scheme governing input tax credit, including the conditions in Section 16, the reversal and re-availment mechanism in Section 41(2), the burden of proof in Section 155, and the GST return framework. The Court held that input tax credit is a statutory concession, not an absolute right, and that Section 16(2)(c) cannot be read in isolation from the accompanying provisions that preserve revenue interests and permit recovery from defaulting suppliers. The Court further held that the doctrine of reading down is not available where the provision is clear and does not produce constitutional infirmity, and that the statutory mechanism does not justify striking down the clause or restricting it only to fraudulent or collusive transactions.

Conclusion: Section 16(2)(c) was upheld and was not read down; the constitutional challenge was rejected and the plea to confine the provision only to fraudulent or collusive cases failed.

Issues: (i) Whether revision under Section 263 could be founded on the Assessing Officer's failure to initiate penalty proceedings under Section 271D; (ii) Whether revision under Section 263 could be invoked to replace the Assessing Officer's valuation-based assessment with the value stated in an unexecuted memorandum of understanding; (iii) Whether the writ petitions were maintainable despite an alternative remedy.

Issue (i): Whether revision under Section 263 could be founded on the Assessing Officer's failure to initiate penalty proceedings under Section 271D.

Analysis: At the time of the assessment order in June 2023, penalty under Section 271D was imposable by the Joint Commissioner; the Assessing Officer acquired authority to impose it only from 1 April 2025. The Assessing Officer therefore lacked jurisdiction to initiate or impose that penalty when the assessment was made. The alleged omission could not render the assessment erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.

Conclusion: The alleged non-initiation of penalty proceedings under Section 271D could not validly support revision under Section 263, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether revision under Section 263 could be invoked to replace the Assessing Officer's valuation-based assessment with the value stated in an unexecuted memorandum of understanding.

Analysis: The Assessing Officer had considered the seized memorandum of understanding, the subsequent registered sale, circumstantial evidence and the broker's statement, obtained a valuation report from the Departmental Valuation Officer, and made an addition based on that report. The memorandum concerned a proposed purchaser with whom the transaction never materialised, whereas the eventual sale occurred two years later. The valuation-based determination was a plausible view reached after inquiry. Revisional jurisdiction requires both an erroneous order and prejudice to Revenue and cannot be used merely to substitute the Commissioner's preferred methodology or improve the assessment order.

Conclusion: The valuation-based assessment was a plausible view and was not revisable under Section 263, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the writ petitions were maintainable despite an alternative remedy.

Analysis: The availability of an alternative remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction where the impugned show-cause notices are without legal basis and inconsistent with the statutory framework.

Conclusion: The writ petitions were maintainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The proposed exercise of revisional jurisdiction lacked a sustainable statutory foundation on both grounds stated in the notices.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 263 cannot be invoked where the Assessing Officer has taken a plausible view after due inquiry and the alleged omission was beyond the Assessing Officer's statutory jurisdiction at the relevant time.