Issues: (i) Whether the reopening of assessments for the relevant assessment years was valid; (ii) Whether the amount received under Clause 7 of the agreement was liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee as a business receipt.

Issue (i): Whether the reopening of assessments for the relevant assessment years was valid.

Analysis: Reopening under Sections 147 and 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 requires reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, supported by tangible material and backed by recorded reasons. Mere change of opinion is impermissible, but where fresh information emerges showing that the true nature of the receipt was not earlier examined, reassessment is justified. The prior scrutiny assessments did not record any formed opinion on the fundamental character of the receipt from the association, and the survey materials and statement disclosed a basis to believe that the receipt was not profit but revenue.

Conclusion: The reopening for both assessment years was valid and was not vitiated by mere change of opinion.

Issue (ii): Whether the amount received under Clause 7 of the agreement was liable to be taxed in the hands of the assessee as a business receipt.

Analysis: Clause 7 provided for immediate entitlement to 35% of the gross sale proceeds, while expenses were to be met from the remaining 65%. On a plain reading, the arrangement did not make the assessee's entitlement dependent on profits. The receipt was therefore a diversion of income at source by overriding title, but in substance it remained a gross revenue receipt and not a share of profit. Since the amount was insulated from project expenses, it lacked the character of profit and was taxable in the assessee's hands as business income.

Conclusion: The amount was taxable in the hands of the assessee as a business receipt and not exempt as a share of profit.

Final Conclusion: The reopening challenges fail, and the disputed receipt is held taxable in the assessee's hands as revenue arising from the arrangement, with the Revenue succeeding overall.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment is valid where fresh tangible material reveals that an earlier assessment never examined the true nature of a receipt, and a contractual entitlement to a fixed share of gross receipts, unrelated to project expenses, constitutes taxable revenue rather than a profit share.

Issues: Whether the assessment order was liable to be quashed for violation of principles of natural justice on account of non-supply of the material and information relied upon by the Assessing Officer.

Analysis: The addition was founded on material said to have been gathered during search and on a screenshot and other corroborative material relied upon in the assessment order. The assessee was not shown to have been furnished with the underlying documents, statements, or other relied-upon material, and the record did not establish that such material had been shared for rebuttal. A quasi-judicial assessment cannot be sustained where adverse conclusions are drawn on the basis of material withheld from the assessee, because denial of a fair opportunity to meet the case strikes at the very legality of the proceedings.

Conclusion: The assessment order was held to be vitiated and liable to be quashed for breach of natural justice.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the consequential proceedings did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment based on material not supplied to the assessee, thereby denying a fair opportunity of rebuttal, is legally unsustainable and vitiated by breach of natural justice.

Issues: Whether a credit co-operative society is entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on interest earned from deposits with nationalised banks.

Analysis: The assessee was engaged in providing credit facilities to its members and had placed funds in bank deposits to maintain liquidity and meet business requirements. The issue was examined in light of earlier Tribunal decisions consistently holding that, where such deposits arise from operational funds and are maintained in the course of the society's business, the resulting interest retains the character of business income eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i). No contrary binding precedent was brought to displace that settled view.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) on the interest earned from deposits with nationalised banks.

Ratio Decidendi: Interest earned by a credit co-operative society from bank deposits kept out of operational funds for business liquidity purposes qualifies for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issues: Whether the assessee, a domestic company, was entitled to the concessional tax rate of 25% for the relevant assessment year on the basis that its turnover or gross receipts in the preceding financial year did not exceed the prescribed threshold.

Analysis: The applicable tax provision in the Finance Act, 2018 granted a reduced rate of tax to domestic companies whose turnover or gross receipts for the specified previous year did not exceed the stated limit. The dispute arose because the return processing did not contain a specific column for furnishing the relevant turnover figure, while the assessee produced audited financial statements before the Tribunal to support the claim that the threshold was not crossed. In these circumstances, the correct course was to verify the claim from the audited accounts and other necessary material rather than to reject the claim merely on the basis of the return processing data.

Conclusion: The issue was restored to the jurisdictional Assessing Officer for verification, and if the turnover for the relevant financial year is found not to exceed the prescribed limit, the concessional rate of 25% shall apply.

Issues: Whether the reassessment proceedings initiated for assessment year 2015-16 pursuant to notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the order under section 148A(d) were barred by limitation in view of the Supreme Court ruling on the relaxation period under the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020.

Analysis: The notice under section 148 was issued on 13.04.2022 for assessment year 2015-16, i.e. after 01.04.2021. The governing Supreme Court decision had considered the effect of the relaxation legislation on reassessment timelines and recorded that, for assessment year 2015-16, notices issued on or after 01.04.2021 were required to be dropped as they would not fall within the extended limitation period. The Tribunal followed that binding position and treated the reassessment notice, the order under section 148A(d), and the consequential assessment order as unsustainable.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were barred by limitation and were quashed.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded on the jurisdictional challenge, and the merits grounds were rendered academic.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a reassessment notice for assessment year 2015-16 is issued after 01.04.2021, it is barred by limitation under the relaxation framework and cannot sustain subsequent reassessment action.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80GGC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the donation of INR 25 lakh made to Kisan Party of India. (ii) Whether the initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was premature.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80GGC of the Income-tax Act, 1961 in respect of the donation of INR 25 lakh made to Kisan Party of India.

Analysis: The donation was examined against the background of information gathered in search proceedings relating to unrecognised political parties and the alleged routing back of funds through intermediaries. The assessee's explanation for the donation, the lack of material showing the political party's presence or activity in the assessee's place of residence, the unusually large amount compared with the assessee's profits, and the overall surrounding circumstances were found insufficient to establish genuineness of the claim. The judicially noticed facts supported the inference that the party functioned as a vehicle for bogus donation claims rather than as a genuine recipient of voluntary political contributions.

Conclusion: The deduction under section 80GGC was rightly disallowed and the assessee's challenge to that disallowance failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was premature.

Analysis: The ground was addressed only to the extent that the penalty action had been initiated and no final penalty order was under challenge at that stage. On that footing, the objection to initiation itself did not warrant interference.

Conclusion: The objection to the initiation of penalty proceedings was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The assessee failed to obtain relief on the substantive disallowance as well as on the challenge to penalty initiation, and the appeal was dismissed in entirety.

Ratio Decidendi: A deduction claim for political donation can be denied where the surrounding facts and material on record show that the contribution lacks genuineness and is part of a bogus donation arrangement.

Issues: Whether cash deposits made during the demonetization period, being traced to recorded cash sales reflected in audited books and supporting records, could be treated as unexplained cash credit under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 merely because the assessee had accepted specified bank notes after 08.11.2016.

Analysis: The cash deposits were accepted by the authorities as arising from cash sales made during the relevant period, and the assessee had maintained regular books, cash book, VAT returns, stock registers, invoices, bank deposit slips and audited financial statements. The books were not rejected and the source and nature of the deposits stood explained. The disallowance rested only on the premise that acceptance of specified bank notes after 08.11.2016 was contrary to RBI guidelines. The statutory test under Section 68 is whether the nature and source of the credit in the books is satisfactorily explained, and not whether the currency received was later alleged to be impermissible under banking directions. The provisions of the Specified Bank Notes (Cessation of Liabilities) Act, 2017 also did not justify treating duly recorded sales proceeds as unexplained income for tax purposes. Once the sale proceeds were already disclosed as turnover and accepted in the books, a further addition on the same amount would amount to double taxation.

Conclusion: The addition under Section 68 was unsustainable and had to be deleted, as the assessee satisfactorily explained the source of the cash deposits from recorded business sales.

Final Conclusion: The assessee succeeded in challenging the addition made on account of cash deposits treated as unexplained income, and the assessment was interfered with to the extent of that addition.

Ratio Decidendi: Where cash deposits are supported by regularly maintained and accepted books of account and the source is explained as recorded business sales, Section 68 cannot be invoked merely because the assessee received specified bank notes during demonetization in alleged breach of RBI guidelines.

Issues: Whether the penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable where the show-cause notice alleged only under-reporting but the penalty order was ultimately founded on under-reporting in consequence of misreporting, and whether the assessee's claim of exemption based on the employer-issued Form 16 was covered by the bona fide explanation exception.

Analysis: The penalty proceedings were held to be vitiated because the notice and the final order were inconsistent as to the exact limb of section 270A invoked. The notice referred to under-reporting, whereas the penalty order proceeded on misreporting, without clearly specifying the exact statutory limb from the relevant sub-sections. The decision further noted that the assessee had claimed the exemption on the basis of the employer's Form 16, where the amount was shown as exempt and no tax was deducted at source, supporting the explanation that the claim was made under a bona fide belief. On these facts, the explanation was treated as bona fide and as supported by disclosure of all material facts within the meaning of the statutory exception.

Conclusion: The penalty order was unsustainable and liable to be deleted.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to exemption under section 11 despite the Form No. 10B having been filed after the prescribed form-filing date but before the due date for filing the return of income.

Analysis: The assessee had filed Form No. 10B on 28.01.2021 and the return of income on 04.02.2021, while the due date for furnishing the return under section 139(1) stood extended to 15.02.2021. On these facts, the form was on record before the due date for filing the return. The statutory scheme under section 11(2)(a) and section 13(9) permits denial of exemption only where the prescribed statement is not furnished on or before the due date under section 139. Since the form was filed within that extended due date, the disallowance made at the processing stage was not sustainable.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to the claim under section 11, and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the prescribed statement or audit form for exemption is furnished on or before the due date for filing the return under section 139(1), the exemption cannot be denied merely because it was filed after an earlier internal deadline but before the return due date.

Issues: Whether the confiscation of the exported mobile phones and the consequential redemption fine and penalties were legally sustainable when the alleged unlocking and activation of the phones before export was treated as constituting use of the goods and as a mis-declaration.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied the binding view that unlocking and activating mobile phones for use in a particular geographical territory is only configuration to make the product usable and does not amount to the goods being "taken into use" for the purposes of the drawback framework. Once that legal position was affirmed and the contrary clarificatory circular was quashed, the foundation for alleging mis-declaration, suppression, and ineligibility for drawback ceased to survive. On that basis, the confiscation under the customs provisions and the connected penalties imposed on the appellants could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The confiscation and the penalties were held to be unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: Unlocking or activating mobile phones for export purposes is configuration and not "taking into use", and when the contrary circular is invalidated, confiscation and penalty based on that premise cannot stand.

Issues: (i) Whether an appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 filed and refiled without a certified copy of the impugned order, and without seeking exemption from filing it, was maintainable. (ii) Whether the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay in filing and refiling the appeal.

Issue (i): Whether an appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 filed and refiled without a certified copy of the impugned order, and without seeking exemption from filing it, was maintainable.

Analysis: Rule 22(2) of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 requires every appeal to be accompanied by a certified copy of the impugned order. The absence of that document at the stage of refiling was not treated as a mere curable irregularity in the facts of the case, because the certified copy had not even been applied for before the appeal was refiled and no exemption had been sought under the relevant procedural rules. The filing and refiling were therefore held to be contrary to the essential requirements governing institution of the appeal.

Conclusion: The appeal, as filed and refiled, was not maintainable and was liable to be rejected at the threshold.

Issue (ii): Whether the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay in filing and refiling the appeal.

Analysis: The statutory timeline under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was treated as strict, and the requirement of a certified copy was linked to diligence and lawful institution of the appeal. Since the appeal was presented and re-presented without compliance with the certified-copy requirement and without the necessary exemption application, the Tribunal should first have examined whether a valid appeal had been instituted at all before granting indulgence on delay. Its failure to do so vitiated the order condoning delay.

Conclusion: The condonation of delay was unjustified and the order granting it could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal was set aside and the appeals were allowed because the underlying appeal had not been properly instituted in accordance with the mandatory procedural requirements.

Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, compliance with the mandatory requirement of filing a certified copy of the impugned order is an essential condition for a valid appeal, and an appeal filed or refiled without such compliance, and without seeking exemption, is incompetent and cannot be saved by condonation of delay alone.

Issues: Whether the dismissal of the Section 7 petition for want of taking steps to serve notice on the corporate debtor was justified when the directions requiring service had not been uploaded on the tribunal record before the next date of hearing.

Analysis: The record showed that directions to take steps for service were passed on two dates, but the corresponding orders were uploaded only after the next dates fixed for hearing. In such a situation, the applicant could not be faulted for not taking steps, since the Registry would not have had the operative order available in time. The principle that no litigant should suffer for the fault or delay of the court supported interference with the dismissal order.

Conclusion: The dismissal order was unsustainable and was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A party cannot be penalised for failure to comply with a direction to serve notice when the order containing that direction was not uploaded in time for compliance before the next hearing date.

Issues: Whether the demand of service tax, interest and penalties could be sustained by invoking the extended period of limitation when the assessee claimed threshold exemption and asserted that its receipts largely related to sale of goods and composite work.

Analysis: The record showed that the assessee had furnished breakup of receipts and supporting documents indicating both sale of goods and provision of services. The appeal also addressed the nature of the transactions, including invoices showing supply along with installation activity, and the assessee relied on the threshold exemption under Notification No. 33/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012. The finding of the lower authorities that the exemption was unavailable was held unsustainable because the assessee had substantially demonstrated that the aggregate taxable service value was within the exemption limit and had acted under a bona fide belief that no service tax was payable. On limitation, the demand could not survive once there was no material showing wilful default or suppression sufficient to justify the extended period.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable and the demand, interest and penalties could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Extended limitation for service tax cannot be invoked in the absence of specific material showing suppression or wilful intent to evade, particularly where the assessee's conduct reflects a bona fide belief and the surrounding records support exemption or non-taxability.

Issues: (i) Whether statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be relied upon to reject the declared transaction value without compliance with section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether printouts and electronic material retrieved from the laptop could be relied upon without compliance with section 138C of the Customs Act, 1962; (iii) Whether the declared value and description/thickness of the imported goods were liable to be rejected and re-determined under the Customs Valuation (Determination of Price of Imported Goods) Rules, 1988; and (iv) Whether confiscation and penalties under the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be relied upon to reject the declared transaction value without compliance with section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Statements recorded during customs inquiry do not attain evidentiary relevance in adjudication merely because they exist. Where the maker of the statement is available, the statute requires examination of that person before the adjudicating authority and a conscious order admitting the statement in evidence in the interests of justice. The mandatory safeguards under section 138B apply to adjudication proceedings as well. In the absence of that procedure, a statement recorded under section 108 cannot be used as substantive evidence for rejection of value or for sustaining allegations of undervaluation and hawala remittance.

Conclusion: The statements under section 108 could not be relied upon against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether printouts and electronic material retrieved from the laptop could be relied upon without compliance with section 138C of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The electronic material was not shown to have been retrieved in the assessee's presence, the chain of custody was doubtful, and the required statutory certificate for electronic records was not produced. In such circumstances, the contents of the laptop printouts could not be treated as reliable evidence to support undervaluation or misdeclaration. The surrounding circumstances also weakened the inference that the material had been properly seized and duly authenticated.

Conclusion: The laptop printouts and electronic records were not admissible for the purpose relied upon by the Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether the declared value and description/thickness of the imported goods were liable to be rejected and re-determined under the Customs Valuation (Determination of Price of Imported Goods) Rules, 1988.

Analysis: Once the statements and electronic material were excluded, there was no dependable basis to discard the declared transaction value. The contemporaneous import data produced by the importers could not be rejected on speculative assumptions about selective disclosure. The record also did not establish any physical measurement showing misdeclaration of thickness, nor was there dependable evidence of extra consideration over invoice value. On the material available, the rejection of transaction value and its redetermination under the valuation rules was unsustainable.

Conclusion: The declared transaction value could not be rejected and re-determined.

Issue (iv): Whether confiscation and penalties under the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Analysis: Confiscation and penalties depended on proof of misdeclaration and undervaluation. Since the foundational evidence was found unreliable, the findings of willful misdeclaration, liability to confiscation, and penal exposure of the importers and the managing director could not stand. The extended penal consequences under the Customs Act therefore failed with the underlying demand.

Conclusion: Confiscation and penalties were not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeals succeeded, as the Revenue's case on undervaluation and misdeclaration was not proved by admissible and reliable evidence.

Ratio Decidendi: Statements recorded under section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 cannot be treated as relevant evidence in adjudication unless the mandatory procedure under section 138B is followed, and electronic records require statutory compliance before they can be relied upon against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the approved scheme of arrangement, including clauses providing for release and discharge of claims and assignment of specified creditors' claims to 63 Moons, was illegal, opposed to public policy, or incapable of implementation so as to permit the appellants to continue their pending civil proceedings against consenting brokers.

Analysis: The scheme had already been approved by the requisite majority and had been upheld in earlier proceedings. The present challenge was essentially an attempt to re-open issues already decided. The clauses impugned by the appellants operated as part of the overall settlement structure: the specified creditors' claims, including claims arising from the payment default and connected broker claims, stood assigned to 63 Moons on the settlement trigger event, and future recoveries were to enure to that assignee. The appellants were receiving a substantial settlement under the scheme and, as specified creditors, were bound by the arrangement approved in the collective commercial process. The Tribunal held that no extraneous claims were being extinguished and that the appellants could not, after accepting the scheme's benefits, insist on separately pursuing the same underlying claims against brokers.

Conclusion: The challenge to the scheme failed. The appellants had no right to continue the parallel civil proceedings in derogation of the approved scheme, and the objections were rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A scheme of arrangement approved by the requisite majority and upheld in prior proceedings binds dissenting creditors, and claims covered by the scheme may validly be assigned or released so that parallel proceedings based on the same cause of action cannot be separately maintained by objecting creditors.

Issues: (i) Whether the applications under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 were barred by limitation; (ii) Whether approval and implementation of the resolution plan of the corporate guarantor extinguished the liability of the personal guarantors.

Issue (i): Whether the applications under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 were barred by limitation.

Analysis: The default had been invoked earlier, the liability had been crystallised by the DRT adjudication, and the limitation period was held to have been extended by the subsequent adjudicatory developments and the effect of the Supreme Court's COVID-related extension of limitation. The later demand notice and the filing of the Section 95 applications were therefore treated as within time.

Conclusion: The objection of limitation was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether approval and implementation of the resolution plan of the corporate guarantor extinguished the liability of the personal guarantors.

Analysis: The liability of a guarantor is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor, and the approval of a resolution plan does not by itself discharge the guarantor unless the plan expressly so provides. The resolution plan of the corporate guarantor did not nullify the surviving unpaid dues, and the personal guarantee remained enforceable for the balance amount.

Conclusion: The plea of discharge on account of the resolution plan was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The tribunal upheld admission of the Section 95 proceedings against the personal guarantors and found no merit in the challenge to the impugned order.

Ratio Decidendi: Approval of a resolution plan does not discharge a personal guarantor's co-extensive liability for unpaid dues, and a Section 95 application is maintainable where the debt remains crystallised and within limitation.

Issues: (i) whether the claimant could be treated as a financial creditor or secured financial creditor on the basis of the deed of agreement, mortgage arrangement and post-dated cheques; (ii) whether rejection of the claim on the ground of delay was sustainable.

Issue (i): whether the claimant could be treated as a financial creditor or secured financial creditor on the basis of the deed of agreement, mortgage arrangement and post-dated cheques.

Analysis: Financial debt under the insolvency law requires disbursal against consideration for time value of money. The arrangement in question did not involve any disbursal of funds by the claimant to the corporate debtor. The properties were only offered as collateral to secure the corporate debtor's borrowing from the bank. Post-dated cheques were treated as a promise to pay and did not create any mortgage, charge or hypothecation over the corporate debtor's assets. The guarantee arrangement was between the claimant and the bank, not the corporate debtor, and therefore did not establish a debt owed by the corporate debtor to the claimant. On these facts, the claimant could not be elevated to the status of a secured financial creditor, though its entitlement arising from the agreement could be recognised in the category of other creditor.

Conclusion: The claimant was not a financial creditor or secured financial creditor of the corporate debtor, but was entitled to have its claim considered as that of an other creditor.

Issue (ii): whether rejection of the claim on the ground of delay was sustainable.

Analysis: The claim was filed within the claim-invitation period and the initial rejection by the resolution professional was not based on delay. The later reliance on delay was found inconsistent with the record and the claim was being pursued promptly after rejection. Procedural delay could not defeat the substantive entitlement in the circumstances of the case.

Conclusion: Rejection of the claim on the ground of delay was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The order under challenge was set aside to the extent it treated the claimant as a secured financial creditor and rejected the claim on delay, and the claim was directed to be processed in the category of other creditor for appropriate treatment under the resolution plan.

Ratio Decidendi: A financial debt requires an actual disbursal by or on behalf of the creditor against consideration for the time value of money, and collateral provided only to secure another party's borrowing does not by itself create financial creditor status or a secured financial debt.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was invocable; (ii) Whether service tax was leviable on exhibition expenses incurred for an exhibition held in Switzerland; (iii) Whether service tax was leviable on sale of software licence where VAT had been paid on the software sale and service tax was paid only on the service component.

Issue (i): Whether the extended period of limitation under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was invocable.

Analysis: The Appellant had disclosed the transactions in its records, cooperated with the audit, and paid the admitted tax wherever applicable. The demand was founded on audit objections, but no material was brought to establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or any intent to evade tax. The Appellant also held a bona fide belief regarding non-taxability of the disputed items, and the burden to prove mala fide remained on the department.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not available and was wrongly invoked; the finding is in favour of the Assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax was leviable on exhibition expenses incurred for an exhibition held in Switzerland.

Analysis: Services relating to events are governed by Rule 6 of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012, under which the place of provision is where the event is actually held. Since the exhibition was held in Geneva, Switzerland, the place of provision was outside the taxable territory. Rule 3, being only the default rule, could not govern a service specifically covered by Rule 6.

Conclusion: No service tax was leviable on the exhibition expenses; the finding is in favour of the Assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether service tax was leviable on sale of software licence where VAT had been paid on the software sale and service tax was paid only on the service component.

Analysis: The software transaction was treated as a sale of software on a perpetual basis under the EULA, with VAT paid on the sale element and service tax paid only on the service portion. The transaction was therefore not exigible to service tax as a full-value service levy. The reasoning aligned with the principle that a transaction cannot be subjected to both VAT and service tax on the same value.

Conclusion: The demand on sale of software licence was unsustainable and is set aside; the finding is in favour of the Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The entire demand was held unsustainable both on limitation and on merits, and the appeal succeeded in full.

Ratio Decidendi: The extended period of limitation cannot be invoked without proof of fraud, suppression, or similar intent to evade tax, and where a service is specifically governed by the place-of-provision rule, taxability must be tested under that specific rule rather than the default rule.

Issues: (i) Whether the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes was competent to make the assessment and levy penalty for the relevant assessment year; (ii) Whether the assessment was barred by limitation; (iii) Whether the movement of goods was established as consignment transfers to agents or constituted inter-State sales; (iv) Whether the penalty imposed was lawful.

Issue (i): Whether the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes was competent to make the assessment and levy penalty for the relevant assessment year.

Analysis: The statutory scheme empowered officers appointed under the State sales tax law, and section 4A authorized higher officers to exercise the powers of subordinate officers subject to instructions of the Commissioner. The later circular and amendment reinforced that higher authorities could exercise such powers. The Deputy Commissioner therefore acted within jurisdiction in completing the assessment and passing the penalty order.

Conclusion: The issue was decided against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment was barred by limitation.

Analysis: Although the normal period under section 14(1) for the relevant year was one year from the end of the assessment year, section 14(3) extended the period to six years where the dealer produced accounts and documents after inspection or submitted returns after inspection. Since the assessee furnished the relevant material only after inspection, the extended limitation applied.

Conclusion: The assessment was held to be within limitation and this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the movement of goods was established as consignment transfers to agents or constituted inter-State sales.

Analysis: Under section 6A of the Central Sales Tax Act, the burden lay on the dealer to prove that the movement of goods was otherwise than by sale. The prescribed documents under rule 14(3) were not furnished, and the assessee failed to establish a principal-agent arrangement or prove genuine consignment transfers. In these circumstances, the transfers were treated as inter-State sales.

Conclusion: The transactions were correctly treated as inter-State sales, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the penalty imposed was lawful.

Analysis: Section 9(2) and section 9(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act attracted the State penalty provision, and section 7A(2)(i) of the State sales tax law authorized penalty in the facts of the case. As the assessment itself was upheld and the statutory basis for penalty existed, no infirmity was found in the penalty order.

Conclusion: The penalty was upheld and this issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment, the classification of the transactions as inter-State sales, and the penalty order were all sustained, and the appeals failed in entirety.

Ratio Decidendi: In a claim that movement of goods was by way of consignment transfer and not sale, the dealer must strictly discharge the statutory burden by producing the prescribed documents, and failure to do so permits treatment of the movement as an inter-State sale with consequential tax and penalty liability.

Issues: (i) Whether the notice under section 148 issued on 02.04.2022 for AY 2015-16 was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether gross sale consideration could be treated as income represented in the form of an asset under section 149(1)(b).

Issue (i): Whether the notice under section 148 issued on 02.04.2022 for AY 2015-16 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The limitation applicable under the erstwhile reassessment provisions for AY 2015-16 expired on 31.03.2022. The first proviso to section 149, introduced by the Finance Act, 2021, precluded issuance of a notice where it had already become time-barred under the earlier law. The settled legal position concerning reassessment notices for AY 2015-16 was applied.

Conclusion: The notice issued on 02.04.2022 was barred by limitation and invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether gross sale consideration could be treated as income represented in the form of an asset under section 149(1)(b).

Analysis: Under the scheme of capital-gains taxation, only taxable capital gain, if any, constitutes escaped income, not the gross consideration received on transfer of a capital asset. Reliance solely on gross sale consideration without determining taxable capital gain failed to satisfy the jurisdictional condition under section 149(1)(b).

Conclusion: Gross sale consideration could not be treated as escaped income represented in the form of an asset; the jurisdictional condition under section 149(1)(b) was unfulfilled, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The independent jurisdictional defects rendered the reassessment unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment jurisdiction requires a timely notice and legally determined escaped income; gross sale consideration alone cannot constitute escaped capital-gains income for invoking the extended reassessment period.