Issues: Whether the additions made by estimating 3.27% profit element on alleged non-genuine purchases were sustainable when the assessee had produced purchase invoices, e-way bills, bank statements, transporter records, toll and dharam-kanta receipts, GPS photographs and other supporting material.

Analysis: The assessee had filed primary documentary evidence to support the purchases, and the revenue authorities did not record any specific defect, fabrication, or discrepancy in those materials. The additions were sustained mainly on the basis that the suppliers were non-filers, had short-lived or cancelled GST registrations, and the supporting evidence could be manufactured in accommodation-entry cases. The Tribunal held that where sales were accepted and only an alleged grey-market profit element was sought to be taxed, such a finding could not rest on suspicion alone. It further held that the evidentiary value of the assessee's documents had to be independently rebutted by material evidence showing that the purchases were available at lower rates from the grey market and that the assessee had in fact benefited by booking inflated bills.

Conclusion: The additions on account of alleged bogus purchases and estimated profit element were deleted, and the appeal was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the addition made under section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by rejecting the assessee's Discounted Cash Flow valuation of shares was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee had valued the shares by the Discounted Cash Flow method, which is one of the recognised methods under Rule 11UA of the Income-tax Rules, 1962. The dispute turned on whether the Assessing Officer and the first appellate authority could discard that valuation on the ground that the projections did not later match actual results and because the valuation reports were also used for FEMA compliance. The valuation exercised by the assessee was a projected, forward-looking exercise, and the subsequent outcome of the business could not by itself justify reworking the valuation with hindsight. The same valuation basis was also accepted for shares issued to a non-resident, and the Revenue could not selectively reject the valuation only for resident share subscriptions while accepting the same price for other allotments.

Conclusion: The rejection of the DCF valuation and the consequent addition under section 56(2)(viib) was unsustainable. The addition was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the impugned communication dated 12.12.2025 was a formal demand notice under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962. (ii) Whether the amount of Rs. 3,20,87,688/- deposited during investigation was liable to be refunded or could be appropriated towards any eventual adjudicated liability.

Issue (i): Whether the impugned communication dated 12.12.2025 was a formal demand notice under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The communication was issued after the petitioner's authorised representative expressed willingness to pay differential duty and requested issuance of a letter. It was treated as a follow-up communication during investigation, not as a statutory demand notice in the sense contemplated by Section 28.

Conclusion: The communication was not treated as a formal demand notice under Section 28.

Issue (ii): Whether the amount of Rs. 3,20,87,688/- deposited during investigation was liable to be refunded or could be appropriated towards any eventual adjudicated liability.

Analysis: The payment was made after the petitioner itself recomputed the differential duty, and the Court held that such an amount, whether paid under protest or otherwise during investigation, does not bar the statutory adjudication process. The amount may be adjusted against the final liability, if any, determined in adjudication, and refund was declined at this stage.

Conclusion: Refund was declined and the deposited amount was permitted to be appropriated towards any eventual demand arising from adjudication.

Final Conclusion: The petitioner obtained quashing of the impugned communication dated 12.12.2025, but no immediate refund was granted and the disputed amount was left to be dealt with in the forthcoming adjudicatory process.

Ratio Decidendi: Amounts paid during investigation may be retained and adjusted against the final liability determined in adjudication, and a communication issued as a consequence of a taxpayer's own willingness to pay differential duty is not necessarily a formal demand notice under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: Whether transportation of Ready Mix Concrete through Transit Mixers under the described contractual arrangement constituted Goods Transport Service and not Supply of Tangible Goods Services, and whether the demand of service tax, interest and penalties could be sustained.

Analysis: The Tribunal applied its earlier decision on identical facts and noted that the assessee was engaged in transportation of Ready Mix Concrete by road from one place to another under consignment notes and not in hiring out vehicles. The arrangement required loading, transporting and unloading the material, and the mere use of Transit Mixers did not convert the activity into supply of tangible goods. The Tribunal also relied on the principle of judicial discipline and found the facts and service recipient to be the same as in the earlier binding view.

Conclusion: The activity was held to be Goods Transport Service and not Supply of Tangible Goods Services. The service tax demand and consequential interest and penalties were not sustainable, and the Revenue's appeal was dismissed.

Issues: Whether parallel adjudicatory proceedings by the Central and State GST authorities on the same subject matter were barred, and what directions should govern the petitioner's response to the notices already issued.

Analysis: The proceedings were examined in the light of the binding law declared in Armour Security, which explains that Section 6(2)(b) bars initiation of proceedings on the same subject matter by the other tax administration once adjudicatory proceedings have already commenced, while bona fide investigative steps may continue so long as they do not amount to parallel adjudication. The Court applied those principles to hold that coordination between the authorities was necessary, that the petitioner should place its replies and supporting documents before the competent authority, and that the authorities must determine inter-se which of them would continue the matter without subjecting the assessee to duplicate adjudicatory action.

Conclusion: Parallel adjudicatory proceedings on the same subject matter were not permitted, and the petitioner was directed to respond before the competent authority, after which the Central and State authorities were to coordinate and proceed in accordance with the law declared in Armour Security.

Final Conclusion: The petition was disposed of by protecting the petitioner from multiplicity of GST adjudicatory proceedings and by directing the authorities to coordinate, receive the petitioner's response, and proceed only before the competent authority in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Central and State GST authorities are proceeding on the same subject matter, Section 6(2)(b) prohibits parallel adjudicatory proceedings and requires inter-se coordination so that only one competent authority carries the matter forward to its logical conclusion.

Issues: Whether the applicant, facing prosecution under the CGST Act for alleged fake invoicing and fraudulent availment of input tax credit, was entitled to bail pending trial.

Analysis: The prosecution was founded substantially on documentary, digital and bank-record evidence. Investigation was stated to be complete and the complaint had already been filed. The maximum punishment for the alleged offence was five years, the case was triable by a Magistrate, the applicant had remained in custody for a considerable period, no criminal antecedents were shown, and no exceptional circumstance was demonstrated to justify continued detention. The constitutional protection of personal liberty, the presumption of innocence, and the settled principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception supported release on bail.

Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to bail and the application was allowed.

Issues: (i) Whether the ninety-day period for passing the appellate order under Section 101(2) of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is mandatory or directory; (ii) whether the departmental appeals were barred by limitation and whether the delay was validly condoned; (iii) whether the CGST authority had locus to prefer the appeal and whether manual filing of the appeal was permissible; (iv) whether the objections based on natural justice and estoppel could invalidate the appellate proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the ninety-day period for passing the appellate order under Section 101(2) of the Rajasthan Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is mandatory or directory.

Analysis: The time prescription was treated as an outer limit intended to ensure expeditious disposal. Since the statute does not provide any automatic consequence for non-compliance, and construing the provision as mandatory would defeat the statutory right of appeal, the use of the word "shall" was held to be contextually directory rather than jurisdictional.

Conclusion: The ninety-day period was held to be directory, not mandatory, and the appellate proceedings were not vitiated on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the departmental appeals were barred by limitation and whether the delay was validly condoned.

Analysis: The relevant date of communication was taken as the date of actual receipt by the respective officers. On that basis, one appeal was found to be within the permissible period and the other within the maximum extendable period under the proviso. The authority was found to have applied its mind while condoning the short delay, and the challenge based on portal upload date and postal tracking was rejected.

Conclusion: The appeals were held to be within time or validly condoned, and the limitation objections failed.

Issue (iii): Whether the CGST authority had locus to prefer the appeal and whether manual filing of the appeal was permissible.

Analysis: The expressions "concerned officer" and "jurisdictional officer" were construed as distinct statutory authorities who may independently pursue the appellate remedy. Manual filing was held not to be fatal because the rules saved manual processing and the electronic mode was treated as facilitative rather than jurisdictional.

Conclusion: The CGST authority was held competent to appeal, and the objection to hard-copy filing was rejected.

Issue (iv): Whether the objections based on natural justice and estoppel could invalidate the appellate proceedings.

Analysis: The internal correspondence relied upon for verifying receipt dates was treated as a procedural step and not as material requiring separate disclosure where the basis of the finding was reflected in the impugned order. The earlier departmental stand before the advance ruling authority did not bind the State, as there is no estoppel against statute or the State in tax matters.

Conclusion: The objections based on natural justice and estoppel were rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appellate order rejecting the preliminary objections and directing the appeal to be heard on merits was upheld, and the writ petition failed.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory time limit for disposal of an appeal is directory where the enactment prescribes no automatic consequence for delay and a mandatory construction would defeat the appellate remedy itself; departmental appellate rights under advance ruling provisions are available to the statutorily authorised officers, and procedural objections such as manual filing or prior departmental inconsistency cannot defeat maintainability in the absence of legal prejudice.

Issues: Whether the revisionary order under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified on the ground that the reassessment and rectification orders suffered from lack of inquiry and non-application of mind regarding the applicability of section 56(2)(vii)(b) to the purchase of immovable property.

Analysis: The reassessment records showed that the assessee had purchased immovable property for a consideration lower than the stamp duty valuation, giving rise to a material difference. Although the Assessing Officer examined the sale-side transactions and completed reassessment and rectification proceedings, no inquiry was made on the applicability of section 56(2)(vii)(b) to the purchase transaction. The record also showed reliance on section 56(2)(x), which was not applicable to the assessment year under consideration. In these circumstances, the order was treated as having been passed without proper inquiry on a material issue, thereby satisfying the requirements for revision under section 263.

Conclusion: The revisionary jurisdiction was validly exercised and the order under section 263 was upheld.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to additional interest under section 244A(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for the delay in passing the order giving effect to the appellate order, and whether the Assessing Officer was required to verify and grant such interest.

Analysis: The assessee had already received refund interest under section 244A(1), but the order giving effect to the appellate order was passed beyond the time prescribed under section 153(5). The statutory scheme treats section 244A(1A) as compensatory and deterrent in nature, providing additional interest at 3% per annum where the Assessing Officer fails to pass the consequential order within the prescribed time. On the facts, the delay extended beyond the statutory period, and the calculation furnished by the assessee showed entitlement to additional interest from the expiry of the permissible time until the refund was actually granted. The cited High Court decisions supported the view that the assessee is entitled to such additional interest where the statutory timeline is breached.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to interest under section 244A(1A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the Assessing Officer was directed to verify the calculation and grant the same.

Issues: Whether the final assessment order under section 143(3) read with section 144C(13) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was time-barred because it was signed on 31 July 2024 but first served on the assessee only on 21 August 2024.

Analysis: The assessment sequence showed that the DRP issued directions under section 144C(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the final order was required to be completed within the statutory period. The assessee relied on the principle that an order affecting rights becomes operative only when it is duly made public or dispatched, not merely when signed. The Tribunal also noted the e-assessment framework, under which delivery of an electronic order is to be effected through the prescribed modes, with the time of dispatch and receipt governed by section 13 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. On the admitted facts, the order dated 31 July 2024 was served only on 21 August 2024, and there was no timely dispatch establishing completion within limitation.

Conclusion: The assessment order was barred by limitation and invalid.

Issues: Whether section 56(2)(viib) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied where the assessee had sold shares and not received consideration for issue of shares, and whether the penalty could survive after deletion of the quantum addition.

Analysis: Section 56(2)(viib) applies only when a company not being one in which the public are substantially interested receives consideration for issue of shares in excess of the fair market value. On the facts found, the assessee had purchased or subscribed to shares and had not received consideration for issue of shares. The foundation for the addition therefore failed. Once the addition was deleted in quantum, the connected penalty, being dependent on the addition, had no independent survival.

Conclusion: Section 56(2)(viib) was held inapplicable to the assessee's transaction, the addition was deleted, and the penalty was also deleted as consequential.

Issues: Whether repair and maintenance overhauling charges paid to non-resident entities for helicopter parts constituted fees for technical services so as to attract tax deduction obligations and disallowance under section 40(a)(i) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The payments related to repair and overhaul of helicopter parts sent outside India to non-resident vendors. The Tribunal followed its own earlier decision in the assessee's case and held that, for treaty jurisdictions containing a make available condition, repair services performed abroad did not result in making available technical knowledge, skill, or know-how to the assessee. In the absence of such make available element, the receipts did not qualify as fees for technical services under the relevant DTAAs. By virtue of section 90(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the more beneficial treaty provisions prevailed over the domestic charging provisions. Since the payments were not chargeable to tax in India, section 195 was not attracted.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 40(a)(i) was unsustainable and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether additions based on seized diaries and statements could be sustained when the assessee was denied an effective opportunity to cross-examine the persons whose statements formed the foundation of the assessment.

Analysis: The addition rested materially on diary entries allegedly recovered during search, together with oral statements explaining the alleged cash committee transactions and the assessee's supposed participation. The assessee disputed involvement and specifically sought cross-examination of the witnesses. Where documentary material is not self-explanatory and is supplemented by oral statements to establish the transaction pattern or modus operandi, denial of cross-examination of the vital witnesses undermines the evidentiary basis of the addition. Mere supply of copies of statements and seized material does not cure the defect when the adverse inference is drawn substantially from such statements. In these circumstances, the probative value of the statements could not be treated as untested and conclusive against the assessee.

Conclusion: The denial of cross-examination vitiated the addition and the impugned additions could not be sustained; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition made under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of share capital received through preferential allotment was sustainable; (ii) Whether the ad hoc disallowance of 25% of other expenses was justified under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether the addition made under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of share capital received through preferential allotment was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee was a public limited company and had furnished the primary particulars of the share applicants, including names, addresses, PAN, number of shares allotted, and the return of allotment filed with the Registrar of Companies. The shares were issued under preferential allotment with regulatory oversight. In such a case, the initial burden stood discharged by production of primary details. The Assessing Officer did not conduct independent verification or summon the subscribers to test the explanation. On these facts, the credit could not be treated as unexplained merely on suspicion.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the ad hoc disallowance of 25% of other expenses was justified under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The expenses were supported by ledger details and related to ordinary business outgoings. No specific defect, falsity, or personal element was pointed out in the vouchers or accounts. A company, as an artificial juridical person, cannot ordinarily incur personal expenditure, and a blanket disallowance without identifying particular inadmissible items was impermissible. The principle of consistency also weighed against repeating a similar disallowance when comparable claims had earlier been accepted or deleted.

Conclusion: The ad hoc disallowance was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additions on account of share capital and the disallowance of other expenses were both set aside, resulting in complete relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a public limited company furnishes complete primary details of share applicants and the revenue makes no independent inquiry, a section 68 addition cannot rest on suspicion alone; similarly, an ad hoc disallowance of business expenditure is unsustainable absent specific defects in the claim.

Issues: (i) Whether the reassessment initiated under section 147 was valid in the absence of independent tangible material apart from information received from the Investigation Wing and the statement of the alleged entry operator. (ii) Whether the addition made under section 68 on account of alleged bogus purchases/accommodation entries could be sustained where the purchases and corresponding sales were already recorded in the books of account.

Issue (i): Whether the reassessment initiated under section 147 was valid in the absence of independent tangible material apart from information received from the Investigation Wing and the statement of the alleged entry operator.

Analysis: The reopening rested essentially on information that certain concerns controlled by an alleged entry operator were shell entities and that the assessee had transacted with them. The record did not show independent inquiry or any material gathered by the Assessing Officer to establish a live nexus between the information and the belief that income had escaped assessment. The reopening was therefore treated as founded only on borrowed satisfaction rather than on a separately formed and supported belief.

Conclusion: The reassessment was held to be invalid and unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition made under section 68 on account of alleged bogus purchases/accommodation entries could be sustained where the purchases and corresponding sales were already recorded in the books of account.

Analysis: The assessee was found to be a wholesale trader and the disputed purchases were reflected in the books, along with the corresponding sales. The Court treated the addition as unsupported where the department failed to establish that the recorded transactions were fictitious in a manner justifying an unexplained-credit addition. It also applied the principle that an amount already routed through disclosed sales cannot be again taxed under section 68, as that would amount to double addition.

Conclusion: The addition under section 68 was deleted and the assessee succeeded on the merits as well.

Final Conclusion: Both the reassessment challenge and the addition on account of alleged bogus purchases were decided in favour of the assessee, and the appeals were allowed in full.

Ratio Decidendi: Reassessment must rest on independent tangible material showing a rational nexus to escapement of income, and a disclosed purchase-sale transaction already recorded in the books cannot be taxed again as an unexplained credit under section 68 absent cogent proof of falsity.

Issues: (i) Whether the order cancelling GST registration was vitiated for want of reasons and non-compliance with the prescribed cancellation procedure; (ii) Whether the petitioner's delayed approach to the Court disentitled him to relief.

Issue (i): Whether the order cancelling GST registration was vitiated for want of reasons and non-compliance with the prescribed cancellation procedure.

Analysis: Cancellation of registration under the GST regime carries adverse civil consequences and therefore requires compliance with the statutory procedure and fair decision-making. The notice under the cancellation provisions must disclose the precise basis of proposed action so that the registered person can give an effective reply. The cancellation order must also be a speaking order in the prescribed form, with specific reasons showing application of mind. A bare reference to the notice and a generic remark without reasons does not satisfy the requirement of Rule 22 of the CGST Rules, 2017 or the requirement inherent in fair procedure.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was held to be non-speaking, arbitrary, and contrary to the prescribed procedure, and was set aside in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner's delayed approach to the Court disentitled him to relief.

Analysis: Although the writ petition was filed after a substantial lapse of time, the defect in the cancellation order went to the root of legality because it was passed without reasons and without due application of mind. In such circumstances, the procedural lapse in approaching the Court late did not outweigh the illegality in the impugned order.

Conclusion: The delay did not bar relief, and the Court granted interference in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The cancellation order was quashed and the matter was restored to the stage of the show-cause notice, with liberty to the petitioner to respond or regularise the dues in accordance with the GST procedure.

Ratio Decidendi: An order cancelling GST registration must be reasoned and passed in strict conformity with the statutory procedure and principles of natural justice; a non-speaking cancellation order affecting civil rights is liable to be set aside.

Issues: Whether an assessment framed under section 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained when additions were made on the basis of documents seized from a third person, without invoking the reassessment framework and the approval contemplated under the statutory deeming provision.

Analysis: The dispute turned on the effect of material seized in the search of another person and used against the assessee. The assessment year involved was prior to the search year, and the additions were founded on third-party documents and statements. The statutory scheme referred to in the order treats such material as giving rise to deemed escapement only within the reassessment framework and subject to the prescribed satisfaction and approval. The Tribunal followed coordinate bench decisions holding that, where seized material from a third person is relied upon, the Assessing Officer must proceed under the reassessment provisions and cannot bypass that procedure by completing the matter under section 143(3). Since the assessment in the present case was made under section 143(3) on the basis of third-party seized material, the procedural route adopted was held to be contrary to law.

Conclusion: The assessment framed under section 143(3) was held to be invalid and was quashed, which was in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the assessee's business income should be estimated at 8% of receipts or at a lower net profit rate based on the past audited results.

Analysis: The assessee's turnover, contractual nature of business, and the consistency of audited net profit rates in the preceding years were not in dispute. The books had not been audited for the year under consideration and the return had not been filed, but the historical record showed turnover in a similar range and net profit rates of about 5% to 5.5%. In these circumstances, the prior years' trend was treated as the appropriate benchmark for a fair estimation of income.

Conclusion: The net profit rate was directed to be applied at 5.75% instead of 8%, resulting in reduction of the estimated business income and relief to the assessee.

Issues: Whether interest income earned by a co-operative housing society from deposits/investments with co-operative banks is eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 80P(2)(d) allows deduction in respect of interest or dividend derived by a co-operative society from its investments with any other co-operative society. The expression "co-operative society" in section 2(19) is of wide import, and a co-operative bank is not taken out of that character merely because section 80P(4) denies the benefit of section 80P to the co-operative bank itself. That provision restricts the bank's own eligibility; it does not prevent a co-operative society from claiming deduction on interest earned from deposits with such bank. The decision relied on by the Revenue on surplus-fund income under section 80P(2)(a)(i) was treated as inapplicable because the present claim was under a different limb, section 80P(2)(d). The prior allowance of the same claim in the assessee's own case also supported the claim on consistency.

Conclusion: The interest income from investments with co-operative banks is deductible under section 80P(2)(d), and the disallowance was not sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: For section 80P(2)(d), a co-operative bank is to be treated as a co-operative society, so interest earned by a co-operative society from investments with a co-operative bank qualifies for deduction, and section 80P(4) does not defeat that claim.

Issues: Whether the notice under section 148 issued on 28.07.2022 and the reassessment proceedings founded on it were barred by limitation in view of the substituted reassessment regime, the deemed notice mechanism, and the surviving limitation period.

Analysis: The original notice under the unamended regime had been issued on 25.06.2021 and was treated as a deemed notice under section 148A(b). The later information was supplied on 26.05.2022 and time was granted upto 20.06.2022 for reply. Applying the binding principle on computation of the surviving limitation period, the fresh notice under section 148 had to be issued within the time still available after excluding the period covered by the earlier notice and the time allowed for compliance. Since the order under section 148A(d) was passed on 27.07.2022 and the notice under section 148 was issued on 28.07.2022, both were beyond the surviving limitation period.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was time-barred and the reassessment proceedings were invalid and liable to be quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: A reassessment notice under the new regime must be issued within the surviving limitation period computed in accordance with the earlier deemed notice and the time excluded by the applicable transitional framework; a notice issued beyond that period is void and the reassessment is liable to be quashed.