Issues: (i) whether deduction under Section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was allowable where the assessee had entered into an escrow arrangement, received an allotment of a residential flat, and had effectively applied the sale consideration towards the flat though possession was delayed due to the builder's dispute; (ii) whether the amount deposited in the Capital Gains Accounts Scheme and later deposited with the High Court pursuant to interim directions could be denied the benefit of Section 54F.

Issue (i): Whether deduction under Section 54F was allowable on the amount adjusted towards the allotted flat.

Analysis: The assessee had entered into an escrow arrangement under which a specifically identified residential flat was allotted in an under-construction project, and the sale consideration of the shares was effectively routed towards that flat. The subsequent delay in execution of the registered conveyance and handing over of possession was attributable to the builder dispute and not to any failure on the assessee's part. The residential flat was thus treated as having been acquired for the purposes of Section 54F(1), and the absence of possession did not defeat the claim where the assessee had already fulfilled the investment condition in substance.

Conclusion: Deduction under Section 54F was held to be allowable in respect of the amount adjusted towards the flat, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the amount deposited in the Capital Gains Accounts Scheme and thereafter deposited with the High Court could be denied exemption under Section 54F.

Analysis: The amount standing in the Capital Gains Accounts Scheme was withdrawn and deposited in court in compliance with judicial directions within the stipulated period. The statutory scheme under Section 54F(4) contemplates taxation only upon non-utilisation after the prescribed period, and the facts showed timely application of the funds towards the intended residential acquisition. The amount therefore satisfied the requirement of investment for purposes of Section 54F and could not be denied in the year under appeal.

Conclusion: Deduction under Section 54F was held to be allowable for the amount deposited under the Capital Gains Accounts Scheme, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's claim for exemption under Section 54F was accepted in full, and the capital gains addition made by the tax authorities did not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an assessee has, within the prescribed period, effectively applied the sale consideration towards a specifically allotted residential house under an escrow arrangement, mere delay in possession caused by the builder does not defeat Section 54F relief; amounts duly invested through the Capital Gains Accounts Scheme and subsequently utilised in compliance with court directions also satisfy the statutory requirement.

Issues: Whether the disallowance of interest expenditure under section 57(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified when the borrowed funds were claimed to have been fully utilised for advancing a loan and the alleged repayment was in fact salary arrears received from the borrower.

Analysis: The record, including Form 26AS, Form 16 and the ledger account, showed that the sum of Rs. 50,00,000 was received as salary and not as repayment of loan. On that factual basis, the amount borrowed from IDBI Bank was treated as having been utilised for advancing funds to the borrower. Since the factual premise for restricting the deduction by a proportionate disallowance did not survive, no disallowance under section 57(iii) remained justified.

Conclusion: The disallowance of Rs. 7,00,172 was deleted and the assessee was held entitled to full allowance of the interest claim on these facts.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded and the entire sustained disallowance was set aside on the ground that the interest expenditure was allowable in full.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the evidence establishes that borrowed funds were wholly deployed for the income-yielding purpose and the contrary inference is displaced by reliable documentary material, a proportionate disallowance of interest under section 57(iii) cannot be sustained.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the show-cause notice was maintainable, and whether the notice suffered from lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the signatory authority was a CGST officer under the Health Security se National Security Cess framework.

Analysis: The challenge was directed against a show-cause notice and no final determination of liability had yet been made. The petitioner was held entitled to file objections and further reply, after which the authority could pass a reasoned and speaking order. The jurisdictional objection was rejected because the relevant orders vested authority in the Deputy or Assistant Commissioner under the CGST set-up with jurisdiction under Rule 11 of the Rules, and the description or rubber stamp below the signature was treated as immaterial.

Outcome: The writ petition was dismissed, with liberty to pursue objections before the authority and thereafter avail statutory remedies.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition made on account of contingent liability recorded in the tax audit report was sustainable; (ii) Whether the disallowance for delayed payment of employees' contribution to provident fund was sustainable in the facts of the case.

Issue (i): Whether the addition made on account of contingent liability recorded in the tax audit report was sustainable.

Analysis: The return of income had been filed along with the tax audit report, but the amount of Rs. 9,41,558 was wrongly reflected by the tax auditor as a contingent liability though it represented a bank guarantee and was not claimed as an expenditure in the profit and loss account. The addition arose only from this mistaken reporting in the audit report and not from any actual claim of deduction by the assessee.

Conclusion: The addition on account of contingent liability was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the disallowance for delayed payment of employees' contribution to provident fund was sustainable in the facts of the case.

Analysis: The delayed deposits were attributed to the Covid period, and the contribution was stated to have been deposited within the extended time limit applicable during that period. The record also referred to a notification issued by the Employees' Provident Fund Organisation dated 15.04.2020 supporting the assessee's claim for relief from the disallowance.

Conclusion: The disallowance for delayed payment of employees' contribution to provident fund was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Both additions were deleted, and the appeals were allowed in full.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an addition is made solely because of a mistaken entry in the tax audit report and the underlying amount was not claimed as expenditure, the disallowance cannot be sustained; similarly, delayed provident fund contribution made within an extended Covid-period timeline is not liable to disallowance on the facts accepted by the Tribunal.

Issues: Whether, for belated filing of annual returns for the 2020-21 assessment period, general penalty under Section 125 of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be sustained when late fee under Section 47 had already been levied, and whether the levy was liable to be interfered with to that extent.

Analysis: The impugned demand was examined in the light of the settled view that Section 125 operates only in the absence of any other specific penal consequence under the GST enactment. The Court followed its earlier decision holding that where the statute itself provides for late fee for delayed filing, imposition of general penalty for the same default is not sustainable. On that reasoning, the levy of general penalty could not survive, while the liability to pay the prescribed late fee remained unaffected.

Conclusion: The general penalty under Section 125 was set aside, and the petitioner was held liable only to pay the late fee under Section 47.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded to the extent of deleting the general penalty, but the statutory late fee for delayed filing was upheld, with consequential relief as to the attachment of the bank account subject to compliance.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a GST enactment specifically provides for late fee for delayed filing of returns, general penalty cannot be imposed for the same default under the residuary penalty provision.

Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit availed on capital goods and inputs was liable to be demanded where the capital goods credit had been reversed and spare parts were cleared on payment of central excise duty without further manufacture. (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation, interest and penalty were attracted.

Issue (i): Whether Cenvat credit availed on capital goods and inputs was liable to be demanded where the capital goods credit had been reversed and spare parts were cleared on payment of central excise duty without further manufacture.

Analysis: The credit on capital goods had been reversed before issuance of the notice, which was treated as sufficient compliance. As regards the spare parts, they were cleared as such on payment of appropriate central excise duty, and that payment was treated as equivalent to reversal of the credit relatable to such inputs. Since no further manufacturing activity was undertaken on those goods at the time of clearance, the demand for reversal of credit was held unsustainable.

Conclusion: The demand of Cenvat credit was not sustainable against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation, interest and penalty were attracted.

Analysis: The notice was issued after about two and a half years, but the assessee had already reversed the credit on capital goods and paid duty on spare parts cleared as such. On those facts, there was no wilful suppression, misstatement or intention to evade duty, so the ingredients for invoking the proviso to section 11A were absent. Once the demand itself failed, interest and penalty could not survive.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not available to the Revenue, and interest and penalty were not leviable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the assessee's appeal was allowed, resulting in complete relief from the confirmed credit demand, interest and penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: Where credit on capital goods is reversed and goods are cleared as such on payment of duty without further manufacture, no further Cenvat credit demand survives, and in the absence of wilful suppression the extended limitation period and consequential penalty cannot be invoked.

Issues: (i) Whether revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 could be invoked on the basis of an audit objection and alleged non-following of CBDT Circular No. 09/2014 when the Assessing Officer had examined the depreciation claim during scrutiny; (ii) whether the assessee was entitled to depreciation under section 32(1)(ii) on the rights acquired under the concession agreement as an intangible asset, and whether the alternative treatment suggested by the Circular could render the assessment order prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.

Issue (i): Whether revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 could be invoked on the basis of an audit objection and alleged non-following of CBDT Circular No. 09/2014 when the Assessing Officer had examined the depreciation claim during scrutiny.

Analysis: The impugned revision was founded on an audit objection and on the premise that the Assessing Officer was bound to apply the CBDT Circular. The record showed that the depreciation issue was specifically examined in scrutiny proceedings through notices and replies, and the absence of an elaborate discussion in the assessment order did not establish lack of enquiry. Revision under section 263 requires both error and prejudice to Revenue, and an order passed after enquiry and adoption of a permissible view cannot be revised merely because another view is possible.

Conclusion: Revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 was not validly assumed on these grounds, and the impugned order was unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to depreciation under section 32(1)(ii) on the rights acquired under the concession agreement as an intangible asset, and whether the alternative treatment suggested by the Circular could render the assessment order prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.

Analysis: The rights obtained under the concession agreement were treated as a licence or, in any event, as a business or commercial right of similar nature within section 32(1)(ii). The year under appeal concerned depreciation on the opening WDV of an already accepted block of intangible assets, and the controversy was therefore confined to the method of allowance. On the authorities considered, the claim was revenue neutral, because the difference between depreciation and amortisation was only one of timing. Since the assessment had already accepted the claim in earlier years and the issue had been enquired into, the order could not be branded prejudicial to Revenue on this basis.

Conclusion: The assessee's depreciation claim on the concession right was accepted, and the alternative amortisation approach did not justify revision.

Final Conclusion: The revision order under section 263 was quashed, and the assessee's appeal succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 263 cannot be invoked unless the assessment order is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, and where the disputed claim has been enquired into and the controversy is only a timing difference on a revenue-neutral issue, revision is impermissible.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the statutory appeal could be condoned despite the limitation prescribed under section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994. (ii) Whether the impugned appellate order and the underlying order deserved to be set aside so that the appeal could be heard on merits.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the statutory appeal could be condoned despite the limitation prescribed under section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The delay was found to have occurred for reasons beyond the petitioner's control, and the matter was treated as one where denial of adjudication on merits would cause prejudice. The statutory limitation under section 85 was acknowledged, but the Court followed its consistent approach in similar matters and granted relief on the basis of the circumstances shown.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the impugned appellate order and the underlying order deserved to be set aside so that the appeal could be heard on merits.

Analysis: Once delay was condoned, the orders preventing consideration of the appeal could not stand, and the appellate forum was directed to consider the appeal in accordance with law. The relief was linked to compliance with the directed statutory deposit.

Conclusion: The impugned orders were set aside and the appeal was directed to be decided on merits in favour of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded to the extent of restoring the appellate remedy by condoning delay and enabling adjudication of the appeal on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where delay in filing a statutory appeal is shown to have arisen for bona fide reasons beyond the party's control, and rigid enforcement of limitation would defeat adjudication on merits, the writ court may grant condonation and direct the appeal to be heard in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee had shown sufficient and reasonable cause for condonation of the delay in filing the first appeals before the appellate authority; (ii) Whether ex-gratia compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme was eligible for exemption under section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the resultant tax additions were liable to be deleted.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee had shown sufficient and reasonable cause for condonation of the delay in filing the first appeals before the appellate authority.

Analysis: The delay was explained as arising from the assessee's lack of awareness of the correct legal position regarding exemption for VRS compensation, and the subsequent discovery of the remedy only after judicial orders in BSNL VRS matters were circulated among employees. The assessee was a senior citizen and a retrenched BSNL employee. The explanation was accepted as bona fide, and the Court held that refusal to condone the delay would defeat substantial justice.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether ex-gratia compensation received under the BSNL VRS-2019 scheme was eligible for exemption under section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the resultant tax additions were liable to be deleted.

Analysis: The BSNL VRS-2019 scheme was implemented pursuant to a Government of India revival package approved by the Union Cabinet and the compensation was funded through budgetary support. The scheme was treated as partaking the character of a government-approved retrenchment scheme rather than an ordinary voluntary retirement scheme. The Court followed consistent co-ordinate bench and appellate precedents holding that such compensation falls within section 10(10B), and no contrary precedent was brought by the Revenue.

Conclusion: The ex-gratia compensation was held exempt under section 10(10B), the additions were directed to be deleted, and consequential relief relating to section 10(10AA) was also directed to be granted, if otherwise eligible.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded and the assessee obtained full relief on both the delay issue and the merits of exemption, resulting in deletion of the impugned tax additions.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a belated appeal is supported by a bona fide and reasonable explanation, substantial justice warrants condonation of delay; and compensation paid under a Government-approved BSNL VRS-2019 scheme funded by public support is to be treated as retrenchment compensation eligible for exemption under section 10(10B).

Issues: Whether disallowance of the assessee's claimed expenditure could be sustained merely because Form 10B was filed belatedly and was not furnished with the return, despite the assessee being registered under section 12AA and the audited details being produced in rectification proceedings.

Analysis: The appeal concerned an educational trust whose return had been processed under section 143(1), after which the claimed expenditure was ignored and rectification relief was refused because the audit report in Form 10B was not filed within time. The Court held that the omission to file the report along with the return was a procedural lapse and that valid expenditure could not be denied merely on technical grounds. It also noted that the belated audit report had been filed and that the matter required fresh consideration with due regard to the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The disallowance was not upheld as final. The matter was remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh adjudication after considering the belatedly filed Form 10B, and the appeal was allowed for statistical purposes.

Issues: (i) Whether the Department's appeal under Section 37A(5) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 was maintainable; (ii) whether subscription to shares and subsequent transfer by gift of the foreign company's equity amounted to holding of foreign security in contravention of Section 4 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999; and (iii) whether the seizure under Section 37A of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 could be maintained only to the extent of value equivalent of the foreign security and not beyond it.

Issue (i): Whether the Department's appeal under Section 37A(5) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 was maintainable.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 37A had to be read as a whole. The opportunity of hearing under sub-sections (3) and (4) to both sides, coupled with the Supreme Court's direction that the Appellate Authority decide the Department's appeal under Section 37A(5), supported a construction that did not exclude the Department from appellate recourse. A restrictive reading would defeat the purpose of the provision and create an inconsistency within the section.

Conclusion: The Department's appeal was held maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether subscription to shares and subsequent transfer by gift of the foreign company's equity amounted to holding of foreign security in contravention of Section 4 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999.

Analysis: The record showed that the foreign company had allotted ordinary shares, the shareholders and directors were identified in the financial statements, and the shares were reflected as fully paid in the company accounts. Even if the initial arrangement was described as subscription, it conferred valuable rights and was treated as direct investment outside India under the foreign security regulations. The transfer by gift also demonstrated that the holding had value and was capable of being transferred. The reasoning that the shares had zero value and therefore were outside Section 4 was rejected.

Conclusion: The holding of the foreign security was found to attract Section 4 of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, and the challenge to the seizure was not accepted in full.

Issue (iii): Whether the seizure under Section 37A of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 could be maintained only to the extent of value equivalent of the foreign security and not beyond it.

Analysis: Section 37A authorises seizure only of value equivalent situated within India of the foreign security held outside India. The objective is to secure the equivalent value and not to permit multiple or excessive seizures for the same underlying foreign security. On the facts, the seizure already made against certain respondents was adequate, but the seizure against the other respondents was not wholly sustainable to the extent it exceeded the permissible equivalent value.

Conclusion: The seizure was upheld for the amount already representing the permissible equivalent value and was set aside to the extent stated by the Tribunal.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was allowed only in part, with the Tribunal sustaining the legal basis of the proceedings while modifying the impugned order to preserve seizure only to the extent of the permissible value equivalent and to the extent specifically upheld against the concerned respondents.

Ratio Decidendi: For the purpose of Section 37A of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, subscription rights in a foreign company that confer transferable and valuable interests constitute foreign security, and seizure in India can extend only to the value equivalent of such holding, not beyond that limit.

Issues: Whether a disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D could be sustained where the assessment was selected for limited scrutiny for a different purpose and there was no approval for conversion to complete scrutiny.

Analysis: The case was selected under section 143(2) for limited scrutiny on specified reasons that did not include disallowance under section 14A. The record did not show any approval or conversion of the proceedings from limited scrutiny to complete scrutiny. On these facts, the disallowance travelled beyond the permissible scope of the scrutiny proceedings and could not be upheld.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded because the addition was held to be beyond the scope of the limited scrutiny assessment.

Ratio Decidendi: In a limited scrutiny assessment, an addition on an issue outside the identified scope cannot be sustained unless the case is validly converted to complete scrutiny with the requisite approval.

Issues: Whether earthwork, embankment formation, road rolling and water filling undertaken as sub-contracted activities for road works were covered by the exemption for services provided by way of construction of a road under Serial No. 13(a) of Notification No. 25/2012-Service Tax dated 20.06.2012.

Analysis: The work orders showed that the appellant was engaged in embankment construction, earthwork, rolling and watering, all of which formed part of the chain of activities necessary for road construction. Such activities, though preparatory in character, were held to be intrinsic and essential components of road construction and could not be artificially severed from the exempted service. A harmonious reading of the exemption entry required the term "construction" to include the full range of activities culminating in road construction, including site preparation and allied works. The Tribunal also relied on earlier decisions treating similar road-related activities as part of the exempt construction of roads.

Conclusion: The disputed activities were held to fall within the exemption for road construction services, and the demand of service tax, interest and penalty was not sustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether retention of the seized cash and vehicles could continue when a prosecution complaint under the PMLA was already pending and no fresh complaint was filed after seizure; (ii) whether further seizure and retention could be invalidated because earlier provisional attachments had already been made and the alleged proceeds of crime were said to be lower than the value already attached; (iii) whether the absence or non-supply of a separate retention order under Section 20(1) of the PMLA vitiated the impugned retention; and (iv) whether the impugned order suffered from non-application of mind or failure to discharge the burden regarding the source of the seized assets.

Issue (i): Whether retention of the seized cash and vehicles could continue when a prosecution complaint under the PMLA was already pending and no fresh complaint was filed after seizure.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Section 8(3) of the PMLA permits confirmed retention of seized or frozen property to continue during investigation for up to 365 days, or for the pendency of proceedings relating to an offence under the Act before a court. The pending prosecution complaint filed earlier in the same ECIR satisfied the statutory requirement. The provision does not require that the complaint be filed against every person whose property is seized. The fact that one appellant was not named as an accused did not, by itself, defeat retention where the proceeding under the Act was already pending.

Conclusion: Retention was held to be valid and the objection based on absence of a fresh or person-specific prosecution complaint was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether further seizure and retention could be invalidated because earlier provisional attachments had already been made and the alleged proceeds of crime were said to be lower than the value already attached.

Analysis: The Tribunal accepted the Enforcement Directorate's case that the investigation was continuing and that the later seizure related to additional assets and a broader assessment of the money trail arising from the same fraudulent transactions. The figure of alleged liability and proceeds of crime was not treated as closed merely because earlier provisional attachments had been made. The materials on record, including the nature of the NSEL transactions and the alleged layering of funds, supported the view that additional properties could still be traced as proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The challenge based on prior attachments and the asserted cap on proceeds of crime was rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether the absence or non-supply of a separate retention order under Section 20(1) of the PMLA vitiated the impugned retention.

Analysis: The Tribunal declined to accept the contention that the impugned action failed for want of a separate retention order from the Directorate. It held that the statutory framework, read as a whole, did not require the seizure to fail merely because of this objection, and it preferred an interpretation that preserved the validity of the adjudicatory process under Section 8 along with the search and seizure mechanism under Sections 17 and 20. The reliance placed on contrary authority was not accepted.

Conclusion: The objection based on absence of a Section 20(1) retention order was rejected.

Issue (iv): Whether the impugned order suffered from non-application of mind or failure to discharge the burden regarding the source of the seized assets.

Analysis: The Tribunal found that the Adjudicating Authority had examined the original application, the relied upon documents, and the appellants' replies before recording the requisite prima facie satisfaction. It held that the notice and order disclosed sufficient material for a reason to believe under the PMLA. It also held that, in the circumstances of serious allegations of money laundering, the appellants failed to satisfactorily explain the source of the seized cash and vehicles and did not discharge the burden cast upon them.

Conclusion: The challenge based on non-application of mind failed, and the burden-related objection was also rejected.

Final Conclusion: The retention and seizure measures were upheld in full, and the appeals were dismissed with no relief to the appellants.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the PMLA, once a prosecution complaint is pending and the Adjudicating Authority records prima facie satisfaction on the material before it, seizure or retention of property alleged to be proceeds of crime can continue without the complaint having to name every affected person, and the burden then lies on the claimants to establish a lawful source for the property.

Issues: Whether the appellant's activity of transporting coal and washery rejects was classifiable as mining service or as transportation of goods by road, and whether the absence of consignment notes excluded the service from service tax under the negative list.

Analysis: The contract showed transportation of raw coal from the mine to the washery and transportation of washery rejects to the power plant through public road. The activity was limited to transportation of goods and no consignment note was issued. Service by way of transportation of goods by road became taxable as goods transport agency service only where a consignment note was issued, and services falling outside that condition remained covered by the negative list under Section 66D(p)(i)(A) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The demand under mining service was not sustainable. The service was not liable to service tax for the material period, and the demand, interest, and penalties were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an advocate, acting in a professional capacity while filing a statutory GST appeal and advising the mode of pre-deposit, could be prosecuted for conspiracy with the client, and whether the FIR, charge-sheet and cognizance order could be sustained against him.

Analysis: The allegations arose solely from the advocate's professional act of preferring an appeal and taking a legal view on the permissibility of pre-deposit from the electronic credit ledger. The Court held that such conduct, even if later viewed as erroneous on law, remains a professional act and does not convert the advocate into a conspirator with the client. Criminal liability cannot be imputed merely because counsel assisted in lawful representation, and permitting such prosecution would undermine fearless legal practice and the constitutional guarantees of fair procedure and access to legal assistance.

Conclusion: The FIR, the charge-sheet and the cognizance order, insofar as they related to the advocate, were unsustainable and were quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: An advocate cannot be subjected to criminal prosecution for conspiracy merely for performing professional legal acts on behalf of a client, absent independent material showing participation in the client's substantive offence.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and the sanction note founded on the same material as earlier examined by the appellate authority could be sustained.

Analysis: The notice was based on the same facts and material that had already been examined and concluded by the appellate authority, with no fresh material having emerged thereafter. Reopening on that basis amounted to a re-examination of a concluded matter and a change of opinion, rendering the reassessment action beyond jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The notice under Section 148 and the sanction note, along with all consequential proceedings, were set aside.

Issues: Whether the addition made on account of alleged non-genuine purchases could be sustained at 100% of the purchase value, or whether it should be restricted to a reasonable profit element.

Analysis: The assessee produced books of account and supporting material, and the purchases were reflected in the stock register with corresponding sales being accepted. The dispute, therefore, was not about the existence of sales but about the source and genuineness of the purchases. Even where purchases are treated as suspicious or from an undisclosed source, only the profit element embedded in such purchases can be brought to tax. A 100% addition was found to be irrational and unsustainable, particularly in a diamond trading business. Considering the declared gross profit rate and the comparable factual context, the addition was restricted to 2% of the alleged non-genuine purchases.

Conclusion: The addition was not sustained at 100% and was instead restricted to 2% of the alleged non-genuine purchases; the issue was decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: In cases of alleged bogus purchases where sales are accepted and the purchases are reflected in the stock records, only the profit element embedded in the purchases can be taxed, not the entire purchase value.

Issues: (i) Whether limitation for filing the appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 runs from the date of pronouncement of the impugned order or from the date of upload or knowledge of the order; (ii) Whether alleged technical glitches in the e-filing portal justify condonation of delay beyond the statutory period of 30 days plus 15 days.

Issue (i): Whether limitation for filing the appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 runs from the date of pronouncement of the impugned order or from the date of upload or knowledge of the order.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Section 61(2) fixes limitation from the date of pronouncement of the order, with a further condonable period of not more than 15 days only on sufficient cause. The order was pronounced on 15.12.2025 and the appeal was filed on the 46th day. The Tribunal applied binding precedent holding that the clock for limitation under the IBC runs from the date of pronouncement and that subsequent knowledge or later upload does not arrest limitation.

Conclusion: The limitation period was held to commence from the date of pronouncement, and not from the date of upload or alleged knowledge.

Issue (ii): Whether alleged technical glitches in the e-filing portal justify condonation of delay beyond the statutory period of 30 days plus 15 days.

Analysis: The Tribunal accepted that technical difficulties in OTP delivery and portal functioning existed and that the appellant faced difficulty in filing the appeal on the last permissible day. However, it held that the IBC creates a strict outer limit for condonation and that neither hardship, equity, nor technical impediments can expand jurisdiction beyond the 30 plus 15 day limit. The Tribunal relied on precedent emphasizing that delay beyond the statutory ceiling is uncondonable.

Conclusion: The delay beyond the statutory outer limit could not be condoned.

Final Conclusion: The appeal was held to be time-barred beyond the maximum condonable period under the IBC, so the delay condonation application and the appeal both failed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, limitation runs from the date of pronouncement and the Appellate Tribunal has no power to condone delay beyond the express statutory limit of 30 days plus 15 days, regardless of equitable or technical grounds.

Outcome: The appeals and special leave petitions were dismissed, including on the ground of low tax effect, and the connected challenge regarding applicability of Rule 6(1) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2002/2004 did not survive for interference.