Issues: Whether a charitable trust, otherwise registered under the income-tax law, could be denied exemption under section 11 merely because the return was filed with an incorrect status entry and the revenue treated the claim as not allowable in rectification proceedings.

Analysis: The assessee was registered as a charitable trust and had filed Form 10B within the extended due date. The incorrect mention of the status as a company in the return did not alter the character of the assessee as a trust. The return filed in the PAN of the trust disclosed a curable defect, and a notice under section 139(9) ought to have been issued before rejecting the exemption claim. Since the assessee was otherwise entitled to exemption under section 11, the benefit could not be denied only on the basis of the mistaken return entry. The appellate authority was not confined by the limitations applicable to rectification proceedings and could grant the lawful relief.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to exemption under section 11, and the denial of relief on the ground of an incorrect return status could not be sustained. The appeal was allowed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a consolidated show cause notice covering multiple financial years was legally sustainable.

Analysis: The challenge was to the validity of a composite notice issued for several assessment years together. The Court followed its earlier Division Bench decisions holding that issuance of a combined notice for multiple assessment years is not legally sustainable, and found merit in the petitioner's objection. On that basis, interference was warranted.

Conclusion: The consolidated show cause notice was quashed, and the respondents were given liberty to issue separate notices for the relevant assessment years. The period from the date of the notice until receipt of a certified copy of the judgment was directed to be excluded while computing limitation for fresh proceedings.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded to the extent of setting aside the composite notice, while preserving the respondents' right to proceed afresh year-wise.

Ratio Decidendi: A composite show cause notice covering multiple assessment years is not sustainable where separate year-wise proceedings are required; such notice may be quashed with liberty to initiate fresh proceedings individually for each relevant year.

Issues: (i) Whether the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 applies to complaint proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, including proceedings against corporate accused; (ii) whether summons issued without the mandatory pre-cognizance notice and supply of complaint under Section 227(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are liable to be set aside.

Issue (i): Whether the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 applies to complaint proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, including proceedings against corporate accused.

Analysis: The pre-cognizance opportunity of hearing mandated by the first proviso to Section 223(1) applies to complaint proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002. The protection is not confined to natural persons and extends to corporate accused as well, since a company can be proceeded against along with its officers and persons in charge under Section 70 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002. The statutory safeguard is necessary where cognizance is taken and process is issued in a complaint case.

Conclusion: The first proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 applies to PMLA complaint proceedings and to corporate accused.

Issue (ii): Whether summons issued without the mandatory pre-cognizance notice and supply of complaint under Section 227(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 are liable to be set aside.

Analysis: The mandatory notice contemplated by the first proviso to Section 223(1) was not complied with, and the complaint copies required under Section 227(3) were also not furnished. Since these procedural requirements are mandatory before cognizance and issuance of process, their breach vitiates the proceedings and renders the summons unsustainable in law.

Conclusion: The impugned summons were liable to be set aside for non-compliance with the mandatory statutory procedure.

Final Conclusion: The summons were quashed and the matter was left open for reconsideration by the trial court after affording the petitioners an opportunity of being heard in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: In complaint proceedings under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, the pre-cognizance hearing mandated by the first proviso to Section 223(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 is mandatory and applies equally to corporate accused; failure to comply vitiates the proceedings.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the adjudication order and Form DRC-07 for the relevant financial year was to be allowed on the same terms as an earlier petition involving identical facts.

Analysis: The petition was treated as covered by the decision rendered the same day in a case involving identical facts. The relief granted there was adopted for the present matter, with the petitioner's liability to stand satisfied upon payment of the disputed demand together with interest and 15% penalty computed in terms of Section 74(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, within the stipulated period.

Conclusion: The petition was allowed on the same terms as the connected identical matter, subject to compliance with the payment condition.

Issues: Whether the complaint proceedings and summoning order could be quashed where the dispute arising from dishonour of cheque did not disclose the applicant's prima facie involvement in the alleged offences.

Analysis: The complaint and the statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 showed that the grievance was essentially confined to dishonour of a cheque. The materials did not indicate that the applicant was involved in the alleged transaction in the manner alleged, and the complaint itself referred to another person as the bank manager at the relevant time. In such circumstances, the invocation of criminal process was held to be unwarranted, especially when the grievance, if any, lay in the realm of cheque dishonour.

Conclusion: The proceedings were liable to be quashed against the applicant and the summoning order could not be sustained.

Final Conclusion: The criminal proceedings and the summoning order were set aside against the applicant for want of prima facie material and for amounting to an abuse of the process of law.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the complaint materials do not disclose the applicant's prima facie involvement and the dispute is essentially one of cheque dishonour, criminal proceedings may be quashed as an abuse of process.

Issues: (i) Whether the gross profit rate adopted after rejection of books of account required reduction from 4% to 3.13%. (ii) Whether any further ad hoc disallowance could be sustained after estimation of income on rejection of books.

Issue (i): Whether the gross profit rate adopted after rejection of books of account required reduction from 4% to 3.13%.

Analysis: The assessee produced comparative material showing that in a similar liquor trading case for the same assessment year, the Department had accepted a gross profit rate of 3.13%. No distinguishing feature was brought on record to justify adoption of a higher rate in the assessee's case. In the absence of rebuttal, parity with the comparable case was treated as the proper basis for estimation.

Conclusion: The gross profit rate was directed to be reduced to 3.13%, and the addition based on estimation was to be recomputed accordingly, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether any further ad hoc disallowance could be sustained after estimation of income on rejection of books.

Analysis: Once the books were rejected and income was estimated by applying a gross profit rate, separate addition on the basis of further disallowance from the profit and loss account was held impermissible. After such estimation, no further addition could be made merely from the same trading results.

Conclusion: The ad hoc disallowance of Rs. 1 lakh was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded on both substantive issues, with the estimated trading addition reduced and the further disallowance deleted, resulting in only a partial allowance of the appeal for statistical purposes.

Ratio Decidendi: After rejection of books of account and estimation of business income, a further separate disallowance from the same trading account is not sustainable, and an estimated gross profit rate should be applied consistently with comparable cases absent distinguishing facts.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 was valid when the reassessment was initiated after expiry of three years from the end of the assessment year but approval was obtained from the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax instead of the authority contemplated under section 151(ii).

Analysis: The reassessment notice was issued beyond three years from the end of the relevant assessment year, attracting section 151(ii). The authority competent to grant sanction in such a case is the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner, and not the Principal Commissioner. Since the notice was issued on the basis of approval from an incompetent authority, the statutory condition precedent for valid initiation of reassessment was not satisfied. The defect went to the root of jurisdiction and rendered the notice invalid. The assessment framed in consequence of such notice could not survive.

Conclusion: The notice under section 148 was invalid for want of proper sanction under section 151(ii), and the assessment order passed pursuant thereto was quashed in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the writ appeal was maintainable despite the availability of an alternative statutory remedy, and whether the alleged absence of prior notice under Section 142(1)(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 could be examined in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: The challenge rested on the contention that no statutory notice had been issued before the show cause notice and that the impugned order was therefore null and void. The Court held that the existence or non-existence of such prior notice was itself a factual dispute. In view of the settled limits on the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, such disputed factual questions were not fit for adjudication in writ proceedings, particularly when an efficacious statutory remedy was available.

Conclusion: The Court found no error in the refusal to entertain the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy and held that the writ appeal was liable to be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the validity of an impugned action turns on a disputed factual question and an effective statutory remedy exists, writ jurisdiction will ordinarily not be invoked.

Issues: (i) Whether the petition to quash the criminal complaint and summoning order was maintainable despite earlier petitions having been withdrawn, and (ii) whether the criminal complaint under Sections 9 and 9AA of the Central Excise Act, 1944 could survive after the appellate tribunal set aside the duty demand on merits.

Issue (i): Whether the petition to quash the criminal complaint and summoning order was maintainable despite earlier petitions having been withdrawn.

Analysis: The earlier petitions were dismissed as withdrawn and not on merits. No adjudication was rendered on the controversy at that stage. The appellate tribunal's later decision on merits materially changed the factual and legal position and gave rise to a fresh cause of action.

Conclusion: The petition was maintainable and was not barred by the earlier withdrawals.

Issue (ii): Whether the criminal complaint under Sections 9 and 9AA of the Central Excise Act, 1944 could survive after the appellate tribunal set aside the duty demand on merits.

Analysis: The tribunal held that there was no contravention of Rule 8(3A) of the Central Excise Rules, 2001 and set aside the demand, noting that the disputed amount with interest had already been deposited before the show cause notice. Once the foundational demand was annulled on merits, the basis of the prosecution ceased to exist and continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of process of law.

Conclusion: The criminal complaint and summoning order were liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The prosecution could not be sustained after the competent appellate forum negatived the very basis of the demand on merits, and the criminal proceedings were quashed.

Ratio Decidendi: When the competent adjudicatory authority sets aside the underlying demand on merits and finds no statutory contravention, the very substratum of a related criminal prosecution disappears, justifying quashing of the proceedings to prevent abuse of process.

Issues: Whether the writ petition was maintainable in Kerala High Court on the ground that part of the cause of action arose within the State, and whether the impugned insolvency proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal, Delhi, could be challenged in writ jurisdiction.

Analysis: Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India permits invocation of writ jurisdiction where a part of the cause of action arises within the State. The credit facility had been obtained in Kerala, but the insolvency process was initiated under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 before the National Company Law Tribunal having territorial jurisdiction over the place where the corporate debtor's registered office was located. As the registered office of the corporate debtor was at New Delhi and the proceedings were founded on the statutory scheme of Sections 95 and 60 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the mere fact that the loan transaction had a Kerala connection did not confer territorial jurisdiction on the Kerala High Court.

Conclusion: The writ petition was held to be not maintainable before the Kerala High Court and was dismissed.

Issues: (i) Whether the transfer pricing search process was vitiated by applying the R&D filter only after selection of the initial set of comparables. (ii) Whether comparables having significantly higher turnover than the tested party were liable to be excluded, and whether an upper turnover filter of 10 times the assessee's turnover should be applied.

Issue (i): Whether the transfer pricing search process was vitiated by applying the R&D filter only after selection of the initial set of comparables.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that once the search process had been completed and 24 comparables identified, a fresh filter could not be introduced at the later stage to alter the final set of comparables. A filter intended to be applied for comparability must form part of the initial search criteria itself; otherwise the exercise becomes inconsistent and the comparability analysis is undermined. The principle against selective application of filters after completion of the search process was accepted.

Conclusion: The later application of the R&D filter was not upheld as a valid method of comparability selection.

Issue (ii): Whether comparables having significantly higher turnover than the tested party were liable to be excluded, and whether an upper turnover filter of 10 times the assessee's turnover should be applied.

Analysis: The Tribunal treated turnover as a relevant comparability factor under the transactional net margin method because scale, market position, economies of scale, assets and risks materially affect margins. It held that companies with substantially higher turnover could not be compared on a like-to-like basis with a much smaller captive service provider. On the facts, the selected comparables had turnovers far exceeding the assessee's turnover of about Rs. 114.15 crores. The Tribunal therefore directed exclusion of the very large comparables and accepted the application of an upper turnover filter of 10 times the assessee's turnover for recomputation.

Conclusion: The higher-turnover comparables were directed to be excluded and the turnover filter plea was accepted in substance.

Final Conclusion: The transfer pricing adjustment was required to be recomputed after excluding the identified high-turnover comparables, resulting in partial relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Filters in transfer pricing comparability must be applied at the proper stage of the search process, and entities with materially different scale of operations and turnover are not reliable comparables under the transactional net margin method.

Issues: (i) Whether disallowance under section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 was sustainable in the absence of exempt income and whether the amendment to section 14A was retrospective; (ii) Whether the write-off of security deposits and waiver of interest receivable on advances was allowable as a business loss or revenue expenditure; (iii) Whether notional interest could be added on interest-free advances given to subsidiary companies; (iv) Whether the amount written off in respect of fixed assets was deductible despite the block of assets continuing to exist; (v) Whether the gratuity-related disallowance required verification.

Issue (i): Whether disallowance under section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 was sustainable in the absence of exempt income and whether the amendment to section 14A was retrospective.

Analysis: The assessee had not earned any exempt income during the year and no fresh investments were made in the relevant year. The binding jurisdictional precedent was treated as holding that where no exempt income is earned, no disallowance can be made under section 14A. The amendment made by the Finance Act, 2022 was treated as prospective and not applicable to the year under appeal.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 14A was rightly deleted and the Revenue's challenge failed.

Issue (ii): Whether the write-off of security deposits and waiver of interest receivable on advances was allowable as a business loss or revenue expenditure.

Analysis: The security deposits were given in the ordinary course of business for leased premises and had become irrecoverable. The interest component arose on advances connected with the business and its waiver was treated as a business-related outgoing. The reasoning proceeded on the footing that a claim incorrectly made as bad debt may still be examined for allowability as business expenditure where the underlying loss is revenue in character and incurred in the course of business.

Conclusion: The write-off was allowable and the Revenue's ground on this issue was rejected.

Issue (iii): Whether notional interest could be added on interest-free advances given to subsidiary companies.

Analysis: The addition was based on a hypothetical interest computation without invoking the specific statutory provision governing interest disallowance. The Tribunal held that only real income can be taxed and hypothetical income cannot be brought to tax in the absence of a proper statutory basis.

Conclusion: The addition of notional interest was deleted and the Revenue's ground failed.

Issue (iv): Whether the amount written off in respect of fixed assets was deductible despite the block of assets continuing to exist.

Analysis: The assets concerned formed part of an existing block of assets on which depreciation had already been claimed. Allowing a separate deduction for the write-off would amount to a double deduction, which was not permissible.

Conclusion: The disallowance was sustained and the assessee's cross-objection on this issue failed.

Issue (v): Whether the gratuity-related disallowance required verification.

Analysis: The assessee contended that the amount was received on closure of the gratuity trust and was not a fresh provision. The matter required factual verification from the books and balance sheet entries.

Conclusion: The issue was restored to the Assessing Officer for verification and was allowed for statistical purposes.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue's appeal was dismissed. The assessee succeeded on the principal additions relating to section 14A, write-off of irrecoverable business balances, and notional interest, while failing on the fixed-assets write-off and obtaining only statistical relief on the gratuity issue.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of exempt income, no disallowance under section 14A can be made, an amendment altering that position is prospective unless clearly stated otherwise, and hypothetical income cannot be taxed without a specific statutory basis.

Issues: Whether the delay of 166 days in re-filing the appeal deserved condonation.

Analysis: The appeal had been filed within limitation, but the defects were not cured within the time prescribed under the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. The explanation offered for the re-filing delay was the non-availability of typed pages and the appellant company's authorised representative undergoing treatment. The Court found that no cause, much less sufficient cause, had been shown to justify the delay.

Conclusion: The application for condonation of re-filing delay was rejected, and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues: Whether issuance of Form DRC-01A before issuance of a show cause notice under Form DRC-01 was mandatory, and whether an assessee could claim the benefit of payment of tax with interest and reduced penalty under Section 74(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 up to the stage of filing reply to the show cause notice.

Analysis: The statutory scheme under Section 74(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was held to confer a substantive right on the noticee to settle the proposed demand before formal adjudication by paying tax with interest and 15% penalty. Rule 142(1A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 was read as ancillary to that scheme and, after amendment, the use of the word "may" in the rule was not treated as making the requirement optional in a manner inconsistent with the parent Act. The Court held that delegated legislation cannot be construed to defeat the mandatory effect of the principal statute, and that the right under Section 74(5) continues until the noticee files a reply to the show cause notice, unless the right is waived by contesting liability without invoking it.

Conclusion: Issuance of DRC-01A was mandatory in the statutory scheme, and the petitioner was entitled to claim the benefit of Section 74(5) up to the stage of reply to the show cause notice. The petitioner succeeded to that extent, and the adjudication was directed to stand satisfied on payment of the disputed demand, interest, and 15% penalty within the stipulated time.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to bail in a prosecution under Section 132 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The applicant was in custody since 15.03.2026, the investigation had been completed and the complaint had been filed. The alleged offence carried a maximum punishment of five years and was triable by a Magistrate. The record did not disclose criminal antecedents, and no material was shown to indicate likelihood of absconding, tampering with evidence, intimidating witnesses, or obstructing the trial. The Court applied the settled principles that bail is the rule and jail is the exception, and that pre-trial detention is not punitive, particularly where the prosecution case is substantially documentary and the trial was unlikely to conclude within a reasonable time.

Conclusion: The applicant was held entitled to bail and the bail application was allowed.

Issues: (i) whether the writ petition was maintainable in view of the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) whether the case fell within any exception permitting writ interference against the show cause notice and the Order-in-Original.

Issue (i): whether the writ petition was maintainable in view of the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

Analysis: The dispute arose out of proceedings under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The Order-in-Original had been passed after service of notice and participation by the petitioner in the adjudication process. In such circumstances, the Court treated the appellate remedy under Section 107 as efficacious and ordinarily sufficient, and declined to entertain the writ petition in exercise of writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The writ petition was held to be not maintainable in view of the alternative statutory remedy, and the petitioner was left to pursue an appeal under Section 107.

Issue (ii): whether the case fell within any exception permitting writ interference against the show cause notice and the Order-in-Original

Analysis: The Court found no breach of natural justice because the show cause notice had been served, objections were raised by the petitioner in adjudication, and a speaking and reasoned order was passed thereafter. The Court also held that the existence of a jurisdictional objection did not justify bypassing the appellate remedy on the facts of the case, particularly when the challenge was to proceedings under Section 74 and the objections had already been dealt with by the adjudicating authority.

Conclusion: No exceptional ground for writ interference was made out.

Final Conclusion: The writ court declined to enter into the merits of the tax demand proceedings and directed the petitioner to work out its remedy in appeal, resulting in dismissal of the petition.

Ratio Decidendi: Where an effective statutory appeal is available under the GST law and no violation of natural justice or other exceptional ground is shown, writ jurisdiction should not be invoked to challenge a notice or adjudication order.

Issues: Whether the penalties imposed under Section 112(a) and Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable in the absence of admissible corroborative evidence, particularly where the principal statement relied upon was not tested through cross-examination under Section 138B of the Customs Act, 1962, and whether the alleged association and alleged recovery from the premises of a third party established conscious involvement of the appellant in the smuggling activity.

Analysis: The foundation of the penalty was the untested statement of a witness and an alleged recovery of a bag said to connect the appellant with smugglers. The statement was not relied upon by the adjudicating authority, the witness was not produced for cross-examination, and no reliable seizure record substantiated the alleged recovery of the bag. No independent material established the appellant's role in improper importation, concealment, removal, or dealing with goods liable to confiscation. The legal ingredients for penalty under Section 112(a) and Section 112(b) require proof of an act or omission rendering goods liable to confiscation, or conscious dealing with such goods with knowledge or reason to believe that they were liable to confiscation. Mere acquaintance or suspicion was insufficient, and penal liability could not rest on conjecture or unverified allegations.

Conclusion: The penalties were not sustainable and were set aside for want of cogent, admissible, and corroborative evidence establishing the appellant's conscious involvement.

Issues: (i) Whether the seizure of the gold jewellery and silver granules was based on a reasonable belief that the goods were smuggled, as required under Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) whether the burden of proof under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 shifted to the respondents in the absence of conclusive evidence of foreign origin; (iii) whether the documents produced by the respondents evidenced licit purchase of the goods from domestic sources; (iv) whether confiscation of the seized gold and silver granules under Sections 111(b) and 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 was legally justified; and (v) whether the penalties imposed under Section 112(a) and Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the seizure of the gold jewellery and silver granules was based on a reasonable belief that the goods were smuggled, as required under Section 110(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The seizure arose from a town interception, not from a customs area or border situation. The goods bore no foreign markings, the intelligence was held to be vague, and the respondents had produced contemporaneous documents showing domestic movement for job work. In the absence of cogent material establishing foreign origin or unlawful import, mere purity levels or assumptions could not sustain the statutory belief required for seizure.

Conclusion: The seizure was not founded on the requisite reasonable belief and was therefore unsustainable.

Issue (ii): Whether the burden of proof under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 shifted to the respondents in the absence of conclusive evidence of foreign origin.

Analysis: Section 123 applies only where goods are seized in reasonable belief that they are smuggled goods. Since the Department failed to establish foreign origin or credible circumstances indicating smuggling, the foundational requirement for shifting the burden was not satisfied. The town seizure character, absence of foreign markings, and lack of independent corroboration meant the presumption under Section 123 could not be invoked against the respondents.

Conclusion: The burden under Section 123 did not shift to the respondents.

Issue (iii): Whether the documents produced by the respondents evidenced licit purchase of the goods from domestic sources.

Analysis: Manufacturing receipt vouchers and GST invoices were produced at the investigative stage and were found to support the claimed domestic procurement and job-work movement. The Department did not establish that these documents were false or fabricated, and the silver granules were also accounted for in the books. The documentary record therefore supported lawful domestic sourcing.

Conclusion: The documents evidenced licit purchase of the gold and silver granules from domestic sources.

Issue (iv): Whether confiscation of the seized gold and silver granules under Sections 111(b) and 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962 was legally justified.

Analysis: Confiscation under Sections 111(b) and 111(d) required proof that the goods were of foreign origin and smuggled into India. That foundational proof was absent. The goods were intercepted within India, the Department could not prove the route of illegal import, and the respondents' documentary evidence remained unrebutted. On these facts, confiscation was not sustainable.

Conclusion: The confiscation was not legally justified.

Issue (v): Whether the penalties imposed under Section 112(a) and Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 112 required conduct rendering goods liable to confiscation or knowledge/reason to believe that the goods were so liable. Once confiscation itself failed, and the respondents had documentary support for lawful domestic procurement, the requisite culpable basis for penalty was absent. The composite penalties were therefore unsustainable.

Conclusion: The penalties were not sustainable.

Final Conclusion: The order of the lower appellate authority was affirmed, the confiscation and penalties remained set aside, and the Revenue's challenge failed in entirety.

Ratio Decidendi: In a town seizure of gold or similar goods, the Department must first establish foreign origin and a reasonable belief of smuggling on cogent material before invoking the presumption under Section 123 or sustaining confiscation and penalty.

Issues: Whether the order permitting withdrawal of the corporate insolvency resolution process under section 12A, at the stage before constitution of the committee of creditors and on the application moved through the interim resolution professional under regulation 30A, was liable to be interfered with for want of notice or hearing to another alleged operational creditor.

Analysis: The settlement between the corporate debtor and the operational creditor had already been recorded, the Form-FA request for withdrawal was received before any public announcement was made, no committee of creditors had been constituted, and the interim resolution professional moved the withdrawal application within the prescribed time under regulation 30A(1)(a) and (3). The legal framework recognised in the binding precedents relied upon permits withdrawal before constitution of the committee through the interim resolution professional, and the requirement of approval by the committee of creditors arises only after its constitution. The appellant had filed no objection before the adjudicating authority, and the relied-upon decisions concerning objections by participating creditors on proved claims or cases where the withdrawal procedure was not followed were held to be distinguishable.

Conclusion: The withdrawal of the insolvency proceedings was held to be in accordance with section 12A read with regulation 30A, and no infirmity was found in the impugned order.

Outcome: The special leave petition was dismissed as barred by delay, as the explanation for condonation was found unsatisfactory.