Issues: (i) Whether proceedings under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were barred because the State GST authorities had closed proceedings under Section 73 of the same Act on similar documents and evidence; (ii) whether the writ petition was maintainable in view of the alternate statutory appellate remedy and the availability of reappreciation of evidence before the appellate authority.

Issue (i): Whether proceedings under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were barred because the State GST authorities had closed proceedings under Section 73 of the same Act on similar documents and evidence.

Analysis: Sections 73 and 74 operate in different fields and are based on different considerations. Exoneration in proceedings under Section 73, by itself, does not preclude separate action by the Central GST authorities under Section 74. The material placed by the petitioner in response to the show-cause notice was independently open to scrutiny and appreciation by the competent authority.

Conclusion: The challenge based on bar of proceedings failed and the proceedings under Section 74 were not held to be invalid on that ground.

Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition was maintainable in view of the alternate statutory appellate remedy and the availability of reappreciation of evidence before the appellate authority.

Analysis: The grievance regarding appreciation of evidence, alleged insufficiency of opportunity to produce additional material, and the burden of statutory pre-deposit were all matters capable of examination by the appellate authority. The Court found no reason to exercise writ jurisdiction where the statute provided an efficacious appeal.

Conclusion: The petition was not entertained and the petitioner was relegated to the statutory appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: The Court declined writ interference, upheld the availability of the statutory appeal, and left the merits of the assessment dispute to be examined in appeal.

Issues: Whether the applicant was entitled to interim pre-arrest bail in connection with summons issued under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and the conditions governing such protection.

Analysis: The application was moved apprehending arrest pursuant to summons issued under Section 70 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The applicant expressed willingness to appear before the investigating authority and cooperate with the inquiry, and the respondent did not seriously oppose interim protection so long as the applicant appeared and assisted the investigation. The Court therefore directed the applicant to appear before the Investigating Officer within ten days and cooperate fully, while also protecting him from immediate arrest by granting interim pre-arrest bail subject to specified conditions and automatic vacation upon non-compliance.

Conclusion: Interim pre-arrest bail was granted, subject to appearance before the Investigating Officer, cooperation with the investigation, and compliance with the stated conditions.

Final Conclusion: The bail application was disposed of by extending temporary protection from arrest while requiring the applicant to join the investigation and abide by the imposed safeguards.

Ratio Decidendi: Interim pre-arrest bail may be granted in a summons-driven investigation where the applicant undertakes cooperation and the Court imposes enforceable conditions to secure the inquiry.

Outcome: Delay was condoned, the petitions were disposed of in terms of the Court's earlier orders, and the matters were remitted to the High Court for decision accordingly.

Issues: Whether the per diem amount received by a non-resident assessee during employment in the United Kingdom was taxable in India or exempt under Article 16(1) of the India-UK Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement read with section 90 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the addition made on that account was sustainable.

Analysis: The assessee was held to be a non-resident for the relevant assessment year and had produced the assignment agreement, passport travel details and UK tax residency certificate. The dispute was confined to the per diem amount of Rs. 16,17,724. Under Article 16(1) of the treaty, salary and similar remuneration derived in respect of employment exercised in the other contracting state may be taxed in that state. On the facts recorded, the per diem payment was linked to the UK assignment and, if taxable at all, fell within UK taxing rights. The balance salary was offered to tax in India, and the revenue's contrary inference that the full amount had not been duly offered to tax was not accepted.

Conclusion: The per diem amount was held not taxable in India, and the addition of Rs. 17,25,932 was deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether the transfer pricing adjustment for the ITES and software development segments, including the comparables and filters adopted, was sustainable. (ii) Whether the notional interest adjustment on outstanding receivables from associated enterprises was sustainable. (iii) Whether the arm's length value of the imported fixed assets could be taken as nil and the related adjustment sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the transfer pricing adjustment for the ITES and software development segments, including the comparables and filters adopted, was sustainable.

Analysis: The dispute for the year was identical to the assessee's earlier years, where the Tribunal had already directed adoption of the accepted margin for the ITES segment and had accepted the assessee's challenge to the fresh comparability exercise. The present year followed the same factual pattern, and the Tribunal treated the earlier findings as fully applicable. The resulting adjustment on the main transfer pricing segment could not therefore be sustained.

Conclusion: Decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the notional interest adjustment on outstanding receivables from associated enterprises was sustainable.

Analysis: The receivables issue was also covered by the Tribunal's earlier orders. The adjustment had been restricted in the prior year by applying the rate accepted in the MAP resolution to receivables outstanding beyond the stipulated credit period, and the same approach was held applicable here. The notional interest addition was therefore not maintainable in the manner made by the tax authorities.

Conclusion: Decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the arm's length value of the imported fixed assets could be taken as nil and the related adjustment sustained.

Analysis: On the fixed assets issue, the Tribunal followed its earlier view that the imported assets could not be valued at nil when the customs authorities had assigned a value through a recognised valuation process. The assessee's evidence was accepted, and the nil valuation adopted for transfer pricing purposes was rejected.

Conclusion: Decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal applied its earlier decisions to all disputed transfer pricing adjustments and deleted the additions, resulting in complete relief to the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the facts and issues are identical to earlier years, the Tribunal may follow its prior binding approach on transfer pricing, receivables, and asset valuation, and a nil arm's length value cannot be adopted for imported assets where a credible customs valuation exists.

Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 126 days in filing the appeal before the first appellate authority deserved condonation. (ii) Whether the assessee, a co-operative credit society dealing only with members, was entitled to deduction under section 80P, including on interest income earned from deposits with banks and co-operative institutions.

Issue (i): Whether the delay of 126 days in filing the appeal before the first appellate authority deserved condonation.

Analysis: The explanation for delay was that the assessee's authorised representative handling tax compliance had left the job and time was taken to collect and organise the records for appeal. The delay was found to be bona fide and unintentional, and the explanation was treated as sufficient cause.

Conclusion: The delay ought to have been condoned and the refusal to condone it was not sustained.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessee, a co-operative credit society dealing only with members, was entitled to deduction under section 80P, including on interest income earned from deposits with banks and co-operative institutions.

Analysis: Section 80P was applied as a benevolent provision meant to encourage the co-operative sector and to be read liberally in favour of the assessee. The assessee was found to be engaged in providing credit facilities only to its members, with no material showing dealings with non-members. On that footing, the activity fell within section 80P(2)(a)(i). The interest income was also treated as attributable to the business of the society. The contrary reliance on decisions dealing with different statutory settings or with section 80P(2)(d) was held to be misplaced.

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i), including on the interest income in question.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals succeeded, the delay was excused, and the assessee was held entitled to the claimed deduction under section 80P.

Ratio Decidendi: A co-operative credit society that provides credit facilities only to its members is entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i), and the provision must be construed liberally so as to cover profits attributable to that business, including related interest income, unless dealings with non-members are shown.

Issues: (i) whether the admitted loan liability and the material on record established default so as to sustain admission of the application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) whether settlement talks, partial payments, and proposed restructuring negated the existence of default or furnished a ground to interfere with admission against the corporate guarantor.

Issue (i): Whether the admitted loan liability and the material on record established default so as to sustain admission of the application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The loan disbursement was not in dispute. The record showed repeated acknowledgements of liability, withdrawal of an earlier petition on the basis of a settlement arrangement, revival of the Section 7 proceedings when the settlement failed, and further attempts before the High Court and the Tribunal to defer adjudication on the basis of prospective repayment plans. The corporate debtor's own pleadings and conduct reflected continuing liability and non-payment of the outstanding dues. Counterclaims and demands for reconciliation did not displace the existence of a default for the purpose of admission under Section 7.

Conclusion: The default was proved and admission of the Section 7 application against the corporate debtor was upheld.

Issue (ii): Whether settlement talks, partial payments, and proposed restructuring negated the existence of default or furnished a ground to interfere with admission against the corporate guarantor.

Analysis: The attempts at settlement and the payments made were treated as evidence that the debt remained unpaid rather than as a defence extinguishing default. The proposed restructuring and partial deposits did not alter the core position that the debt had crystallised and remained in default. Since default by the principal borrower was established and recall notice had also been issued against the corporate guarantor, there was no ground to interfere with the admission order against the guarantor.

Conclusion: No ground existed to set aside admission of insolvency proceedings against the corporate guarantor.

Final Conclusion: Both appeals were rejected and the insolvency admissions against the corporate debtor and the corporate guarantor were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: For admission under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the Tribunal must be satisfied about financial debt and default, and settlement negotiations, partial payments, or unadjudicated counterclaims do not by themselves negate a proved default.

Issues: (i) whether the loan recall notice issued on 09.03.2020 was valid and could found default under the loan agreements; (ii) whether a Section 7 application under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 could be maintained on the basis of the loan recall default and the arbitral award even though the award was under challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and execution proceedings were also pending; and (iii) whether the Section 7 application was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the loan recall notice issued on 09.03.2020 was valid and could found default under the loan agreements.

Analysis: The loan agreements permitted recall on the lender forming the opinion that an event had occurred causing a material adverse effect on the obligors' ability to perform. The notice was issued after the arrest of one of the personal guarantors and referred to the contractual clauses authorising recall and enforcement. The default alleged was non-payment of the recalled amount within the stipulated period, and the applications were founded on that contractual default, not on any extraneous basis.

Conclusion: The loan recall notice was held to be valid and the default arising from non-payment after recall was upheld in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether a Section 7 application under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 could be maintained on the basis of the loan recall default and the arbitral award even though the award was under challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and execution proceedings were also pending.

Analysis: The inquiry under Section 7 is confined to the existence of debt and default. The application was not treated as one filed merely to execute the award, because the pleaded foundation included the continuing default following the loan recall notice. The pendency of the Section 34 challenge did not extinguish the default, and the existence of execution proceedings did not bar recourse to the insolvency remedy. The challenge to the award also did not prevent reliance on the default already committed under the recall notice.

Conclusion: The Section 7 applications were held maintainable and the objection based on pendency of the Section 34 proceedings and execution proceedings was rejected in favour of the respondent.

Issue (iii): Whether the Section 7 application was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The arbitral award furnished a fresh cause of action for recovery and the Section 7 application was filed within three years thereafter. The default was also continuing and had not been cured by payment.

Conclusion: The limitation objection was rejected in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: No ground was found to interfere with the admission of the Section 7 applications, as debt and default were established and the corporate debtor had remained in default for years; the appeals were therefore dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: In a Section 7 proceeding, the adjudicating authority's inquiry is limited to the existence of debt and default, and a continuing contractual default or a fresh cause of action arising from an award or decree does not cease to be actionable merely because related challenge or execution proceedings are pending.

Issues: Whether the order appointing the Resolution Professional in proceedings under Section 95 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 could be sustained when the record did not disclose any deed of guarantee or invocation of guarantee and the application was found to have proceeded on incorrect jurisdictional facts.

Analysis: The Appellant was described in the loan and assignment records as a co-borrower, while the relevant assignment documents recorded that there were no guarantors. The demand notice and the application under Section 95 did not disclose any deed of guarantee or notice invoking a guarantee. The subsequent rectification proceedings before the Adjudicating Authority also recorded dissatisfaction with the manner in which the matter had been represented and acknowledged that incorrect facts had been placed before it. Since the deed of guarantee and its invocation were foundational to the initiation of proceedings against a personal guarantor, the findings recorded by the Adjudicating Authority were held to have been vitiated by misrepresentation of material jurisdictional facts.

Conclusion: The impugned order appointing the Resolution Professional was unsustainable and was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: Proceedings initiated against a person as a personal guarantor under Part III of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code cannot be sustained where the foundational documents of guarantee and its invocation are absent and the jurisdictional basis is established to have been misrepresented.

Issues: (i) whether, after commencement of CIRP, the Resolution Professional could seek eviction of persons occupying the corporate debtor's premises; (ii) whether an unregistered MoU and arbitral award could confer a continuing right to occupy the hotel premises; and (iii) whether the appellant, against whom no separate notice was issued, could resist eviction.

Issue (i): whether, after commencement of CIRP, the Resolution Professional could seek eviction of persons occupying the corporate debtor's premises.

Analysis: The corporate debtor's hotel premises were undisputedly its assets. Once CIRP commenced, the Resolution Professional was required to take control and custody of assets over which the corporate debtor had ownership rights. Persons in possession through the suspended management or their family members could not claim priority over other stakeholders, and any alleged dues could only be pursued through the CIRP claims process.

Conclusion: The Resolution Professional was entitled to seek possession and eviction, and the occupants had no right to continue in possession.

Issue (ii): whether an unregistered MoU and arbitral award could confer a continuing right to occupy the hotel premises.

Analysis: The claimed occupancy right rested on an unregistered and unstamped MoU, coupled with an arbitral award that was not reflected in the corporate debtor's records, annual reports, or financial statements. The arrangement also bore the character of a related party transaction requiring disclosure. Even assuming some monetary claim existed, that would not translate into a right to retain possession of the corporate debtor's immovable property; at best, a claim could be lodged in CIRP.

Conclusion: The MoU and arbitral award did not create any enforceable right of occupation in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): whether the appellant, against whom no separate notice was issued, could resist eviction.

Analysis: The eviction prayer expressly covered the suspended director along with family members, friends, relatives and acquaintances occupying the premises. The appellant claimed no independent right and relied only on the same alleged occupancy arrangement rejected in the first issue.

Conclusion: The appellant could not resist eviction on the ground of absence of separate notice.

Final Conclusion: The appeals failed, and the order directing vacation of the premises was sustained, with additional time granted for compliance.

Ratio Decidendi: After commencement of CIRP, occupants cannot retain possession of corporate debtor assets on the basis of an unregistered or undisclosed private arrangement; any monetary claim must be pursued in the insolvency process, not through continued occupation.

Issues: Whether the appellant could retain possession of the corporate debtor's hotel premises on the basis of unregistered profit-sharing agreements after commencement of CIRP, and whether the resolution professional was entitled to seek eviction and repossession before the Adjudicating Authority.

Analysis: The appellant's claim to occupy the salon, shops and rooms was founded on profit-sharing agreements, but those agreements were neither lease nor licence deeds and did not create any interest or occupancy right in immovable property. The Court noted that no consideration under those agreements was reflected in the corporate debtor's books or bank statements, the documents were unregistered and unstamped, and they surfaced only after the eviction application was filed. Once CIRP commenced, the resolution professional was obliged under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to take custody and control of the corporate debtor's assets and could move the Adjudicating Authority for recovery of premises in unauthorised occupation. The authorities relied on by the appellant were distinguished as involving subsisting lease or other legally protected possession rights, which were absent here.

Conclusion: The appellant had no legally enforceable right to continue in occupation of the corporate debtor's premises, and the application seeking vacation and handover of possession was maintainable and rightly allowed.

Final Conclusion: The impugned eviction order was upheld, and the appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: In CIRP, a resolution professional may recover possession of the corporate debtor's assets from an occupant who cannot show a valid lease, licence or other legally cognisable right; an unregistered profit-sharing arrangement does not confer occupancy rights in immovable property.

Issues: (i) Whether the appeal seeking recall of the order dated 03.10.2024 could be entertained when the earlier orders approving and enforcing the resolution plan had attained finality; (ii) Whether GNIDA could reopen the question of its claim as a secured operational creditor and the quantum payable under the approved resolution plan; (iii) Whether the appellant's repeated challenges were barred by res judicata and constructive res judicata.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal seeking recall of the order dated 03.10.2024 could be entertained when the earlier orders approving and enforcing the resolution plan had attained finality.

Analysis: The approval of the resolution plan had already been upheld or left undisturbed in earlier proceedings, and subsequent attempts to challenge the same directions were found to raise no new factual or legal basis. The Tribunal treated the earlier orders as having attained finality and found the present challenge to be a attempt to unsettle settled proceedings.

Conclusion: The appeal could not be entertained and failed on finality of the earlier orders.

Issue (ii): Whether GNIDA could reopen the question of its claim as a secured operational creditor and the quantum payable under the approved resolution plan.

Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the dispute regarding GNIDA's status and the amount payable had already been considered in the plan approval and in later proceedings. After approval under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the plan bound the parties, and no additional burden could be imposed on the successful resolution applicant outside the approved terms. The challenge to the amount payable was therefore not open in this appeal.

Conclusion: GNIDA could not reopen its secured creditor claim or seek a higher payout beyond the approved resolution plan.

Issue (iii): Whether the appellant's repeated challenges were barred by res judicata and constructive res judicata.

Analysis: The Tribunal held that the same issues had already been litigated in earlier appeals and had reached finality, including before the Supreme Court. Re-agitation of the same controversy was held to be barred by res judicata and constructive res judicata and was found to be impeding implementation of the resolution plan.

Conclusion: The present appeal was barred by res judicata and constructive res judicata.

Final Conclusion: The Tribunal declined to interfere with the enforcement of the approved resolution plan, dismissed the appeal, rejected the interlocutory application seeking conditional modification, and imposed costs on GNIDA for obstructing implementation.

Ratio Decidendi: Once a resolution plan attains finality, its terms bind the parties and cannot be reopened in collateral proceedings on issues already decided or capable of being raised earlier.

Issues: (i) whether the appellant had abandoned the e-auction process or remained a bona fide and serious bidder; (ii) whether the alleged non-availability of the pre-qualification link was attributable to a technical glitch in the auction platform; and (iii) whether the enhanced offer and deposited amount justified setting aside the concluded auction and directing a fresh e-auction with a revised reserve price.

Issue (i): whether the appellant had abandoned the e-auction process or remained a bona fide and serious bidder?

Analysis: The appellant had earlier participated in the sale process, uploaded documents, deposited the EMD and logged into the auction platform on multiple occasions. The communications from the liquidator referred to registration, upload of documents and EMD deposit, but did not clearly highlight the separate pre-qualification step. The appellant also contacted the BAANKNET support team before the auction closed, complaining that the pre-qualification link was unavailable.

Conclusion: The appellant was not treated as having abandoned the process and was found to have acted as a bona fide participant.

Issue (ii): whether the alleged non-availability of the pre-qualification link was attributable to a technical glitch in the auction platform?

Analysis: The tribunal noted that neither the liquidator nor the adjudicating authority had the technical means to conclusively rule out a platform defect. No affidavit or appearance was made by the auction platform operator to negate the complaint. The appellant's contemporaneous complaint and multiple login attempts supported its case, while the absence of a screenshot or log was held insufficient to dislodge the grievance.

Conclusion: The plea of technical difficulty was accepted and the adverse finding against the appellant on this aspect was set aside.

Issue (iii): whether the enhanced offer and deposited amount justified setting aside the concluded auction and directing a fresh e-auction with a revised reserve price?

Analysis: The appellant had offered a substantially higher amount and later deposited Rs. 54 crores. The tribunal distinguished authorities protecting concluded auctions, holding that those decisions did not bar interference where a genuine participant was excluded by process failure and the higher offer could materially advance value maximization. The liquidator's own stand before the High Court also supported a re-auction at the enhanced reserve price.

Conclusion: The concluded auction was set aside and a fresh e-auction was directed with a reserve price of Rs. 54 crores.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded, the impugned order was set aside, and the liquidation sale was ordered to be redone through a fresh competitive process open to eligible bidders, including the appellant, on a revised reserve price.

Ratio Decidendi: A concluded liquidation auction may be interfered with where a bona fide bidder is excluded because of a plausible platform-related failure, and a substantially higher offer already secured supports a fresh auction to further the statutory objective of value maximization.

Issues: Whether an appeal e-filed at 9.00 P.M. on the last day of the condonable period could be treated as filed on that day, and whether the delay of 15 days in filing the appeal was liable to be condoned.

Analysis: The limitation for filing an appeal under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 was considered alongside the NCLAT Rules, 2016, particularly Rule 22 governing presentation of appeals and Rules 103 and 104 enabling electronic filing and issuance of directions to meet procedural contingencies. The Tribunal also noticed its own order dated 24.12.2022 clarifying that limitation is computed from the date of e-filing, and declined to apply Delhi High Court E-filing Rules in the absence of any notification making them applicable to NCLAT. Relying on the settled meaning of the word "day" as a 24-hour period commencing at midnight, and on the principle that procedural rules cannot curtail the statutory period of limitation, the Tribunal held that the appeal filed at 9.00 P.M. on 30.03.2026 was within the permissible time. It further found the explanation offered for the delay sufficient.

Conclusion: The delay was liable to be condoned, and the application for condonation was allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: Where statute permits filing within a prescribed period with condonable delay, the term "day" denotes a full 24-hour period ending at midnight, and procedural filing rules cannot shorten the statutory limitation unless expressly applicable and authorised.

Issues: Whether the appellant established a clear and undisputed operational debt and default against the respondent so as to sustain a petition under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: The dispute turned on rival contemporaneous documents concerning freight payment for the 2019 voyage, including emails, declarations, invoices, remittances and settlement terms. The material showed a genuine controversy on whether freight attributable to the respondent's cargo had already been discharged through BST and Globechart, or whether any liability survived and was later recoverable by the appellant. The settlement between the appellant and the shipowner could not, by itself, conclusively fix the respondent's liability, especially when the respondent was not a party to that settlement and the underlying factual controversy remained unresolved. The asserted defence was supported by documents and was not sham or illusory, and deciding liability would require detailed evidentiary inquiry beyond the summary scope of Section 9.

Conclusion: The appellant failed to establish an undisputed operational debt and default, and the Section 9 application was not maintainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the record discloses a genuine pre-existing dispute requiring detailed factual investigation, insolvency proceedings under Section 9 cannot be used as a substitute for debt recovery.

Outcome: The matter was disposed of after settlement between the parties, the impugned order was set aside, and the review petitions stood disposed of.

Outcome: Delay condoned and the special leave petition was dismissed, with liberty to the petitioner to pursue the intra-court appeal remedy.

Issues: Whether the order under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were barred by limitation under the fifth and sixth provisos to Section 149.

Analysis: The notice under Section 148A(b) was issued on 28.03.2024 and the assessee was granted time to respond, but sought adjournments on 05.04.2024 and 15.04.2024. The request for adjournment was declined, and the date of 15.04.2024 was treated as the deemed date of filing reply. Once that date was taken as the relevant date, the Assessing Officer had seven days to pass the order under Section 148A(d) and issue notice under Section 148. The order and notice were issued on 16.04.2024, which was within the permissible period.

Conclusion: The reassessment action was within limitation and the challenge failed.