Issues: (i) Whether the Tribunal was justified in reducing the penalty under section 45(6) and deleting the penalty under section 45(4) and the composition fee under Rule 78. (ii) Whether interest was payable under section 47(4A)(a) and section 47(4A)(b) on delayed payment of tax and on the balance remaining after lump sum payment.

Issue (i): Whether the Tribunal was justified in reducing the penalty under section 45(6) and deleting the penalty under section 45(4) and the composition fee under Rule 78.

Analysis: The difference between tax payable and tax paid had to be computed on the basis of the actual tax paid by the assessee, not merely the tax shown in the return. The assessing authority had not given reasons for imposing penalty at 90%, and the Tribunal found that the assessee had paid the additional tax on receipt of subsidy. In the absence of any supporting discussion in the assessment orders, the Tribunal also deleted the penalty under section 45(4) and the composition fee under Rule 78.

Conclusion: The reduction of penalty to 10% and deletion of penalty under section 45(4) and composition fee under Rule 78 were upheld, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest was payable under section 47(4A)(a) and section 47(4A)(b) on delayed payment of tax and on the balance remaining after lump sum payment.

Analysis: Liability to interest arose for tax not paid within the prescribed time, and where lump sum payment still left a differential amount outstanding, interest continued to apply on the unpaid balance. The Tribunal declined to interfere with the levy of interest, and the Court found no reason to disturb that part of the order.

Conclusion: The levy of interest under section 47(4A)(a) and section 47(4A)(b) was upheld, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The penalty relief granted by the Tribunal was sustained, while the interest levy was also sustained, and both the tax appeals and the cross-objections stood dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi: For levy of penalty under the sales tax provisions, the actual tax paid must be considered, and a penalty order without reasons cannot justify retention of an excessive penalty; however, interest remains payable on tax not paid within the statutory time and on any unpaid balance after partial or lump sum payment.

Issues: Whether the delay of 496 days in filing the tax appeal should be condoned.

Analysis: The delay was explained through the chronology of events and subsequent affidavits showing that approval and processing were undertaken through different departments before the appeal could be filed. The appeal raised a substantive question on the applicable rate of tax on fungicides, pesticides, herbicides and weedicides, and refusing condonation would have deprived the applicant of an to seek consideration on merits. In the circumstances, the delay was not treated as intentional and substantial justice was held to justify condonation.

Conclusion: The delay of 496 days was condoned.

Issues: Whether the delay of 324 days in filing the appeal before the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal deserved condonation and, if so, whether the matter should be remitted for disposal on merits.

Analysis: The delay was explained on the basis of the petitioner's disinvestment and merger process, which was said to have affected timely filing of the appeal. The Court held that condonation of delay must turn on the facts of each case and that discretion should be exercised on the basis of sufficient cause. It emphasised that the judicial approach should favour substantial justice over technical dismissal, and that delay without negligence, mala fides, or deliberate inaction calls for a liberal and pragmatic view.

Conclusion: The explanation was accepted as sufficient, the delay of 324 days was condoned, and the appeal was ordered to be considered by the Tribunal on merits.

Issues: Whether the adjudicating authority could issue a second show cause notice and pass the impugned order after the earlier remand directions requiring adjudication on the first notice with personal hearing and consideration of the reply.

Analysis: The remand order had required the Assessing Officer to afford personal hearing and adjudicate the matter on the show cause notice already issued, after considering any reply filed by the petitioner. Instead, a second show cause notice was issued and the matter was adjudicated afresh, which was inconsistent with the earlier directions and amounted to overreaching the Court's order. The impugned adjudication therefore could not be sustained on that legal ground.

Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Assessing Officer to pass a fresh order on the basis of the first show cause notice after granting personal hearing and considering the reply, in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessee could, under Rule 27 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, support the impugned order on grounds decided against it without filing a separate appeal or cross-objection; (ii) whether disallowance of deduction under section 80IB(10)(f) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified on the basis of an untested third-party statement and the alleged allotment of flats to employees.

Issue (i): Whether the assessee could, under Rule 27 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, support the impugned order on grounds decided against it without filing a separate appeal or cross-objection.

Analysis: Rule 27 permits a respondent to support the order appealed against on any ground decided against it, even without filing an appeal or cross-objection. The assessee's additional plea that the alleged violation, if any, related to a later assessment year was a legal ground available to sustain the relief granted by the first appellate authority.

Conclusion: The Rule 27 application was held maintainable and was allowed.

Issue (ii): Whether disallowance of deduction under section 80IB(10)(f) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was justified on the basis of an untested third-party statement and the alleged allotment of flats to employees.

Analysis: Denial of a beneficial deduction requires the Revenue to prove violation of the statutory condition with cogent and reliable evidence. The assessment rested mainly on a statement recorded under section 132(4), but no independent corroborative material was brought on record to show that the flats were in substance allotted to the same individual through representatives. No effective cross-examination was granted despite reliance on the statement. The documentary evidence showed allotment to different purchasers in their own names, payments through their bank accounts, registered sale deeds, and subsequent taxation of capital gains in their hands. The alleged violation was also stated to pertain to a later year and could not justify disallowance in the year under appeal.

Conclusion: The disallowance under section 80IB(10)(f) was not justified and the relief granted by the first appellate authority was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The Revenue failed to establish a statutory violation warranting denial of deduction, and both appeals were rejected, leaving the assessee's deduction undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: A deduction under a beneficial provision cannot be denied on the basis of an uncorroborated third-party statement without cross-examination; the Revenue must prove the statutory violation by reliable evidence, and a later-year event cannot be used to disallow deduction for an earlier year absent statutory warrant.

Issues: (i) Whether delay in filing the statutory appeal under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 ought to be condoned where the mandatory pre-deposit was made and sufficient cause for delay was shown; (ii) whether garnishee or recovery proceedings could be sustained when the appeal had been filed and the pre-deposit stood satisfied.

Issue (i): Whether delay in filing the statutory appeal under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 ought to be condoned where the mandatory pre-deposit was made and sufficient cause for delay was shown.

Analysis: The petitioner demonstrated that the adjudication order had not been effectively communicated to the management and that the delay resulted from the failure of the accountant to inform the petitioner. The statutory pre-deposit under Section 107(6) had been paid, and the Court found that dismissal of the appeal only on limitation, without giving due weight to the explanation for delay and the compliance already made, would reduce the appellate remedy to a formality.

Conclusion: The delay was directed to be condoned, and the appellate authority was required to admit and hear the appeal on merits.

Issue (ii): Whether garnishee or recovery proceedings could be sustained when the appeal had been filed and the pre-deposit stood satisfied.

Analysis: The Court treated the recovery action as inconsistent with the statutory scheme once the pre-deposit requirement had been satisfied and the appeal was to be entertained. It held that continuation of recovery in these circumstances was a hyper-technical approach that frustrated the appellate remedy.

Conclusion: The garnishee proceedings were not quashed, but they were directed to remain in force only until disposal of the appeal by the appellate authority.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded in substance, the appellate authority's dismissal order was set aside, the delay was condoned, and the appeal was restored for fresh decision on merits.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory pre-deposit has been made and sufficient cause is shown, the appellate remedy under the GST law should not be defeated by a purely technical view of limitation, and recovery measures should not be allowed to frustrate consideration of the appeal on merits.

Issues: (i) Whether denial of video-conference hearing before the appellate authority violated the principles of natural justice; (ii) whether rectification under section 154 could validly be invoked to tax amounts paid out of accumulated income to other charitable institutions; (iii) whether the payments made to the recipient institutions were hit by section 11(3)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and were taxable as income of the assessee; and (iv) whether consequential interest was chargeable.

Issue (i): Whether denial of video-conference hearing before the appellate authority violated the principles of natural justice.

Analysis: The appellate record showed issuance of notices and filing of detailed written submissions, which were considered by the appellate authority. No specific prejudice was demonstrated from the absence of a video-conference hearing. A procedural lapse, without prejudice, does not vitiate the proceedings.

Conclusion: The challenge on natural justice failed and was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether rectification under section 154 could validly be invoked to tax amounts paid out of accumulated income to other charitable institutions.

Analysis: The relevant facts were already available on the assessment record. The Court held that section 11(3)(d) applies on the basis of the source of funds and the status of the recipient institution, and that the provision leaves no room for treating such payments as outside rectification merely because they were described as project expenditure or implementing-agency payments. The omission to tax the amount constituted a mistake apparent from the record.

Conclusion: Invocation of section 154 was upheld and was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the payments made to the recipient institutions were hit by section 11(3)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and were taxable as income of the assessee.

Analysis: The Court interpreted the expression "paid or credited" in section 11(3)(d) as broad and unqualified. It held that accumulated income under section 11(2) cannot be routed to another registered charitable institution without attracting the deeming fiction, and that no exception exists merely because the recipient acted as an implementing agency, raised invoices, or used the amounts for identified projects. The statutory scheme treats such transfers as prohibited utilisation of accumulated income.

Conclusion: The addition under section 11(3)(d) was sustained and was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether consequential interest was chargeable.

Analysis: Interest under the relevant charging provisions was treated as mandatory and consequential, subject to recomputation while giving effect to the order.

Conclusion: The levy of consequential interest was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeals were rejected in their entirety, and the additions arising from the treatment of accumulated income paid to other charitable institutions were sustained along with consequential interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Accumulated income enjoyed under section 11(2) loses its exempt character when it is paid or credited to another charitable institution, and the deeming provision in section 11(3)(d) applies according to the statutory form of the transfer rather than the nomenclature or commercial character of the payment.

Issues: Whether denial of cross-examination of witnesses, despite a specific request, amounted to a violation of Regulation 17(4) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 and vitiated the proceedings.

Analysis: The notice relied upon the statement of a witness against the customs broker, and the broker had sought cross-examination during the inquiry. Regulation 17(4) confers a right to cross-examine persons whose statements form the basis of the proceedings, unless reasons are recorded for refusing such permission. As no opportunity to cross-examine the relied-upon witness was granted, the proceedings were held to be contrary to the mandatory procedure under the Regulations.

Conclusion: The breach of Regulation 17(4) was fatal, and the appeal by the Revenue was rejected.

Issues: Whether the Customs Broker had violated Regulations 10(d) and 10(e) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018, and whether the Tribunal's factual findings setting aside revocation of licence and forfeiture of security deposit gave rise to any substantial question of law.

Analysis: The Tribunal, as the final fact-finding authority, examined the record and concluded that the Revenue failed to establish breach of Regulation 10(d) or Regulation 10(e). It found no evidence that the Customs Broker had failed to advise the client to comply with the law or had participated in preventing proper examination of the goods, and also found no material showing that the importer had been advised by the Customs Broker to offer only partial examination. The High Court noted that the Revenue did not demonstrate that these factual findings were perverse, contrary to record, or based on omission of material evidence. In that situation, the Tribunal's factual conclusions could not be faulted.

Conclusion: No violation of Regulations 10(d) or 10(e) was established, and the appeal did not raise any substantial question of law.

Issues: Whether B-Traxim 2C Mn-220 is classifiable as a separate chemically defined organic compound under Tariff Item 2922 4990 of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, or as preparations of a kind used in animal feeding under Tariff Item 2309 9090.

Analysis: Classification was examined under Rule 1 of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the Import Tariff, read with Chapter Note 1(a) to Chapter 29 and Chapter Note 1 to Chapter 23 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The product did not satisfy the threshold for Chapter 29 because its technical description showed a variable amino-acid ligand structure, fluctuating molecular weight, and no single constant molecular composition or definitive structural diagram. Chapter 29 was therefore held inapplicable. The product was found to be designed, branded, regulated, and presented for use in animal nutrition, with datasheet indications that it is intended for use in premix and feed, which brought it within the scope of Heading 2309 as a feed preparation. The residual nature of Heading 2309 and the reliance on the product's objective characteristics and commercial identity supported this classification.

Conclusion: The subject goods are not classifiable under Tariff Item 2922 4990 and are classifiable under Tariff Item 2309 9090, in favour of Revenue.

Issues: (i) Whether the proceedings in a cheque dishonour prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 should be stayed on the ground of pendency of a civil appeal arising from the same transaction; (ii) Whether the complaint deserved to be quashed after long delay on the pleas relating to marking of documents, financial capacity, and liability.

Issue (i): Whether the proceedings in a cheque dishonour prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 should be stayed on the ground of pendency of a civil appeal arising from the same transaction.

Analysis: The legal position is that civil and criminal proceedings arising from the same transaction may proceed simultaneously and independently. The pendency of an appeal against the civil decree does not bar continuation of the prosecution, and the challenge based on the alleged reason for seeking stay was found to be untenable.

Conclusion: The request to stay the prosecution was rightly rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the complaint deserved to be quashed after long delay on the pleas relating to marking of documents, financial capacity, and liability.

Analysis: The complaint disclosed the essential ingredients of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The presumption under Section 139 includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, and disputed factual defences cannot be examined in depth at the quashing stage. The long pendency of the case did not furnish a ground to quash the prosecution, and the challenge to the marking of documents was also found to be without merit.

Conclusion: The complaint was not liable to be quashed.

Final Conclusion: The criminal miscellaneous case failed in its entirety, while the trial court was directed to conclude the cheque dishonour case expeditiously in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 cannot be stayed or quashed merely because a connected civil dispute or appeal is pending, and the statutory presumption under Section 139 precludes pre-trial adjudication of disputed factual defences.

Issues: Whether the refund claims filed under Section 55 read with Section 54(2) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 were barred by limitation and liable to be rejected as time barred.

Analysis: The time limit prescribed in Notification No. 20/2018-Central Tax dated 28.03.2018 was held to run from 01.08.2019, when Circular No. 23/2019-Customs dated 01.08.2019 clarified that Customs authorities would process such refund claims. The period also overlapped with the COVID-19 extension granted by the Supreme Court, which further enlarged the time available for filing the claims.

Conclusion: The refund claims were held to be within time and not liable to rejection on limitation.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the appeals were allowed with consequential reliefs.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the competent authority for filing a refund claim is clarified later by circular, the limitation for such claim is to be reckoned from that clarification date and, where applicable, must also account for the judicial extension of limitation during the COVID-19 period.

Issues: Whether the acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was liable to be interfered with in view of the proved dishonour of the cheque, the returned demand notice marked as unclaimed, and the presumption under Section 139.

Analysis: The complainant's evidence established the loan transaction, issuance of the cheque, its dishonour for insufficiency of funds, and dispatch of the statutory notice to the drawer's known address. The return of the notice with the endorsement 'unclaimed' was treated as sufficient compliance with the notice requirement, and the presumption of service was applied on the basis that notice sent to the correct address is deemed served. The accused adduced no evidence to rebut the complainant's version or to prove the alleged alternative transaction and discharge. The discrepancy between describing the accused as a person known to the complainant and as a friend was held immaterial. The initial burden to prove the transaction and execution of the cheque was found to have been discharged, thereby attracting the statutory presumption, which remained unrebutted.

Conclusion: The acquittal was set aside and the accused was found guilty under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Issues: Whether reassessment under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was valid when the recorded reasons were based on material already furnished with the original return and examined in the original assessment, thereby amounting to a change of opinion.

Analysis: The assessee had disclosed the relevant financial statement along with the return of income. The notice under section 142(1) had specifically sought details of large expenses in the profit and loss account, and the assessee had supplied the particulars of net loss on foreign currency transactions and translation. The original assessment order was passed thereafter without disallowing that claim, while the related issue of warranty provision was expressly dealt with. The reasons for reopening substantially reproduced the same material already on record and did not disclose any new tangible material. Reassessment on such a basis would amount to a review of the earlier assessment on a mere change of opinion.

Conclusion: The reassessment was invalid and the impugned reassessment order, along with the notices and orders leading to it, were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalty under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable when the assessment and penalty proceedings did not clearly specify the exact limb of default, namely under-reporting or misreporting of income.

Analysis: The penalty was founded on additions confirmed in quantum, but the notices and orders did not record a clear and specific finding as to which limb of section 270A had been invoked. The Tribunal noted the consistent view of the Delhi High Court and coordinate Benches that penalty under section 270A cannot be sustained unless the exact charge is specified, since the statutory scheme distinguishes between under-reporting and misreporting and the consequences differ. On the facts, the absence of a specific finding as to the applicable limb rendered the penalty unsustainable.

Conclusion: The penalty under section 270A read with section 274 was deleted, and the assessee succeeded; the revenue's appeal was dismissed on the same reasoning.

Issues: Whether the order-in-original made against a deceased sole proprietor was liable to be quashed, and whether the department could proceed without first taking steps against the legal representative.

Analysis: The sole proprietor had died prior to the impugned order. The Court treated the order as vulnerable because it had been made against a dead person. It declined to examine the disputed question of specific intimation of death, but noted that an earlier order in similar proceedings had already stayed further action after the same objection was raised. The Court also held that, in the case of a proprietary concern, the department could not proceed against the dead proprietor without at least issuing notice to the legal representative if it intended to continue the proceedings.

Conclusion: The order-in-original dated 23 January 2026 was quashed and set aside. The respondents were left at liberty to take steps in accordance with law to pursue their claims against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether the reassessment order under section 148A(3) and the consequential notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 were sustainable when the assessee's replies and supporting materials were not duly considered and the formation of opinion on escaped income was challenged as violative of natural justice.

Analysis: The order proceeded on the basis of partial bank statements and circular movement of funds, but did not address the assessee's replies in their entirety or deal with the explanation and materials furnished in response to the show cause notice. In a proceeding under section 148A, the Assessing Officer is required to consider the reply and pass a reasoned determination on whether notice under section 148 is warranted. Non-consideration of the specific replies and absence of a detailed finding on the alleged escaped income vitiated the decision.

Conclusion: The impugned reassessment order and the consequential notice were quashed and set aside, and the matter was directed to be reconsidered afresh after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal was justified in refusing leave to file additional objections and documents under the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, and whether the impugned order warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: Rule 55 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 permits subsequent pleadings after reply only with the leave of the Tribunal on such terms as it deems fit, and Rule 11 preserves the Tribunal's inherent power. The petitioner had filed the reply within the short time granted and sought to place additional objections and documents with reasons. The order rejecting that request proceeded on the footing that there was no provision to entertain such material, yet it simultaneously permitted the documents to be relied on to a limited extent. In these circumstances, the refusal to entertain the additional objections could not be sustained, especially when the materials were sought to be introduced for fair adjudication and no prejudice was shown to justify exclusion. The objection also raised a natural justice concern.

Conclusion: The impugned order refusing leave for additional objections and documents was not sustainable and was set aside. The additional objections and documents were directed to be considered by the Tribunal while dealing with the insolvency petition.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Rule 55 of the National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016, read with the Tribunal's inherent power, subsequent pleadings and supporting documents may be entertained on terms of leave where their exclusion would impede fair adjudication, and an order rejecting such material on an erroneous premise is liable to be interfered with under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to refund with interest or was liable to make payment with interest in terms of the tribunal order, and whether the High Court should decide the dispute on merits at this stage.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to the concerned respondent to examine and decide, after hearing the petitioner if necessary, whether refund with interest was payable or whether any amount with interest was recoverable from the petitioner, and to communicate the decision within the stipulated time. The rival contentions on merits were left open.

Issues: Whether the preliminary objection to continuation of the appeal, based on the Supreme Court's interim order in another matter and the pendency of a reference before a Larger Bench, should be accepted.

Analysis: The objection was founded on the submission that the Supreme Court's interim protection in another case did not stay the present refund dispute, and that the reference to a Larger Bench on refund of CENVAT credit in cash under Section 142(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 should halt proceedings here. The Tribunal held that the interim order in the cited case was conditional and did not operate as a blanket stay in all other matters. It further noted that the issue of cash refund under Section 142(3) had already been decided in earlier precedent, and that the non-obstante language of Section 142(3) and Section 142(6A) rendered the absence of a similar provision in the erstwhile law immaterial for the present controversy.

Conclusion: The preliminary objection was rejected and the appeal was directed to proceed on merits.