Issues: (i) Whether the Corporate Debtor was denied a fair opportunity of hearing before admission of the financial creditor's insolvency application. (ii) Whether a pending scheme of compromise and arrangement and ongoing settlement negotiations required deferment of the insolvency application. (iii) Whether pending counterclaims, asserted receivables and commercial viability barred admission upon establishment of financial debt and default.

Issue (i): Whether the Corporate Debtor was denied a fair opportunity of hearing before admission of the financial creditor's insolvency application.

Analysis: The Corporate Debtor had filed pleadings and written submissions and was afforded repeated opportunities to advance oral submissions. Its right to address oral arguments was closed only after it failed to utilise those opportunities, including a further opportunity afforded following a change in Bench composition. The adjudication proceeded on the available pleadings, documents and written submissions rather than ex parte. Fair opportunity does not require indefinite adjournments where a party has adequately participated but fails to argue.

Conclusion: There was no violation of the principles of natural justice and no procedural infirmity in deciding the insolvency application on the record.

Issue (ii): Whether a pending scheme of compromise and arrangement and ongoing settlement negotiations required deferment of the insolvency application.

Analysis: A scheme under Sections 230-232 remains a proposal until approved in accordance with law and made binding. Settlement negotiations and unsuccessful one-time settlement proposals do not create a legal embargo on an insolvency application. The settlement proposal had failed for want of the stipulated upfront payment, and the statutory process could not be kept pending indefinitely upon uncertain future negotiations.

Conclusion: The pending scheme and settlement negotiations did not bar or require postponement of admission of the insolvency application.

Issue (iii): Whether pending counterclaims, asserted receivables and commercial viability barred admission upon establishment of financial debt and default.

Analysis: The jurisdictional enquiry is confined to the existence of financial debt, occurrence of default and completeness of the application. The credit facilities, default, classification of accounts as non-performing assets and acknowledgments through settlement proposals established debt and default. The counterclaim before the debt recovery forum remained undecided and could not displace the established default. Claimed receivables, future arbitral recoveries, commercial viability and business hardship do not override the statutory insolvency framework, which itself provides for resolution while preserving the corporate debtor as a going concern.

Conclusion: Pending counterclaims, prospective recoveries and asserted viability did not preclude admission once financial debt and default were established.

Final Conclusion: The admission of the Corporate Debtor to the corporate insolvency resolution process was legally sustainable, and the connected challenges to the procedural orders furnished no basis for appellate intervention.

Ratio Decidendi: Once financial debt and default are established under Section 7, unapproved compromise proposals, ongoing settlement negotiations, and undecided counterclaims do not ordinarily justify deferral of insolvency admission; adequate repeated opportunities satisfy natural justice even where oral argument is subsequently closed for non-utilisation.

Issues: Whether the application for initiation of insolvency resolution process against the personal guarantor under Section 95 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The corporate debtor's part-payment on 03.02.2021 was undisputed. Under the deed of guarantee, a part-payment by the borrower bound the guarantor; further, the guarantor's liability was co-extensive with that of the principal borrower. The earlier dismissal of the recovery application for default did not extinguish the underlying debt or make the Section 95 proceeding non-maintainable.

Conclusion: The Section 95 application instituted on 28.09.2023 was within limitation and was maintainable against the personal guarantor.

Issues: Whether gratuity and leave encashment payable to an employee who superannuated during the corporate insolvency resolution process constitute insolvency resolution process costs.

Analysis: Section 5(13) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 employs an exhaustive definition of insolvency resolution process costs. Apart from the resolution professional's remuneration, the enumerated categories concern expenses actually incurred by the resolution professional during the insolvency resolution process. Gratuity accrues as a terminal benefit upon cessation of employment and is not an expense incurred by the resolution professional; it is also not equivalent to salary payable for services during the process. Leave encashment likewise cannot be included in insolvency resolution process costs and must be addressed under the resolution-plan framework and payment priority prescribed by the Code.

Conclusion: Gratuity and leave encashment do not form part of insolvency resolution process costs; the issue is decided against the appellant.

Issues: Whether, pending the appeal, suspension of a resolution professional's registration for misconduct alleged in one CIRP could operate across all other assignments without an opportunity of hearing concerning those assignments.

Analysis: The statutory scheme requires Board confirmation for appointment or replacement of a resolution professional, while Regulation 13(7) contemplates communication of disciplinary action to the committees of creditors in other ongoing assignments. The blanket suspension was prima facie disproportionate, undermined the respective committees' statutory role, and affected the appellant's other assignments without a hearing on conduct in those assignments. The appellant established a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury. The wider appellate scope under Section 220(7) was left for determination in the main appeal.

Outcome: The suspension was stayed insofar as it barred the appellant from acting in assignments other than the CIRP in which he had been removed; the Board may communicate its order to the respective committees of creditors for their decision.

Issues: (i) Whether the Section 7 application was validly authorised by the partnership firm notwithstanding objections by one surviving partner and the intervention of a deceased partner's legal representative; (ii) Whether the asserted financial debt and default entitled the appellant to initiate insolvency proceedings within limitation.

Issue (i): Whether the Section 7 application was validly authorised by the partnership firm notwithstanding objections by one surviving partner and the intervention of a deceased partner's legal representative.

Analysis: Under the partnership deed, the death of a partner did not dissolve the firm, and a nominee of the deceased partner could join only upon acceptance by the surviving partners. As the legal representative had not been admitted as a partner, he lacked standing to intervene in the insolvency proceeding. Decisions concerning the firm's business could be taken by a majority under the partnership deed and Section 12(c) of the Partnership Act, 1932. The decision of two of the three surviving partners to commence the proceeding was therefore binding. A partner acting in the firm's name could institute the application because each partner is an agent of the firm, and neither Rule 4 nor Form 1 required signatures of every partner. Any challenge to the majority decision lay before the competent civil forum.

Conclusion: The Section 7 application was validly authorised; the objection to its institution fails.

Issue (ii): Whether the asserted financial debt and default entitled the appellant to initiate insolvency proceedings within limitation.

Analysis: The corporate debtor's balance sheets classified the appellant as a sundry creditor, and the ledger and Form 1 showed amounts advanced and repayable by the corporate debtor. Absence of a formal loan agreement or an interest stipulation did not negate the existence of a debt, and the principal amount exceeded the statutory threshold. However, the last transaction was on 31.03.2019, furnishing the nearest ascertainable point for default and limitation. The subsequently asserted default date of 30.05.2022 was unsupported by the record. As the Section 7 application was filed after expiry of the limitation period reckoned from the last transaction, the debt was time-barred.

Conclusion: The Section 7 application was not maintainable because the claim was barred by limitation.

Final Conclusion: Although the initiation of proceedings was duly authorised and the amount constituted a debt, insolvency jurisdiction could not be invoked for a time-barred claim.

Ratio Decidendi: A Section 7 insolvency application founded on an otherwise established financial debt cannot be maintained after expiry of limitation, and an unsupported later date of default cannot extend the limitation period.

Issues: Whether refund of service tax paid on specified services used for authorised operations of an SEZ unit can be denied because the services were not wholly consumed within the SEZ.

Analysis: Section 26(1)(e) of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 grants service-tax exemption for taxable services provided to an SEZ unit for authorised operations. Notification No. 17/2011-Service Tax dated 01.03.2011 regulates that exemption through a refund mechanism where tax has been paid. The requirement concerning services being wholly consumed within the SEZ applies only to the option of obtaining ab initio exemption; it does not restrict refund of tax paid on specified services actually used for authorised operations. The notification permits proportionate restriction only where services are shared between SEZ and DTA operations, and no such sharing was established. The services were approved specified services and no finding established that they were unconnected with authorised operations. The SEZ Act prevails over inconsistent restrictions under the Finance Act, 1994 or notifications issued thereunder.

Conclusion: Refund of Rs.13,37,485 on services used for authorised operations could not be denied merely because those services were not wholly consumed within the SEZ; the assessee was entitled to that refund.

Issues: Whether the balance VAT payable at 12.5% on pre-2010 sales of pressure cookers must be computed on the original sale price on which 4% VAT was initially collected, or by treating the gross amount inclusive of the earlier VAT as the revised tax-inclusive consideration.

Analysis: Under the definitions of output tax, sale price, gross turnover and taxable turnover, VAT is chargeable on the sale price exclusive of tax charged or chargeable. The earlier 4% VAT had been collected and paid on the stated sale price of Rs.100. Recomputing the sale price as Rs.91 to accommodate the subsequently determined 12.5% rate would disconnect the computation from the original taxable sale price and artificially reduce the differential tax liability. Computing the total 12.5% VAT and the balance 8.5% liability on Rs.100 does not amount to levying VAT on VAT, because the levy remains on the original sale price and not on the tax component.

Conclusion: The balance 8.5% VAT is payable on the original sale price on which the earlier 4% VAT was paid; the tax-inclusive recomputation advanced by the assessee is impermissible.

Issues: Whether pending civil and arbitral proceedings concerning operational-credit claims, which had not crystallised into determinable and quantifiable claims before approval of the resolution plan, survived the approved resolution plan.

Analysis: The final list of operational creditors quantified the disputed claims at a notional value of Re.1 and did not preserve them subject to the outcome of pending proceedings. The resolution plan, which had attained finality, provided that the settlement corpus available to relevant operational creditors was payable pro rata only for crystallised and approved claims within the stipulated period. Its provisions, read harmoniously, discharged and extinguished pre-effective-date liabilities and required pending proceedings by operational creditors to be withdrawn, abated, settled or extinguished. The clean slate and fresh start principles preclude indeterminate claims from resurfacing after plan approval. There was no ambiguity warranting application of contra proferentem or adoption of a face-value reservation mechanism.

Conclusion: Pending civil and arbitral claims that had not crystallised by approval of the resolution plan stood abated, waived, withdrawn and extinguished; the operational creditors were entitled to no amount beyond their quantified Re.1 claims. The issue is decided in favour of the appellant.

Outcome: Delay condoned; the Special Leave Petitions seeking bail were dismissed, and pending applications were disposed of.

Issues: Whether the extended limitation period for recovery of service tax for 2016-17 was validly invoked, and whether the penalty for suppression was sustainable.

Analysis: The appellant, though registered, neither filed ST-3 returns nor disclosed gross receipts, taxable receipts, exempt receipts, abatements, or its service-tax liability for the relevant period. Statutory returns required disclosure of gross receipts before deductions or exemptions could be claimed. The failure to respond to departmental requests for records further prevented verification. The prescribed statutory manner for disclosure could not be replaced by an undisclosed claim of abatements, and a party could not derive advantage from its own default. These circumstances established deliberate suppression of taxable receipts with intent to evade service tax, warranting invocation of the extended period. Since suppression justifying the extended period stood established, the penalty was consequentially justified.

Conclusion: The extended period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was validly invoked, and the penalty under Section 78 of that Act was sustainable; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether tax was leviable under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 on imported cars claimed to have been sold in the course of high seas sales; (ii) Whether the Tribunal could restore the assessment of tax for breach of conditions under G.O.Ms.No.381 despite no departmental appeal against the first appellate order.

Issue (i): Whether tax was leviable under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 on imported cars claimed to have been sold in the course of high seas sales.

Analysis: The import and sale records showed that the dealer's sale invoices were raised after the cars entered Indian territory and from its Tamil Nadu factory address. The dealer paid customs duty, while no reliable evidence established that title passed while the cars were on the high seas. Transport documents did not prove that the sales occurred before entry into the customs frontier or outside Tamil Nadu. The place of transfer, in the absence of contrary evidence, was determinable from the sale invoices.

Conclusion: The sales were not high seas sales and were taxable under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal could restore the assessment of tax for breach of conditions under G.O.Ms.No.381 despite no departmental appeal against the first appellate order.

Analysis: The exemption granted under G.O.Ms.No.381, issued under Section 17 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959, required the purchased goods to be used for the declared manufacturing purpose; its third proviso imposed tax where the goods were otherwise disposed of. The dealer failed to establish that the goods purchased against declarations were used in manufacture or correlate them with exports. The exemption under Section 5(3) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 was unavailable to a dealer that had obtained the State exemption by declaration and breached its conditions. The Tribunal was entitled, in the dealer's appeal, to correct the apparent legal error in substituting compounding fees for the tax consequence expressly prescribed by the exemption notification.

Conclusion: The Tribunal rightly restored the assessment of tax for violation of the conditions of G.O.Ms.No.381. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The claimed import-sale exemption and the conditional exemption for locally purchased goods were unavailable on the established facts, and the tax liability under the State regime remained enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: A dealer that avails a conditional State tax exemption on a declaration must satisfy its stipulated use condition; upon breach, the prescribed tax consequence applies and cannot be displaced by an alternative export-sale claim or compounding mechanism.

Issues: (i) Whether project completion for anti-profiteering purposes is reckoned from the application for, or actual issuance of, the occupancy certificate; (ii) Whether the investigation period was correctly confined to 01.07.2017 to the date of occupancy certificate; (iii) Whether the revised methodology and quantification of profiteering were legally sustainable; (iv) Whether homebuyers were identifiable recipients requiring restitution under Rule 133(3)(b), rather than deposit under Rule 133(3)(c); and (v) Whether penalty under Section 171(3A) was leviable.

Issue (i): Whether project completion for anti-profiteering purposes is reckoned from the application for, or actual issuance of, the occupancy certificate.

Analysis: A project is completed only upon actual grant of the occupancy certificate by the competent authority. Mere filing of an application does not establish completion. The occupancy certificate was issued during the GST period and input tax credit was availed until that date, establishing that the project continued post-GST.

Conclusion: Project completion is reckoned from actual issuance of the occupancy certificate, not from the application date. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the investigation period was correctly confined to 01.07.2017 to the date of occupancy certificate.

Analysis: Construction services supplied before issuance of the occupancy certificate remain taxable, whereas post-certificate sale of building is outside taxable supply and constitutes exempt supply for input tax credit purposes. As no admissible input tax credit benefit survives for post-certificate sales, anti-profiteering computation must end on issuance of the occupancy certificate.

Conclusion: The investigation was correctly restricted to 01.07.2017 to 13.10.2017. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the revised methodology and quantification of profiteering were legally sustainable.

Analysis: The project fell within the category where construction commenced before GST but continued after GST, and purchasers who paid before GST remained entitled to the benefit of post-GST input tax credit. The revised computation used Chartered Accountant-certified purchase and credit data, compared pre-GST and post-GST credit ratios, calculated per-square-foot savings, and confined the calculation to the period before occupancy certification. It quantified the base benefit at Rs. 2,38,495 and GST thereon at Rs. 28,619.

Conclusion: The revised methodology and total profiteering quantification of Rs. 2,67,114 were sustainable. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether homebuyers were identifiable recipients requiring restitution under Rule 133(3)(b), rather than deposit under Rule 133(3)(c).

Analysis: Rule 133(3)(c) is a narrow residuary mechanism applicable only where recipients are genuinely incapable of identification. Non-participation in proceedings, present untraceability, or resale of flats does not make recipients unidentifiable where the supplier's transaction, allotment, payment, and contact records disclose their identities. The general statutory remedy is restitution to identifiable recipients with interest.

Conclusion: The homebuyers were identifiable, and the profiteered amount must be refunded to them individually with interest at 18% per annum. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether penalty under Section 171(3A) was leviable.

Analysis: The investigation period preceded the effective date of Section 171(3A). Penal provisions cannot operate retrospectively absent express legislative mandate.

Conclusion: No penalty under Section 171(3A) is leviable for the relevant period. The finding is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The additional post-GST input tax credit benefit was required to be passed on to the identifiable homebuyers through commensurate price reduction and restitution with statutory interest, while the subsequently introduced penalty provision could not govern the pre-2020 period.

Ratio Decidendi: In a real-estate anti-profiteering matter, the benefit of post-GST input tax credit must be computed only until actual issuance of the occupancy certificate and passed to identifiable purchasers; the residuary consumer welfare fund mechanism applies only where identification is genuinely impossible, and a later penal provision cannot be retrospectively applied.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit is admissible on input services used for setting up a manufacturing plant after deletion of the expression "setting up" from the inclusive part of the definition of input service with effect from 01.04.2011.

Analysis: Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 contains a means clause, an inclusive clause and an exclusion clause. Services used directly or indirectly in or in relation to manufacture fall within the means clause. Services required for erection, commissioning, installation and fabrication of plant and machinery, technical consultancy, recruitment, information technology, transportation of inputs and capital goods, security, clearing and forwarding, and related business activities had a direct nexus with manufacture because the factory could not be established for production without them. The deletion of "setting up" from the inclusive clause does not exclude services independently covered by the means clause; denial arises only where the service is specifically covered by the exclusion clause. The disputed services were not related to construction of a building or civil structure and were not otherwise excluded.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit on the disputed services used for setting up the plant is admissible; the assessee is entitled to the credit, and the demand, interest and penalty are unsustainable.

Issues: Whether interest on refundable deposits is payable at 12% or 6%, and whether it runs from the date of deposit or only after expiry of three months from receipt of the refund application.

Analysis: Divergent coordinate-bench decisions were noted on the applicable rate and commencement of interest on refunds. The statutory refund-interest framework and the notification fixing a 6% rate were also noted, requiring consideration by an appropriate Bench.

Outcome: The questions were referred for appropriate orders; no final adjudication was made.

Issues: Whether an addition under Section 43CA could be sustained where the difference between the declared sale consideration and the value determined by the District Valuation Officer was within 10%.

Analysis: Section 43CA deems the stamp-duty value to be the full value of consideration for transfer of land or building held otherwise than as a capital asset. The 10% tolerance band in the first proviso to Section 43CA(1) is a beneficial and curative measure intended to alleviate hardship in genuine real-estate transactions and applies retrospectively. Since the variation between the declared consideration and the District Valuation Officer's valuation was below 10%, the deeming provision was inapplicable.

Conclusion: No addition under Section 43CA was warranted, and the addition of Rs. 8,99,780 was deleted.

Issues: Whether the entire addition for alleged bogus purchases was sustainable where the purchases were recorded in regular books, supported by invoices and bank payments, consumed in manufacturing, and the corresponding sales were not disputed.

Analysis: The purchase invoices, payment evidence, stock records and consumption in manufacturing supported the transactions. The books of account were not rejected under section 145(3), while the assessing authority neither discredited those materials nor questioned consumption or corresponding sales. The supplier's later identification as an issuer of accommodation invoices and non-service or non-response to notice did not, without more, establish that the goods had not been received in the relevant assessment year.

Conclusion: The addition for alleged bogus purchases was deleted; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.