Issues: Whether interest is payable at 12% per annum on refund of an amount paid by mistake of fact, and the period for which such interest is payable.

Analysis: An amount paid by mistake of fact is a deposit rather than tax. The earlier appellate order had accepted that the payment was made by mistake and that the limitation framework under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 did not govern its refund. The decisions applied establish that, in the absence of a statutory rate governing interest on refund of such deposits, interest at 12% is payable. The refund having arisen from a mistaken deposit, the subsequent payment of refund does not extinguish entitlement to interest from the date of deposit.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to interest at 12% per annum from the date of deposit until payment of the refund.

Issues: (i) Whether manpower supplied for sweeping and cleaning to Noida Authority qualified for exemption as sanitation conservancy services provided to a Governmental Authority; (ii) Whether the balance amount qualified for small service provider exemption; (iii) Whether the service-tax demand for April 2015 to March 2017 could be raised by invoking the extended period of limitation.

Issue (i): Whether manpower supplied for sweeping and cleaning to Noida Authority qualified for exemption as sanitation conservancy services provided to a Governmental Authority.

Analysis: The work order established that sweepers were supplied for cleaning purposes, bringing the activity within sanitation conservancy under Entry 25. Noida Authority, being constituted under a State enactment and performing municipal functions, satisfied the definition of Governmental Authority in the notification.

Conclusion: The services were exempt as sanitation conservancy services provided to a Governmental Authority, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the balance amount qualified for small service provider exemption.

Analysis: The remaining taxable amount was assessed under the small service provider exemption notification.

Conclusion: The balance amount was eligible for small service provider exemption, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the service-tax demand for April 2015 to March 2017 could be raised by invoking the extended period of limitation.

Analysis: The assessee had regularly filed ST-3 returns and acted under a bona fide belief that its services were exempt. These circumstances did not justify invocation of the extended period.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was unavailable; the demand and consequential penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The exemption claims were sustained, and the service-tax demand and penalties did not survive.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit reversed under protest pursuant to a show-cause notice is refundable where the demand is set aside as barred by limitation.

Analysis: The demand had been annulled on the ground that the extended period of limitation was unavailable, and that determination had attained finality. The amount reversed under protest consequently represented CENVAT credit not payable by the assessee. The precedent denying refund of voluntarily paid duty against a time-barred but legally due demand was inapplicable because the demand in the present matter stood set aside and the assessee had no liability to pay it.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to refund of the CENVAT credit reversed under protest; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Issues: Whether the challenge to a communication seeking commercial justification and supporting documents during an ongoing tender evaluation was premature.

Analysis: The communication neither rejected nor disqualified any bidder, nor did it determine the petitioners' rights. It sought material to assess the commercial sustainability of quoted discounts and avoid disruption of medicine supplies. The petitioners had already furnished their responses and supporting documents. Since no final decision on the bids had been made, the tendering authority was required to evaluate the material and issue a reasoned decision.

Conclusion: The challenge was premature; the tendering authority must decide the bids after considering the responses and documents, with aggrieved bidders left free to pursue remedies available in law.

Issues: (i) Whether a no-fee corporate guarantee furnished by a holding company for its subsidiary is a taxable supply of services, including where accompanied by a share pledge; (ii) Whether such guarantee is a continuous supply of services; (iii) Whether Section 15(4) and Rule 28(2), prescribing valuation of corporate guarantees, are constitutionally valid; (iv) Whether Rule 28(2) can apply to guarantees furnished before 26 October 2023 and to guarantees for foreign recipients; (v) Whether the impugned circulars and the differential treatment of governmental and directors' guarantees are valid; and (vi) Whether proceedings under Section 74 could be invoked for non-payment of GST on corporate guarantees.

Issue (i): Whether a no-fee corporate guarantee furnished by a holding company for its subsidiary is a taxable supply of services, including where accompanied by a share pledge.

Analysis: Section 7(1)(c) read with Entry 2 of Schedule I treats supplies between related persons in the course or furtherance of business as supplies notwithstanding absence of monetary consideration. The statutory incidents of a guarantee, including the benefit of credit to the subsidiary, the surety's indemnity and subrogation rights, establish a service supplied by the holding company for the subsidiary's benefit. The guarantee is incidental or ancillary to the holding company's business under Section 2(17), and the subsidiary is its recipient under Section 2(93). A guarantee is a contingent secondary obligation, not a direct transferable claim to a debt or beneficial interest, and therefore is not an actionable claim excluded by Schedule III. Entry 5(e) of Schedule II classifies the undertaking as an agreement to do an act. The substance and terms of a pledge arrangement may also disclose an undertaking to discharge the subsidiary's default, notwithstanding its nomenclature.

Conclusion: The issue is decided against the assessees: a corporate guarantee furnished by a holding company for its subsidiary is a taxable supply of services, even if issued without a separately charged fee.

Issue (ii): Whether such guarantee is a continuous supply of services.

Analysis: Although a guarantee has a continuing operative obligation, Section 2(33) requires periodic payment obligations. A gratuitous corporate guarantee lacks that essential feature. Its time of supply is instead determined under Section 13(2)(c) by the subsidiary's accounting recognition, with the subsisting guaranteed debt relevant for each financial year.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessees: a gratuitous corporate guarantee is not a continuous supply of services; its annual valuation may nevertheless arise from the recipient's yearly accounting recognition of the outstanding guarantee.

Issue (iii): Whether Section 15(4) and Rule 28(2), prescribing valuation of corporate guarantees, are constitutionally valid.

Analysis: Sections 15(4), 15(5), 2(87) and 164 permit specialised valuation rules recommended by the GST Council for supplies whose value is difficult to ascertain. Rule 28(2) is consequently traceable to the parent statute and the 1% benchmark may operate where actual consideration is unavailable. However, compelling valuation at 1% when the actual commission is lower disregards the actual value, conflicts with the statutory valuation scheme, and is arbitrary.

Conclusion: The issue is decided partly in favour of the assessees: Section 15(4) and Rule 28(2) remain valid, but the words "whichever is higher" in Rule 28(2) are read down, permitting valuation on the actual commission or charge where it is available.

Issue (iv): Whether Rule 28(2) can apply to guarantees furnished before 26 October 2023 and to guarantees for foreign recipients.

Analysis: Imposition of the newly prescribed valuation mechanism on guarantees executed before Rule 28(2) came into force creates an impermissibly harsh retroactive fiscal burden and lacks a legal basis for the earlier period. A continuing guarantee may be taxed only from 26 October 2023. Rule 28(2), as amended, is confined to recipients located in India; guarantees furnished for foreign subsidiaries fall outside that rule.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessees: GST under Rule 28(2) cannot be levied for the period before 26 October 2023, and the demand concerning guarantees for foreign recipients is unsustainable.

Issue (v): Whether the impugned circulars and the differential treatment of governmental and directors' guarantees are valid.

Analysis: The circulars are administrative clarifications of the statutory framework and do not independently create the levy. Their operation must conform to the reading down of Rule 28(2) and the restriction on pre-rule levy. Exemption for governmental guarantees and nil valuation of a director's personal guarantee are founded on distinct public-finance and regulatory considerations and do not establish unconstitutional discrimination.

Conclusion: The issue is decided partly in favour of the assessees: the circulars are set aside only insofar as they conflict with the directions governing valuation and temporal operation of Rule 28(2); the discrimination challenge fails.

Issue (vi): Whether proceedings under Section 74 could be invoked for non-payment of GST on corporate guarantees.

Analysis: Section 74 requires fraud, wilful misstatement or deliberate suppression with intent to evade tax. The dispute arose from a bona fide and contested interpretation of the GST provisions governing an unsettled corporate-guarantee levy. Mere non-disclosure or non-payment, without a positive and deliberate act to evade tax, does not constitute wilful suppression.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of the assessees: the impugned Section 74 order and show-cause notices are unsustainable and stand quashed.

Final Conclusion: The GST charge on intra-group corporate guarantees operates prospectively under the preserved valuation framework, subject to valuation on actual consideration where available; pre-rule levy, inconsistent circular guidance, and fraud-based enforcement founded only on the interpretative dispute do not survive.

Issues: Whether revocation of the Customs Broker licence, forfeiture of security deposit and penalty were sustainable for undertaking clearance activities through another Customs Broker's credentials without the requisite authorisation and in breach of Customs Broker obligations.

Analysis: The Appellant admittedly undertook clearance-related work, received the import documents, and deputed its G-Card holder for examination, although the Bill of Entry bore another Customs Broker's credentials. Consent or a mutual arrangement with that broker could not authorise the Appellant to transact without an importer authorisation in its own name. The goods were prohibited for import under the applicable plant-quarantine regime; accordingly, the Appellant was required to exercise diligence, advise the importer of applicable restrictions, report non-compliance to Customs, and maintain and produce relevant business records. The established conduct supported violations of Regulations 10(a), 10(d), 10(e), 10(f) and 10(k) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018. Relief granted to the other broker in separate proceedings did not eliminate the Appellant's independent statutory breaches. Given the conscious use of another broker's credentials in a transaction involving prohibited goods, the sanctions were not manifestly disproportionate, and no substantial question of law arose under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962.

Conclusion: The revocation of the licence, forfeiture of security deposit and penalty were sustained against the assessee.

Issues: Whether a one-day delay reflected in the payment record could deny the assessee the benefit of the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme and issuance of a discharge certificate.

Analysis: The scheme benefit was sought after payment of the amount determined in Form SVLDRS-3. Although the departmental record reflected the CIN date as one day later than the claimed payment date, such minor procedural delay could not defeat the benefit of the scheme. The applicable approach also permitted manual examination and processing of declarations for issuance of the discharge certificate.

Conclusion: The assessee cannot be denied the scheme benefit because of the one-day delay; the request for issuance of the discharge certificate must be examined and processed manually within four weeks.

Issues: (i) Whether the extended limitation period was invocable for the service-tax demand; (ii) Whether the appellant's pantry-car activity was taxable as outdoor catering service.

Analysis: The Members reached opposite conclusions. The Technical Member treated the appellant's licensed on-board operations as catering performed for IRCTC, found that the operational obligations went beyond a mere sale of pre-packed food, and considered the non-payment and non-disclosure sufficient to establish suppression. The Judicial Member found that the appellant had disclosed its activity and tax position during departmental enquiry, that the Revenue had not established deliberate suppression with intent to evade, and that the contractual basis, service recipient and consideration for the alleged taxable service had not been sufficiently established.

Outcome: The Members recorded a difference of opinion and referred the matter to the President for determination by a Third Member.

Issues: (i) Whether Cenvat credit was admissible on structural steel items, welding electrodes and oxygen used for manufacture, repair and maintenance of capital goods and machinery within the factory; (ii) Whether the demand raised by show-cause notice for credit availed during August 2008 to April 2009 was barred by limitation.

Issue (i): Whether Cenvat credit was admissible on structural steel items, welding electrodes and oxygen used for manufacture, repair and maintenance of capital goods and machinery within the factory.

Analysis: The Chartered Engineer's certificates established that the disputed goods were used within the factory for manufacture of capital goods and machinery, rather than for construction of factory sheds, buildings, foundations or support structures. The applicable principles recognise credit for inputs used in manufacture of capital goods deployed in the manufacturer's factory; the exclusion concerning structural items used for construction or foundations did not apply to the established end-use. The earlier Larger Bench view denying such credit stood displaced by subsequent authority.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit on the disputed structural materials, welding electrodes and oxygen was admissible. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the demand raised by show-cause notice for credit availed during August 2008 to April 2009 was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The credit had been recorded in statutory RG23A records and disclosed in ER-1 returns. Given the divergent judicial views prevailing on admissibility of credit on the disputed goods, the assessee's belief in eligibility was bona fide. There was no suppression warranting invocation of the extended period.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice was time-barred. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed demand, and consequential interest and penalty, could not survive either on merits or on limitation; consequential relief follows in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: Inputs demonstrably used in manufacture of capital goods within the factory qualify for Cenvat credit unless used for excluded construction or foundation purposes; disclosure of such credit in statutory records, coupled with a bona fide view amid interpretational dispute, negates suppression for invoking extended limitation.

Issues: Whether the appellant's request for issuance of a discharge certificate under the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019, upon payment of the amount determined in Form SVLDRS-3, required manual processing.

Analysis: The records, including Forms SVLDRS-1 and SVLDRS-3 and the bank statement, established that the differential duty determined under the Scheme had been remitted, which was undisputed. The matter was procedural, and manual examination and processing of the declaration was warranted for issuance of the discharge certificate.

Conclusion: The appellant's request for a discharge certificate is to be manually examined and processed by the Commissioner within four weeks.

Issues: Whether an ex parte demand order passed under Section 73(9), without the petitioner filing a reply to the show-cause notice, should be set aside to provide an opportunity to contest the proceedings.

Analysis: The petitioner attributed the failure to file a reply and documents to bona fide and unavoidable circumstances. A justice-oriented approach required a reasonable opportunity to respond to the show-cause notice and participate in the adjudication.

Conclusion: The ex parte demand order was set aside and the matter was directed to be adjudicated afresh after permitting the petitioner to file a reply and supporting documents.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to file a comprehensive petition challenging the subsequent order.

Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the GST adjudication and rectification-rejection orders should be entertained without exhausting the statutory appellate remedy, despite delay in filing the appeal.

Analysis: Section 107 provides a statutory appeal against the impugned adjudication order. The writ petition was instituted 124 days beyond the prescribed appeal period. The recorded circumstances established sufficient cause for the delay, and the applicable Division Bench approach permits consideration of a delayed statutory appeal on merits where such cause is shown.

Conclusion: Direct writ adjudication was declined; the appellate authority was required to entertain and decide the statutory appeal on merits if filed within 30 days of upload of the order.

Issues: (i) Whether delays in filing the appeals were liable to be condoned; (ii) Whether rejection of registration applications under section 12AB on account of absent or pending registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 required category-specific reconsideration; (iii) Whether a summary observation that genuineness of activities was not established justified rejection without a fuller factual enquiry; (iv) Whether incomplete Form No. 10AB, an incorrect clause, or analogous curable procedural defects warranted an opportunity for rectification; (v) Whether rejection for non-compliance with notices or inadequate supporting material warranted a final effective opportunity; and (vi) Whether rejection of approval under section 80G consequential upon refusal of section 12AB registration could independently survive.

Issue (i): Whether delays in filing the appeals were liable to be condoned.

Analysis: The explanations concerning rural functioning, lack of familiarity with electronic compliance, communications being sent to former consultants, and reliance on professional advisers established that the delays were neither deliberate nor lacking in bona fides. The explanations constituted sufficient cause, and procedural delay could not prevent adjudication on merits.

Conclusion: The delays were condoned, in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of registration applications under section 12AB on account of absent or pending registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 required category-specific reconsideration.

Analysis: Where State public-trust registration had subsequently been obtained, that certificate materially altered the factual basis of a rejection founded principally on its absence. Verification of its authenticity, validity and applicability is required, but the enquiry cannot be expanded into an unrestricted fresh enquiry on grounds not forming part of the original rejection. Where an application for State registration remains pending, the assessee has invoked the process within its control and should be permitted to produce the certificate upon issuance rather than be required to initiate the section 12AB process afresh.

Conclusion: The section 12AB applications require reconsideration confined to verification of the obtained certificate or consideration of the pending State-registration process, in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iii): Whether a summary observation that genuineness of activities was not established justified rejection without a fuller factual enquiry.

Analysis: A positive finding that activities are non-genuine differs materially from a conclusion based merely on insufficient documents or incomplete compliance. In the absence of identified sham, fictitious, colourable, or object-unrelated activities supported by cogent adverse material, the earlier observation did not amount to a concluded finding of non-genuineness. The prescribed authority must assess primary material concerning accounts, actual charitable activities, supporting evidence, and their nexus with the stated objects; any adverse material must first be disclosed for explanation and rebuttal.

Conclusion: Genuineness of activities must be determined afresh on a complete record after a fair opportunity, in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iv): Whether incomplete Form No. 10AB, an incorrect clause, or analogous curable procedural defects warranted an opportunity for rectification.

Analysis: A distinction applies between defects affecting substantive eligibility and defects only in the manner of presenting the statutory application. An incomplete form, incorrect clause selection, or subsequently producible document should not by itself preclude consideration of the substantive claim where rectification is legally permissible. The opportunity to rectify does not override limitation or other substantive statutory conditions.

Conclusion: Legally curable application defects must be permitted to be rectified before deciding substantive eligibility, in favour of the assessees.

Issue (v): Whether rejection for non-compliance with notices or inadequate supporting material warranted a final effective opportunity.

Analysis: Since the statutory enquiry could not be meaningfully completed without the relevant primary material, a final opportunity is necessary for the assessees to provide forms, constitutional documents, accounts, activity details, registration certificates and explanations. This opportunity carries a corresponding obligation of timely cooperation; further unjustified default permits determination on available material.

Conclusion: The applications must receive one final effective opportunity for compliance and thereafter be decided by reasoned orders, in favour of the assessees.

Issue (vi): Whether rejection of approval under section 80G consequential upon refusal of section 12AB registration could independently survive.

Analysis: A rejection under section 80G founded substantially on the absence or rejection of section 12AB registration cannot remain on that basis once the underlying section 12AB application is subject to reconsideration. Nevertheless, approval under section 80G requires independent satisfaction of conditions peculiar to that provision, without mechanically duplicating matters already properly determined in the section 12AB proceedings.

Conclusion: Consequential section 80G refusals cannot survive and require fresh consideration subject to independent satisfaction of section 80G conditions, in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The eligibility applications remain to be determined by the prescribed authority through category-specific and confined enquiries, with reasonable opportunity to produce material and without any concluded opinion on factual eligibility that has been left open.

Ratio Decidendi: Where charitable-registration applications are rejected for curable registration, evidentiary, or procedural deficiencies, reconsideration must be confined to those deficiencies and conducted with a fair opportunity, rather than through an unrestricted fresh enquiry.

Issues: Whether attachment of the petitioner's bank accounts should continue while the restored statutory appeal against the assessment remains pending.

Analysis: The statutory appeal had been remitted for fresh decision and remained undecided. In those circumstances, the revenue's interest required protection through a proportionate deposit rather than continued restraint on operation of the bank accounts.

Conclusion: The bank-account attachment shall be lifted upon deposit of 20% of the assessed tax liability within three weeks, and the restored appeal shall be decided on priority within six months.

Issues: Whether Sections 69 and 70(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are unconstitutional.

Analysis: The vires challenge stood rejected by the binding determination that powers to summon, arrest and prosecute for GST levy, collection and evasion-control are ancillary and incidental to the legislative power under Article 246A of the Constitution of India.

Conclusion: Sections 69 and 70(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 are constitutionally valid; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing Form No. 10AB for regularisation of provisional registration could be rejected without considering the statutory power to condone delay upon reasonable cause.

Analysis: Section 12A(1)(ac)(iii) prescribes the time for filing an application by a provisionally registered institution. However, the proviso inserted with effect from 01.10.2024 expressly empowers the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner to condone delay where reasonable cause is established. The strict-compliance principles applicable where no condonation power exists do not displace this express statutory discretion. The explanation based on a bona fide misunderstanding of the provisional-registration period was not inherently implausible or demonstrative of deliberate disregard, though the substantial delay requires a specific examination by the competent authority.

Conclusion: The competent authority must determine whether reasonable cause exists under the proviso to Section 12A(1)(ac) and cannot reject the application solely on the premise that the statutory time-limit is incapable of condonation.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute expressly authorises condonation of delay on reasonable cause, a time-barred application must be considered under that statutory discretion and cannot be rejected merely because the prescribed period has expired.

Issues: Whether a trust holding a valid and subsisting registration under section 12AB could seek renewal under section 12A(1)(ac)(ii) despite an erroneous sub-clause having been selected in its earlier application for regular registration.

Analysis: The trust had first obtained provisional registration under section 12A(1)(ac)(vi), followed by regular registration which remained operative when the renewal application was filed. Section 12A(1)(ac)(ii) applies to an existing registered trust whose registration is due to expire. An incorrect selection of clause (i), instead of clause (iii), in the earlier application did not negate the legal existence of the regular registration granted by the competent authority. Such subsisting statutory registration could not be treated as non-existent through a collateral challenge unless withdrawn or cancelled in accordance with law. The rejection was not founded on the objects, genuineness of activities, or breach of registration conditions.

Conclusion: The renewal application under section 12A(1)(ac)(ii) was valid, and the absence of registration under the erstwhile regime before 01.04.2021 could not justify refusal of renewal.

Issues: (i) Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is ultra vires the Constitution? (ii) If not, whether the provision is liable to be read down so as to protect a bona fide purchaser? (iii) Whether the show cause notice dated 26.09.2025 lacks the jurisdictional foundation for invoking Section 74? (iv) Whether the proceedings are vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice, including the rule against bias and the non issuance of Form GST DRC-01A? (v) Whether, in the absence of any of the above, the petitioner ought to be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy?

Issue (i): Whether Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is ultra vires the Constitution?

Analysis: Input tax credit under Section 16 is conditional and Section 16(2) imposes cumulative, mandatory conditions. The supplier-tax-payment condition in Section 16(2)(c), read with Section 41(2), requires reversal where the supplier has not paid tax but permits re-availment once payment is made. Section 155 places the burden of proving eligibility on the claimant. The supplier-default risk assigned to the recipient is a legislative-policy choice, while the reversal-and-restoration mechanism prevents the condition from being final or confiscatory. A speaking Supreme Court ruling affirming the validity of the provision and declining its read-down is binding.

Conclusion: Section 16(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 is constitutionally valid. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): If not, whether the provision is liable to be read down so as to protect a bona fide purchaser?

Analysis: The request to read down Section 16(2)(c) stands expressly rejected by the binding ruling on the provision. Independently, a bona fide-purchaser exception would not resolve allegations that credit was claimed through fake invoices, bogus supplies and transactions without movement of goods. The genuineness and bona fides of such transactions require factual determination on evidence within the statutory appellate process.

Conclusion: Section 16(2)(c) is not liable to be read down for the assessee. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the show cause notice dated 26.09.2025 lacks the jurisdictional foundation for invoking Section 74?

Analysis: Section 74(1) requires prima facie satisfaction that wrongful availment of credit resulted from fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax. A mere reproduction of statutory language would be insufficient; however, detailed allegations of layered dealings, fake invoices, bogus supplies and absence of goods movement furnish the requisite jurisdictional foundation. The challenge concerns the adequacy and correctness of the material, which is an issue on merits rather than an absence of jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The show cause notice does not lack jurisdictional foundation under Section 74. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the proceedings are vitiated by breach of the principles of natural justice, including the rule against bias and the non issuance of Form GST DRC-01A?

Analysis: Following the substitution of "shall" by "may" in Rule 142(1A), pre-notice intimation in Form GST DRC-01A is an enabling facility rather than a condition precedent to action under Section 74. Absence of demonstrable prejudice also defeats this objection. The statutory scheme permits the proper officer to undertake investigation and determination; performance of both functions by that officer, without personal interest, animus, closed mind, or other cogent material creating a real likelihood of bias, does not establish disqualifying bias. Alleged inadequate consideration of the reply is, at most, an error within jurisdiction capable of appellate scrutiny.

Conclusion: The proceedings are not vitiated by breach of natural justice, bias, or non-issuance of Form GST DRC-01A. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether, in the absence of any of the above, the petitioner ought to be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy?

Analysis: Once the constitutional and jurisdictional challenges fail, disputed questions concerning the alleged bogus transactions, the sufficiency of evidence, and the assessment of the reply fall within the appellate framework under Section 107. Permitting writ review of those merits would bypass the statutory hierarchy.

Conclusion: The assessee must pursue the statutory appellate remedy. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The supplier-tax-payment condition for input tax credit remains enforceable, and the alleged factual merits of the transactions, including their bona fides, remain open for determination under the statutory appellate framework.

Ratio Decidendi: Input tax credit is a conditional statutory entitlement, and the mandatory supplier-tax-payment condition under Section 16(2)(c), supported by reversal and re-availment under Section 41, cannot be invalidated or read down; disputes as to transaction genuineness ordinarily require recourse to the statutory appellate remedy.