Issues: Whether a taxpayer whose electronic credit ledger is blocked under Rule 86A may nevertheless utilise the blocked input tax credit for the pre-deposit required to file an appeal under Section 107.

Analysis: Section 49(4) permits utilisation of amounts in the electronic credit ledger towards output-tax payments only in the prescribed manner and subject to prescribed conditions and restrictions. Rule 86A is a provisional credit-blocking measure, requiring recorded reasons and operating for no longer than one year. Sections 49 and 107 must be read with Rule 86A: although an appellant may ordinarily use available electronic credit for statutory liabilities including pre-deposit, such utilisation is barred while a valid Rule 86A restriction remains in force. Rule 86A(2) permits unblocking where the conditions for restriction no longer exist.

Conclusion: Section 49(4) does not confer an absolute right to use blocked electronic credit for appeal pre-deposit. The request for unblocking must be decided expeditiously; if rejection is proposed, a speaking order must be issued after affording reasonable opportunity.

Issues: (i) Whether transfer-pricing comparables may be rejected or selected without satisfying the statutory comparability requirements, and when the Tribunal's determination is reviewable under section 260A; (ii) Whether turnover and related-party transaction filters adopted for selecting comparables were sustainable; (iii) Whether foreign-exchange gain or loss is an operating item for determining the arm's length price; (iv) Whether the burden concerning comparables shifts after redetermination by the Transfer Pricing Officer and whether comparables may be introduced or excluded at the appellate stage; (v) Whether the 5% variation under section 92C(2) is a standard deduction and whether section 92C(2A) applies retrospectively; (vi) Whether working-capital adjustment warrants interference in an appeal under section 260A; (vii) Whether the Tribunal may follow its earlier comparability findings where the relevant facts remain identical; (viii) Whether a cross-objection is maintainable in an appeal under section 260A.

Issue (i): Whether transfer-pricing comparables may be rejected or selected without satisfying the statutory comparability requirements, and when the Tribunal's determination is reviewable under section 260A.

Analysis: Section 92C(3) permits displacement of the taxpayer's arm's length price only upon the existence of one or more specified statutory conditions. Comparability must satisfy the factors under Rule 10B, including functions performed, assets employed, risks assumed, contractual terms and market conditions. Substitution of taxpayer-selected comparables by a standard departmental set, without the required statutory exercise, is impermissible. Inclusion or exclusion of comparables is ordinarily a factual and data-driven determination; interference under section 260A is confined to demonstrated breach of the Act or Rules or perversity.

Conclusion: Comparable-selection findings that conform to section 92C and Rule 10B and are not shown to be perverse do not give rise to a substantial question of law. The challenged exclusions based on functional dissimilarity, abnormal margins, lack of segmental information and other supported comparability distinctions were not interfered with.

Issue (ii): Whether turnover and related-party transaction filters adopted for selecting comparables were sustainable.

Analysis: Company size, brand value, bargaining power, intangible assets and economies of scale can materially affect comparability and profitability. The upper turnover threshold of Rs.200 crores was founded on a rational comparability basis. A related-party transaction filter is intended to minimise the effect of controlled transactions on comparable margins; a lower threshold is preferable where sufficient reliable comparables are available.

Conclusion: The upper turnover filter of Rs.200 crores and the 15% related-party transaction filter were sustained. A higher related-party transaction threshold of 20% or 25% may be adopted only upon a recorded finding that sufficient comparables satisfying the lower threshold are unavailable.

Issue (iii): Whether foreign-exchange gain or loss is an operating item for determining the arm's length price.

Analysis: Foreign-exchange fluctuation is an operating item only where it is directly and intrinsically connected with the relevant international transaction. A gain or loss merely attributable to business operations, but not derived from or directly linked to the international transaction, cannot enter operating revenue or operating cost. The required nexus is fact-specific and must be established by the taxpayer claiming operating treatment.

Conclusion: Foreign-exchange gain or loss is includible as an operating item only on proof of direct nexus with the international transaction. The foreign-exchange issues in the concerned appeals were remitted to the Transfer Pricing Officer for this factual verification.

Issue (iv): Whether the burden concerning comparables shifts after redetermination by the Transfer Pricing Officer and whether comparables may be introduced or excluded at the appellate stage.

Analysis: The taxpayer initially bears the burden of determining and substantiating the arm's length price with prescribed documentation. Where the Transfer Pricing Officer rejects that determination and substitutes or excludes comparables, the Transfer Pricing Officer must justify that exercise. Updated and reliable current-year data may become available after filing the return; Rule 10B(5) permits its use during arm's length price determination.

Conclusion: The burden depends upon the party seeking inclusion or exclusion of a comparable. There is no absolute bar on appellate inclusion or exclusion of comparables based on subsequently available reliable data, provided the requirements of section 92C and Rule 10B are satisfied.

Issue (v): Whether the 5% variation under section 92C(2) is a standard deduction and whether section 92C(2A) applies retrospectively.

Analysis: The arithmetical mean determined under section 92C(2) must be compared with the actual international-transaction price. The prescribed percentage operates only as a tolerance range within which no adjustment is required; it is not deductible from the arm's length price before measuring the variation. Section 92C(2A), inserted by the Finance Act, 2012, withdraws the earlier option where the variation exceeds the prescribed range.

Conclusion: The 5% variation is not a standard deduction. Section 92C(2A) applies retrospectively from assessment year 2002-03; the Tribunal's contrary findings were set aside and the affected matters were remitted for fresh determination in accordance with this ruling, in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether working-capital adjustment warrants interference in an appeal under section 260A.

Analysis: Working-capital adjustment is a comparability adjustment under Rule 10B(3), intended to neutralise material effects of differences in receivables, payables, inventory, financing costs and credit periods. Its necessity, method and quantum are fact- and data-dependent; no fixed statutory formula governs it.

Conclusion: Working-capital adjustment is not a selection filter and ordinarily remains a factual determination not open to interference absent breach of the Act or Rules or perversity.

Issue (vii): Whether the Tribunal may follow its earlier comparability findings where the relevant facts remain identical.

Analysis: An earlier functional, assets and risks analysis concerning a comparable may be followed for the same or comparable assessment years where the relevant factual profile continues unchanged. A different result may be sought only by establishing that the earlier finding was erroneous or that material facts differ.

Conclusion: Reliance on earlier comparability findings is permissible where identical facts and functional characteristics persist; such reliance does not, by itself, violate section 92C or Rule 10B.

Issue (viii): Whether a cross-objection is maintainable in an appeal under section 260A.

Analysis: The statutory appeal framework under section 260A does not provide for maintenance of a cross-objection.

Conclusion: The cross-objection was not maintainable and stood dismissed.

Final Conclusion: The transfer-pricing determinations based on sustainable factual comparability findings, including the turnover, related-party transaction and working-capital conclusions, remain undisturbed. Fresh adjudication is required on the identified foreign-exchange nexus questions, the affected comparables linked to the revised section 92C(2A) position, and the arm's length price consequences of the ruling on the statutory tolerance range.

Issues: Whether a reassessment notice for Assessment Year 2015-16 issued on 31 March 2021 was validly sanctioned by the competent authority under the pre-amendment reassessment regime.

Analysis: The notice fell within the period governed by the pre-amendment regime. The extension of time for sanction preserved the applicability of Section 151(2), under which approval for a notice issued within four years from the end of the relevant assessment year had to be granted by the Joint Commissioner. Sanction by the Principal Commissioner, who was the authority specified under Section 151(1) for notices beyond that period, did not satisfy the statutory requirement. Where sanctioning power is vested in a distinct specified authority, the prescribed authority alone must record satisfaction.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice was invalid for want of sanction by the competent authority; the notice, objection-disposal order, assessment order, demand notice and consequential proceedings were quashed and set aside.

Issues: Whether voluntary compensation received for diminution in the value of unexercised employee stock options following a corporate divestment is taxable under the head "Salaries" as a perquisite or as profits in lieu of salary.

Analysis: Section 17(2)(vi) requires a taxable perquisite to arise from the allotment or transfer of specified securities, with valuation premised on exercise of the option. The options were neither exercised nor cancelled, surrendered, forfeited, repurchased, allotted or transferred, and the assessee retained the same options after the payment. The proximate cause of the payment was the divestment and resulting diminution in option value, not employment services. The payment was a voluntary payment, made without statutory or contractual obligation and to all option holders; it therefore lacked the requisite employment nexus. The absence of an employment nexus also excluded treatment as profits in lieu of salary under Section 17(3)(ii). Tax deduction at source and the payer's reporting of the amount as salary could not independently establish chargeability.

Conclusion: The compensation is neither a perquisite under Section 17(2)(vi) nor profits in lieu of salary under Section 17(3)(ii), and cannot be taxed under the head "Salaries".

Issues: Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962 to entertain appeals raising questions concerning exemption from customs duty on stores imported for salvage operations.

Analysis: Sections 130 and 130E create an exclusion from High Court appellate jurisdiction for orders relating, among other things, to determination of questions having a relation to the rate of customs duty or valuation for purposes of assessment. The exclusion has a wide scope and extends to questions intrinsically connected with duty assessment, including entitlement to exemption. The questions concerning the availability of duty exemption for stores used in salvage operations had wider fiscal ramifications and fell within the Supreme Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The High Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeals; the challenge to the Tribunal's order lay before the Supreme Court under Section 130E of the Customs Act, 1962.

Issues: (i) Whether the revisionary notice and order under Section 263 were without jurisdiction because the officer, after assuming charge as Chief Commissioner, issued the notice and acted in the capacity of Principal Commissioner without a Central Board of Direct Taxes authorisation; (ii) Whether revision under Section 263 was sustainable on the allegation that the Assessing Officer failed to examine the annual letting value of the assessee's properties.

Issue (i): Whether the revisionary notice and order under Section 263 were without jurisdiction because the officer, after assuming charge as Chief Commissioner, issued the notice and acted in the capacity of Principal Commissioner without a Central Board of Direct Taxes authorisation.

Analysis: Although Section 263 permits a Chief Commissioner to exercise revisionary power, the notice was issued by an officer holding formal charge as Chief Commissioner while using the designation and signature of Principal Commissioner. Principal Commissioner and Chief Commissioner are distinct income-tax authorities under Section 116. Exercise by one authority of the functions assigned to another required an express authorisation under Section 120(2), which was absent. A statutory power required to be exercised by a specified authority must be exercised in the prescribed manner.

Conclusion: The revisionary notice was without jurisdiction and the consequential revisionary order was void in law, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether revision under Section 263 was sustainable on the allegation that the Assessing Officer failed to examine the annual letting value of the assessee's properties.

Analysis: The assessment record showed inquiries into the properties, their ownership, use, and annual letting value. Properties genuinely used for the assessee's professional activities did not attract annual letting value under Section 22, and gifted properties were no longer owned by the assessee. The Assessing Officer's acceptance of the disclosed treatment was a plausible view. Explanation 2 to Section 263 did not apply merely because the Principal Commissioner preferred further inquiry; no failure of inquiry, specific error, or material demonstrating prejudice to revenue was established. The revision rested on a change of opinion.

Conclusion: The conditions for revision under Section 263 were not satisfied, and the revision on the annual-letting-value issue was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment order remained legally valid, and the revisionary proceedings had no legal foundation.

Ratio Decidendi: Revisionary jurisdiction cannot be exercised by an authority acting under an incorrect designation without statutory authorisation, and an assessment reached after inquiry on a plausible view cannot be revised merely for further inquiry or change of opinion.

Issues: Whether a taxpayer has an absolute statutory right to use amounts in the electronic credit ledger for the appellate pre-deposit despite a credit-blocking order under Rule 86A.

Analysis: Section 49(4) permits use of electronic credit ledger balances towards output-tax payments only in the prescribed manner and subject to prescribed conditions and restrictions. Read with Section 107 and Rule 86A, an appellant may ordinarily use such credit towards liabilities including pre-deposit, but that facility is unavailable while a valid Rule 86A blocking order remains in force. Rule 86A is a provisional measure, requires recorded reasons, permits an application for unblocking, and restricts the measure to a maximum period of one year.

Conclusion: Section 49(4) does not confer an absolute right to use blocked electronic credit ledger amounts for making the appellate pre-deposit; such utilisation is impermissible during the operation of a Rule 86A blocking order.

Issues: (i) Whether rejection of input tax credit on construction intended for leasing without applying the Supreme Court precedent on "own account" construction was sustainable; (ii) Whether debit and recovery from electronic cash and credit ledgers without an intimation under Rule 142B(1) and expiry of seven days was valid.

Issue (i): Whether rejection of input tax credit on construction intended for leasing without applying the Supreme Court precedent on "own account" construction was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 17(5)(d) blocks input tax credit for construction of immovable property on a taxable person's own account, subject to its stated exceptions. The applicable Supreme Court precedent distinguishes construction for personal use or as the premises from which the taxable person conducts business from construction intended for sale, lease or licence, which cannot be characterised as construction on the taxable person's own account. The assessment findings treated ownership and capitalisation as determinative and rejected leasing as irrelevant, without addressing that binding distinction.

Conclusion: The rejection of input tax credit without applying the governing distinction regarding construction intended for leasing was unsustainable; the claim requires fresh consideration in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether debit and recovery from electronic cash and credit ledgers without an intimation under Rule 142B(1) and expiry of seven days was valid.

Analysis: Rule 142B requires electronic intimation in Form GST DRC-01D of an amount recoverable under Section 79 and allows recovery measures only where the amount remains unpaid after seven days from that intimation. The prescribed intimation and waiting period were not complied with before the ledger debits. The underlying assessment orders also could not sustain recovery action.

Conclusion: The ledger debits and recovery were invalid; the amounts must be restored to the corresponding electronic ledger in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to reconsideration of the leasing-related input tax credit claim under the binding interpretation and to restoration of the amounts recovered without adherence to the prescribed recovery process.

Issues: (i) Whether long-term capital gains from sale of listed shares, supported by stock-exchange trades, securities transaction tax, demat records and banking channels, could be assessed as unexplained cash credits in the absence of evidence linking the assessees to price manipulation; (ii) Whether deletion of penalty for concealment could be sustained after deletion of the underlying quantum additions; (iii) Whether reopening or reassessment proceedings founded on the assessment findings invalidated in the quantum matters could survive.

Issue (i): Whether long-term capital gains from sale of listed shares, supported by stock-exchange trades, securities transaction tax, demat records and banking channels, could be assessed as unexplained cash credits in the absence of evidence linking the assessees to price manipulation.

Analysis: Under Section 260-A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, interference with the Tribunal's factual findings is confined to a substantial question of law, including perversity. The material established documented purchase and sale through recognised stock exchanges, payment of securities transaction tax, demat trail and receipt through banking channels. Though abnormal price appreciation and circumstances concerning intermediaries could create suspicion, no positive and corroborated material connected either assessee with payment of unaccounted cash, an arrangement with operators, or manipulation of the share price. The test of human probabilities remains an evidentiary tool but does not dispense with proof where primary documentary evidence remains undisplaced.

Conclusion: The gains could not be treated as unexplained cash credits under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and were eligible for exemption under Section 10(38) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; the issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether deletion of penalty for concealment could be sustained after deletion of the underlying quantum additions.

Analysis: The penalty proceedings under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 rested on the same additions that were found unsustainable for want of cogent and corroborated evidence.

Conclusion: Deletion of the penalty is sustained; the issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iii): Whether reopening or reassessment proceedings founded on the assessment findings invalidated in the quantum matters could survive.

Analysis: The challenged reopening and reassessment measures were founded upon the assessment orders whose additions had not survived judicial scrutiny. Their stated foundation was consequently unavailable.

Conclusion: Reopening or reassessment proceedings based on those invalidated assessment findings cannot stand; the issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The share-sale gains retained their exempt capital-gain character, the related concealment penalties lacked a surviving basis, and derivative reassessment measures founded on the invalidated additions were rendered unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Suspicion arising from unusual share-price movements or third-party conduct cannot displace documented securities transactions or sustain an addition under Section 68 without positive, corroborated evidence linking the assessee to the alleged manipulation.

Issues: Whether interference in extraordinary writ jurisdiction was warranted against the service-tax demand where the claimed exemption was unsupported by the relevant tender and work-order documents.

Analysis: A claimant of notification-based tax exemption bears the burden of establishing eligibility through supporting evidence. The assessment order recorded consideration of the materials furnished but found that the relevant work orders and agreements were not produced to correlate the receipts with exempt handling and transportation services. The relevant tender document was also withheld in the writ proceedings, and the assertions in the counter affidavit regarding the contractual rate and taxes remained unanswered. A statutory appellate remedy was available.

Conclusion: No ground was made out for exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction to interfere with the service-tax demand; the petitioner could pursue the statutory remedy in accordance with law.

Outcome: Writ petition disposed of as withdrawn with liberty to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether continuation of the debit freeze on the assessee's bank account after expiry of the statutory period for provisional attachment was legally permissible.

Analysis: Section 110(5) permits provisional attachment of a bank account for a maximum of six months, extendable by a further period not exceeding six months only for recorded reasons and upon intimation of the extension. The investigation had concluded, the show-cause notice had been adjudicated, and the assessee had filed an appeal after making the statutory pre-deposit. No material or statutory authority supported continuation of the debit freeze beyond one year or after conclusion of the investigation. Continued freezing in those circumstances operated coercively without legal sanction.

Conclusion: Continuation of the debit freeze beyond the permissible statutory period was impermissible and the account was required to be defreezed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the tax demand order and the appellate order rejecting the appeal as time-barred should be set aside to afford the assessee an opportunity to reply to the show-cause notice and contest the proceedings.

Analysis: The demand had been confirmed under Sections 73(9), 122(2)A and 50 of the Karnataka Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 without a reply to the show-cause notice, and the appellate challenge was rejected under Section 107(11) of the Karnataka Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The inability to file a reply and contest the proceedings was accepted as arising from bona fide reasons, unavoidable circumstances and sufficient cause. A justice-oriented approach required a further opportunity, with costs, for a fresh determination after allowing the assessee to place replies and documents and receive a reasonable hearing.

Conclusion: The demand order and the appellate order were set aside, and the matter was restored for fresh consideration from the stage of filing a reply to the show-cause notice.

Issues: Whether recovery of the disputed demand should be stayed pending disposal of the appeal before the Tribunal.

Analysis: The appeal remained under scrutiny and the challenge to invocation of Section 74 was not examined on merits. The applicant's full discharge of the GST liability was confirmed, and the statutory deemed stay of recovery under Section 112(9), subject to compliance with Section 112(8), applied. Continued recovery from amounts receivable under works contracts could defeat the pending appeal and cause irreparable injury.

Outcome: Operation of the order rejecting the first appeal on limitation and recovery of the disputed demand were stayed until disposal of the appeal before the Tribunal.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit can be denied because it was not reflected in ST-3 returns and was utilised after the prescribed time limit; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked where the service-tax demand was based on third-party information from the Income Tax Department.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit can be denied because it was not reflected in ST-3 returns and was utilised after the prescribed time limit.

Analysis: The receipt of input services, payment of service tax thereon, and possession of supporting documents were undisputed. Substantive eligibility to CENVAT credit could not be defeated by procedural lapses, including non-reflection of credit in ST-3 returns or its delayed utilisation.

Conclusion: The CENVAT credit was admissible to the assessee despite its non-reflection in ST-3 returns and delayed utilisation.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked where the service-tax demand was based on third-party information from the Income Tax Department.

Analysis: The demand originated from information supplied by the Income Tax Department, and no material established suppression, misstatement, fraud, collusion, or intent to evade service tax.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The restoration of the original adjudication preserves the assessee's eligible CENVAT credit and prevents confirmation of demand through extended limitation.

Ratio Decidendi: Substantively eligible CENVAT credit cannot be denied for procedural non-reporting or delayed utilisation, and third-party information alone does not establish suppression or intent to evade tax for invoking extended limitation.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration, followed by dismissal of the statutory appeal on limitation, warranted reconsideration where the personal hearing fixed in the show-cause notice was not a meaningful opportunity and the assessee had subsequently filed returns and paid outstanding dues.

Analysis: Section 75(4) of the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires an opportunity of hearing where an adverse decision is contemplated. The hearing date was fixed before expiry of the period allowed for furnishing a reply to the show-cause notice, rendering the hearing an empty formality. The assessee had subsequently filed the pending GSTR-3B and GSTR-1 returns and paid the tax, late fee and penalty. Permanent cancellation of registration could cause civil death to the business.

Conclusion: The appellate order was set aside. The assessee may apply for revocation of cancellation within three weeks, and the competent authority must decide that application on merits without rejecting it solely on limitation.

Issues: Whether the demand arising from denial of exemption for non-filing of Form 10-B should be adjudicated in the writ petition while the assessee's rectification application remains pending.

Analysis: The rectification application acknowledged by the Income Tax Department had not been considered because it was not reflected on the electronic system. Since no order on rectification had been passed on merits, adjudication of the challenge to the demand was considered premature. The competent authority was directed to take the application on record, consider it on its own merits in accordance with law, and communicate its order; the demand was directed to abide by that decision.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with directions for consideration and disposal of the pending rectification application.

Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to a further extension for making the statutory pre-deposit after expiry of the period fixed by an earlier coordinate-bench order.

Analysis: The earlier order had set aside the appellate dismissal conditional upon appearance before the appellate authority and furnishing the statutory pre-deposit within 30 days, while expressly providing that the earlier dismissal would revive upon non-compliance. The deposit was made after the stipulated period. Granting a further extension or directing acceptance of the delayed deposit would nullify the binding directions of the coordinate bench in a separate writ proceeding.

Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to further time or a direction to accept the delayed statutory pre-deposit; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the complaints contained sufficient averments to fasten vicarious liability on the petitioner under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of cheques under Section 138.

Analysis: Liability of a company director for an offence by the company requires averments that, at the time of the offence, the director was both in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business, or that the offence occurred through the director's consent, connivance or neglect. Directorship alone does not create deemed criminal liability. The petitioner was neither a party to the underlying agreement nor a signatory to the cheques, and the complaints contained only general allegations against all accused without material particulars of the petitioner's role in the company's day-to-day affairs or in the cheque transactions. The process-issuing orders also did not address the statutory requirements for vicarious liability.

Conclusion: The petitioner could not be prosecuted under Sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on the basis of the deficient complaints; the issue is decided in favour of the petitioner.

Issues: Whether a taxpayer is entitled to proportionate refund of the statutory pre-deposit attributable to the demand set aside in first appeal, notwithstanding its intended further appeal against the surviving demand.

Analysis: Under Section 107(6) of the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, read with Circular No. 125/44/2019-GST dated 18.11.2019, refund of pre-deposit is admissible once appellate proceedings attain finality. The first appellate order had set aside 64% of the original demand, and the department had not challenged that relief. The taxpayer's intended appeal concerned only the balance demand sustained against it; consequently, finality attached separately to the portion of demand deleted in appeal. A statutory pre-deposit is in the nature of a security deposit and, upon appellate relief, its retention without authority is impermissible. The appellate order, insofar as it set aside the demand, was binding under Section 107(16) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: The taxpayer was entitled to refund of the proportionate pre-deposit attributable to the demand set aside in appeal; the rejection founded on absence of finality of the entire appellate proceedings was unsustainable.