Issues: Whether unconditional return of seized gold could be directed under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, despite the Revenue's assertion that an oral notice under Section 124(a) had been issued and the underlying facts were disputed.

Analysis: Section 110(2) mandates return of seized goods where the notice contemplated by Section 124(a) is not issued within the prescribed or validly extended period. The first proviso to Section 124 permits an oral notice and oral representation at the request of the person concerned. A mere waiver does not dispense with the statutory notice requirement; however, the Revenue specifically recorded that an oral notice was issued on the date of seizure. The contemporaneous statement, coupled with that assertion, raised disputed factual questions as to the oral proceedings, the request for oral notice, and the voluntariness and contents of the statement. Such evidentiary disputes could not be resolved in writ jurisdiction. The absence of a personal hearing did not by itself establish entitlement to return under Section 110(2), which turns on issuance of notice under Section 124(a).

Conclusion: The Petitioner was not entitled to unconditional release of the gold under Section 110(2) on the mere absence of a written notice; the asserted oral notice and disputed factual foundation required determination by the competent Customs authority. The conclusion is against the assessee.

Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised against a customs confiscation order despite the availability of a statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The challenge involved disputed factual questions concerning the recording and voluntariness of the statement, issuance of notice, waiver of notice and hearing, and procedural compliance in confiscation proceedings. These matters required appraisal of the adjudication record and were appropriately examinable by the statutory appellate authority. Mere allegation of breach of natural justice did not warrant bypassing the efficacious appellate remedy on these facts.

Outcome: The petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether unconditional release of the detained gold bars could be directed solely because no separate written show-cause notice was issued within the period contemplated by Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 permits the notice and representation contemplated therein to be oral at the request of the person concerned. Although no separate written notice was issued, the departmental record asserted that an oral show-cause notice had been given on the date of detention and contained a contemporaneous statement concerning concealment, non-declaration and waiver of notice and hearing. The recital of waiver was not conclusive of statutory compliance. Whether an oral notice was actually given, the grounds communicated, the voluntariness of the statement, and the effect of the contemporaneous proceedings required examination of evidence, including the asserted CCTV material, and could not appropriately be determined in writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: Unconditional release was not warranted at this stage; the competent adjudicating authority must determine compliance with Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 after affording the petitioner a personal hearing.

Issues: Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction could be invoked to challenge a concluded customs adjudication order despite an available statutory appeal and prolonged unexplained delay.

Analysis: Article 226 jurisdiction is not barred absolutely by an alternative remedy, but exhaustion of an efficacious statutory remedy remains the governing rule. The challenge involved disputed questions concerning service of notice, the purported waiver, adjudication records and findings of confiscation, all of which were amenable to appellate scrutiny under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioner had knowledge of the seizure, did not respond to the public notice, did not pursue the statutory appeal against the adjudication order, and furnished no satisfactory explanation for the prolonged inaction.

Conclusion: Exercise of writ jurisdiction was declined; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether a customs claim arising from a pre-CIRP import transaction, which the Customs Department did not submit during CIRP, could be adjudicated and enforced after approval of the resolution plan.

Analysis: A claim under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 arises from the underlying right to payment and need not have been adjudicated, quantified or crystallised before the insolvency commencement date. The public announcement mechanism obligated the Customs Department to file its pre-CIRP claim with the Resolution Professional. Approval of the resolution plan under Section 31(1) made it binding upon governmental authorities, and the plan expressly extinguished unfiled pre-CIRP claims. Although customs authorities may determine liability during CIRP, that power cannot be exercised after plan approval to enforce an extinguished pre-CIRP claim. Section 238 gives the IBC overriding effect where the Customs Act conflicts with the binding consequences of the approved plan.

Conclusion: The unfiled customs claim arising from the pre-CIRP import stood extinguished upon approval of the resolution plan and could not thereafter be adjudicated or enforced against the corporate debtor.

Issues: (i) Whether Article 24 of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area ousted the jurisdiction of Customs Authorities to initiate proceedings under the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether Customs Authorities lacked power, before insertion of Section 28DA, to recover duty on an incorrect preferential-tariff claim.

Issue (i): Whether Article 24 of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area ousted the jurisdiction of Customs Authorities to initiate proceedings under the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Article 24, containing the inter-State dispute-resolution mechanism, was not incorporated into Indian municipal law. The Rules of Origin, 2009 gave effect to origin criteria for preferential treatment but did not incorporate that dispute-resolution mechanism. An unincorporated treaty obligation cannot be enforced by a private party to displace statutory jurisdiction conferred on Customs Authorities under domestic law.

Conclusion: Article 24 did not oust the jurisdiction of Customs Authorities under the Customs Act, 1962. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Customs Authorities lacked power, before insertion of Section 28DA, to recover duty on an incorrect preferential-tariff claim.

Analysis: The pre-amendment statutory scheme of Sections 28 and 46 empowered recovery of duty short-levied or short-paid because of suppression of facts. The importer was required to make a truthful declaration in the bill of entry and supporting documents, including particulars underlying the certificate of origin and regional value content. Section 28DA introduced an additional verification mechanism for preferential-origin claims; it did not create or curtail the pre-existing recovery jurisdiction under Section 28.

Conclusion: Customs Authorities possessed the requisite power under the unamended Customs Act, 1962 to proceed on an incorrect or suppressed preferential-duty declaration. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional objections to the orders denying preferential customs-duty benefit failed, while questions concerning duty quantification, confiscation and penalty remained open for statutory appellate consideration.

Ratio Decidendi: An unincorporated treaty dispute-resolution provision cannot override domestic customs jurisdiction, and a later preferential-origin verification mechanism does not negate the pre-existing statutory power to recover duty arising from suppression in import declarations.

Issues: Whether duty demand, redemption fine and penalty for alleged non-compliance with EPCG notification conditions could survive after issuance of the Export Obligation Discharge Certificates and cancellation of the bonds.

Analysis: Installation certificates covering the imported capital goods and Export Obligation Discharge Certificates for all six EPCG authorisations established fulfilment of the stipulated conditions. The EODC had not been produced during adjudication because its issuance by the licensing authority was pending despite the assessee having submitted the required material. Customs subsequently accepted the EODCs and cancelled the corresponding bonds. Confirmation of duty for non-production of documents was consequently inconsistent with the subsequent acceptance of those documents and bond cancellation.

Conclusion: The duty demand, redemption fine and penalty were legally unsustainable; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether a PCM had a statutory duty and regulatory visibility to verify TM clients' debit/credit positions before liquidating collateral; (ii) Whether the NCL/MCSGFC could order restitution of liquidated securities; (iii) Whether TM clients could recover from a PCM for the TM's default.

Issue (i): Whether a PCM had a statutory duty and regulatory visibility to verify TM clients' debit/credit positions before liquidating collateral.

Analysis: Under the applicable F&O Regulations and the CM-TM arrangement, a PCM's constituent was the TM. The restrictions on use of client margins required a TM to preserve its individual clients' collateral and prevented a PCM from using one TM's collateral for another TM's dues; they did not impose on a PCM a duty to ascertain the debit/credit position of each individual client of its TM. The reporting regime then in force did not provide real-time client-level position data. The later daily client-level reporting and pledge/re-pledge framework confirmed that such visibility and segregation were introduced subsequently.

Conclusion: A PCM had no statutory duty to verify individual TM-client debit/credit positions before liquidation, and the then applicable regulatory mechanism did not provide such visibility. This issue is decided in favour of the PCMs.

Issue (ii): Whether the NCL/MCSGFC could order restitution of liquidated securities.

Analysis: The statutory byelaw-making power permits fines, expulsion, suspension and like penalties not involving payment of money. Disgorgement powers were expressly vested in SEBI under separate provisions, but no corresponding authority was conferred on a stock exchange, clearing corporation or its committee. An order requiring restoration of securities, or alternatively blocking their value with an additional amount, was monetary in substance and could not be sustained as restitution based on equity where the liquidation was not contrary to the governing regulatory framework.

Conclusion: The NCL/MCSGFC lacked statutory power to direct restitution of the liquidated securities. This issue is decided against the NCL/MCSGFC.

Issue (iii): Whether TM clients could recover from a PCM for the TM's default.

Analysis: The losses resulted from the TM's default and its unauthorised assured-return arrangements, in which the investors had furnished securities as collateral. The PCM neither had privity with those individual clients nor breached a regulatory obligation in liquidating the collateral to meet the TM's unpaid obligations. Any remedies of the affected clients lay against their respective TMs, subject to lawful exceptions.

Conclusion: TM clients cannot lay a claim against a PCM for the TM's default in these circumstances. This issue is decided against the investors.

Final Conclusion: The restitution directions lacked statutory foundation, and the regulatory regime applicable during the relevant period did not shift the TM's client-level obligations or losses to the PCMs.

Ratio Decidendi: A clearing member cannot be subjected to monetary restitution for a trading member's client-level default unless the governing statutory and regulatory framework both imposes the relevant client-level obligation and authorises that remedial power.

Issues: (i) Whether the Railways can be treated as a dealer under the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975; (ii) Whether the transfer of rolling stock to the financing corporation constituted sales by the Railways; (iii) Whether sales established between the Railways and the financing corporation were liable to tax in Delhi.

Issue (i): Whether the Railways can be treated as a dealer under the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975.

Analysis: The statutory definitions of business and dealer are broad, make profit motive immaterial, and expressly include the Central Government when carrying on the business of selling goods. The Railways' public functions do not confer immunity from sales-tax legislation. Its statutory capacity as a dealer is distinct from whether a particular transaction is a sale.

Conclusion: The Railways can be a dealer under the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the transfer of rolling stock to the financing corporation constituted sales by the Railways.

Analysis: A sale requires transfer for consideration of property that vested in the Railways. Possession, procurement functions and commissioning responsibilities are relevant but not conclusive of title. Where the Railways acted as agent of the financing corporation in procurement from private manufacturers, property passed directly from the manufacturer to the financing corporation and no intermediate sale arose. Conversely, rolling stock manufactured and owned by the Railways, or privately procured by it as principal, was sold when title was transferred to the financing corporation against adjustment of funds advanced by it. Agency could arise without a separate agency fee. An adverse inference from non-production of records could not eliminate the necessary distinction between these legally different classes of transactions.

Conclusion: Transfers of rolling stock previously owned by the Railways constituted sales, whereas stock procured by the Railways on behalf of the financing corporation did not. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether sales established between the Railways and the financing corporation were liable to tax in Delhi.

Analysis: The burden of proving exclusion from levy arises only after a sale is established. The assessee was required to prove, transaction-wise, that the sale occasioned inter-State movement or occurred outside Delhi under the applicable statutory tests. Manufacture, dispatch or subsequent use outside Delhi did not by themselves establish that the sale between the Railways and the financing corporation was an inter-State or outside-State sale. The parties' head-office locations and a lease stipulation deeming appropriation in Delhi were not conclusive, but contemporaneous records could be considered in the absence of contrary transaction-specific material.

Conclusion: Sales established as having been made by the Railways were not proved to be excluded from the Delhi levy. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The taxable turnover must be confined to rolling stock owned by the Railways before transfer to the financing corporation, excluding stock procured by the Railways as its agent; classification and computation require assessment-year-wise determination on the stipulated legal basis.

Ratio Decidendi: A financing arrangement for acquisition of goods constitutes a taxable sale only where the intermediary previously held title as principal and transferred that property for consideration; agency procurement does not create an intermediate sale.

Issues: (i) Whether purse-seine vessels may transit State territorial waters to fish in the EEZ under the distinct Union and State regulatory regimes; (ii) Whether pending applications for EEZ Access Passes may be left unprocessed by the State verifying authority.

Issue (i): Whether purse-seine vessels may transit State territorial waters to fish in the EEZ under the distinct Union and State regulatory regimes.

Analysis: Fishing in the EEZ falls within the Union's legislative and executive sphere, whereas fishing in territorial waters is regulated by the State. The EEZ Rules, 2025 provide for Access Passes for EEZ fishing, while the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Rules, 2020 regulate activity within territorial waters. These autonomous regulatory fields do not conflict. Cooperative federalism requires implementation that enables regulated access to the EEZ while preserving the State's power to regulate transit and fishing within territorial waters. The State must designate transit channels under Rules 15(5) and 15(6), with due regard to the Expert Committee's recommendations.

Conclusion: Purse-seine vessels possessing the requisite EEZ permissions may obtain regulated transit access through Tamil Nadu's territorial waters to fish in the EEZ; the State must frame rules or regulations for specified transit channels. This is in favour of the applicants.

Issue (ii): Whether pending applications for EEZ Access Passes may be left unprocessed by the State verifying authority.

Analysis: The Access Pass framework requires coordination between the Union issuing authority and the State verifying authority. Prolonged non-verification of applications defeats the regulatory scheme and, in practical effect, creates an impermissible unwritten prohibition on the pursuit of the applicants' occupation, subject to lawful regulation.

Conclusion: The State must ensure effective, efficient and timely verification and clearance of applications in accordance with the governing rules and regulations. This is in favour of the applicants.

Final Conclusion: The governing Union and State regimes must operate harmoniously to secure lawful, regulated EEZ fishing access and timely regulatory clearances.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Union law regulates fishing in the EEZ and State law regulates territorial waters, their distinct constitutional fields must be implemented cooperatively, and administrative delay cannot operate as an unwritten bar to regulated access.

Issues: (i) Whether a co-operative bank must deduct tax at source on interest paid or credited to non-member co-operative societies under section 194A(3)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961? (ii) Whether tax was deductible from interest credited to NRE fixed deposits exempt under section 10(4)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961? (iii) Whether tax was deductible from interest paid on a member's fixed deposit closed before 1 June 2015? (iv) Whether the assessee may avoid being treated as an assessee in default where the resident payee has returned and paid tax on the interest income?

Issue (i): Whether a co-operative bank must deduct tax at source on interest paid or credited to non-member co-operative societies under section 194A(3)(v) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

Analysis: Section 194A(1) imposes the general tax-deduction-at-source obligation, while section 194A(3)(v) creates specified exemptions. The first limb of section 194A(3)(v) excludes a co-operative bank only in relation to interest paid to its members; the second limb, covering interest paid by a co-operative society to another co-operative society, contains no such exclusion. The binding jurisdictional interpretation confirms that a co-operative bank continues to be a co-operative society for the second limb. Paragraph 42.7 of CBDT Circular No. 19/2015 also preserves this exemption for interest paid by a co-operative bank to a co-operative society. The recipient's eligibility under section 80P concerns assessment of its income and does not govern the payer's tax-deduction-at-source obligation.

Conclusion: Interest paid or credited by a co-operative bank to a non-member co-operative society is exempt from tax deduction at source under section 194A(3)(v); the assessee cannot be treated as an assessee in default or charged consequential interest under section 201(1A). This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether tax was deductible from interest credited to NRE fixed deposits exempt under section 10(4)(ii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961?

Analysis: The tax-deduction-at-source obligation under section 195 arises only where the sum payable to a non-resident is chargeable to tax in India. Interest on the specified NRE fixed deposits was exempt under section 10(4)(ii) and therefore lacked the essential element of chargeability of income.

Conclusion: No tax was deductible from the interest credited to the specified NRE fixed deposits. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether tax was deductible from interest paid on a member's fixed deposit closed before 1 June 2015?

Analysis: The amendment excluding co-operative banks from the member-interest exemption under section 194A(3)(v) operated prospectively from 1 June 2015. The interest in question was paid or credited upon closure of the deposit before that effective date.

Conclusion: No tax was deductible from the interest paid or credited on the member's fixed deposit closed before 1 June 2015. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the assessee may avoid being treated as an assessee in default where the resident payee has returned and paid tax on the interest income?

Analysis: The first proviso to section 201(1) prevents double recovery of tax where the resident payee has filed a return under section 139, included the relevant sum in its income, and paid the tax due. Entitlement must be substantiated through an accountant's certificate in Form No. 26A under rule 31ACB. The certificate was produced for the first time and required verification.

Conclusion: The claim is remitted to the Assessing Officer for verification of Form No. 26A and the accountant's certificate and for fresh determination in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The tax-deduction liabilities on interest paid to co-operative societies, exempt NRE deposit interest, and pre-amendment member-deposit interest cannot be sustained; the resident-payee compliance claim requires verification.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration should be set aside and registration restored subject to compliance with prescribed conditions.

Analysis: The issue was governed by the earlier framework for revival of cancelled GST registrations. That framework requires filing pending pre-cancellation returns and payment of outstanding tax, interest, and applicable fine or fee; filing post-cancellation returns and paying GST in cash; and permitting utilisation of input tax credit only after scrutiny and approval by the competent authority.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was set aside and restoration of GST registration was directed, subject to compliance with the prescribed conditions, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the qualifying conditions in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Regulation 27(1)(c) apply also to a borrower and subsidiary of a credit rating agency's promoter under Regulation 27(1)(a) and (b).

Analysis: Regulation 27(1) was ambiguous regarding the applicability of the qualifying conditions to borrowers and subsidiaries of the promoter. A harmonious construction, having regard to the common purpose of preventing conflict of interest, the contemporaneous regulatory press release, the parliamentary report, and the analogous formulation in Regulation 28V, supported applying the conditions uniformly to borrowers, subsidiaries and associates of the promoter.

Conclusion: The conditions in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of Regulation 27(1)(c) apply to Regulation 27(1)(a) and (b) as well; the issue was answered in the affirmative.

Issues: Whether filing an appeal with the prescribed pre-deposit under Section 107(7) of the applicable GST enactments requires unblocking of the electronic credit ledger blocked under Rule 86A.

Analysis: A blocking order under Rule 86A is a provisional measure requiring recorded reasons and cannot remain in force beyond one year. The deemed stay arising upon filing an appeal and making the pre-deposit stays recovery of the balance demand and prevents appropriation from the electronic cash ledger or blocked electronic credit ledger. It does not affect the subsisting blocking order under Rule 86A. The statutory framework permits the affected person to seek unblocking, and the pending representation requires consideration.

Conclusion: The deemed stay under Section 107(7) does not by itself require unblocking of the electronic credit ledger; the request for unblocking must be considered under Rule 86A.

Issues: (i) Whether a belated appeal dismissed solely on limitation causes merger of the GST-registration cancellation order and bars writ review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether cancellation of GST registration for failure to reply to a show-cause notice should be set aside and registration restored where the non-response was explained by bona fide reasons.

Issue (i): Whether a belated appeal dismissed solely on limitation causes merger of the GST-registration cancellation order and bars writ review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The appellate order was a summary rejection on the ground of limitation and did not adjudicate the validity of the original cancellation. Such rejection does not attract the doctrine of merger. The constitutional writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 therefore remains available against the original cancellation order.

Conclusion: The time-barred appellate dismissal did not cause merger or preclude writ review of the cancellation order, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether cancellation of GST registration for failure to reply to a show-cause notice should be set aside and registration restored where the non-response was explained by bona fide reasons.

Analysis: The cancellation followed the absence of a reply to the show-cause notice. The stated bona fide reasons, unavoidable circumstances, and sufficient cause for the omission warranted a justice-oriented exercise of writ jurisdiction by affording one further opportunity.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was quashed and restoration of GST registration was directed upon compliance with the prescribed return-filing and tax-payment obligations, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The original cancellation cannot survive, and the assessee is entitled to restoration of registration upon fulfilment of the stipulated fiscal compliance.

Ratio Decidendi: A summary appellate rejection solely on limitation does not result in merger of the original order and does not bar constitutional writ review of that order.

Issues: Whether disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D could be directed in respect of exempt income where the bank had sufficient own funds and no expenditure was shown to have been incurred for earning that income.

Analysis: Expenditure may be disallowed only where it has a direct nexus with the earning of exempt income. The assessee's surplus own funds were sufficient to cover the investments yielding exempt income; consequently, no financial expenditure could be attributed to those investments. In the absence of such nexus, estimation of proportionate expenditure was unjustified.

Conclusion: The direction to apply Section 14A read with Rule 8D for a proportionate or estimated disallowance was unsustainable, and no disallowance was warranted.

Issues: (i) Whether an ECIR can be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India following the petitioner's first-instance acquittal in the scheduled offence; (ii) Whether the PMLA enquiry and information-sharing under Section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 cease because of that acquittal; (iii) Whether release of seized cash and documents can be sought in writ jurisdiction despite the statutory PMLA adjudicatory mechanism; (iv) Whether the petitioner can maintain parallel writ proceedings after invoking the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority.

Issue (i): Whether an ECIR can be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India following the petitioner's first-instance acquittal in the scheduled offence.

Analysis: An ECIR is a non-statutory internal administrative record of the Enforcement Directorate and is not equivalent to an FIR. The statutory scheme permits inquiry into property suspected to be proceeds of crime and consequential action without an ECIR being a legal prerequisite. Although action for money laundering cannot continue where the person has been finally absolved in the scheduled offence, a first-instance acquittal that remains amenable to appellate challenge does not constitute final absolution. The acquittal was also confined to the predicate case and did not determine the source or character of the separately seized assets.

Conclusion: The ECIR is not amenable to quashing under Article 226 merely on the basis of an appealable first-instance acquittal in the scheduled offence.

Issue (ii): Whether the PMLA enquiry and information-sharing under Section 66(2) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 cease because of that acquittal.

Analysis: The offence of money laundering requires proceeds of crime derived from criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. However, Section 66(2) operates in a distinct sphere by requiring the Enforcement Directorate to share material indicating contravention of other laws with the concerned agency. This inter-agency information-sharing mechanism may operate on material independently gathered during enquiry, including material concerning assets not examined in the predicate trial. The provisions concerning predicate-offence prosecution and Section 66(2) were construed harmoniously so that neither is rendered ineffective.

Conclusion: No. The enquiry and the statutory sharing of material under Section 66(2) may continue notwithstanding the non-final acquittal in the predicate case.

Issue (iii): Whether release of seized cash and documents can be sought in writ jurisdiction despite the statutory PMLA adjudicatory mechanism.

Analysis: The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 provides a specialised statutory mechanism for adjudication concerning seized property, followed by appeals to the Appellate Tribunal and the High Court. Questions concerning the legitimacy and source of the seized assets require factual examination of financial and documentary material and fall within the domain of the Adjudicating Authority. Writ jurisdiction cannot be used to pre-empt that statutory fact-finding process.

Conclusion: No. Release of the seized assets cannot be directed in writ jurisdiction by bypassing the statutory adjudicatory and appellate remedies.

Issue (iv): Whether the petitioner can maintain parallel writ proceedings after invoking the jurisdiction of the Adjudicating Authority.

Analysis: Having invoked the statutory adjudicatory process and placed factual and legal defences before the competent authority, the petitioner cannot simultaneously pursue a parallel writ remedy seeking adjudication of the same asset-related questions. The principle requiring exhaustion of the alternative statutory remedy applies.

Conclusion: No. Parallel recourse to writ jurisdiction is impermissible while the statutory adjudication remains pending.

Final Conclusion: The specialised PMLA process before the Adjudicating Authority remains the proper forum for determination of the character and retention of the seized assets, with the petitioner entitled to raise the predicate-offence acquittal and other defences before the competent statutory authorities.

Ratio Decidendi: A first-instance acquittal that remains subject to appellate challenge is not final absolution, and an ECIR being a non-statutory internal record cannot be quashed under Article 226 when disputed asset-related issues are pending before the statutory PMLA adjudicatory forum.

Issues: (i) Admissibility of CENVAT credit on scaffolding as capital goods. (ii) Recovery of alleged excess CENVAT credit caused by carry-forward balance in ST-3 returns.

Issue (i): Admissibility of CENVAT credit on scaffolding as capital goods.

Analysis: The capital-goods definition under Rule 2(a) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 was applied. Scaffolding, after coming into existence, was found not to be tubes, pipes or fittings covered by Rule 2(a)(A)(vi), nor to fall within any other category of capital goods under Rule 2(a).

Conclusion: CENVAT credit on scaffolding is inadmissible. The finding is against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Recovery of alleged excess CENVAT credit caused by carry-forward balance in ST-3 returns.

Analysis: The alleged excess arose from discrepancies in the credit balance carried forward in the ST-3 returns. The reconciliation based on revised return workings, audited accounts, CENVAT records and cash-payment challans requires verification by the adjudicating authority.

Conclusion: No final fiscal finding is recorded on the alleged excess credit; the issue is remanded for fresh adjudication.

Final Conclusion: The disallowance of credit on scaffolding remains undisturbed, while the alleged excess-credit liability requires fresh determination.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods not falling within any category prescribed in the definition of capital goods cannot qualify for CENVAT credit as capital goods.

Issues: Whether a refund application may be treated as time-barred through a deficiency memo under Rule 90(3), instead of following the refund-rejection procedure under Rule 92(3).

Analysis: Rule 92(3) requires issuance of a show cause notice where the proper officer proposes to reject a refund claim wholly or partly, followed by consideration of the reply and an opportunity of hearing. Rule 90(3) concerns deficiencies capable of rectification and requires a fresh application after rectification; its limitation-related proviso does not permit a deficiency memo to reject a claim as time-barred.

Conclusion: A deficiency memo cannot be issued on the ground that the refund application is time-barred; any proposed rejection of the refund claim must be undertaken through the procedure under Rule 92(3).

Issues: (i) Whether exemption for investment in a new residential property could be denied on the basis that a shop-cum-office was an additional residential house for purposes of Section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961; (ii) Whether deduction for investment in agricultural land could be denied where the purchased land was situated in an urban area for purposes of Section 54B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether exemption for investment in a new residential property could be denied on the basis that a shop-cum-office was an additional residential house for purposes of Section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The denial rested on treating SCO No. 7, Dhakoli, Zirakpur as a residential property. Factual verification established that the property was commercial in nature. A commercial shop-cum-office could not be counted as a residential house while applying the ownership condition.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to the claimed exemption under Section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961, subject to fulfilment of the remaining statutory conditions; the issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deduction for investment in agricultural land could be denied where the purchased land was situated in an urban area for purposes of Section 54B of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Verification of the purchase deeds and factual material confirmed that the relevant properties were agricultural lands purchased by the assessee. Their location in an urban area, without material showing that they had lost their agricultural character, was insufficient to deny the claim.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to deduction under Section 54B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to the extent of the eligible investment established by the documentary evidence, including the specified purchase deeds; the issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The verified commercial nature of the shop-cum-office and agricultural nature of the purchased lands remove the bases on which the corresponding capital-gains claims had been denied, requiring computation on the eligible investments established on record.