Loading...
By creating an account you can:
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Issues: (i) Whether the attachment was liable to be set aside on the ground that the Enforcement Directorate had not conducted any independent investigation into the predicate offence; (ii) Whether the attachment failed for non-compliance with the conditions in the second proviso to Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (iii) Whether properties acquired from alleged lawful income could still be attached where the public servant was found in possession of disproportionate assets.
Issue (i): Whether the attachment was liable to be set aside on the ground that the Enforcement Directorate had not conducted any independent investigation into the predicate offence?
Analysis: The material before the Authority showed that the role of the Enforcement Directorate is confined to examining the existence of a predicate offence, the generation of proceeds of crime, and the laundering or likely laundering of such proceeds. The investigation into the scheduled offence remains with the police or CBI, and the Enforcement Directorate is not required to re-investigate the predicate offence or reach an independent conclusion on that offence. It may only notice glaring mistakes or lacunae in the predicate investigation for the purpose of its own proceedings under the money-laundering law.
Conclusion: The contention was rejected and the issue was decided against the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the attachment failed for non-compliance with the conditions in the second proviso to Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002?
Analysis: The record showed that there was material supporting a reason to believe that the appellant was in possession of proceeds of crime and that the properties were likely to be concealed, transferred, or otherwise dealt with so as to frustrate confiscation proceedings. The Authority held that the statutory pre-conditions for provisional attachment were satisfied and that the safeguards in the second proviso were met on the facts proved before it.
Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellant.
Issue (iii): Whether properties acquired from alleged lawful income could still be attached where the public servant was found in possession of disproportionate assets?
Analysis: The Authority held that even where a particular asset is traced to a lawful source, it may still be attached as property of equivalent value if direct attachment of the tainted property is not practicable. The definition of proceeds of crime is wide enough to include the value of such property, and the object of the statute permits attachment of equivalent value to prevent dissipation of the proceeds of crime.
Conclusion: The issue was decided against the appellant and in favour of the respondent.
Final Conclusion: The attachment order was sustained and the appeal failed on all substantive grounds, with no interference granted to the confirmed provisional attachment.
Ratio Decidendi: In proceedings under the money-laundering law, the Enforcement Directorate need not re-investigate the predicate offence, and property of equivalent value may be attached where proceeds of crime are involved, even if the particular asset is claimed to have been acquired from lawful income.
ISSUES:
RULINGS / HOLDINGS:
RATIONALE:
Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to duty drawback on customs duty and social welfare surcharge paid by its EOU supplier and included in the price of goods sold to the petitioner, and whether the authorities were justified in rejecting the drawback claim for want of a separate invoice disclosure of customs duty.
Analysis: The supplier had paid customs duty and social welfare surcharge on the imported inputs used in the goods cleared to the petitioner and had issued declarations and invoices stating that the duty burden was included in the sale price. The Court held that, once the supplier had paid the duty and the petitioner had paid the price inclusive of that duty, the incidence of duty was borne by the petitioner. The presumption under Section 28D of the Customs Act, 1962 operated in favour of passing on the duty burden to the buyer unless the contrary was proved. The authorities erred in insisting that the customs duty must be separately reflected in the invoice, because no such requirement was shown under the Customs Act, 1962 or the Drawback Rules, 2017. The petitioner's omission in the drawback statement was treated as an inadvertent mistake and not a ground to deny substantive entitlement.
Conclusion: The rejection of the drawback claim was unsustainable and the petitioner was held entitled to brand rate drawback on the customs duty and surcharge borne through the purchase price.
Final Conclusion: The impugned orders were quashed and the petitioner's drawback applications were directed to be sanctioned in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: Where customs duty paid by a supplier forms part of the sale price charged to the buyer, the duty incidence is presumed to have been passed on to the buyer, and drawback cannot be denied merely because the invoice does not separately disclose the customs duty component.
(i) Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) of the Income Tax Act applies to the assessee's case, thereby denying the claim of depreciation on revalued assetsRs.
(ii) Whether the Tribunal was justified in not following the Supreme Court decisions in M/s. Jogta Coal Co. Ltd. and Kalooram Govindram, which were argued to be directly applicable to the facts of the assessee's caseRs.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Applicability of Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) and denial of depreciation claim on revalued assets
Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 43(1) of the Income Tax Act defines "actual cost" of an asset for the purpose of depreciation claims. Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) provides that where assets were previously used by another person in business and the transfer to the assessee is primarily for reducing income-tax liability by claiming depreciation on an enhanced cost, the Assessing Officer, with prior approval, may determine the actual cost to the assessee considering all circumstances.
Rule 5 of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 states that aggregate depreciation allowed on any asset cannot exceed its actual cost.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined whether Explanation 3 applied to the facts where the assessee took over the entire business and assets of a partnership firm through a dissolution deed. The assets' valuation was based on an earlier valuation from April 1982, predating the dissolution in 1984. The assessee claimed depreciation on the cost actually paid to the erstwhile partners as per this valuation.
The Court noted that the dissolution deed executed on 31.03.1984 transferred all assets and liabilities to the assessee, who then carried on the business from 01.04.1984. The payment to the other partners was as per the valuation done in 1982, which was the basis for the actual cost paid by the assessee.
The Assessing Officer invoked Explanation 1 to Section 43(6) (though the judgment primarily discusses Explanation 3 of Section 43(1)) to deny the depreciation claim, alleging that the transfer was for tax avoidance by inflating asset cost. The Tribunal upheld this view.
The Court rejected this reasoning, holding that the actual cost to the assessee is the amount paid to acquire the assets, irrespective of family relationships among partners or shareholders. The Act does not exclude such cases from depreciation claims. The Court emphasized that the valuation was a bona fide business valuation predating the dissolution and that the assessee legitimately took over the business and assets.
Key evidence and findings: The dissolution deed, the valuation report from April 1982, and the payment made by the assessee to the erstwhile partners as per that valuation were critical. The Court found no evidence that the transfer was primarily to reduce tax liability by inflating asset cost.
Application of law to facts: The Court applied the definition of actual cost under Section 43(1) and found that the actual cost to the assessee was the amount paid to the partners. Explanation 3 was not applicable as there was no tax avoidance motive established. Hence, depreciation on the actual cost paid was allowable.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Revenue argued that Explanation 3 applied, denying depreciation on revalued assets to prevent tax avoidance. The Court disagreed, holding that Explanation 3 requires satisfaction of the Assessing Officer and approval of the Joint Commissioner based on the main purpose of transfer being tax reduction. No such satisfaction or approval was recorded, and the facts did not support such a conclusion.
Conclusions: Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) did not apply. The assessee was entitled to claim depreciation on the actual cost paid for the assets taken over from the partnership firm.
Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal erred in not following Supreme Court precedents
Relevant legal framework and precedents: The assessee relied on Supreme Court decisions in M/s. Jogta Coal Co. Ltd. and Kalooram Govindram, which dealt with similar issues on determination of actual cost and depreciation claims on assets acquired from partners or firms.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed that these decisions were directly applicable and supported the assessee's claim. These precedents recognized that where an assessee acquires assets from a partnership firm by paying the actual cost, depreciation should be allowed on that cost.
Key evidence and findings: The Court noted that the Tribunal failed to follow these binding precedents without adequate reasons, thereby causing an error in law.
Application of law to facts: Applying the principles from these precedents, the Court found that the assessee's claim for depreciation on actual cost was justified and consistent with the law.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Revenue's reliance on Explanation 3 and the Tribunal's approach was rejected as inconsistent with the Supreme Court rulings.
Conclusions: The Tribunal was not justified in disregarding the Supreme Court precedents. The Court held that these decisions apply fully to the facts of the present case.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
"... assessee will be entitled to claim depreciation for the subsequent years on the basis of the actual cost paid. It is immaterial whether the erstwhile partners or shareholders or directors are all of the same family. The Act does not provide for any exclusion in such cases."
"... Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) does not apply where the transfer is bona fide and not primarily for the purpose of reducing income-tax liability by claiming depreciation with reference to an enhanced cost."
"The Tribunal erred in not following the Supreme Court decisions in M/s. Jogta Coal Co. Ltd. and Kalooram Govindram which apply on all fours to the facts of the assessee's case."
Core principles established include that actual cost for depreciation purposes is the amount paid by the assessee to acquire the asset, even if acquired from partners of a dissolved firm, and that Explanation 3 to Section 43(1) is applicable only where there is clear evidence of tax avoidance motive and proper satisfaction and approval by authorities.
Final determinations were that the assessee was entitled to claim depreciation on the actual cost paid for the assets acquired from the partnership firm, and the appeals were allowed accordingly.
The core legal questions considered by the Court in this matter are:
- Whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable to challenge the demand raised under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act) for alleged fraudulent availment of Input Tax Credit (ITC) from non-existent suppliers whose GST registrations were cancelled.
- Whether the adjudicating authority erred in invoking Section 16(2)(c) read with Section 41 of the CGST Act with retrospective effect, given that the amendment to Section 41 was introduced only on 1st October 2022.
- The scope and applicability of writ jurisdiction in cases involving complex factual matrices of alleged fraudulent availment of ITC and the appropriate forum for adjudication of such disputes.
- The Court also considered the procedural aspects relating to limitation for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act and the possibility of condoning delay in filing such appeal.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Maintainability of Writ Petition in Cases of Alleged Fraudulent Availment of ITC
Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The Court referred extensively to a prior judgment in W.P.(C) 5737/2025, which dealt with the misuse of the ITC mechanism under Section 16 of the CGST Act. Section 16 provides the entitlement to ITC for businesses on inputs and input services used in the course of business. Section 41 pertains to provisional assessment and recovery of ITC wrongly availed. The Court emphasized the extraordinary nature of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and the settled principle that such jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly in matters involving complex factual disputes and allegations of fraud.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court underscored the serious nature of allegations involving a "complex maze of transactions" between non-existent firms to fraudulently avail ITC. It recognized that the ITC facility is a key feature of the GST regime, designed to avoid cascading taxes and facilitate ease of doing business. However, misuse of this facility by claiming ITC from cancelled or non-existent dealers undermines the GST framework and causes significant revenue loss to the exchequer.
The Court noted that the adjudicating authority had concluded no actual supply of goods or services took place and the suppliers were non-existent, justifying the demand. It observed that such factual determinations require detailed analysis and cannot be undertaken in writ proceedings. The Court reiterated that writ jurisdiction should not be used as a substitute for statutory remedies and should not be extended to shield unscrupulous litigants from consequences of fraudulent transactions.
Key Evidence and Findings: The impugned order was supported by findings that the suppliers' GST registrations were cancelled and that the firms were non-existent. The Petitioner's reply to the Show Cause Notice was rejected on these grounds. The Court also referred to the prior detailed order involving multiple firms and individuals connected in the fraudulent scheme.
Application of Law to Facts: Given the serious allegations and factual complexity, the Court held that the Petitioner should avail the statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act rather than seek relief by way of writ petition. The Court emphasized the availability of an appellate forum equipped to conduct a factual inquiry and adjudicate the matter comprehensively.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Petitioner argued that the writ petition was maintainable and challenged the retrospective application of Section 16(2)(c) read with Section 41. The Court acknowledged these submissions but held that such issues are better addressed in the appeal process rather than writ jurisdiction, especially given the serious allegations of fraud and the need to protect the revenue.
Conclusions: The Court concluded that writ jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly in cases involving fraudulent availment of ITC and complex factual disputes. The Petitioner was directed to file an appeal against the impugned order before the appropriate appellate authority.
Issue 2: Retrospective Application of Section 16(2)(c) read with Section 41 of the CGST Act
Relevant Legal Framework: Section 41 of the CGST Act was amended effective 1st October 2022. Section 16(2)(c) restricts ITC in certain circumstances, including where the supplier's registration is cancelled. The Petitioner contended that the adjudicating authority wrongly applied these provisions retrospectively to transactions prior to the amendment.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court noted the Petitioner's contention but did not delve into detailed adjudication of this issue in writ proceedings. It observed that such legal questions involving retrospective effect and interpretation of statutory provisions require detailed examination and are better suited for determination in appeal proceedings. The Court refrained from expressing any opinion on this issue, reserving it for the appellate forum.
Application of Law to Facts: Since the impugned order invoked Section 16(2)(c) read with Section 41, the Petitioner's challenge to retrospective application was noted but not decided in the present proceedings.
Conclusions: The Court held that the issue of retrospective application should be raised and argued before the appellate authority and refrained from making any observations that may prejudice the final adjudication.
Issue 3: Limitation and Extension of Time for Filing Appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act
Relevant Legal Framework: Section 107 of the CGST Act provides for appeal against orders passed under the Act, with a limitation period of three months plus one month for filing appeal.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court acknowledged that the limitation period for filing the appeal had expired. However, it referred to its own precedents where it had extended the limitation period after examining the merits of the case. The Court exercised its discretion to extend the time for filing the appeal by one month, subject to the Petitioner making the requisite pre-deposit.
Application of Law to Facts: The Petitioner was granted one month's time to file the appeal against the impugned order. The Court clarified that if the appeal was filed within this extended period, it would be entertained on merits and not dismissed on the ground of limitation.
Conclusions: The Court exercised judicial discretion to condone delay and directed the Petitioner to file the appeal within one month with the necessary pre-deposit, ensuring access to statutory remedy despite the lapsed limitation.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
- "The allegations against the Petitioner in the impugned order are extremely serious in nature. They reveal the complex maze of transactions, which are alleged to have been carried out between various non-existent firms for the sake of enabling fraudulent availment of the ITC."
- "The entire concept of Input Tax Credit, as recognized under Section 16 of the CGST Act is for enabling businesses to get input tax on the goods and services which are manufactured/supplied by them in the chain of business transactions. The same is meant as an incentive for businesses who need not pay taxes on the inputs, which have already been taxed at the source itself."
- "It is observed by this Court in a large number of writ petitions that this facility under Section 16 of the CGST Act has been misused by various individuals, firms, entities and companies to avail of ITC even when the output tax is not deposited or when the entities or individuals who had to deposit the output tax are themselves found to be not existent. Such misuse, if permitted to continue, would create an enormous dent in the GST regime itself."
- "Insofar as exercise of writ jurisdiction itself is concerned, it is the settled position that this jurisdiction ought not be exercised by the Court to support the unscrupulous litigants."
- "When such transactions are entered into, a factual analysis would be required to be undertaken and the same cannot be decided in writ jurisdiction."
- The Court held that the Petitioner should avail the remedy of appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act and that all grounds raised in the writ petition may be raised in the appeal.
- The Court granted extension of limitation for filing appeal by one month, subject to pre-deposit, and clarified that no observations made in the writ proceedings shall affect the final adjudication of the appeal.
Issues: Whether the trust was entitled to registration under Section 12AA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite the delay in filing, the family-control clause in the trust deed, the supplementary deed conferring additional powers, and the existence of surplus income from school fees.
Analysis: Charitable purpose under Section 2(15) includes education, and the trust was admittedly running an educational institution. Mere delay in seeking registration was held to be no bar, as the statute did not prescribe any time limit for making the application. The clause regarding lineal descendants becoming trustees did not by itself negate a public charitable character. The supplementary deed was treated as part of the original trust deed, and no court approval was required on the facts found. The requirement of spending a specified percentage of income was held to be relevant at the stage of claiming exemption under Section 11, not at the stage of registration under Section 12AA. The existence of surplus, without any finding of diversion for private benefit, did not justify an inference that the trust was run on commercial lines.
Conclusion: The refusal of registration was unsustainable, and the direction to grant registration under Section 12AA was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of registration under Section 12AA, the authority must examine the charitable nature of the objects and activities, and not deny registration merely because of delay, surplus income, or matters relevant only to exemption under Section 11.
Issues: (i) Whether the writ court should interfere with provisional attachment proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in view of the statutory appellate and adjudicatory remedies; (ii) Whether the directions issued by the Assistant Director under Section 54 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 restraining bank transactions could survive after the provisional attachment order.
Issue (i): Whether the writ court should interfere with provisional attachment proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 in view of the statutory appellate and adjudicatory remedies.
Analysis: The Act creates a complete mechanism for attachment, adjudication, confirmation, appeal, and further challenge. A provisional attachment under Section 5 is only an interim measure, followed by adjudication under Section 8 and appeal under Section 26, with further recourse under Section 42. The existence of this tiered statutory scheme makes writ interference inappropriate except in exceptional circumstances. The nature of the remedy under the Act therefore justified relegating the appellants to the statutory forums.
Conclusion: The challenge to the provisional attachment was not maintainable in writ jurisdiction and the appellants were rightly relegated to the statutory remedies.
Issue (ii): Whether the directions issued by the Assistant Director under Section 54 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 restraining bank transactions could survive after the provisional attachment order.
Analysis: Section 54 only enables specified officers and authorities to assist in the enforcement and inquiry process. It does not confer an independent power to issue binding interdictory directions freezing bank operations. Once a provisional attachment order is made under Section 5(1) in respect of identified properties, any earlier general restraint issued by an officer under Section 54 loses efficacy to the extent it is inconsistent with the attachment order. The affected parties may still pursue their objections before the adjudicating authority under the Act.
Conclusion: The Assistant Director's restraint directions had no continuing legal effect beyond the properties specifically covered by the provisional attachment order.
Final Conclusion: The appeals failed on the main challenge and the appellants were directed to work out their remedies under the statutory scheme, while the bank restraint was clarified to be inoperative except as to properties covered by the provisional attachment proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute provides a complete hierarchy of remedies for provisional attachment and adjudication, writ interference is ordinarily unwarranted, and a general assistance power cannot be used to create an independent restraint on property or bank operations beyond the limits of a valid provisional attachment order.
Issues: (i) Whether service tax was payable under reverse charge on royalty and other periodic payments made after 01.04.2016 where the mining lease and grant of mining rights were executed before 01.04.2016. (ii) Whether the same payments could be subjected to service tax when they had formed part of the cost of coal production and the activity amounted to manufacture attracting excise duty.
Issue (i): Whether service tax was payable under reverse charge on royalty and other periodic payments made after 01.04.2016 where the mining lease and grant of mining rights were executed before 01.04.2016.
Analysis: The taxable event for service tax is the provision or agreement to provide the service. Where the agreement granting the right to use natural resources was executed before 01.04.2016, the later amendment to section 66D(a)(iv) of the Finance Act, 1994 did not create a fresh taxable liability merely because consideration or instalments were paid after that date. The mining lease in question had been granted and made effective prior to the levy becoming applicable to such services, and the issue was covered by earlier Tribunal decisions affirmed by the Supreme Court.
Conclusion: The royalty and other periodic payments were not liable to service tax under reverse charge for the period in question.
Issue (ii): Whether the same payments could be subjected to service tax when they had formed part of the cost of coal production and the activity amounted to manufacture attracting excise duty.
Analysis: The extraction of coal was treated as a manufacturing activity and the relevant amounts had already entered the cost of production on which excise duty had been discharged. A levy of service tax on the same incidence would amount to a simultaneous burden on the same activity, which was not sustainable in the statutory framework applied by the Tribunal.
Conclusion: No service tax was exigible on the amounts already subjected to excise duty as part of coal production cost.
Final Conclusion: The demand, interest, and penalty could not be sustained, and the impugned order was set aside with consequential relief.
Ratio Decidendi: For service tax purposes, liability on a service involving grant of mining rights arises with the agreement or provision of the service, not with later instalments of consideration, and a payment already embedded in manufacturing cost and subjected to excise duty cannot be taxed again as a service.
Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to recognition as a Non-Resident Dealer for the SPEC division under the exemption notification, and whether the NRI investment already used for the Saw Pipe Division could be relied upon again for the new SPEC division.
Analysis: The notification required a new industrial unit to be separately registered, independently established, and backed by capital investment in which NRI participation was at least 26% of the equity invested by private promoters, with the equity to be retained during the prescribed lock-in period. The petitioner had already secured the benefit of Non-Resident Dealer status for the Saw Pipe Division on the basis of the earlier NRI investment. The SPEC division was treated in the record as a separate unit with separate registration and eligibility certificates, and the materials showed that the additional investment relied upon for SPEC was not demonstrated as fresh NRI investment made before commencement of production. The notification did not permit the same NRI investment to be reused for another unit after the benefit had already been exhausted for the earlier unit.
Conclusion: The petitioner was not entitled to be recognised as a Non-Resident Dealer for the SPEC division, and the refusal to grant the exemption was / justified against the petitioner.
Final Conclusion: The challenge to the denial of exemption for the SPEC division failed, and the tax assessments based on that denial remained undisturbed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where an exemption notification conditions benefit on fresh NRI-backed investment in a new industrial unit, the same investment already utilized to secure the benefit for an earlier unit cannot be recycled to claim the identical status for another separate unit.
The core legal questions considered by the Court in these petitions were:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Determination of the Limitation Period and Computation of Delay
The legal framework governing limitation for filing appeals is Section 107 of the CGST Act, 2017, which prescribes a limitation period of three months from the date of communication of the Order-In-Original. The Court noted that the O-I-O was dated 13 December 2023 but electronically uploaded on 20 December 2023, and served by post on 3 January 2024.
The petitioners filed their appeals on 27 and 28 March 2024, respectively. If the date of postal communication (3 January 2024) is taken as the starting point, the appeals were filed within the three-month limitation period. However, if the date of electronic uploading (20 December 2023) is considered, the appeals were filed with a delay of 7/8 days.
The Court observed that the prescribed limitation period is triggered by communication of the order, which traditionally means service upon the party. The petitioners were served by post on 3 January 2024, which supports their contention that the appeals were timely filed.
Issue 2: Condonation of Delay in Absence of Formal Application
Section 107(4) of the CGST Act permits condonation of delay up to one month beyond the prescribed limitation period upon showing sufficient cause. The appellate authority dismissed the appeals citing the absence of any application for condonation of delay and the delay of 7/8 days.
The petitioners contended that they had kept applications for condonation of delay ready but were informed that the matter could be argued on merits since they had not yet received postal communication of the O-I-O. This factual assertion was not disputed by the respondents.
The Court found the petitioners' explanation credible, especially since they were heard on merits despite the absence of a condonation application. The Court held that the delay was caused by the difference in dates of electronic uploading and postal service, and that sufficient cause existed for condonation.
Issue 3: Dismissal of Appeals Without Adjudication on Merits
The appellate authority dismissed the appeals solely on limitation grounds without addressing the substantive issues raised by the petitioners. The Court emphasized that such dismissal without considering the merits, particularly when sufficient cause for delay exists, is not justified.
The Court noted that the petitioners were heard on merits, indicating that the appellate authority had an opportunity to consider the substantive issues but chose to dismiss on procedural grounds.
Issue 4: Remand for Consideration on Merits
Considering the above facts and circumstances, the Court exercised its supervisory jurisdiction to quash the impugned orders and remand the appeals to the appellate authority for fresh consideration on merits.
The Court left all contentions on merits open for adjudication by the appellate authority, thereby ensuring that procedural technicalities do not preclude substantive justice.
Issue 5: Challenge to Notification
One of the petitions included a challenge to a Notification dated 31 March 2023. The Court explicitly refrained from adjudicating upon this challenge, leaving it open for consideration in the appropriate forum.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Court held:
"Upon cumulative consideration of the facts and circumstances, therefore, we quash the impugned orders and remit the petitioner's appeals for consideration on merits."
"All contentions of all parties on the merits of the matter are left open to be decided by the appellate authority pursuant to this remand."
Core principles established include:
Final determinations:
Issues: Whether the compensation and interest received pursuant to the arbitral award were liable to be treated as business income arising from the Assessee's business activities and, in the absence of a permanent establishment in India, whether such receipts were taxable in India under Article 7 of the India-Japan Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.
Analysis: The receipts arose from non-payment of dues for offshore supplies made under the business arrangement and were inseparably connected with the Assessee's commercial operations. The arbitral award did not create a distinct source unrelated to the business; rather, it crystallised amounts payable under the contractual relationship. The interest component was held to be incidental to and part of the same business receipt and could not be severed and recharacterised as income from other sources. In the absence of any permanent establishment in India, the treaty allocation rule under Article 7 governed the taxability of such business income.
Conclusion: The receipts were correctly treated as business income and were not taxable in India in the absence of a permanent establishment.
The core legal questions considered by the Court in this matter are:
(a) Whether the issuance of a notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after the approval of a Resolution Plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC Code), is legally valid, given that the Resolution Plan provides for the waiver and extinguishment of all tax liabilities prior to the approval date;
(b) Whether the tax dues, both assessed and unassessed, including penalties, interest, prosecution risks, and other related liabilities, stand extinguished upon approval of the Resolution Plan under Section 31 of the IBC Code;
(c) The extent and effect of the binding nature of the Resolution Plan on the Corporate Debtor, creditors, and government authorities, particularly concerning outstanding tax liabilities;
(d) The applicability of the Supreme Court precedents regarding the finality and extinguishment of claims upon approval of a Resolution Plan under the IBC Code;
(e) Whether the Court should examine the merits of the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, or whether such examination is rendered academic in light of the extinguishment of tax liabilities.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (a) & (b): Validity of Section 148 notice post-IBC Resolution Plan approval and extinguishment of tax dues
The legal framework governing this issue primarily involves the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, specifically Section 31, which mandates that once a Resolution Plan is approved by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT), it becomes binding on the Corporate Debtor and all stakeholders including government authorities. The Resolution Plan in this case explicitly provides for the waiver and extinguishment of all unassessed and assessed tax liabilities, penalties, prosecution risks, and related dues for the period prior to the approval date.
The Court examined the Resolution Plan's provisions, which unequivocally stated that "any Tax liabilities pertaining to a period prior to and Including the NCLT Approval Date... shall be deemed to be extinguished and written off with effect from the NCLT Approval Date." Further clauses confirmed the waiver of penalties, prosecution risks, and outstanding TDS demands. The Plan also ensured that benefits and incentives previously available to the Corporate Debtor would continue despite change of ownership, and no proceedings could be initiated for liabilities prior to the approval date.
The Court relied heavily on authoritative Supreme Court decisions interpreting Section 31 of the IBC Code. In the landmark case concerning the Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel Ltd., the Supreme Court held that once a Resolution Plan is approved, all claims not part of the Plan stand extinguished and no further claims can be raised by any party. The Court emphasized that allowing unresolved claims post-approval would undermine the finality and certainty essential to the insolvency resolution process.
Similarly, in the case of Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd., the Supreme Court reiterated that the 2019 amendment to Section 31 is clarificatory and retrospective, confirming that all claims not included in the approved Resolution Plan stand extinguished. The Court held that no proceedings can be initiated or continued in respect of such claims, including statutory dues owed to government authorities.
Applying these principles, the Court found that the issuance of the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, after the approval of the Resolution Plan which extinguished all tax liabilities, was legally untenable. The tax liabilities had ceased to exist as per the binding Resolution Plan and the IBC Code provisions, rendering the notice invalid.
Issue (c): Binding nature of the Resolution Plan on government authorities and stakeholders
The Court noted that Section 31(1) of the IBC Code explicitly provides that the Resolution Plan shall be binding on the Corporate Debtor, its employees, members, creditors, including the Central Government, State Governments, local authorities, guarantors, and other stakeholders. The Resolution Plan's effect is comprehensive, covering all dues arising under any law for the time being in force.
The Court highlighted the detailed provisions of the Resolution Plan which not only waived and extinguished tax liabilities but also clarified that no proceedings could be initiated for any past period liabilities, including those arising from withholding tax compliance, penalties under various sections of the Income Tax Act, and adverse tax implications under related party transactions or write-offs of trade payables.
This binding effect was underscored by the Court as essential to providing certainty and finality to the insolvency resolution process, protecting the successful resolution applicant from unforeseen liabilities and enabling the Corporate Debtor to continue operations on a "fresh slate."
Issue (d): Applicability of Supreme Court precedents on finality and extinguishment of claims
The Court extensively relied on the Supreme Court's rulings in the Essar Steel and Edelweiss cases, which are authoritative pronouncements on the interpretation of Section 31 of the IBC Code. These judgments clarify that the Resolution Plan, once approved, conclusively determines the claims against the Corporate Debtor, freezing and extinguishing all claims not included in the Plan.
The Court observed that these precedents establish that statutory dues, including tax liabilities, are subject to the same extinguishment if not incorporated in the Resolution Plan. This interpretation ensures that the resolution process is not undermined by subsequent claims or notices issued by authorities.
Issue (e): Merits of the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act
Given the binding effect of the Resolution Plan and the extinguishment of tax liabilities, the Court held that the merits of the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act became academic and did not require examination. The issuance of the notice was held to be without jurisdiction and contrary to the binding Resolution Plan.
The Court therefore quashed and set aside the impugned notice dated 31.03.2025 under Section 148, granting relief to the petitioner accordingly.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Court's crucial legal reasoning is encapsulated in the following verbatim excerpt from the judgment:
"On the complete extinguishment of all tax liabilities of the Corporate Debtor upon the approval of the Resolution Plan on 31.03.2025, there could be no occasion whatsoever for the respondents to issue the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act on 31.03.2025. In such view of the matter, the merits of the impugned notice under Section 148 of the Act have become academic and need not be ventured into by this Court."
Core principles established include:
- The Resolution Plan approved under Section 31 of the IBC Code is binding on the Corporate Debtor and all stakeholders, including government authorities, and conclusively determines the liabilities of the Corporate Debtor.
- All tax liabilities, assessed or unassessed, including penalties, prosecution risks, and related dues, pertaining to the period prior to the approval of the Resolution Plan, stand waived and extinguished as per the Plan and the IBC Code.
- Post-approval, no proceedings can be initiated or continued against the Corporate Debtor for claims not included in the Resolution Plan, ensuring finality and certainty in the insolvency resolution process.
- Notices or proceedings issued under tax laws after the approval of the Resolution Plan that seek to recover extinguished liabilities are invalid and liable to be quashed.
Final determination on the issues:
The Court quashed and set aside the impugned notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, holding that it was invalid in light of the extinguishment of tax liabilities pursuant to the approved Resolution Plan under the IBC Code. The Court declined to examine the merits of the notice, as the legal effect of the Resolution Plan rendered such inquiry unnecessary.
1. Whether the IRP is entitled to receive fees and expenses as claimed, in light of the provisions of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) and the associated regulations.
2. The legal effect and necessity of ratification by the Committee of Creditors (CoC) of the fee and expenses payable to the IRP under Regulation 33 of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016.
3. Whether the determination of fees and expenses without formal ratification by the CoC is valid and enforceable.
4. The applicability and interpretation of Regulation 33 and Regulation 34 of the IBBI Regulations concerning the fixation and ratification of IRP and Resolution Professional (RP) costs.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Entitlement of the IRP to Fees and Expenses under the IBC and Regulations
The legal framework governing the payment of fees and expenses to the IRP is primarily found in the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. Section 60(5) of the IBC empowers the Adjudicating Authority to pass necessary orders, while Regulations 33 and 34 specifically address the costs of the IRP and RP.
Regulation 33(1) mandates that the applicant fixes the expenses to be incurred on or by the IRP, and Regulation 33(3) requires that these expenses be reimbursed by the CoC to the extent it ratifies. Regulation 33(4) clarifies that ratified expenses are treated as insolvency resolution process costs. Regulation 34 similarly governs the costs of the RP.
The Appellant contended that the fee claimed by the IRP was not determined in accordance with these regulations and that the Adjudicating Authority erred in directing payment without proper compliance. The Court examined the statutory provisions and the process followed in the instant case, noting that the IRP had been appointed by the Adjudicating Authority and had performed his duties during the CIRP period.
The Court found that the IRP's claim for Rs.9,05,058/- towards fees and expenses was supported by the activities undertaken and was consistent with the process envisaged under the IBC and Regulations. The Adjudicating Authority had rightly recognized the entitlement of the IRP to receive fees for services rendered during his tenure.
Issue 2: Necessity and Effect of Ratification by the Committee of Creditors
The pivotal legal question was the interpretation of the term "ratify" under Regulation 33(3) and (4) and its impact on the IRP's entitlement to fees and expenses. The Appellant argued that ratification by the CoC was a mandatory precondition and that without explicit ratification, the IRP's claim could not be sustained.
The Court analyzed the concept of ratification, drawing on the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Section 196, which explains ratification as a confirmation or adoption of a prior decision, thereby validating it retrospectively. The Court observed that ratification is procedural and serves to affirm a decision already taken, providing it enforceability and sanctity.
In the instant case, the IRP had consented to perform his duties at a fee of Rs.3,00,000/- per month plus reimbursement of actual expenses, as recorded in the 1st CoC meeting dated 09.06.2022. The 2nd CoC meeting dated 13.07.2022 expressly approved and ratified the minutes of the 1st CoC meeting, including the fee determination.
The Court held that such ratification by the CoC was sufficient and in accordance with the Regulations. The contention that the fee was fixed unilaterally without CoC approval was contradicted by the meeting records, which showed that the CoC, with 100% voting rights held by the Appellant, had approved the fee structure and expenses.
Issue 3: Validity of Fee Determination without Formal Ratification
The Appellant's argument that the absence of ratification invalidated the fee determination was addressed by the Court through a detailed examination of the CoC meeting minutes and the timeline of events. The Court noted that the fee and expenses were initially fixed at the 1st CoC meeting and subsequently ratified at the 2nd CoC meeting.
Therefore, the Adjudicating Authority's order directing payment was justified and consistent with the regulatory framework. The Court emphasized that ratification is a confirmation of a prior decision and that the CoC's subsequent approval remedied any initial lack of formal ratification.
The Court rejected the Appellant's contention that the fee determination violated Regulation 33 and Regulation 34, holding that the process followed was compliant with the statutory requirements.
Issue 4: Interpretation and Application of Regulations 33 and 34
The Court closely examined Regulations 33 and 34 to interpret the scope and procedural requirements for fixing and ratifying IRP and RP costs. It highlighted that the Regulations envisage a two-step process: first, the fixation of expenses by the applicant or the Adjudicating Authority, and second, ratification by the CoC.
The Court underscored that ratification is essential to treat the expenses as insolvency resolution process costs, but it must follow a prior decision or fixation of fees. The Court explained that ratification confers enforceability but does not itself constitute the initial decision to pay fees.
Applying this interpretation to the facts, the Court found that the IRP's fees and expenses were fixed during the 1st CoC meeting, and the 2nd CoC meeting ratified these decisions, thereby fulfilling the requirements of the Regulations.
Competing Arguments and Their Treatment
The Appellant argued that the IRP's fees were unilaterally fixed and lacked proper ratification, rendering the payment direction unlawful. The Court countered this by relying on the CoC meeting records, which demonstrated that the Appellant itself, holding 100% voting rights, had approved the fees and expenses.
The Court also addressed the procedural aspect of ratification, clarifying that it is a confirmatory act that must follow an initial decision. Since the initial fixation of fees was done during the 1st CoC meeting and ratified in the 2nd, the Appellant's objection was unfounded.
The Court found no merit in the contention that the Adjudicating Authority's order was contrary to the Regulations or the IBC provisions.
Conclusions
The Court concluded that the IRP was entitled to receive the fees and expenses claimed, as the fixation and ratification process complied with the IBC and IBBI Regulations. The ratification by the CoC was valid and sufficient to confer enforceability on the fee determination.
The Adjudicating Authority's order directing payment of Rs.9,05,058/- to the IRP was upheld, and the Appeal was dismissed for lack of merit.
Significant Holdings
"The word 'ratifies', it simpliciter means, a formal approval to be granted to a decision already taken, in order to provide the decision with a strength of enforceability."
"Ratification once it is even orally accepted by a conduct or even by an act, it will have the same implication as to be an original authority so as to bind the principal."
"The minutes of the 1st CoC meeting was placed for ratification in the 2nd CoC meeting, and it was ratified, and that is what has been observed in the conclusion which has been arrived at by the Tribunal."
"Under the given set of circumstances, the issue of ratification do not come into the picture, in order to deprive Respondent No.1 i.e., the IRP of the fees, and other expenses payable to him as it has been determined to be paid."
"The professional fee as claimed by the Respondent No.1, also stood approved by the Appellant itself holding 100% voting rights of the CoC, and the claim made that it was unilaterally fixed, is contrary to the facts as borne out by the minutes of the 1st CoC meeting."
"The Appeal lacks merit, and the same is dismissed."
1. Whether the Section 7 application filed by the financial creditors in a class (homebuyers) complied with the threshold requirements introduced by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020, specifically the requirement that an application by allottees under a real estate project must be filed jointly by not less than 100 allottees or 10% of the total allottees.
2. Whether the failure to modify the Section 7 application within the prescribed 30-day period after the Amendment Act 2020 renders the application deemed withdrawn under the third Proviso to Section 7(1).
3. The effect of the declaration of a "zero period" by the State Government on the determination of default and the timing of the alleged default for the purpose of Section 7 application.
4. Whether the Adjudicating Authority erred in admitting the Section 7 application despite the alleged non-compliance with the statutory threshold and other objections raised by the Corporate Debtor.
5. The validity and effect of the settlement proposal made by the Corporate Debtor to certain homebuyers during the pendency of the proceedings.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis
1. Compliance with Threshold Requirements under Amended Section 7(1) of IBC
Legal Framework and Precedents: The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020, inserted three Provisos in Section 7(1). The second Proviso mandates that for financial creditors who are allottees under a real estate project, an application for initiating CIRP must be filed jointly by not less than 100 allottees or 10% of the total allottees under the same project. The third Proviso requires that applications filed prior to the amendment but not admitted must be modified within 30 days of the commencement of the Act to comply with the threshold, failing which they shall be deemed withdrawn.
The Supreme Court in Manish Kumar vs. Union of India upheld these amendments and clarified the legislative intent behind the third Proviso, emphasizing it as a one-time compliance measure to prevent frivolous or premature insolvency proceedings by a handful of creditors.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the Section 7 application was originally filed on 11.01.2019 by eight homebuyers, prior to the Amendment Act. The third Proviso required modification within 30 days of the Amendment's commencement (28.12.2019) or the Supreme Court's judgment upholding it (19.01.2021). However, the first application to implead additional allottees to meet the threshold was filed only on 15.07.2021, well beyond the prescribed 30-day period.
The Tribunal observed that the original application by eight homebuyers did not meet the threshold requirement. The subsequent applications for impleadment of additional allottees (52, 22, and 25 applicants) were attempts to comply with the threshold but were filed too late.
Accordingly, by operation of the third Proviso's deeming fiction, the Section 7 application stood withdrawn as the statutory timeline for modification was not met.
Key Evidence and Findings: The Tribunal examined the pleadings and documents filed by the parties, including the dates of allotment of units, the number of allottees claimed by the Corporate Debtor (varying from 820 to 1124), and the number of applicants impleaded. The Tribunal also considered the Supreme Court's judgment in Manish Kumar, which clarified the legislative intent and the consequences of non-compliance.
Application of Law to Facts: Since the original application was filed by only eight allottees and the modification to meet the threshold was filed beyond the 30-day period mandated by the third Proviso, the application was deemed withdrawn by operation of law. The Adjudicating Authority's admission of the Section 7 application was therefore contrary to the statutory scheme.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Appellant (Corporate Debtor) argued non-compliance with the threshold and premature filing, supported by the declaration of zero period and extensions granted by UP RERA, indicating no default had occurred at the time of filing. The Respondents (Financial Creditors) contended that the application met the threshold after impleadment and that the Corporate Debtor's cancellation of allotments was a mala fide attempt to defeat the application. The Tribunal favored the statutory mandate and timing requirements over these contentions.
Conclusion: The Section 7 application was held to be deemed withdrawn for failure to comply with the threshold requirements within the prescribed time.
2. Effect of the State Government's Declaration of Zero Period and UP RERA Extensions
Legal Framework: The Builder Buyer Agreement specified a 40-month period for project completion with a grace period. The State Government declared a zero period from 14.02.2011 to 01.09.2017, and UP RERA issued notifications extending the project completion timeline due to COVID-19.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Appellant argued that the zero period and extensions meant the project completion period had not expired when the Section 7 application was filed, so no default had occurred. However, since the Tribunal held the Section 7 application was deemed withdrawn on statutory grounds, it did not consider this issue in detail.
Treatment of Competing Arguments: The Respondents argued the zero period related only to dues payable to Greater Noida and did not affect the contractual completion timeline or default under the Builder Buyer Agreement.
Conclusion: The Tribunal did not find it necessary to decide on this issue due to the primary finding on the statutory withdrawal of the application.
3. Admission of Section 7 Application by Adjudicating Authority
Legal Framework: Section 7(5) of IBC empowers the Adjudicating Authority to admit or reject an application based on compliance with statutory requirements.
Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Tribunal found that the Adjudicating Authority admitted the Section 7 application without considering the mandatory deeming provision of the third Proviso to Section 7(1), which required withdrawal due to non-compliance within 30 days.
Conclusion: The admission of the Section 7 application was held to be contrary to the statutory scheme and unsustainable.
4. Settlement Proposal by Corporate Debtor
Details and Findings: During pendency, the Corporate Debtor proposed a settlement offering refund with SBI FD interest rates to homebuyers wishing to exit and possession of completed towers to others. The Corporate Debtor also offered to revive cancelled allotments if the project exited insolvency proceedings.
Court's Interpretation: The Tribunal held the Corporate Debtor bound by this proposal and directed compliance with the offer: (i) homebuyers opting for refund to be paid within 60 days; (ii) cancelled allotments to be revived, subject to payment of balance consideration.
Conclusion: The settlement proposal was accepted as binding on the Corporate Debtor.
5. Other Issues
The Tribunal noted objections to the genuineness of homebuyers participating in voting on the settlement proposal and the Corporate Debtor's inconsistent disclosures regarding the number of units and allottees. The Tribunal observed that cancellation of allotments after filing Section 7 application was an attempt to defeat the application and was not permitted.
Significant Holdings
"Thus, in event the application is not modified within the time prescribed, underlying deeming fiction shall come into play and application shall be treated to be withdrawn."
"The filing of IA No.4163 of 2021 by the Applicants to comply with the provisions of second Proviso by adding 52 Applicants to make it compliant, clearly indicate that the original application was filed by eight Homebuyers was not in compliance with the amended provisions."
"The application filed under Section 7 CP(IB)/288(PB)/2019, shall be deemed to be withdrawn and order of the Adjudicating Authority proceeding with the application and admitting the said application is contrary to the statutory scheme and cannot be sustained."
"The Appellant is held bound to honour its settlement proposal as noted above, i.e. to grant withdrawal to those units holders, who want to withdraw their amounts deposited with SBI FD interest rate within 60 days from the receipt of communication; the allotments, which were cancelled by the CD, after filing of the application under Section 7, till passing of the impugned order, shall stand revived."
The Tribunal established that the statutory timeline and threshold requirements for filing Section 7 applications by allottees under a real estate project are mandatory and non-compliance results in deemed withdrawal. The Adjudicating Authority must ensure compliance before admitting such applications. The decision underscores the binding nature of settlement proposals made by Corporate Debtors during insolvency proceedings.
1. Whether the Customs Department was justified in detaining and confiscating the gold bangles worn by the petitioner without issuing a Show Cause Notice (SCN) or providing an opportunity for personal hearing, in compliance with Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962.
2. Whether a pre-printed waiver signed by the petitioner, purportedly waiving the right to SCN and personal hearing, is valid and sufficient to dispense with the statutory requirements under Section 124 of the Act.
3. Whether the gold bangles worn by the petitioner qualify as "personal effects" under the Baggage Rules, 2016, and are thus exempt from customs duty and detention.
4. The applicability and interpretation of relevant customs laws, rules, and judicial precedents concerning the detention and confiscation of jewellery carried by passengers returning from abroad.
Issue-wise detailed analysis:
1. Validity of detention and confiscation without issuance of Show Cause Notice and personal hearing:
The legal framework under Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 mandates that no order of confiscation or penalty can be passed without issuing a written notice to the owner specifying the grounds for confiscation, providing an opportunity to make a written representation, and affording a reasonable opportunity of personal hearing. The statute allows for an oral SCN only if requested by the person concerned.
The Court examined the Customs Department's reliance on a pre-printed waiver form signed by the petitioner, which purportedly waived the issuance of SCN and personal hearing. The Court referred to binding precedents, including Amit Kumar v. Commissioner of Customs and Makhinder Chopra v. Commissioner of Customs, where it was held that such pre-printed waivers are fundamentally flawed and violate the principles of natural justice. The Court emphasized that natural justice is not mere lip service and must be complied with in letter and spirit.
The Court held that a pre-printed waiver, which is indecipherable and incomprehensible to a layperson, cannot substitute the statutory requirements of Section 124. It cannot be deemed a valid oral SCN. Consequently, the absence of a proper SCN and hearing rendered the detention and confiscation orders unsustainable in law.
The Court further noted that the statutory timeline under Section 110 of the Act prescribes six months for issuing the SCN, extendable by another six months. In this case, over one year had elapsed without issuance of SCN, further invalidating the detention.
2. Classification of the detained jewellery as personal effects under the Baggage Rules, 2016:
The Court analyzed the Baggage Rules, 2016, particularly Rules 2(vi), 3, and 5, which define "personal effects" and prescribe free allowance limits for jewellery carried by passengers. Rule 2(vi) excludes jewellery from the definition of personal effects; however, Rule 3 allows clearance free of duty for used personal effects and travel souvenirs. Rule 5 permits duty-free clearance of jewellery up to specified weight and value limits depending on the passenger's gender.
The Court relied on authoritative judicial precedents, including the Supreme Court's decision in Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Pushpa Lekhumal Tolani, which clarified that jewellery worn by passengers cannot be categorically excluded from personal effects. The Court held that bona fide jewellery worn or carried by a passenger, especially if used and intended for personal use, falls within the ambit of personal effects and is exempt from customs duty and detention.
The Court also referred to the Division Bench decision in Saba Simran v. Union of India, which distinguished between "jewellery" and "personal jewellery," holding that used personal jewellery worn by the passenger is not subject to the monetary caps applicable to newly acquired jewellery under the Baggage Rules. This position was upheld by the Supreme Court when the Union of India's challenge was dismissed.
Further, the Court reiterated its own ruling in Makhinder Chopra, affirming that the Customs Department must differentiate between bona fide personal jewellery and other jewellery for regulatory purposes.
3. Application of law to facts and treatment of competing arguments:
The petitioner's case was that the detained gold bangles weighing 117 grams were personal effects worn as part of her attire during her pilgrimage and travel. The Customs Department contended that the petitioner herself had appealed the Order-in-Original and the Order-in-Appeal was reasonable, imposing a penalty and redemption fine along with customs duty.
The Court observed that it is customary for women to wear basic jewellery such as bangles as personal effects, and mere purity or value of gold does not warrant detention if the jewellery is bona fide personal use. The Court rejected the Customs Department's reliance on the pre-printed waiver and absence of SCN and personal hearing, holding such practice contrary to law and natural justice.
On the classification issue, the Court found the petitioner's jewellery to be used personal effects exempt under the Baggage Rules, and thus not liable for detention or confiscation.
4. Conclusions:
The Court concluded that the detention and confiscation of the petitioner's gold bangles were illegal due to failure to comply with Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962, and the jewellery constituted personal effects exempt from customs duty under the Baggage Rules, 2016. The Court set aside the Order-in-Original and Order-in-Appeal, directed the release of the detained jewellery within two weeks, and mandated the Customs Department to discontinue the practice of obtaining pre-printed waivers that waive SCN and personal hearing rights.
Significant holdings include:
"A perusal of Section 124 of the Act along with the alleged waiver which is relied upon would show that the oral SCN cannot be deemed to have been served in this manner as is being alleged by the Department. If an oral SCN waiver has to be agreed to by the person concerned, the same ought to be in the form of a proper declaration, consciously signed by the person concerned. Even then, an opportunity of hearing ought to be afforded, inasmuch as, the person concerned cannot be condemned unheard in these matters. Printed waivers of this nature would fundamentally violate rights of persons who are affected. Natural justice is not merely lip-service. It has to be given effect and complied with in letter and spirit."
"This Court is of the opinion that the printed waiver of SCN and the printed statement made in the request for release of goods cannot be considered or deemed to be an oral SCN, in compliance with Section 124. The SCN in the present case is accordingly deemed to have not been issued and thus the detention itself would be contrary to law."
"Jewellery that is bona fide in personal use by the tourist would not be excluded from the ambit of personal effects as defined under the Baggage Rules. Further, the Department is required to make a distinction between 'jewellery' and 'personal jewellery' while considering seizure of items for being in violation of the Baggage Rules."
"The detained jewellery are the personal effects of the Petitioner. Accordingly, the detained jewellery would be liable to be released."
"The Customs Department is directed to discontinue the practice of making tourists sign undertaking in a standard form waiving the show cause notice and personal hearing, as it is contrary to the provisions of Section 124 of the Act."
The first issue concerns the scope and limitation of the power of the Tribunal under Section 420(2) of the Companies Act, 2013, which restricts the Tribunal's power to review or recall an order to rectifying mistakes apparent on the face of the record, and does not envisage re-examination of merits or revisiting an order once passed on merits. The appellant contended that the impugned order violated this statutory bar by effectively reviewing or recalling the earlier orders dated 19.04.2023 and 07.06.2023, which had directed the appointment of a Practicing Company Secretary (PCS) to conduct a Secretarial Audit for the specified period.
The Tribunal analyzed the orders dated 19.04.2023 and 07.06.2023 and found that these orders were procedural directions aimed at enabling scrutiny of the company's financial statements and share capital status by appointing a PCS to conduct a Secretarial Audit. The order of 19.04.2023 directed the Respondent Company to appoint a PCS within seven days to complete the audit by 30.05.2023 and file the report before the Tribunal. The subsequent order of 07.06.2023 was passed due to non-compliance by Respondent No.3 and resulted in the Tribunal itself appointing a PCS to conduct the audit. These orders were not final determinations mandating that the audit must be completed regardless of circumstances but were conditional directions to facilitate fact-finding.
Turning to the impugned order dated 02.04.2025, the Tribunal observed that this order did not review or recall the earlier orders but was an outcome of the report and findings of the PCS appointed pursuant to those orders. The PCS report and evidence on record revealed that the company had been non-operational since 2015, had no business activity, had not maintained books of accounts, and had not filed statutory financial returns with the Registrar of Companies (ROC). Consequently, conducting a Secretarial Audit for the period 2015-2023 was deemed futile and unnecessary. The Tribunal emphasized that the impugned order was a reasoned conclusion based on the factual matrix and the PCS's confirmation, rather than an impermissible review or recall of prior orders.
The appellant's argument that the impugned order was contrary to the statutory bar under Section 420(2) was rejected on the ground that the order was a continuation and compliance with the earlier directions, not a recall or review. The Tribunal underscored that the statutory provision does not prohibit the Tribunal from passing subsequent orders in the same proceeding that are necessitated by developments in facts or evidence. The impugned order was thus within the Tribunal's jurisdiction and consistent with the procedural framework.
Regarding the necessity of the Secretarial Audit, the Tribunal found that the absence of any financial statements filed with the ROC and the company's defunct status negated the requirement for such an audit. The appellant failed to produce any material to establish that the company was operational or had submitted financial statements during the relevant period. The Tribunal held that mere pleadings or counter-affidavits could not substitute for evidence and judicial scrutiny. The PCS's report was treated as credible and conclusive on the operational status of the company.
The Tribunal also addressed the appellant's contention that the Secretarial Audit was mandated by the earlier orders and could not be dispensed with. It clarified that the earlier orders did not fix an unalterable mandate to conduct the audit irrespective of the factual scenario. The impugned order was an exercise of judicial discretion based on the PCS's findings, which rendered the audit unnecessary. This approach was consistent with principles of reasonableness and avoidance of futile exercises.
In conclusion, the Tribunal dismissed the appeal, holding that the impugned order was a judicious and lawful order passed in compliance with the directions contained in the earlier orders. The appeal was found to lack merit, and all interlocutory applications were closed accordingly.
The significant holdings established by the Tribunal include the following:
"The impugned order dated 02.04.2025 is an order in continuation to the directions issued on 19.04.2023 and 07.06.2023 and does not amount to review or recall of earlier orders so as to bring it within the ambit of restrictions imposed by Section 420(2) of the Companies Act, 2013."
"Where the basic parameters for conducting a Secretarial Audit are not satisfied, including non-filing of financial statements and non-operation of the company, the Tribunal may dispense with the conduct of such audit."
"The report of the Practicing Company Secretary, confirming the non-operational status of the company and absence of statutory filings, is a credible piece of evidence which justifies the Tribunal's decision to not proceed with the Secretarial Audit."
"Pleadings or counter-affidavits without judicial scrutiny and appreciation of evidence cannot be exclusively relied upon to mandate continuation of a Secretarial Audit."
"The statutory bar under Section 420(2) of the Companies Act, 2013, limits the power of the Tribunal to review or recall orders to rectifying mistakes apparent on the face of the record and does not preclude the Tribunal from passing subsequent orders necessitated by developments in facts or evidence."
These holdings affirm the principle that procedural directions by the Tribunal are subject to modification based on evolving factual circumstances and that the Tribunal's discretion to dispense with futile processes is an inherent aspect of judicial administration under the Companies Act, 2013.
Issues: Whether the delay of 117 days in filing the appeal could be condoned and whether the appellant was entitled to exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Analysis: The limitation for an appeal under Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 runs from the date of pronouncement of the impugned order, with a maximum condonable delay of 15 days beyond the initial 30 days. The appellant had sought to rely on the earlier appeal and to exclude the intervening period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, but the earlier appeal did not validly challenge the impugned order within limitation and the record showed no due diligence or good faith. The concept of good faith under Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act, 1963 requires due care and attention, which was found lacking. In view of the binding law that the appellate tribunal cannot condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit, the application for condonation could not be entertained.
Conclusion: The delay condonation application was not maintainable and the delay could not be condoned.
The core legal questions considered by the Court are:
(a) Whether the initiation of proceedings under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax (CGST) Act, 2017, was justified in the present case, given the petitioner's inability to initially produce a Chartered Accountant's certificate due to the supplier's liquidation;
(b) Whether the impugned assessment order passed under Section 74 was sustainable in law, especially when the petitioner subsequently furnished a Chartered Accountant's certificate confirming the supplies and GST payments;
(c) Whether the proceedings ought to have been initiated and adjudicated under Section 73 of the CGST Act instead of Section 74, considering the facts and circumstances;
(d) The appropriate course of action regarding the disputed tax amount in light of the petitioner's willingness to deposit the said amount;
(e) The application and interpretation of Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST dated 27.12.2022, concerning verification of transactions and the requirement of Chartered Accountant certificates in such GST assessments.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (a) and (b): Justification for invoking Section 74 proceedings and sustainability of the impugned order
The relevant legal framework involves Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act, 2017. Section 73 deals with determination of tax not paid or short paid due to reasons other than fraud or willful misstatement, whereas Section 74 applies where tax is not paid due to fraud or willful misstatement or suppression of facts.
The respondent initiated proceedings under Section 74, alleging that the petitioner had fraudulently availed excess input tax credit (ITC) without actual receipt of goods or services, based on differences noted between GSTR-2A and GSTR-3B returns and failure to furnish documentary evidence. The impugned order (para 5) emphasized that the taxpayer had availed excess ITC and willfully falsified returns to utilize undue ITC for outward supplies, thus attracting penal provisions under Section 122.
However, the petitioner contended that the supplier had gone into liquidation, making it impossible initially to obtain a Chartered Accountant's certificate. Subsequently, the petitioner did obtain and filed such a certificate confirming receipt of goods, payment made, and GST compliance. The Court noted that the petitioner's explanation was not disputed and that the certificate was produced to justify the claimed ITC.
The Court observed that despite production of the certificate, the respondent did not consider or give any findings on the certificate's validity or content. The impugned order was passed mechanically without applying mind to the newly furnished evidence. This failure to consider critical evidence was held to be legally unsustainable.
The Court also referred to Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST dated 27.12.2022, which aims to verify whether the supplier has remitted tax on supplies, and noted that the respondent could independently verify transactions even without strict reliance on such certificates. The petitioner's certificate was a valid piece of evidence that warranted consideration before concluding fraud or willful misstatement.
Issue (c): Whether proceedings should be under Section 73 instead of Section 74
The Court highlighted the distinction between Sections 73 and 74. Section 74 is invoked in cases involving fraud or willful misstatement, while Section 73 applies to cases of non-payment or short payment of tax without such fraudulent intent.
Given that the petitioner had no dispute regarding the supplier's liquidation and had furnished a certificate to substantiate the ITC claimed, the Court found no sufficient basis for invoking Section 74, which carries more severe consequences and penal provisions. The Court opined that the matter ought to be treated as a case under Section 73, allowing for a more appropriate and fair adjudication of the tax liability.
Issue (d): Disputed tax amount and conditions for remand
The petitioner expressed readiness to deposit the entire disputed tax amount of Rs. 81,12,876/- if the impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh consideration under Section 73. The Court accepted this condition and made the setting aside of the impugned order and remand contingent upon the petitioner depositing the disputed amount within two weeks of receipt of the order.
Issue (e): Application of Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST and procedural propriety
The Court noted that Circular No. 183/15/2022-GST provides procedural guidance to ensure that suppliers have remitted the GST on supplies made, which is relevant for verification of ITC claims. However, the Court clarified that even without strictly following the Circular, the respondent has independent authority to verify transactions and documents.
In the present case, the petitioner produced a Chartered Accountant's certificate confirming the supplies and GST payment. The respondent failed to apply mind or render findings on this certificate, which the Court found to be a procedural lapse and a mechanical exercise of power. Such failure undermines the principles of natural justice and fair adjudication.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Court held that:
"Merely for not furnishing the Chartered Accountant's Certificate, the proceedings were initiated under Section 74."
"When such certificate is produced by the petitioner, the respondent is supposed to have applied his mind and arrived at a wise conclusion after verifying all the transaction along with the relevant documents."
"No findings were rendered with regard to the aforesaid Chartered Accountant certificate produced by the petitioner. Therefore, it is clear that the respondent had arrived at a conclusion in a mechanical manner and passed the impugned order under Section 74 of the GST Act."
"The said impugned order is not sustainable in law and the same is liable to be set aside."
"The respondent is directed to consider the notice issued under Section 74 as Section 73 of the CGST Act and proceed to pass appropriate orders accordingly."
Core principles established include:
(i) The necessity of applying mind and considering all relevant evidence, including Chartered Accountant certificates, before passing an order under Section 74;
(ii) The importance of distinguishing between cases warranting initiation under Section 74 (fraud/willful misstatement) and those under Section 73 (non-fraudulent short payment or non-payment of tax);
(iii) The procedural fairness owed to taxpayers, including the requirement that authorities must not pass mechanical or non-speaking orders;
(iv) The procedural option to remit matters back for fresh consideration under the correct statutory provisions when the initial order is found unsustainable.
Final determinations:
The impugned order dated 18.03.2024 passed under Section 74 was set aside. The matter was remanded to the respondent for fresh consideration treating the proceedings as initiated under Section 73, subject to the petitioner depositing the entire disputed tax amount within two weeks. No costs were imposed, and connected petitions were closed accordingly.
The core legal questions considered by the Court are:
(a) Whether the appellants have reversed the Input Tax Credit (ITC) that was allegedly wrongly availed by them;
(b) Whether the appellants were duly served and given an opportunity to respond to the show-cause notice issued by the adjudicating authority;
(c) Whether the interim order directing the appellants to deposit 10% of the disputed tax was justified;
(d) Whether the factual disputes raised regarding the reversal of ITC require remand for fresh adjudication;
(e) The procedural propriety of the ex-parte order passed by the adjudicating authority due to non-response by the appellants;
(f) The correctness of the appellate authority's dismissal of the appellants' appeal without allowing reconciliation of the alleged defects;
(g) The implications of the absence of interest levied by the adjudicating authority on the appellants in respect of the disputed ITC.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (a) and (g): Whether the appellants have reversed the ITC wrongly availed and the significance of non-levy of interest
The relevant legal framework involves the provisions under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act relating to availing and reversal of ITC. The Court examined the submissions of the appellants who claimed to have filed GSTR-3B returns and produced a tabulated statement demonstrating the reversal of the wrongly availed ITC for the financial year 2017-18.
The appellate authority, however, found that the appellants failed to submit the GSTR-3B return for August 2017, which was necessary to incorporate the facts related to reversal. This created a factual dispute as to whether the reversal was indeed effected.
The Court noted that the adjudicating authority did not levy interest on the appellants, which is indicative that the ITC may have been reversed, since interest would typically be imposed if ITC was wrongly availed and not reversed. This absence of interest was taken as a significant factor suggesting that the matter might be revenue neutral if reversal had indeed taken place.
The Court emphasized that these are factual questions requiring adjudication based on documentary evidence and submissions by the appellants.
Issue (b) and (e): Service of show-cause notice and procedural propriety of ex-parte order
The show-cause notice was served upon the appellants by e-mail. However, the appellants did not respond, leading to an ex-parte order dated 14th December 2023 by the Assistant Commissioner. The Court recognized that non-response to the notice resulted in the ex-parte order.
Nonetheless, the Court observed that procedural fairness requires that the appellants be given an opportunity to respond and reconcile any defects, especially since the appellants claim to have reversed the ITC.
The Court thus treated the original order as a show-cause notice and directed the appellants to submit a detailed reply with supporting documents within 15 days of receiving the judgment copy.
Issue (c) and (f): Interim order directing 10% deposit and appellate authority's dismissal
The interim order dated 13th June 2025 directed the appellants to deposit 10% of the tax in dispute while granting stay. The appellants challenged this order in the intra-Court appeal.
The Court found that since the factual dispute regarding reversal of ITC could render the matter revenue neutral, the condition of pre-deposit may not be justified without proper adjudication.
The appellate authority had dismissed the appellants' appeal without allowing them to reconcile the defect pointed out (non-submission of GSTR-3B for August 2017). The Court held that the appellants should be given an opportunity to cure this defect.
Accordingly, the Court set aside the appellate authority's order and remanded the matter to the original adjudicating authority for fresh adjudication on merits after hearing the appellants.
Issue (d): Necessity of remand for fresh adjudication
The Court recognized the existence of factual disputes that cannot be resolved on the limited record before it. Since the appellants claim to have reversed the ITC, and the appellate authority's order was based on incomplete submissions, a remand was necessary.
The Court directed the adjudicating authority to treat the original order as a show-cause notice, consider the appellants' detailed reply and documents, provide a personal hearing, and pass a fresh order on merits and in accordance with law.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
The Court held:
"If the assessee have already reversed the ITC then the matter becomes revenue neutral and the question of making any pre-deposit would not arise."
"These are all factual matters, which needs to be adjudicated before the authority."
"The appellants are directed to treat the order in original dated 14th December, 2023 as a show-cause notice and submit their detailed reply along with all documents to the adjudicating authority within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of server copy of this judgment and order."
"On receipt of the same, the adjudicating authority shall afford an opportunity of personal hearing to the authorised representative of the appellants, consider all the documents and the submissions that may be made by the appellants and pass a fresh order on merits and in accordance with law."
The Court established the principle that factual disputes concerning reversal of ITC and related procedural compliance must be resolved through proper adjudication rather than summary dismissal or ex-parte orders.
The final determination was to set aside the appellate order, remand the matter for fresh adjudication, and allow the appellants an opportunity to respond and reconcile the alleged defects, thereby ensuring procedural fairness and adherence to statutory provisions.
The core legal questions considered by the Court are:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of Department's rejection of the first refund application without proper communication and opportunity of hearing
Legal framework and precedents: The refund applications are governed by Section 54 of the GST Act. Section 54(1) mandates that an application for refund must be made within two years from the relevant date. Section 54(4) requires the application to be supported by documentary evidence unless the refund amount is below Rs. 2 lakhs. Section 54(7) requires the Department to pass an order within 60 days of receipt of a complete application. Rule 90(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 requires the Department to communicate any deficiency in the application by issuing Form GST RFD-03 through the common portal, and the period during which deficiencies are communicated is excluded from the two-year limitation period. The petitioner must be given an opportunity of hearing before rejection.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Department contended that the SCN dated 5th July 2019 and the consequential rejection order dated 19th September 2019 were uploaded on the portal and that three dates for personal hearing were fixed. The petitioner, however, denied knowledge of these documents, asserting that they were never uploaded, and thus, the rejection order was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing.
The Court observed that the petitioner only became aware of the rejection order after the Department filed an additional affidavit in February 2025, nearly six years after the order was passed. This delay in communication deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to respond or appeal within the prescribed time.
Key evidence and findings: The Department's own admission that the petitioner was not aware of the SCN or rejection order until 2025, and the petitioner's assertion that these documents were not uploaded on the portal, are critical. The Department's failure to upload the SCN and rejection order on the portal constitutes a procedural lapse.
Application of law to facts: Since the petitioner was not given proper notice or opportunity to respond, the rejection order is effectively without jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that procedural fairness and adherence to statutory timelines are mandatory under the GST Act.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Department's argument that the petitioner delayed submission of supporting documents until 2023 was rejected as the petitioner's lack of knowledge of the rejection order was a consequence of the Department's failure to upload the documents. The petitioner's right to be heard was paramount.
Conclusion: The Court held that the petitioner's remedies cannot be shut out and permitted the petitioner to file an appeal against the rejection order before the Appellate Authority under Section 107 of the Act. The appeal was to be filed within one month and was to be adjudicated on merits without being dismissed on limitation grounds.
Issue 2: Whether the Department's inability to trace the deficiency memo (Form GST RFD-03) in respect of the second refund application justifies withholding the refund
Legal framework and precedents: Rule 90(3) mandates that any deficiency in the refund application must be communicated to the applicant via Form GST RFD-03. The deficiency communication period is excluded from the limitation period under Section 54(1). The refund application must be accompanied by requisite documents, and the Department cannot withhold refund without valid grounds.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Department admitted that despite best efforts, the deficiency memo issued to the petitioner could not be traced. The Department also acknowledged that the petitioner submitted the requisite documents later, on 17th October 2023, but by then the matter was already before the Court.
Key evidence and findings: The Department's affidavit explicitly stated the inability to trace the deficiency memo and that the petitioner had submitted the required documents physically only much later. There was no denial of submission of documents, only a procedural lapse in record-keeping by the Department.
Application of law to facts: Since the deficiency memo was not traceable and the petitioner eventually submitted the documents, the Department had no valid ground to withhold the refund. The statutory framework requires the Department to process the refund if no valid deficiency exists.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Department's argument that physical copies were not submitted at the time of filing was noted but did not justify withholding the refund since the deficiency communication was not properly recorded or communicated.
Conclusion: The Court directed the Department to process the second refund application dated 12th June 2019 and refund the amount along with statutory interest within two months.
Issue 3: Procedural timelines and remedies available to the petitioner
Legal framework and precedents: Section 54(7) requires the Department to decide refund applications within 60 days of receipt of complete applications. Section 107 provides the right to appeal against orders passed under the Act. Rule 90(3) governs deficiency communications and their impact on limitation periods.
Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court emphasized strict compliance with timelines and procedural safeguards. It recognized the petitioner's right to appeal against the rejection order despite the delay in knowledge due to Departmental lapses.
Key evidence and findings: The delay in processing and communication was attributable to the Department's failure to upload documents and maintain proper records.
Application of law to facts: The Court applied the principles of natural justice and statutory provisions to ensure the petitioner's rights were protected and procedural lapses by the Department did not prejudice the petitioner.
Treatment of competing arguments: The Court rejected the Department's reliance on procedural failings by the petitioner as a justification for withholding refunds or denying appeal rights.
Conclusion: The petitioner was allowed to file an appeal within one month, which would be heard on merits without limitation objections. The second refund application was ordered to be processed expeditiously.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
"In view of the fact that the final order of rejection has already been passed in this matter on 19th September, 2019 which has come to the knowledge of the Petitioner only on 11th, February, 2025 after filing of the additional affidavit on behalf of the Department, this Court is of the opinion that the Petitioner's remedies cannot be shut out. Accordingly, the Petitioner is permitted to file an appeal challenging the said order before the Appellate Authority under Section 107 of the Act."
"The stand of the Department in its affidavit is not that the documents were not submitted, rather that the deficiency memo is not traceable. In such circumstances, there is no valid ground to hold back the refund. The refund application dated 12th June, 2019 is, accordingly, directed to be processed and the amount to be refunded along with the statutory interest from the date of the second application i.e., 12th June, 2019 within a period of two months."
Core principles established include:
Final determinations:
Note
Bookmark
Share
Download
Don't have an account? Register Here
TaxTMI