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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether, in light of the lenders' stated consensus to withdraw the insolvency proceedings on the basis of a proposed revival/settlement framework, the appeals should be kept pending or disposed of with liberty to pursue withdrawal under Section 12A of the Code.
(ii) What operative directions were required regarding filing and processing of a Section 12A withdrawal application (including submission of Form 'FA' and steps by the IRP), and whether protection by continuation of stay on the admission order should operate until the withdrawal application is decided.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Disposition of appeals in view of proposed withdrawal/settlement
Legal framework: The Court considered withdrawal of commenced CIRP through a Section 12A process, in the context of the lenders' decision to have the lead lender take steps for withdrawal.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court proceeded on the submissions that the lead lender had decided to move for withdrawal, that other financial creditors had agreed in principle to such withdrawal, and that consent terms and supporting affidavits were already placed on record. Given this consensus position and the stated intent to pursue withdrawal before the Adjudicating Authority, the Court held that keeping the appeals pending would serve no useful purpose.
Conclusion: The appeals were disposed of, with liberty granted to pursue withdrawal of CIRP through the Section 12A route.
Issue (ii): Directions for Section 12A steps and interim protection pending decision
Legal framework: The Court addressed the procedural steps for moving a withdrawal request under Section 12A, specifically the requirement of furnishing Form 'FA' to the IRP and the IRP thereafter taking steps to file the withdrawal application.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court directed that the lead lender may file the Section 12A withdrawal application after providing Form 'FA' to the IRP, and fixed a timeline that the IRP shall take steps to file the application within two weeks from receipt of Form 'FA'. Since an interim stay of the admission order had earlier been granted, the Court considered it necessary to maintain protection so that no steps are taken pursuant to the admission order until the Adjudicating Authority decides the Section 12A application.
Conclusion: Liberty was granted to initiate Section 12A withdrawal; the IRP was directed to act within two weeks of Form 'FA' being provided; and no action was permitted to be taken pursuant to the admission order until the Section 12A application is decided by the Adjudicating Authority.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether the final registration application under section 12AB (as applied through section 12A(1)(ac)(iii)) was validly rejected for non-maintainability on the ground that it was filed beyond the statutory time limit and was not saved by the CBDT extension circular.
2. Whether the rejection of the application without according an opportunity to produce documentary evidence or without consideration of past activities and provisional registration violated principles of natural justice or rendered the order unsustainable.
3. Whether the remedy of the applicant lay in filing an appeal against the original order denying registration and whether the Tribunal should interfere with the CIT(E)'s maintainability finding or advise on condonation of delay in a future appeal.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Maintainability: time-bar and effect of CBDT circular
Legal framework: The statutory scheme requires filing of registration applications under section 12AB (as relevant through section 12A(1)(ac)(iii)) within the time prescribed by law. The CBDT issued a circular (No. 07/2024 dated 25.04.2024) that extended the time for filing certain applications and specified in para 4.1 the categories of applications covered by the extension.
Precedent treatment: No judicial precedents were cited in the impugned order or before the Tribunal that altered the statutory time limits or the applicability of the circular; the Tribunal proceeded on the basis of the statutory scheme and the text of the CBDT circular.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal examined the record and noted that the impugned application was the second application for final approval; an earlier application dated 17.09.2023 had already been rejected by the CIT(E) and provisional registration had been cancelled by order dated 23.02.2024. The subsequent application, though filed within the extended window provided by the CBDT circular, did not fall within para 4.1 of the circular because the earlier rejection and cancellation precluded coverage under the categories listed. On this factual and textual basis the CIT(E) concluded the present application was beyond the statutory deadline and therefore non-maintainable. The Tribunal found no error in that conclusion and observed that the assessee's counsel did not controvert the factual finding that the application was time-barred and not saved by the circular.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - an application for final registration filed after an earlier rejection and cancellation is not maintainable merely because a general extension has been issued; applicability of an extension circular must be determined against its specific coverage (para 4.1). Obiter - none on alternative methods of calculating time limits beyond the circular's text.
Conclusions: The Tribunal upheld the CIT(E)'s rejection of the application as non-maintainable for being filed beyond the prescribed time and not covered by the CBDT circular.
Issue 2 - Alleged denial of opportunity / failure to consider documentary evidence and past activities
Legal framework: Principles of natural justice require reasonable opportunity to place material before a decision-maker where admissible and relevant. The assessment of genuineness of charitable activities under section 12AB is fact-sensitive and ordinarily involves consideration of documents such as activity reports, bank statements, financial statements and provisional registration status.
Precedent treatment: The record did not identify binding precedent applied to require reopening of maintainability questions where the application is time-barred. The Tribunal applied standards of opportunity to be given but contextualized them within the maintainability determination.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal noted that the sole argument advanced before it was that the application had been rejected without adequate opportunity to file documentary evidence. However, the Tribunal accepted the CIT(E)'s factual finding that the application was the second application following prior rejection and cancellation and therefore was non-maintainable. Because the maintainability objection was dispositive and uncontroverted, the Tribunal did not find error in refusing to consider the merits (i.e., documentary evidence and activities) of a time-barred application. The Tribunal also observed that the remedy against the earlier denial lay in an appeal against the original denial, implying that procedural avenues to test merits remained available but through the correct proceedings.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - when an application is held non-maintainable as being beyond the statutory time and not covered by an extension, a tribunal need not adjudicate the merits including documentary verification or purported defects in opportunity, unless the maintainability finding itself is successfully challenged. Obiter - the Tribunal remarked that the assessee could furnish documentary evidence if given an opportunity in the proper proceeding, but this was not a basis to set aside the maintainability finding.
Conclusions: The Tribunal rejected the contention of denial of natural justice as insufficient to overturn the maintainability rejection; it declined to remit for merits consideration because the application was correctly held non-maintainable.
Issue 3 - Appropriate remedy and observations on condonation of delay in appeal
Legal framework: Statutory rights to seek registration can be challenged by appeal against the order that denied registration; time limits for appeals are governed by the relevant procedural provisions and condonation of delay is available in appropriate cases before the appellate forum on established principles.
Precedent treatment: The Tribunal did not rely on or distinguish any precedent concerning condonation thresholds; it confined itself to stating legal remedies and the discretion available to appellate bodies.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal observed that the proper remedy lay in appealing against the original order dated 23.02.2024 which denied final approval and cancelled provisional registration. It acknowledged the practical difficulty that such an appeal may be time-barred but recorded that the assessee's bona fide attempt to rectify the rejection by filing a fresh application (which was later held non-maintainable) could be a relevant circumstance for an appellate bench to consider when deciding an application for condonation of delay. This observation was directional and advisory, not an order of condonation.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - the proper procedural remedy for challenging denial of registration is an appeal against the original denying order; maintainability of a subsequent application does not replace or negate the right to appeal the original order. Obiter - the Tribunal's remark that the facts may be considered for condonation in a future appeal is advisory and not a ruling on condonation.
Conclusions: The Tribunal dismissed the present appeal and directed that the assessee remain free to pursue an appeal against the original order; the Tribunal indicated that it would be open to consider a condonation plea in that appeal based on the assessee's bona fide conduct, but made no binding determination on such condonation.
Issues: Challenge to the show-cause notice and consequential demand on the ground of haste in issuance, alleged non-grant of adequate time to respond to audit queries and DRC-01A, and request for interim protection against coercive action.
Outcome: Notice issued to the respondents, returnable on 04.09.2025, with ad-interim relief that no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner during the pendency of the petition.
Issues: (i) Whether appellate proceedings revive only if the settlement application is rejected without terms of settlement and whether the assessee must forgo the challenge to the assessment order on merits in that situation; (ii) whether the Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay, setting aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), and restoring the first appeal; (iii) whether the appellate proceedings should remain in abeyance pending disposal of the settlement application.
Issue (i): Whether appellate proceedings revive only if the settlement application is rejected without terms of settlement and whether the assessee must forgo the challenge to the assessment order on merits in that situation.
Analysis: The statutory consequence under Section 245HA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 arises only upon rejection of the settlement application without terms of settlement. In that event, the pending appellate proceedings stand revived. The assessee is not required to abandon the right to contest the assessment order on merits merely because the settlement application is rejected in that manner.
Conclusion: The stand of the Revenue was rejected, and the assessee's right to pursue the appeal on merits was preserved.
Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal was justified in condoning the delay, setting aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals), and restoring the first appeal.
Analysis: In the peculiar facts of the case, the Tribunal found sufficient justification for condonation of delay and for restoring the appeal after setting aside the order of the Commissioner (Appeals).
Conclusion: The Tribunal's order was upheld as justified.
Issue (iii): Whether the appellate proceedings should remain in abeyance pending disposal of the settlement application.
Analysis: Since the settlement application had not yet been decided and an order under Section 245D(4) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was awaited, the appellate proceedings were directed to remain stayed in the meantime.
Conclusion: The appellate proceedings were directed to be kept in abeyance until disposal of the settlement application.
Final Conclusion: The special leave petition failed, while protecting the assessee's right to pursue the statutory appeal after the settlement proceedings are concluded.
Ratio Decidendi: Appellate proceedings revive under Section 245HA of the Income-tax Act, 1961 only upon rejection of the settlement application without terms of settlement, and pending appellate remedies need not be abandoned while the settlement application remains undecided.
Issues: Whether, in proceedings under Section 67 leading to action under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the respondents should be restrained from taking coercive action pending further consideration.
Analysis: The petition raised the contention that the officer who initiated the inquiry and investigation could not also proceed as the adjudicating authority, and reliance was placed on the departmental circular of 09.02.2018 and the Delhi High Court order referred to in the text. The Court, taking note of the similar order passed in connected matters, found it appropriate to grant interim protection.
Outcome: Notice issued, returnable on 21 July 2025, and the respondents were directed not to take any coercive action against the petitioner until further orders.
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Issues: Whether the cancellation of GST registration, and the consequential rejection of revocation and appeal, could be sustained when the later verification report showed that the business premises existed at the notified address.
Analysis: The registration was cancelled on the premise that the business activity at the declared premises could not be verified and that the registration had been obtained by fraud, wilful misstatement and suppression of facts. A subsequent report, prepared after further enquiry and physical verification under Rule 25 of the WBGST /CGST Rules, 2017, disclosed that the petitioner no. 1's business entity was found existing at the notified address. In that factual backdrop, the basis of the cancellation ceased to survive, and the consequential orders founded on the cancellation could not be sustained.
Conclusion: The cancellation of registration and the consequential orders were set aside, and restoration of the registration was directed in favour of the assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: Where subsequent verification establishes the existence of the business premises at the registered address, cancellation of GST registration on the ground of non-existence or unverifiable business activity cannot be continued.
Issues: Whether CENVAT credit was admissible on the disputed input services used by the assessee.
Analysis: The Tribunal noted that the same dispute had already been decided in favour of the assessee in an earlier final order of the Bench. It also took note that for the subsequent period the Department itself had allowed the credit. In these circumstances, the Tribunal found no reason to take a different view for the intervening period involved in the appeal.
Conclusion: CENVAT credit on the disputed services was held admissible and the denial of credit was not sustained.
The Supreme Court, in a partial bench comprising Hon'ble Justices Rajesh Bindal and R. Mahadevan, heard Special Leave Petitions challenging an interim High Court order that relied on the judgment in *K.J. International v. State of Punjab*, 2023 (12) Centax 106 (P&H). The main writ petition remains pending. The Court condoned the delay but held that no case was made out for interference with the impugned order, stating: "We do not find that any case is made out for interference with the impugned order." Accordingly, the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed, and any pending applications were disposed of.
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Issues: Whether the impugned certificate and the order under Section 197 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained when they disregarded a binding Supreme Court decision on taxability of subscription receipts on the ground that a review petition was pending.
Analysis: The order under challenge contained no independent reasoning and proceeded by relying on an assessment order that treated the receipts as royalty under Article 12 of the India-US Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement. The binding effect of the Supreme Court decision in Engineering Analysis Centre of Excellence Pvt. Ltd. was emphasised. It was also noted that the review petition against that decision had already been dismissed, and that a pending review could not justify ignoring a binding precedent. Under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, the decision of the Supreme Court continued to bind the Revenue.
Conclusion: The impugned order could not stand and was set aside.
Final Conclusion: The matter was sent back for fresh consideration by the Assessing Officer in accordance with law, and the petitioner obtained the substantive relief of reconsideration of its withholding-tax application.
Ratio Decidendi: A binding decision of the Supreme Court must be followed by revenue authorities and cannot be disregarded merely because a review petition is pending or has been filed.
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(i) Whether the impugned SCNs suffer from lack of jurisdiction, particularly due to the absence of essential jurisdictional facts such as breach of the Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices (PFUTP) Regulations or the making of disproportionate gains or securing unfair advantage;
(ii) Whether the issuance of the impugned SCNs is barred by the principles of res judicata or issue estoppel, given that earlier SCNs on the same allegations were adjudicated and penalties imposed;
(iii) Whether the Petitioners' prior participation in the proceedings before the Quasi-Judicial Authority (QJA) estops them from raising these jurisdictional and res judicata challenges at this stage, or whether fundamental rights preclude any such waiver;
(iv) Whether the objections raised by the Petitioners should be treated as preliminary issues for determination before proceeding further with adjudication of the impugned SCNs;
(v) The appropriateness of entertaining writ petitions challenging SCNs issued by SEBI at an advanced stage of adjudication proceedings.
Issue-wise Detailed Analysis
1. Jurisdictional Challenge to the Impugned SCNs
The Petitioners contend that the impugned SCNs were issued without jurisdiction because the essential jurisdictional facts-namely, violation of PFUTP Regulations and the making of disproportionate gains or unfair advantage-were absent. They rely on prior adjudication orders where penalties were imposed for minor breaches unrelated to PFUTP violations or disproportionate gains, and no findings were made against them under the PFUTP Regulations or regarding unfair advantage.
The relevant legal framework includes the SEBI Act and the PFUTP Regulations, which empower SEBI to issue SCNs and impose penalties only upon satisfaction of certain jurisdictional facts. The Petitioners rely on precedent emphasizing the necessity of jurisdictional facts for valid issuance of SCNs.
The Court observed that while the Petitioners assert that no such jurisdictional facts exist, the prior adjudication orders did not conclusively resolve these issues, especially since the investigations and reports forming the basis of the impugned SCNs (notably by ISB, Deloitte, and E&Y) were not available at the time of earlier proceedings. The Court noted that the scope of earlier proceedings and the current SCNs differ, particularly with respect to disgorgement of unlawful gains, which was not addressed previously.
The Court refrained from deciding the jurisdictional challenge on merits but held that these issues are mixed questions of law and fact best decided by the QJA during adjudication rather than as preliminary issues.
2. Application of Res Judicata and Issue Estoppel
The Petitioners argued that the impugned SCNs are barred by res judicata or issue estoppel because the same allegations had been adjudicated earlier, resulting in penalties that were paid, thereby concluding the matter.
Res judicata is a principle that prevents vexatious litigation on the same cause of action and requires finality in judicial decisions. The Court acknowledged that this principle applies to SEBI proceedings as held by the Supreme Court, but emphasized that the plea involves mixed questions of law and fact, including the identity of cause of action and scope of prior adjudication.
The Court noted that the prior adjudication did not involve the new reports and findings that form the basis of the impugned SCNs and that the scope and jurisdiction of the adjudicating officer then and the Whole Time Member (WTM) now differ. Therefore, the Court found no prima facie bar in entertaining the impugned SCNs on res judicata grounds at this stage.
Further, the Court referred to precedents stating that res judicata pleas can be waived if not raised timely and that such pleas are not jurisdictional bars but estoppel based on public policy.
Consequently, the Court declined to treat the res judicata plea as a preliminary issue to avoid piecemeal adjudication and delay.
3. Waiver and Estoppel by Participation in Proceedings
SEBI contended that the Petitioners' participation in the SCN proceedings, including cross-examination of witnesses and seeking documents, estops them from challenging the SCNs at this stage. The Petitioners countered that fundamental rights cannot be waived and that participation does not preclude raising jurisdictional or res judicata objections.
The Court observed that the Petitioners had actively participated in the proceedings over an extended period and only after the hearings had substantially progressed did they file these petitions. While fundamental rights cannot be waived, the Petitioners failed to demonstrate which fundamental rights were at stake. The Court left the question of waiver to be addressed by the QJA along with other issues.
4. Treatment of Challenges as Preliminary Issues
The Petitioners sought directions to treat their objections, including jurisdictional and res judicata pleas, as preliminary issues to be decided before further hearings in the impugned SCNs. They relied on a coordinate bench decision where such directions were issued in a case involving exoneration in earlier proceedings followed by a fresh SCN on the same allegations.
SEBI argued that the factual matrix in the present case differs significantly from the cited precedent and that the earlier proceedings and current SCNs differ in scope and jurisdiction. It submitted that treating these issues as preliminary would cause undue delay and is not warranted.
The Court analyzed the procedural history, noting multiple adjournments, challenges to inspection proceedings, and attempts to delay cross-examination of expert witnesses. It found a pattern of delay tactics by the Petitioners, aimed at stalling adjudication.
Legal principles from the Code of Civil Procedure (Order XIV) and Supreme Court precedents were considered, which generally discourage piecemeal adjudication unless the preliminary issue is purely legal and can dispose of the case expeditiously. Since the res judicata plea and jurisdictional challenges involve mixed questions of law and fact, the Court held that these should be decided together with other issues.
The Court distinguished the facts from the coordinate bench decision and held that the present case does not justify treating these challenges as preliminary issues.
5. Entertaining Writ Petitions Against Show Cause Notices
The Court noted that ordinarily, challenges to show cause notices are not entertained under Article 226 of the Constitution unless there is a violation of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or the proceedings are wholly without authority.
Here, the Court found that the Petitioners' contentions do not establish that the SCNs are wholly without jurisdiction or issued in abuse of process. The issues raised are contentious and require adjudication by the QJA. The Court relied on precedents emphasizing that interference at the SCN stage should be rare and only in exceptional cases.
Significant Holdings
"The interests of justice would be best served if all issues, including those related to the bar of res judicata or the alleged lack of jurisdictional facts, are considered and resolved by the QJA either in one comprehensive hearing or simultaneously without resorting to any piecemeal adjudication being insisted by the Petitioners."
"The extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 cannot support strategies or attempts simply because the Petitioners may have the means and the wherewithal to sustain the same."
"The normal rule is that all issues must be decided simultaneously and in one go."
"The plea of res judicata, depending on the facts of a given case, is capable of being waived, if not properly raised at an appropriate stage and in an appropriate manner."
"Challenges to a show cause notice must not ordinarily be entertained in Petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution except where there has been a violation of principles of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of the act is challenged."
"We decline to order the QJA to treat such issues as preliminary issues. We are satisfied that this is a fit case where all the issues must be tried together instead of any piecemeal adjudication."
The Court's final determination was to dismiss the petitions without quashing the impugned SCNs, leaving it open to the Petitioners to raise all their objections, including jurisdictional and res judicata pleas, before the QJA. However, the Court refused to direct the QJA to treat these objections as preliminary issues, emphasizing the need to avoid undue delay and piecemeal adjudication in the public interest. The Court's observations on merits were expressly stated to be prima facie and not binding on the QJA in its adjudication.
Issues: (i) Whether MEIS scrips, though already availed and whose validity period had expired, could be cancelled retrospectively under Section 9(4) of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 read with Rule 10 of the Foreign Trade (Regulation) Rules, 1993. (ii) Whether the authorities satisfied the requirements of the governing provisions before cancelling the scrips. (iii) Whether the appellate authority applied its mind and recorded proper reasons while affirming the cancellation.
Issue (i): Whether MEIS scrips, though already availed and whose validity period had expired, could be cancelled retrospectively under Section 9(4) of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 read with Rule 10 of the Foreign Trade (Regulation) Rules, 1993.
Analysis: Section 9(4) empowers cancellation of a scrip only for good and sufficient reasons and subject to the prescribed conditions. Those conditions are found in Rule 10 of the Foreign Trade (Regulation) Rules, 1993. The validity of the scrips had expired, but the power under Section 9(4) was treated as wide enough to permit cancellation where the underlying decision required reconsideration. The Court declined to accept the contrary view that an expired scrip could never be cancelled.
Conclusion: Yes. The scrips could be cancelled retrospectively even after expiry of their validity period.
Issue (ii): Whether the authorities satisfied the requirements of the governing provisions before cancelling the scrips.
Analysis: The order in original and the appellate order did not identify which specific condition under Rule 10 had been satisfied. Rule 10(a) was inapplicable because fraud, suppression of facts, or misrepresentation was not established. Rule 10(b) and Rule 10(c) were also inapplicable. Rule 10(d) could not be invoked because the alleged default was treated as a foreign trade policy issue rather than a contravention of customs law, foreign exchange law, or the rules and regulations relating thereto. The cancellation was therefore unsupported by the required statutory basis.
Conclusion: No. The cancellation was not shown to satisfy the statutory requirements.
Issue (iii): Whether the appellate authority applied its mind and recorded proper reasons while affirming the cancellation.
Analysis: The appellate order merely reproduced a conclusion that cancellation was permissible after hearing, but it did not examine the relevant rule or explain how the facts fitted any condition under Rule 10. The absence of a reasoned connection between the facts and the enabling provision showed non-application of mind.
Conclusion: No. The appellate authority failed to give proper reasons or demonstrate due application of mind.
Final Conclusion: The appellate order could not be sustained and the matter had to be reconsidered by the appellate authority on its own merits in the light of the Court's observations. The writ petitions succeeded and the dispute was sent back for fresh decision.
Ratio Decidendi: Cancellation of a fiscal scrip under Section 9(4) of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 must be grounded in a specific prescribed condition under Rule 10 of the Foreign Trade (Regulation) Rules, 1993 and supported by a reasoned order identifying that condition.
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