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ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether a Customs House Agent (CHA) who files the bill of entry is liable to penalty under Section 112(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 where the imported goods are held liable to confiscation under Section 111(d).
2. Whether imposition of penalty on a CHA requires proof of mens rea, knowledge, collusion or abetment, or whether absolute/vicarious liability arises by virtue of Section 147 (liability of principal and agent).
3. The proper application of Section 147 in proceedings under the Customs Act: scope of deemed knowledge/consent and whether agent can be treated as owner/importer for purposes of liability.
4. The precedential value and applicability of judicial decisions relied upon by the adjudicating authority (notably the Delhi High Court judgment referred to by the adjudicator) and whether such authorities mandate imposition of penalty on CHA absent proof of knowledge.
5. Whether facts of non-cooperation by the CHA (summons not complied with) justify drawing adverse inference sufficient to sustain penalty under Section 112(i).
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - CHA liability under Section 112(i) where goods are confiscated under Section 111(d)
Legal framework: Section 111(d) renders goods liable to confiscation; Section 112(i) prescribes penalty where goods are liable to confiscation. Section 147 addresses liability of principal and agent in proceedings under the Act.
Precedent treatment: The impugned order relied on a Delhi High Court decision holding both importer and CHA liable in appropriate circumstances. The Tribunal and other authorities cited (e.g., D.S. Cargo Service; Prime Forwarders; Ghevarchand Chunilal Jain) have held that penalty on CHA is not sustainable in absence of material showing knowledge or connivance.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court recognizes that Section 112 penalizes persons whose acts render goods liable to confiscation and also those who "abet" such acts. The Tribunal emphasizes distinction between primary offender and facilitator: mere filing of bill of entry, without knowledge or role in the illicit importation, does not ipso facto attract penalty. The adjudicator's view that Section 147 casts equal onus on CHA is analysed alongside authorities that qualify such onus by requiring proof of knowledge or that the agent acted with consent/knowledge of principal.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - CHA is not automatically liable under Section 112(i) merely for filing a bill of entry; penalty requires either direct involvement or evidence of abetment/collusion/knowledge. Obiter - discussion on policy consequences of imposing absolute liability on CHAs (commercial harm) and civil vs. criminal nature of proceedings.
Conclusion: Penalty under Section 112(i) cannot be sustained against a CHA absent evidence of prior knowledge, collusion, or abetment; mere facilitation by filing documents is insufficient.
Issue 2 - Requirement of mens rea/knowledge/collusion for penalizing CHA (interpretation of "abet")
Legal framework: Section 112 (and related penal provisions) penalize acts rendering goods liable to confiscation and persons who "abet" such acts. Definition/meaning of abetment is drawn from the General Clauses Act and IPC (Section 107 IPC as referenced), since Customs Act does not define "abet".
Precedent treatment: Tribunal and various High Court/Tribunal decisions (Amritlaksmi Machine Works; Yogesh Kumar; Prakash Poonia; Shiva Khurana; Poonia & Brothers; Rajan Arora) emphasize need for mens rea/knowledge for penalizing CHA/CB; where absence of guilty mind established, penalty set aside.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal reasons that the "abet" limb imports intentional aiding or collusion; therefore mens rea is a sine qua non for penalizing CHA as abettor. The adjudicator's broader reading (imposing penalty by operation of Section 147 or by contumacious conduct) is examined and found insufficient without evidentiary support of knowledge or collusion. The Court further notes that civil character of customs penal provisions makes them compensatory but does not negate requirement of culpability for facilitators.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - mens rea/knowledge is required to impose penalty on CHA under the abetment limb; absent such proof, penal provisions should not be applied to mere facilitators. Obiter - expansive commentary on commercial consequences if CHAs were treated as strictly liable.
Conclusion: For CHA to be penalized as abettor under Section 112, there must be evidence of knowledge, collusion or intentional facilitation; inadvertent or routine filing of documents without such knowledge does not attract penalty.
Issue 3 - Application and scope of Section 147 (liability of principal and agent)
Legal framework: Section 147(1)-(3) permits acts required of owner/importer to be done by agent; subsection (2) deems acts done by agent to be done with knowledge/consent of owner unless contrary proved; subsection (3) deems agent to be owner for certain purposes.
Precedent treatment: The Delhi High Court decision relied upon by the adjudicator interpreted Section 147 as making owner/importer and agent jointly liable in certain circumstances. However, Tribunal decisions distinguish that holding where there is no evidence of express/implicit authorization or admission by the CHA of mis-declaration.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal observes that Section 147 creates presumptions that can be rebutted by proof to the contrary; it does not create absolute unqualified liability in every case. Where the CHA acted on documents provided by importer and there is no evidence of knowledge/connection, Section 147's deeming provisions alone do not justify penalty. Reliance on Section 147 must be contextualized with evidentiary findings (e.g., admissions, statements, or other proof of connivance).
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Section 147 exposes agent to liability but permits rebuttal; it does not eliminate requirement to establish knowledge/consent where penalty is sought under penal provisions. Obiter - comparison of cases where Section 147 was applied versus cases where it was distinguished on facts.
Conclusion: Section 147 can render an agent liable, but its presumptions are rebuttable; absence of evidence of knowledge or authorization precludes penal consequence solely based on Section 147.
Issue 4 - Precedential value of relied authorities and distinguishing of Delhi High Court decision
Legal framework: Adjudicative reliance on precedent must fit the facts; admissions/statements of CHA play decisive role where precedent upheld penalty based on such admissions.
Precedent treatment: The impugned order relied on Jasjeet Singh Marwaha (Delhi High Court) where CHA's admission/collusion supported penalty. The Tribunal cites Buhariwala Logistics and other authorities distinguishing Jasjeet Singh where no admission or evidence of authorisation/knowledge exists.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal distinguishes the cited Delhi High Court authority on factual matrix: in Jasjeet Singh the CHA had admitted mis-declaration; in the present proceedings there was no evidence of such admission or proof of knowledge. The Tribunal underscores that precedents upholding penalty on CHA are fact-sensitive and do not mandate penalty where the record lacks culpatory evidence.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - precedents imposing penalty on CHA are applicable only when factual findings (admission, knowledge, collusion) exist; otherwise those precedents are distinguishable. Obiter - commentary on investigative practice and recording of CHA statements.
Conclusion: Reliance on the Delhi High Court decision is distinguishable on facts; absent corroborative evidence of knowledge or admission, that authority does not support penalty in the present matter.
Issue 5 - Effect of CHA's non-cooperation (failure to appear/respond to summons) on sustaining penalty
Legal framework: Adjudicating authorities may draw adverse inferences from non-cooperation, but penalty requires substantive evidence of culpability under Section 112.
Precedent treatment: The impugned order treated failure to appear and alleged lack of cooperation as indicative of connivance. The Tribunal considered alternate findings in an appellate order where similar facts resulted in setting aside penalty for absence of mens rea and evidentiary proof.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal notes that while non-appearance may be considered, it is not a substitute for positive evidence of knowledge or abetment. The adjudicator's rejection of CHA's explanation because of non-appearance was weighed against other authorities and an appellate finding in a related matter that accepted absence of evidence of malafide and set aside penalty.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - non-cooperation alone, without material evidence of knowledge or collusion, is insufficient to sustain penalty under Section 112(i). Obiter - observations on administrative practice of summoning CHAs and consequences of procedural non-compliance.
Conclusion: Adverse inference from non-cooperation does not automatically validate penalty; in the absence of evidence of mens rea/abetment, penalty cannot be sustained solely on the CHA's failure to appear.
OVERALL CONCLUSION
The penalties imposed under Section 112(i) on the CHA are not sustainable on the record before the Tribunal because there is no evidence of knowledge, collusion, abetment or admission by the CHA; Section 147 and relied authority are distinguishable on facts; mere filing of bill of entry or procedural non-cooperation does not suffice to fix penal liability. The appeal is allowed and the penalty set aside.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether a show-cause notice issued under Section 74(1) read with Section 74(10) of the GST Act (invoking the five-year extended limitation) is sustainable where the authority has not recorded any material establishing fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts by the taxable person.
2. Whether invocation of the extended period under Section 74 can be justified by alleged conduct of the taxpayer (challenge to earlier communication and subsequent withdrawal of a writ petition) absent specific factual findings of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression as contemplated by Section 74 and its Explanation 2.
3. Whether the respondent could re-classify pre-Notification (31.12.2018) transactions by treating composite supplies as works contract to attract a higher rate (18%) when Notification No. 24/2018-Central Tax (Rate) is prospective from 01.01.2019 and the impugned notices/orders relate to periods prior to that date.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 1: Validity of invoking Section 74's extended limitation absent material of fraud/wilful misstatement/suppression
Legal framework: Section 74 prescribes that the extended five-year limitation (Section 74(10)) applies only where it appears to the proper officer that tax has not been paid/short paid/erroneously refunded or ITC wrongly availed by reason of fraud, or any wilful misstatement or suppression of facts to evade tax; Explanation 2 defines "suppression". Section 73 governs non-fraud short-payment with a three-year limitation (Section 73(10)).
Precedent Treatment: No binding precedent was relied upon by the parties or recorded in the judgment; the Court proceeded on statutory text and record before it.
Interpretation and reasoning: The show-cause notice dated 05.08.2024, on its face, did not record any specific material establishing fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression by the petitioner. The affidavit-in-reply filed by the authority (post hoc) cannot cure the absence of such material in the notice itself. Mere allegations of suspicious conduct or inferences drawn from commercial data and pricing differentials, without concrete factual findings articulated in the notice, do not satisfy the statutory threshold for invoking Section 74's extended limitation.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - The extended limitation under Section 74 cannot be invoked unless the show-cause notice reflects material demonstrating fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression as defined under the Act; absence of such material renders invocation of Section 74 unsustainable. Obiter - Observations on the insufficiency of averments that merely infer intention from procedural conduct (challenge and withdrawal of writ) are supportive but not necessary to the central ratio.
Conclusions: The Court held that the impugned show-cause notice fails to demonstrate fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression on its face and therefore the authority could not validly assume jurisdiction under Section 74(1) read with Section 74(10). The notice is liable to be quashed on that ground alone.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 2: Sufficiency of alleged taxpayer conduct (challenge and withdrawal of writ; non-production of documents) to sustain Section 74 invocation
Legal framework: Explanation 2 to Section 74 treats "suppression" as non-declaration in returns/statements/documents or failure to furnish information when asked in writing by the proper officer; statutory scheme requires a showing that the evasion is by reason of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression.
Precedent Treatment: No precedent applied; issue decided on statutory interpretation and record.
Interpretation and reasoning: The authority's contention that the taxpayer's filing of a writ petition (challenging a prior communication) and subsequent withdrawal evidenced an intent to evade tax or to prevent investigation is an inference unsupported by direct factual material in the show-cause notice. The definition of "suppression" requires failure to declare facts in returns/statements or failure to furnish information when asked in writing; the impugned notice did not set out specific instances showing such statutory non-declaration or failure. Procedural acts (litigation conduct) alone do not automatically equate to statutory suppression or fraud. Further, post-hoc assertions in affidavit do not substitute for the requirement that the notice itself supply sufficient grounds for invoking Section 74.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Procedural conduct like instituting and withdrawing litigation, or perceived non-cooperation, cannot by themselves justify invoking the extended limitation under Section 74 unless the notice itself identifies material facts amounting to fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression as defined. Obiter - The Court's view that administrative difficulty or suspicion does not replace statutory requirements is supplementary.
Conclusions: The Court rejected the authority's reliance on the taxpayer's litigation conduct and alleged non-production of documents as constituting suppression or fraud for the purposes of Section 74. The authority failed to identify statutory suppression or fraud in the notice; invocation of the extended period was therefore unjustified.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 3: Temporal application of Notification and classification of supplies prior to 01.01.2019
Legal framework: Notification No. 24/2018-Central Tax (Rate) (dated 31.12.2018) and its Explanation to Entry No.234 altered valuation/deemed value for supplies w.e.f. 01.01.2019; classification of composite supplies and application of Section 2(90) (composite supply) and Section 2(119) (works contract) are relevant to tax-rate determination.
Precedent Treatment: No authority cited; Court examined the statutory effect of a notification prospectively applicable from 01.01.2019.
Interpretation and reasoning: It was not in dispute that the Notification was issued on 31.12.2018 and is effective from 01.01.2019. The Court observed that to rope in transactions entered into prior to 01.01.2019 by treating them as subject to the Notification's deemed value mechanism (70/30 split) would be untenable. Therefore, reclassification of pre-Notification transactions as works contract to attract 18% on that basis raised serious temporal and legal issues. Although the Court did not decide merits of classification beyond this temporal observation, the absence of fraud/wilful misstatement or suppression precluded the authority from resorting to Section 74 to retrospectively apply the Notification.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - The authority cannot lawfully invoke Section 74 to apply Notification No. 24/2018 prospectively to transactions antecedent to its effective date in the absence of the specific statutory predicate (fraud/wilful misstatement/suppression). Obiter - The Court did not finally determine the correct classification of the transactions on merits; it refrained from adjudicating the substantive tax-rate dispute.
Conclusions: The attempt to treat pre-01.01.2019 supplies as falling within the Notification's scheme (and thereby as works contract at 18%) could not be sustained through invocation of Section 74 where statutory conditions for extended limitation were not met. The Court declined to adjudicate the substantive classification issue and quashed the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction under Section 74.
DISPOSITION (LEGAL CONCLUSION)
The Court quashed and set aside the impugned show-cause notice issued under Section 74(1) read with Section 74(10) and the consequent Order-in-Original, holding that the authority had no jurisdiction to invoke the five-year extended limitation in the absence of material in the notice demonstrating fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression as required by Section 74 and Explanation 2; the authority's post-hoc averments and reliance on taxpayer's litigation conduct did not cure this defect.
Issues: (i) whether interest earned on deposits maintained under statutory compulsion with co-operative banks or scheduled banks was attributable to the business of the assessee and eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i); (ii) whether interest earned on surplus or idle funds invested in banks was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) or section 80P(2)(d), and if not, whether deduction under section 57 was allowable against such income.
Issue (i): whether interest earned on deposits maintained under statutory compulsion with co-operative banks or scheduled banks was attributable to the business of the assessee and eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i).
Analysis: The assessee was treated as a co-operative society entitled to claim deduction under section 80P. The Tribunal noted that certain deposits were not voluntary investments but were maintained to satisfy statutory requirements under the governing co-operative law and rules. Where funds are compulsorily parked as part of regulatory compliance and remain linked to the business activity, the resulting interest has a business nexus and is wider than income merely "derived from" operations. On that footing, the interest from statutory deposits was held to be attributable to the business of the society.
Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of the assessee, and interest on statutory deposits was held eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i).
Issue (ii): whether interest earned on surplus or idle funds invested in banks was eligible for deduction under section 80P(2)(a)(i) or section 80P(2)(d), and if not, whether deduction under section 57 was allowable against such income.
Analysis: The Tribunal distinguished interest arising from surplus or idle funds from interest on statutorily required deposits. It held that surplus funds invested only to earn interest are not attributable to the business of providing credit facilities and therefore do not qualify under section 80P(2)(a)(i). It further held that interest from investments in banks, where the recipient is not a co-operative society, is not covered by section 80P(2)(d). However, where such income is assessed under the head "Income from other sources", proportionate expenditure incurred for earning it must be examined and allowed under section 57, subject to verification by the Assessing Officer.
Conclusion: The issue was partly in favour of the assessee and partly in favour of the Revenue, with the matter remanded for verification and recomputation.
Final Conclusion: The appeal was not finally decided on a straight allowance or rejection of the disputed interest claim and was sent back for limited recomputation on the nature of the deposits, the head of income, and admissible deductions.
Ratio Decidendi: Interest from deposits compulsorily maintained to satisfy statutory reserve or liquidity requirements has a direct business nexus and is deductible under section 80P(2)(a)(i), whereas interest from surplus or idle funds invested merely to earn income is not so deductible and may be taxed under the appropriate head with only permissible expenditure allowed.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether beneficial DTAA rate applies to tax paid on dividend (assessment years under consideration).
2. Whether rural advances made by a transferor NBFC during the period between the appointed date and effective date of a court-sanctioned amalgamation can be treated as advances of the transferee bank for the purpose of deduction under section 36(1)(viia), and whether the 8.5% baseline percentage or NBFC ceiling applies.
3. Whether loss on sale of immovable properties acquired in satisfaction of loans is taxable as business loss (profits and gains of business) or as capital loss.
4. Whether provisions made for standard assets (RBI classification) can be taken into account in computing deduction under section 36(1)(viia) for banks.
5. Whether additional ESOP cost (difference between market value at exercise and market value at grant) is deductible / requires adjustment at exercise.
6. Whether ESOP expenditure (claimed by the assessee) is allowable as business deduction (revenue) or disallowable as capital / not wholly and exclusively for business.
7. Whether disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D is permissible for investments/ exempt income of a bank (including investments held as stock-in-trade).
8. Whether preliminary/QIP subscription expenses qualify for amortisation under section 35D(2)(c)(iv) (i.e., whether QIP is a "public subscription").
9. Whether bad debts in respect of credit card business are allowable as business deduction under section 36(1)(vii).
10. Whether interest on Innovative Perpetual Debt Instruments / perpetual bonds is allowable as deduction (section 36(1)(iii) / alternatively under section 37) or is akin to equity and non-deductible.
11. Whether amortisation of premium on Held-to-Maturity (HTM) securities is allowable as deduction.
12. Whether broken period interest paid on acquisition of securities is revenue deductible or capital in nature.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - DTAA beneficial rate on dividend
Legal framework: Claim to apply beneficial DTAA rate to tax on dividend.
Precedent treatment: Issue conceded to be covered adverse to assessee by a Special Bench decision of coordinate Tribunal.
Interpretation and reasoning: Parties invited the Tribunal to follow binding coordinate bench Special Bench jurisprudence.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - the Tribunal follows on point; no separate reasoning recorded.
Conclusion: Ground dismissed following the Special Bench precedent.
Issue 2 - Inclusion of NBFC (transferor) rural advances for section 36(1)(viia) post-amalgamation and applicable percentage
Legal framework: Section 36(1)(viia) allows deduction to banking companies for provisions for bad and doubtful debts computed as per prescribed methodology and compared to book provisions; provides minimum of 8.5% of total income and 10% of aggregate rural advances (subject to s.36(2)(v)).
Precedent treatment: Reliance on Supreme Court authority on effect of sanction of scheme of amalgamation (Marshall Sons & Co.) and on scheme clauses deeming transferor to have carried on business for and on behalf of transferee from the appointed date.
Interpretation and reasoning: Tribunal examined the NCLT-approved scheme which specified an appointed date and clauses deeming the transferor company to have carried on business for the transferee from that date; noted that the assessee filed revised returns including income of transferor and paid tax at bank rates; held that where a court-sanctioned scheme prescribes an appointed date and the scheme provides transferor carried on business for transferee, the advances made by transferor in that interim are to be treated as advances of transferee (bank). Distinction drawn from literal reading that s.36(1)(viia) applies to banks - held effect of sanctioned scheme is to make transferor's interim business that of bank. On percentage, held same logic applies and 8.5% baseline is applicable (because total income is that of the transferee including transferor income from appointed date).
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - assets and advances made by transferor during appointed date-to-effective date fall within transferee's business for s.36(1)(viia) where NCLT scheme so provides; 8.5% percentage applies to combined total income. (This forms the legal holding remitting quantum to AO.)
Conclusion: Claim allowed in principle; issue remitted to Assessing Officer for factual/verificatory exercise regarding quantum and correctness of amounts, and to apply s.36(1)(viia) read with s.36(2)(v) accordingly.
Issue 3 - Treatment of sale of immovable properties (acquired in satisfaction of loans) as business loss
Legal framework: Taxability under heads "Capital Gains" v. "Profits and gains of business or profession"; principles recognizing character of asset determined by manner and purpose of acquisition and use.
Precedent treatment: Followed jurisprudence of High Courts and Tribunal (L.M. Devere / Andhra Pradesh decisions, Karumuru Venkata, Madras decisions) holding that immovable properties acquired in satisfaction of debts by money-lending/banking business are in the nature of stock-in-trade / business assets and gains/losses on sale are business income/loss.
Interpretation and reasoning: Tribunal found properties acquired in foreclosure/settlement of loans, accounted as investments but arising from lending operations; properties were not fixed assets nor used in the business; sale proceeds set off against outstanding loans-hence character is converted form of stock-in-trade/business asset. Distinguished the argument that mere absence of depreciation or classification in books dictates capital nature. Noted factual questions not examined by lower authorities.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - when an immovable property is acquired in satisfaction of debt by a banker and subsequently sold, resultant gain/loss is business income/loss; factual determination required as to nature of acquisition, so remitted for enquiry.
Conclusion: Held in favour of assessee in principle; remitted to AO for limited factual examination to ascertain acquisition in satisfaction of debt and to allow business loss if established.
Issue 4 - Allowability of provisions for standard assets under section 36(1)(viia)
Legal framework: Section 36(1)(viia) allows deduction for "any provision made for bad and doubtful debts" subject to ceilings; banks follow RBI provisioning norms which include standard, sub-standard, doubtful, loss categories.
Precedent treatment: Followed coordinate-bench decisions (Kotak Mahindra and prior ITAT rulings) holding that provisions for standard assets are made pursuant to RBI guidelines and are legitimately "provision for bad and doubtful debts" and therefore can be considered for allowance under s.36(1)(viia) subject to verification.
Interpretation and reasoning: Tribunal accepted the view that section uses the phrase "provision made for bad and doubtful debts" and does not limit to specified categories; a provision for standard assets addresses inherent risk and thus falls within the statutory language. Emphasised that AO must examine reasonableness and evidence for provisioning.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - deduction under s.36(1)(viia) may include provisions made for standard assets where justified; remitted to AO to examine merits.
Conclusion: Directs AO to examine and allow deduction including provisions for standard assets, subject to verification.
Issue 5 - ESOP additional adjustment at exercise (market value at exercise v. market value at grant)
Legal framework: Deductibility principles under mercantile accounting; taxation of ESOP benefit as perquisites in employee hands; SEBI guidelines on accounting treatment; section 37 general deduction.
Precedent treatment: Followed Special Bench decision (Biocon Ltd. SB) which held (i) discount on ESOP is an ascertainable liability deductible over vesting, (ii) amounts relating to unvested/lapsed options must be reversed, and (iii) adjustment at exercise is required to reconcile provisional deductions with actual discount measured by market price at exercise - i.e., north/south adjustments on exercise.
Interpretation and reasoning: Tribunal rejected submission that accounting guidance alone determines tax outcome; adopted Special Bench reasoning that the company's deductible employee cost must ultimately match the actual discount that accrues to employees at exercise; provisional deductions over vesting must be adjusted at exercise for difference between grant-based estimate and exercise-based actual; remitted for AO verification.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - additional adjustment at exercise is required; the Special Bench holding is followed as binding for the issue remitted to AO for verification and appropriate allowance/reversal.
Conclusion: Allowed in principle; remitted to AO to verify additional claim and permit reasonable opportunity to assessee in accordance with Special Bench decision.
Issue 6 - Allowability of ESOP expenditure (revenue v. capital / wholly and exclusively)
Legal framework: Section 37 for general business deductions; principles for mercantile accounting and timing of deduction; SEBI accounting guidance.
Precedent treatment: Followed coordinate-bench decisions in assessee's own case and other Tribunal rulings restoring matter to AO for verification and allowing deduction where liability is ascertained and quantified (subject to verification of terms/conditions).
Interpretation and reasoning: Tribunal observed issue had been considered by coordinate bench and lower appellate authority; factual verification required regarding terms and quantification of ESOP; in absence of contrary findings, no interference with CIT(A) allowance.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - ESOP expenditure can be revenue deduction where it represents employee compensation recognized as an ascertained liability and appropriately quantified; factual verification required.
Conclusion: Revenue's disallowance dismissed; CIT(A) order sustaining allowance upheld following coordinate bench precedents.
Issue 7 - Section 14A/Rule 8D disallowance for bank's exempt income / stock-in-trade investments
Legal framework: Section 14A disallows expenditure in relation to exempt income; Rule 8D prescribes computation mechanism; interplay with banking business and classification of investments.
Precedent treatment: Followed coordinate bench and higher court jurisprudence (including Maxopp, CBDT Circular No.18/2015, and Tribunal decisions in assessee's own case) which recognize that for banks investments and related income may form part of business and that Rule 8D application requires nuanced treatment; in this matter prior coordinate bench decisions led to deletion of Rule 8D(2)(ii) disallowance and complete deletion ultimately.
Interpretation and reasoning: Tribunal accepted that where investments form part of banking business/stock-in-trade, the mechanical application of Rule 8D may not yield correct result; reliance on CBDT Circular and Supreme Court guidance supports that incomes from banking investments are business income; followed coordinate bench holdings which deleted the disallowance.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - in the factual matrix of the assessee-bank, disallowance under Rule 8D deleted; AO directed to delete disallowance.
Conclusion: CIT(A) order deleting Rule 8D disallowance sustained.
Issue 8 - QIP subscription expenses and section 35D(2)(c)(iv)
Legal framework: Section 35D allows amortisation of preliminary expenses incurred in connection with issue for "public subscription". Question whether QIP (issue to QIBs) constitutes "public subscription".
Precedent treatment: Followed coordinate bench precedent (Deccan Chronicle, Yes Bank, and tribunal decisions) holding that QIBs/QIP fall within the ambit of "public" for the purpose of section 35D where statutory instruments/regulations and listing rules classify QIBs as part of public shareholding and regulatory scheme treats IPP/QIP as modes to raise public shareholding.
Interpretation and reasoning: Tribunal relied on SCRR, listing agreement, SEBI regulations and prior Tribunal decisions holding QIBs to be part of public; concluded expenses of QIP may qualify for amortisation under s.35D; noted factual similarity with prior allowed years and remitted as required for factual examination in some precedents but here followed coordinate bench allowing 1/5th amortisation.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - QIP/QIB issue can be treated as public subscription for s.35D allowing amortisation of preliminary expenses; followed coordinate bench precedent in assessee's own case.
Conclusion: CIT(A) order allowing amortisation upheld; no interference.
Issue 9 - Bad debts pertaining to credit card business
Legal framework: Section 36(1)(vii) deduction for bad debts; characterisation of credit card business as part of banking business.
Precedent treatment: Followed coordinate bench decisions (assesssee's own case) and RBI master circular recognising credit card activity as banking business.
Interpretation and reasoning: Tribunal held credit card business is part of banking operations (per RBI circular), income from it was offered as business income by the assessee; bad debts arising in that business are deductible as business bad debts even if not routed through provision accounts, subject to proper book entries and verification of write-offs.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - bad debts from credit card business are allowable as business deductions under s.36(1)(vii) where income from that business has been offered and facts support write-off; remitted/allowed as per facts.
Conclusion: CIT(A) order allowing bad-debt deduction sustained.
Issue 10 - Allowability of interest on perpetual bonds
Legal framework: Section 36(1)(iii) deduction for interest on capital borrowed; characterization of perpetual instruments (debt v. quasi-equity) and practical features (fixed rate, investor rights, redemption/call, treatment in accounts).
Precedent treatment: Followed coordinate bench decisions (ICICI Bank decision) which considered terms, RBI recognition, treatment in books (shown as borrowings), tax deducted at source on interest and practical redemption history; held interest allowable under s.36/alternatively under s.37.
Interpretation and reasoning: Tribunal distinguished authorities treating government-provided capital and statutory features; observed that where instruments carry fixed interest, holders have no management rights, interest was paid and TDS deducted and instruments were shown as borrowings and actually redeemed in practice, they operate as long-term borrowings - interest is deductible. Also held that if not falling under s.36, interest may be allowable under s.37 as business expenditure.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - interest on perpetual instruments having debt-like features, used for business purposes, and shown/treated as borrowings is allowable as deduction; factual elements determine characterization.
Conclusion: CIT(A) order deleting disallowance upheld; revenue appeal dismissed.
Issue 11 - Amortisation of premium on HTM securities
Legal framework: RBI classification of investments (HTM/AFS/HFT) and accounting treatment; question whether amortisation/diminution on HTM is allowable in computing taxable income.
Precedent treatment: Followed coordinate bench precedent (Bank of Rajasthan, HDFC Bank decisions) holding amortisation of HTM premium allowable.
Interpretation and reasoning: Tribunal noted settled coordinate bench position in favour of allowing amortisation where investments are classified HTM in accordance with RBI norms and prior Tribunal authority supports allowance.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - amortisation of premium on HTM securities allowed; AO directed to accept claim following coordinate bench jurisprudence.
Conclusion: CIT(A) allowance sustained.
Issue 12 - Broken period interest
Legal framework: Treatment of broken period interest paid on acquisition of securities - whether capital element of acquisition cost or revenue expenditure deductible in P&L.
Precedent treatment: Followed jurisdictional High Court decisions in assessee's own case (HDFC Bank line of authority) holding broken period interest allowable as deduction.
Interpretation and reasoning: Tribunal relied on High Court precedent that accepted broken period interest as allowable and noted that Supreme Court had not overturned the High Court outcome in relevant appeals; fact and law thus support treating broken period interest as revenue deduction in the assessee-bank context.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - broken period interest is deductible in the facts of banking investments as revenue expenditure; AO cannot disallow following binding High Court authority.
Conclusion: Revenue ground on broken period interest dismissed; CIT(A) order sustained.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether a criminal complaint under Section 276C(2) read with Section 278B of the Income Tax Act can be sustained against a director when the complaint contains only a bald averment that the person is a director, without specific allegations that the director was "in charge of" or "responsible for" the company's day-to-day affairs.
2. Whether the ingredients of Section 278B(2) (offence by a company attributable to consent, connivance or neglect of a director/manager/secretary/officer) are satisfied by mere pleading that a director is "in charge of and responsible for" the company, in absence of specific factual averments linking the director to the alleged offence.
3. The relevance and effect of earlier discharge of a similarly-placed director by the Magistrate and confirmation in revision by the Sessions Court on the treatment of the present accused's prosecution.
4. Whether the Supreme Court's reasoning in the decision treating requirements of pleading under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as analogous to Section 278B(2) of the Income Tax Act is applicable and determinative for quashing the present complaint.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Sufficiency of pleadings against a director - legal framework
Legal framework: Section 276C(2) creates the substantive offence; Section 278B (and specifically 278B(2)) provides for attribution of company offences to directors/managers/secretaries/officers where the offence is committed with their consent, connivance or attributable to their neglect. Criminal complaints must plead facts sufficient to show that the accused falls within the statutory deeming provision.
Precedent Treatment: The Court relied on the Supreme Court's approach that, in analogous contexts (Section 138 NI Act), mere generic allegations that "all directors are in-charge and responsible for the conduct of business" are insufficient; specific factual averments are required to show involvement in day-to-day management or running of business.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined the complaint and found only a bald averment of directorship without any specific factual allegations that the applicant was in charge of or responsible for day-to-day affairs. The cheque central to the alleged default was not signed by the applicant (admitted in the complaint), and the applicant had earlier, by written response to a SCN, stated he was a part-time professional director with no role in day-to-day activities and had resigned before the cheque date. The respondents did not rebut these assertions on record. The Court reasoned that absent specific pleading of facts establishing control, consent, connivance or neglect, the statutory ingredients for proceeding under Section 278B(2) are not made out.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - A criminal complaint seeking to prosecute a director under Section 276C(2) read with Section 278B(2) must contain specific factual allegations connecting the director with the company's day-to-day management or with consent/connivance/neglect in commission of the offence; mere allegation of directorship is insufficient. Obiter - Observations stressing the non-signature of the cheque and the applicant's prior resignation serve as case-specific support but the legal principle is framed broadly.
Conclusion: The complaint was insufficient as to the applicant; the proceedings against him under Section 276C(2) read with Section 278B are quashed insofar as they relate to the applicant.
Issue 2: Applicability of Section 278B(2) on the facts - legal framework
Legal framework: Section 278B(2) deems directors/managers/secretaries/officers guilty where an offence by a company is shown to have been committed with their consent, connivance or attributable to their neglect; the prosecution must plead and ultimately prove the specific nexus between the officer and the commission of the offence.
Precedent Treatment: The Supreme Court authority applied treats pleading requirements under Section 278B(2) as analogous to those under Section 138/141 NI Act: courts require specific averments demonstrating a director's active role or culpable neglect, not generalized attributions of responsibility.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found no pleadings satisfying Section 278B(2) - there were no specific allegations of consent, connivance or neglect by the applicant. The Court emphasized that statute contemplates proof of such nexus; without pleadings making out those ingredients, the deeming provision cannot be invoked to fasten criminal liability on the director.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - The application of Section 278B(2) requires pleading of specific facts showing consent/connivance/neglect; absence of such facts mandates quashing. Obiter - The observation that the Revenue had not rebutted the applicant's written statements is factual to this case.
Conclusion: Section 278B(2) is not attracted on the present pleadings; the complaint as to the applicant is unsustainable and must be quashed.
Issue 3: Effect of prior discharge of a similarly-placed director and confirmation in revision
Legal framework: While each accused's liability is determined on available facts and pleadings, prior judicial orders discharging similarly situated accused and confirmation thereof are relevant as indicative of the sufficiency of prosecution material.
Precedent Treatment: The Court treated the earlier discharge and confirmation by the Sessions Court as persuasive and significant; absence of challenge to that confirmation by the Revenue was taken to indicate acceptance of that outcome.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that accused No.10 (Technical Director) had been discharged by the Magistrate, and that discharge had been confirmed by the Sessions Court in revision, with no record shown of further challenge. The Court saw no material distinction between accused No.10 and the present applicant on the pleadings. That parity reinforced the conclusion that the complaint did not make out culpability of the applicant.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio (limited): Prior discharge of a similarly-placed director, confirmed on revision and left unchallenged by the prosecution, is a relevant factor in assessing sufficiency of allegations against another director in the same facts. Obiter: The weight accorded to the Revenue's inaction (no further challenge) is specific to these proceedings.
Conclusion: The prior discharge and its confirmation materially support quashing the complaint against the applicant.
Issue 4: Applicability of Supreme Court reasoning from analogous NI Act jurisprudence
Legal framework: Pleading standards for attributing liability to company officers under different statutes may be analogous where the statutory ingredients require demonstration of a director's active role or culpable neglect.
Precedent Treatment: The Court followed the Supreme Court decision addressing Section 138 NI Act which held that specific averments of involvement in day-to-day affairs are necessary; the Court treated that ratio as squarely applicable to Section 278B(2) of the Income Tax Act because the required ingredients are identical in substance.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court applied that precedent to hold that mere blanket allegations of responsibility are inadequate; specific factual pleadings are essential. The Court found the present complaint to fall short of that requirement, making the precedent determinative.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Analogous authority requiring specific factual averments for officer liability under corporate-offence provisions is binding and was followed. Obiter - The Court's remark that the facts "are similar" to the precedent is case-specific.
Conclusion: The Supreme Court's reasoning is applicable and supports quashing the complaint insofar as it relates to the applicant.
Overall Disposition and Limitation of Order
Conclusions: The criminal complaints under Section 276C(2) read with Section 278B are quashed insofar as they concern the applicant due to lack of specific pleadings establishing that the applicant was in charge of or responsible for the company's day-to-day affairs or that the offence was committed with his consent, connivance or neglect. The order does not preclude prosecution of other accused, and observations are confined to the facts pertaining to the applicant.
1. Whether the Assessing Officer (AO) validly exercised jurisdiction under Section 153C of the Income Tax Act, 1961, given the requirement of recording separate and specific satisfaction notes for each assessment year prior to issuing notices.
2. Whether the satisfaction note recorded by the AO met the statutory and judicially mandated criteria, including year-wise evaluation of incriminating material linking the seized documents to the assessee's income for each assessment year.
3. Whether the addition of unexplained income under Section 69 of the Act, based solely on entries in a pen drive seized from a third party, is legally sustainable without corroborative evidence linking the entries to the assessee.
4. Whether the presumption under Section 292C of the Act applies to the assessee when the incriminating material was seized from a third party and not from the assessee's possession.
5. Whether the entries in the seized pen drive qualify as admissible evidence or are "dumb documents" lacking evidentiary value due to absence of authorship, confirmation, or corroboration.
6. Whether principles of natural justice were violated by the AO in issuing notices with insufficient time to respond and passing orders without adequate opportunity to the assessee.
7. Whether the reliance on third-party statements and unverified electronic records, without independent corroboration, justifies additions to the assessee's income.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSISIssue 1 & 2: Validity and sufficiency of satisfaction note under Section 153C
- Legal Framework and Precedents:
Section 153C mandates that before issuing a notice to a person other than the searched person, the AO must record a written satisfaction note specifying that the seized material belongs to or relates to the other person and has a bearing on that person's income for the relevant assessment year(s). Judicial precedents emphasize that such satisfaction must be contemporaneous, specific, and year-wise:
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The satisfaction note in the present case was omnibus, covering multiple assessment years without year-wise evaluation or specific linkage of incriminating material to each year. It lacked detailed description of seized documents, did not specify distinct satisfaction for each assessment year, and failed to demonstrate application of mind. The AO's note was vague and mechanical.
- Conclusions:
The Court held that such a blanket satisfaction note does not meet statutory requirements and judicial standards, rendering the jurisdiction under Section 153C invalid and the entire proceeding void ab initio.
Issue 3 & 5: Admissibility and evidentiary value of pen drive entries as basis for addition under Section 69
- Legal Framework and Precedents:
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The pen drive entries were seized from a third party, lacked specific identification of the assessee, and were not confirmed by the custodian or author. The assessee denied receipt of any cash payments. There was no corroborative evidence such as bank transactions, asset creation, or third-party confirmation linking the entries to the assessee. The entries were vague, referring only to "Krishnan Sir" without full name or address, and thus failed the test of belonging and incrimination.
- Treatment of Competing Arguments:
The Revenue relied on the statement of the custodian, which only acknowledged the assessee's professional consultancy role unrelated to cash payments. The Revenue's attempt to extrapolate this limited admission to support the pen drive entries was rejected as speculative and unsubstantiated. The Court emphasized the doctrine of whole truth, requiring that statements be considered in entirety rather than selectively.
- Conclusions:
The pen drive entries were held to be "dumb documents" without evidentiary value. The addition under Section 69 based solely on such uncorroborated electronic entries was arbitrary and unsustainable. The presumption under Section 292C did not apply to the assessee, and the Revenue failed to discharge its burden of proof.
Issue 4: Applicability of presumption under Section 292C to third-party seized material
- Legal Framework and Precedents:
Section 292C applies only to the person from whom the material is seized, creating a rebuttable presumption that the documents belong to that person and contents are true. No presumption arises against a third party absent independent evidence linking the material to them.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The pen drive was seized from Mr. Badri Narayana Choudhary Kota, not from the assessee. The Revenue failed to produce independent material establishing nexus between the pen drive contents and the assessee. The Court noted that even if the presumption applied, it is rebuttable and stands discharged once the assessee denies the transaction and the Revenue fails to corroborate.
- Conclusions:
The presumption under Section 292C did not operate against the assessee, and the Revenue's reliance on it was misplaced.
Issue 6: Compliance with principles of natural justice in issuing notices and passing orders
- Legal Framework:
Principles of natural justice require that a reasonable opportunity be given to the assessee to respond to notices and to present their case before adverse orders are passed.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The AO issued a notice under Section 142(1) demanding information within one day and passed order shortly thereafter without affording adequate opportunity to the assessee to justify or prove his claims. Such action was held to be arbitrary and violative of natural justice.
- Conclusions:
The AO's and CIT(A)'s actions in this regard were improper and contributed to the invalidity of the assessment proceedings.
Issue 7: Reliance on third-party statements and unverified electronic records for additions
- Legal Framework and Precedents:
Judicial decisions consistently hold that additions cannot be based solely on uncorroborated third-party documents or statements, especially when the assessee denies the transactions and there is no independent evidence.
- Court's Interpretation and Reasoning:
The statements of the custodian did not confirm the entries as relating to the assessee. The Revenue's reliance on such statements and the pen drive entries without further corroboration was rejected as speculative and insufficient.
- Conclusions:
Additions based solely on such material are unsustainable and liable to be deleted.
3. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS1. The AO's satisfaction note under Section 153C was a consolidated and undifferentiated note lacking year-wise specific satisfaction, rendering the jurisdiction invalid and the proceedings void ab initio.
2. The pen drive entries seized from a third party were "dumb documents" without authorship, confirmation, or corroboration, and thus inadmissible as evidence to sustain additions under Section 69.
3. The presumption under Section 292C applies only to the person from whom material is seized and does not extend to the assessee absent independent evidence.
4. The Revenue failed to prove possession or receipt of unexplained money by the assessee, and the additions made were arbitrary and without foundation.
5. The AO and CIT(A) violated principles of natural justice by issuing notices with unreasonable time and passing orders without adequate opportunity to the assessee.
6. The additions based solely on unverified third-party digital entries and uncorroborated statements are legally unsustainable and liable to be deleted in full.
7. The appeals are allowed, and the additions under Section 69 are deleted for all assessment years 2015-16 to 2019-20.
1. ISSUES:
1. Whether the MRP based assessment Notifications Nos. 02/2006-CE(NT), 14/2008-CE(NT), and 49/2008-CE(NT) issued under Section 4A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, are applicable to 'packaged drinking water' classified under Chapter Sub-Heading 22019090.
2. Whether the classification of 'packaged drinking water' as distinct from 'mineral water' affects the applicability of Section 4A valuation provisions and related notifications.
2. RULINGS / HOLDINGS:
1. The MRP based assessment Notifications issued under Section 4A do not apply to 'packaged drinking water' classified under 22019090, as these notifications specify 'mineral water' and not 'packaged drinking water' despite mentioning the same tariff sub-heading.
2. The classification of 'packaged drinking water' as a separate product from 'mineral water' is upheld, supported by BIS certification and differing price points, leading to the conclusion that valuation must be based on transaction value under Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 rather than deemed value under Section 4A.
3. RATIONALE:
1. The Court applied the statutory framework of Section 4A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, which allows the Central Government to notify goods for valuation on the basis of Retail Sale Price (RSP) or Maximum Retail Price (MRP) under the SWM (P&C) Rules, 1977 or Legal Metrology Act, 2011.
2. The Notifications in question specify 'mineral water' but do not expressly include 'packaged drinking water', creating ambiguity which must be resolved in favor of the assessee as per established principles of taxation law that "an ambiguity in a taxation provision is to be interpreted in favour of assessee."
3. The Court relied on precedent emphasizing that "subject goods is not to be taxed, unless the words of the statute unambiguously impose a tax," rejecting the Department's view that the inclusion of tariff sub-heading 22019090 implies inclusion of packaged drinking water within mineral water for MRP valuation.
4. The Court further noted amendments in subsequent notifications distinguishing 'mineral water' from 'drinking water', reinforcing that 'packaged drinking water' was never intended to be subject to valuation under Section 4A.
5. The decision aligns with a recent Tribunal ruling on a related unit, which after thorough analysis of classification, notifications, Board circulars, and BIS certifications, held that the valuation of packaged drinking water must be on transaction value under Section 4, not on MRP basis under Section 4A.
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Issues: Whether the demands raised under the exemption notification could be confirmed before the competent authority decided the pending applications for fixation of special rate.
Analysis: The exemption was claimed under Notification No. 56/2002-CE, and the special rate mechanism introduced by Notification No. 19/2008 was invoked on the basis of claimed higher value addition. The Tribunal had already fixed the special rate in the assessee's own case for one year, while the applications for other years remained pending before the jurisdictional Commissioner. The impugned demands were issued and confirmed during this pendency. In these circumstances, confirmation of demand before the special rate applications were decided was held to be premature, especially when doing so would only multiply litigation and the assessee's entitlement depended upon the outcome of the pending special rate determination.
Conclusion: The premature confirmation of demand was unsustainable, and the matter was remanded to be decided afresh after the competent authority determines the special rate applications.
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The Supreme Court, through Hon'ble Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Atul S. Chandurkar, dismissed the Civil Appeals due to an inordinate delay of 295 days in filing. Despite hearing the Additional Solicitor General, the Court held that the explanation offered "does not constitute sufficient cause" to condone the delay, resulting in dismissal solely on that ground.
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1. ISSUES:
1. Whether the Adjudicating Authority was justified in rejecting the application filed by the Resolution Professional (RP) seeking a 30-day extension for completion of the Personal Insolvency Resolution Process (PIRP) voting period under Section 112 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016.
2. Whether the observations of the Adjudicating Authority regarding the "lack of seriousness in the attitude, conduct, and approach of the parties concerned" were appropriate in the context of the extension request.
3. The procedural requirements and authority of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) to approve an extension of the PIRP timeline and the RP's obligation to file a report under Section 112 of the IBC.
2. RULINGS / HOLDINGS:
1. The Court set aside the Adjudicating Authority's order rejecting the extension application and allowed the 30-day extension for completing the e-voting on the repayment plan, holding that the rejection was not justified as the voting was ongoing and the extension was sought on the basis of a resolution passed by the CoC.
2. The Court disapproved the Adjudicating Authority's observation of "lack of seriousness in the attitude, conduct, and approach of the parties concerned," stating that the personal guarantor had submitted the repayment plan and it was for the CoC to vote, thus no lack of seriousness was evident.
3. The Court recognized that under Section 112 of the IBC, the RP must submit a report to the Adjudicating Authority detailing the outcome of the creditors' meeting concerning the repayment plan, regardless of approval, and that the CoC's resolution to seek extension was valid and binding for filing the extension application.
3. RATIONALE:
1. The Court applied the framework under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, specifically Section 112, which mandates the RP to file a report on the resolution plan's voting outcome and contemplates extensions of the PIRP period to facilitate completion of the process.
2. The Court relied on the minutes of the CoC meeting dated 15.05.2025, which showed that 61% of votes were cast and the remaining 39% required additional time due to new bank policies delaying approvals, justifying the requested extension.
3. The Court emphasized the importance of procedural fairness and the CoC's authority to decide on extension requests, rejecting the Adjudicating Authority's adverse inference about the parties' conduct as unsupported by the facts.
4. The decision reflects a doctrinal affirmation that extensions of insolvency timelines should be granted where justified by procedural delays and creditor interests, ensuring the resolution process is not unduly prejudiced by rigid timelines.
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