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Issues: (i) Whether the question of existence of an arbitration agreement should be left for the arbitral tribunal to decide; (ii) Whether clause 13 would constitute an arbitration agreement between the parties as contemplated under Section 7 of the 1996 Act; (iii) Whether clause 32 of Instructions to Bidders negates the existence of an arbitration agreement.
Issue (i): Whether the question of existence of an arbitration agreement should be left for the arbitral tribunal to decide
Analysis: The scope of Section 11, after the 2015 amendment, is confined to examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. The referral court is required to undertake only a limited, prima facie scrutiny of the material placed before it and not a mini-trial on disputed questions of fact or evidence. The doctrine of competence-competence permits the arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, but that does not oust the court's threshold duty to see whether an arbitration agreement is prima facie shown to exist.
Conclusion: The question of existence of an arbitration agreement cannot be left entirely to the arbitral tribunal at the Section 11 stage.
Issue (ii): Whether clause 13 would constitute an arbitration agreement between the parties as contemplated under Section 7 of the 1996 Act
Analysis: An arbitration agreement must disclose an intention to submit disputes to a private tribunal and a binding obligation to be governed by its decision. A clause that merely permits or enables arbitration, or contemplates arbitration only if parties later agree, does not satisfy the requirement of consensus ad idem. Clause 13, read as a whole, provided a staged process for internal settlement and thereafter stated that redressal of disputes may be sought through arbitration in cases other than Government agencies. The wording was permissive and did not create a binding commitment that either party could unilaterally invoke arbitration as of right.
Conclusion: Clause 13 does not constitute an arbitration agreement.
Issue (iii): Whether clause 32 of Instructions to Bidders negates the existence of an arbitration agreement
Analysis: Clause 32 only specifies the civil court jurisdiction for disputes arising out of the tender and the contract. It does not by itself exclude arbitration or operate as a substitute for an arbitration clause. Since no arbitration agreement was found in clause 13, the discussion on clause 32 did not alter the result.
Conclusion: Clause 32 does not independently establish or negate arbitration, and the issue does not affect the outcome.
Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the contractual clause relied upon was not a binding arbitration agreement and the request for appointment of an arbitrator was therefore unsustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: A clause is an arbitration agreement only if it evinces a binding and present intention to refer disputes to arbitration; a merely permissive or future-contingent reference does not satisfy Section 7.
Arbitration agreement requires a present binding intention; permissive future reference clause under Section 7 was insufficient.
Under Section 11 of the 1996 Act, the referral court must conduct only a limited prima facie examination of whether an arbitration agreement exists, while the tribunal's competence to rule on jurisdiction does not remove that threshold judicial scrutiny. Clause 13 did not satisfy Section 7 because it used permissive, future-contingent language and did not show a present binding intention to submit disputes to arbitration as of right. Clause 32, which fixed civil court jurisdiction for tender disputes, did not independently create or negate arbitration. The contractual reference therefore was not a binding arbitration agreement, and appointment of an arbitrator was unsustainable.
Dismissal of application u/s 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the ground that there exists no arbitration agreement between the parties - disputes arose between the parties during the subsistence of the contract relating to transportation/handling of goods. Whether the question of existence of an arbitration agreement should be left for the arbitral tribunal to decide? - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, the appellant is relying on just one clause in the contract which, according to the appellant, constitutes an arbitration agreement whereas according to the respondent, though the clause is not disputed, the same does not constitute an arbitration agreement. In such circumstances, the Court while exercising power under Section 11 would not have to hold a mini-trial or an enquiry into its existence rather a plain reading of the clause would indicate whether it is, or it is not, an arbitration agreement, prima facie, satisfying the necessary ingredients of it, as required by Section 7 of the 1996 Act. Such a limited exercise would not transgress the limit set out by sub-section (6-A) Section 11. (6-A). The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, while considering any application under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6), shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, confine to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. of Section 11 of the 1996 Act as introduced by 2015 Amendment because the object of such an exercise (i.e., of examination) is to weed out frivolous claims for appointment of an arbitrator/ reference to an arbitral tribunal - the argument of the appellant that Referral Court should straight away refer the matter and leave it to the arbitral tribunal to decide whether the arbitration agreement exists or not cannot be accepted. Whether clause 13 would constitute an arbitration agreement between the parties as contemplated under Section 7 of the 1996 Act? - HELD THAT:- Clause 13 in its first paragraph sets out intent to avoid litigation and advises the contractor to make effort to settle the dispute at the company level. Second paragraph sets out the procedure for raising the dispute/ claim for settlement at the company level. It provides that the contractor should make request in writing to the Engineer-in-charge for settlement of disputes/ claims within 30 days of arising of the cause of dispute/ claim failing which it shall not be entertained by the company. Thereafter, clause 13 provides for a two-stage procedure for resolution of the dispute. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that clause 13 provides option to the parties, which include any of one of the parties, to seek dispute resolution through arbitration and, therefore, it is nothing but an arbitration clause. According to him, use of the word “may” in clause 13 does not provide choice to the parties to agree, or not to agree, for arbitration, rather it is a choice given to either of the parties to seek a settlement through arbitration and, therefore, when one party exercises the option, the other party cannot resile from the agreement. In that sense, according to him, clause 13 is an arbitration agreement - As it is not the case of the appellant that parties at any later stage have agreed to refer the disputes to arbitration, the High Court was justified in rejecting the application seeking appointment of an arbitrator. Whether clause 32 of Instructions to Bidders negates the existence of an arbitration agreement? - HELD THAT:- Clause 32 does not exclude resolution of disputes through arbitration agreement. It only fixes jurisdiction and in the event of there being an arbitration agreement could determine the juridical seat. However, since it is held that there is no arbitration agreement between the parties, decision of this issue is of no consequence. Appeal dismissed.