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Issues: Whether the MSME revival and rehabilitation framework prevented a secured creditor from classifying the borrower's account as non-performing and issuing notice under the SARFAESI regime without first identifying incipient stress, and whether the borrower could invoke that framework for the first time at the stage of action under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act.
Analysis: The framework in the 29 May 2015 notification was read as a whole and harmoniously, so that the sequence of identification by the bank or creditor and identification by the enterprise gave effect to both sides' obligations. The borrower was required to act with vigilance and, where it reasonably apprehended failure of business or inability to pay debts, to initiate the framework by a verified claim. On such invocation, the secured creditor would be bound to consider the request and keep further SARFAESI action in abeyance. However, the framework did not bar the creditor from classifying a defaulting account as non-performing or from issuing notice under section 13(2) where the borrower had not earlier invoked the framework. A claim raised only after notice, and especially at the stage of proceedings under section 14, was treated as a belated attempt to restrain lawful SARFAESI steps. The availability of a statutory remedy under section 17 also weighed against interference under Article 32.
Conclusion: The borrower was not entitled to the claimed protection at the belated stage, and no interference under Article 32 was warranted.
Ratio Decidendi: The MSME revival framework operates on a harmonised scheme of reciprocal obligations: the borrower must timely invoke it with a verified claim, and only then does the secured creditor become bound to consider the claim and hold further SARFAESI action in abeyance; absent such invocation, classification of the account and notice under section 13(2) are not barred, and belated reliance on the framework cannot defeat the SARFAESI process.
Issues: Whether the deceased employee's fatal road accident while commuting to work arose out of and in the course of employment under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923.
Analysis: The phrase "arising out of and in the course of employment" in the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 is to be construed in the light of its beneficial object and the cognate scheme of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. The earlier restrictive approach in the commuting context was found to have been neutralised by the later statutory intervention in Section 51E of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948, which was treated as clarificatory and retrospective because it resolved the ambiguity surrounding accidents occurring while travelling between residence and place of work. The Court also relied on the theory of notional extension and the principle that statutes in pari materia may be read together where they serve a common social welfare object. On the undisputed facts, the deceased was a night watchman proceeding to work during his duty hours and the accident occurred about 5 km from the factory, establishing a sufficient nexus between the circumstances, time and place of the accident and the employment.
Conclusion: The fatal accident is held to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, and compensation under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 is payable.
Final Conclusion: The High Court's reversal was set aside and the compensation award of the Commissioner was restored in favour of the claimants.
Ratio Decidendi: A commuting accident may fall within "arising out of and in the course of employment" where the statutory context and the facts establish a real nexus between the journey and the employment, and the provision must be construed liberally in a social welfare statute.
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The Supreme Court, through Hon'ble Justices B. V. Nagarathna and K.V. Viswanathan, dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed with a delay of 1130 days. Relying on the precedent set in the order dated 03.03.2025 in SLP (C) D.No.31561/2024 (Principal Commissioner Of Income Tax 2 Thane Vs. Zahira R. Khatun), the Court dismissed the petition "both on the ground of delay as well as on merits." All pending applications were disposed of accordingly.
The Supreme Court, through Hon'ble Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Atul S. Chandurkar, dismissed the Special Leave Petition (SLP) relying on the precedent set in SLP (C) No. 26525 of 2018, "Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax Vadodara 1 vs. Petrofils Cooperative Limited through Director." The Court held that the issue in the present case is conclusively covered by that decision. Consequently, the SLP is dismissed, and all pending applications are disposed of.
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Issues: (i) Whether the ex parte assessment order disallowing input tax credit and levying purchase tax warranted interference and remand for fresh consideration; (ii) whether the assessee was entitled to an opportunity to contest the purchase tax levy under Section 17 of the Act.
Issue (i): Whether the ex parte assessment order disallowing input tax credit and levying purchase tax warranted interference and remand for fresh consideration.
Analysis: The assessment was made ex parte, notices were stated to have been sent only by e-mail, and the material indicated that the assessee had not been afforded a full opportunity to place books of accounts, documents, and explanations. A part of the input tax credit had already been allowed, while the balance was rejected, and the matter called for reconsideration by the assessing officer after hearing the assessee. The tribunal's direction to pursue the appellate remedy did not cure the need for a fresh assessment on the disputed components.
Conclusion: The ex parte assessment was interfered with to the extent of the disallowed input tax credit and the purchase tax levy, and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the assessee was entitled to an opportunity to contest the purchase tax levy under Section 17 of the Act.
Analysis: The assessee was permitted to raise all objections on the levy of purchase tax in the remanded proceedings. The Court directed that a personal hearing be granted and that written submissions and supporting records be considered before a fresh order is passed.
Conclusion: The assessee was held entitled to contest the purchase tax levy under Section 17 of the Act before the assessing officer.
Final Conclusion: The writ petition succeeded to the extent that the disputed assessment was set aside in part and sent back for fresh consideration, while the already-allowed input tax credit was left undisturbed and coercive recovery was restrained in the meantime.
Ratio Decidendi: An ex parte tax assessment that has not afforded a meaningful opportunity of hearing may be set aside and remanded for fresh decision where the disputed levy and credit claim require reconsideration on the assessee's materials.
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Issues: (i) Whether the questions proposed by the petitioners arose out of the Tribunal's order and were referable to the High Court; (ii) Whether penalty could be sustained by invoking provisions of the General Sales Tax/VAT regime when the goods were admittedly liable to entry tax under the Entry Tax Act and the Act itself contained only a limited penalty provision.
Issue (i): Whether the questions proposed by the petitioners arose out of the Tribunal's order and were referable to the High Court.
Analysis: The reference jurisdiction could be exercised only where the question of law actually arose from the proceedings decided by the Tribunal. Once the petitioners accepted that the seized goods were liable to entry tax under the Entry Tax Act, the controversy as framed by them on the effect of invoking one provision instead of another did not survive as a referable question. The Court treated the proposed questions as unrelated to the real basis of the Tribunal's decision.
Conclusion: The questions were not referable to the High Court.
Issue (ii): Whether penalty could be sustained by invoking provisions of the General Sales Tax/VAT regime when the goods were admittedly liable to entry tax under the Entry Tax Act and the Act itself contained only a limited penalty provision.
Analysis: The Entry Tax Act was held to be a self-contained scheme. Section 4 provided the substantive charging provision for entry tax and Section 4(3) authorised penalty only where the accompanying documents were fake or false. Section 6 merely incorporated specified procedural provisions of the General Sales Tax Act for limited purposes and did not create a new charging source for penalty. A penalty being a statutory liability could not be imposed unless a substantive charging provision existed, and a machinery provision could not be read to create such liability. On the facts, the documents were not found to be fake or false, so the precondition for penalty under the Entry Tax Act was absent.
Conclusion: The penalty imposed under the borrowed VAT/GST provisions was unsustainable.
Final Conclusion: The petition failed because the impugned questions did not warrant reference and the penalty could not be justified by resort to provisions that did not supply a substantive charging basis under the Entry Tax Act.
Ratio Decidendi: A penalty can be imposed only by a substantive charging provision, and a machinery or incorporated procedural provision cannot be used to create penalty liability where the parent statute does not itself authorise it.
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