Issues: Whether an assessment order passed without considering the assessee's reply, despite a prior judicial direction requiring such consideration, is sustainable.

Analysis: The assessment was completed without considering the reply submitted pursuant to the show-cause notice, notwithstanding the earlier direction requiring the Assessing Officer to consider that reply. Completion of assessment to meet the limitation period did not justify non-compliance with the direction or denial of an effective consideration of the assessee's response, resulting in a breach of the principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The assessment order was invalid for violation of the principles of natural justice, and the reply is required to be considered in fresh assessment proceedings.

Issues: Whether a nine-day delayed filing of Form No. 10-IE, attributable to e-filing portal technical difficulties, disentitled the assessee from opting for the concessional tax regime under section 115BAC.

Analysis: The assessee had unequivocally exercised the option for the new regime, furnished Form No. 10-IE along with the revised return shortly after the extended due date, and consistently attributed the nine-day delay to portal difficulties that remained uncontroverted. The prescribed form was available with the Department, there was no complete non-compliance, abandonment of the option, deliberate withholding, or misuse of the provision. In the prevailing electronic-filing difficulties, the minor procedural delay did not defeat the substantive compliance with the option requirement.

Conclusion: The delayed filing of Form No. 10-IE did not justify denial of the benefit under section 115BAC; the form must be taken into account and tax liability recomputed under the opted concessional regime.

Issues: Whether the adjudication and appellate orders, passed after remand, could disregard the Tribunal's directions to reconsider classification, valuation and extended-period demand with reference to the technical material and approved classifications.

Analysis: The adjudicating authority expressed a view contrary to the Tribunal's remand directions while dealing with the evidentiary role of technical reports, notwithstanding the specific requirement to consider such material for redetermination of classification. The appellate order reproduced and confirmed that approach, disclosing the same infirmity and non-application of mind. The remand directions of the statutory appellate forum were required to be followed in the fresh adjudication.

Conclusion: The orders passed in disregard of the Tribunal's remand directions were invalid; the matter must be freshly adjudicated in accordance with those directions after affording hearing to the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the portal-generated order declaring that proceedings were dropped, while expressly incorporating an annexure confirming demand on one issue, constituted an unconditional dropping of all proceedings and whether the annexure was invalid for want of a separate signature; (ii) Whether the corrigendum correcting the inconsistent portal recital was a permissible rectification under Section 161 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, notwithstanding the absence of a further hearing and expiry of the period for original adjudication; (iii) Whether the alleged non-availability of FORM GST DRC-07 invalidated the adjudication and demand.

Issue (i): Whether the portal-generated order declaring that proceedings were dropped, while expressly incorporating an annexure confirming demand on one issue, constituted an unconditional dropping of all proceedings and whether the annexure was invalid for want of a separate signature.

Analysis: An adjudication order cannot be read in disconnected parts. The digitally signed portal order expressly adopted the reasons and details in the annexure, which recorded rejection of input tax credit on the fourth issue, quantified tax, interest and penalty, and referred to the consequential demand. The portal order and annexure were uploaded together and formed a composite order. Digital authentication of the portal order extended to the incorporated annexure; the latter was not an independent unsigned adjudication order.

Conclusion: Against the assessee. The composite order did not unconditionally drop proceedings on all issues, and the demand recorded in the incorporated annexure was not invalid for lack of a separate signature.

Issue (ii): Whether the corrigendum correcting the inconsistent portal recital was a permissible rectification under Section 161 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, notwithstanding the absence of a further hearing and expiry of the period for original adjudication.

Analysis: Section 161 permits correction of an error apparent from the record but cannot be used to reconsider merits or create a fresh adjudication. The contradiction between the portal recital dropping proceedings and the incorporated annexure confirming the fourth-issue demand was apparent on the face of the composite order. The corrigendum retained relief on the first three issues and neither added reasons nor enlarged the pre-existing demand. Since it did not adversely alter the assessee's position under the original adjudication, a further hearing was not required. Issued within six months of the original order, the corrigendum satisfied the statutory period for rectification; it was not a fresh adjudication governed by the limitation applicable to the original order.

Conclusion: Against the assessee. The corrigendum validly rectified the inconsistent portal recital under Section 161 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (iii): Whether the alleged non-availability of FORM GST DRC-07 invalidated the adjudication and demand.

Analysis: FORM GST DRC-07 is a statutory electronic summary of the adjudication order under Rule 142(5) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, rather than the adjudication itself. Its non-availability does not invalidate an otherwise issued adjudication, though the statutory summary must be made available to enable an appeal and enforcement. The factual position regarding availability was not conclusively established. The corresponding rectification summary in FORM GST DRC-08 is also required under Rule 142(7).

Conclusion: Against the assessee on validity of the adjudication. The absence of a demonstrated portal upload did not invalidate the demand, but the prescribed DRC-07 and DRC-08 summaries must be uploaded and made available.

Final Conclusion: The determination on the fourth issue remains operative as rectified. Certified copies of the composite order and corrigendum, together with the statutory summaries, must be supplied or made available, and the assessee may pursue the statutory appeal on the merits of the demand and surviving limitation questions within the protected period.

Ratio Decidendi: An electronically authenticated adjudication order expressly incorporating an annexure must be read as a composite order, and an internally contradictory electronic recital may be rectified under Section 161 where the correction merely conforms the record to the pre-existing determination without changing the liability.

Issues: Whether the agreements relating to jointly held ancestral land effected a transfer of the assessee's capital asset, attracting long-term capital gains.

Analysis: The Tribunal's finding that the documents did not evidence a transfer by the assessee was supported by the subsequent agreement and the final partition decree. The land forming the subject of the joint development arrangement fell to other family members, whereas the assessee continued to hold the land allotted to his share. The factual finding was supported by material on record and was not perverse.

Conclusion: No transfer of the assessee's capital asset was established; deletion of the long-term capital-gains additions was sustained in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the accused were entitled to discharge in light of their departmental exoneration and the prosecution material.

Analysis: Departmental and criminal proceedings are independent, are decided on their respective evidence, and involve different standards of proof. Departmental exoneration does not ipso facto require termination of a criminal prosecution. At the discharge stage, the relevant inquiry is whether the prosecution record discloses the ingredients of the alleged offences or raises a strong suspicion warranting trial. The record disclosed prima facie material concerning the alleged conspiracy, receipt of illegal gratification, facilitation of gold smuggling and the role attributed to the accused. Questions concerning proof of demand and the evidentiary value of the material require evaluation at trial.

Conclusion: Departmental exoneration did not entitle the accused to discharge, and the prosecution material disclosed sufficient prima facie grounds to proceed to trial.

Issues: Whether a Bill of Export is the sole acceptable evidence for discharge of export obligation in respect of supplies to SEZ units under Advance Authorisation, despite subsequent policy circulars permitting corroborative evidence.

Analysis: The subsequent policy circulars permit an Advance Authorisation holder supplying goods to an SEZ unit to establish fulfilment of export obligation through specified corroborative material where a Bill of Export is unavailable. Such material includes an attested ARE-1 form, evidence of receipt of supplies by the SEZ recipient, or evidence of payment by the SEZ unit, subject to compliance with the stipulated conditions. The sufficiency of the petitioner's documents requires assessment by the competent authority under those policy instructions.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in the negative: a Bill of Export is not the only acceptable evidence for discharge of export obligation where the subsequent circulars allow prescribed corroborative evidence.

Issues: (i) Whether the search and seizure at the petitioner's residential premises complied with Section 17 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; (ii) Whether the petitioner's arrest complied with Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Issue (i): Whether the search and seizure at the petitioner's residential premises complied with Section 17 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Section 17 permits an authorised officer to search and seize where, on information in possession, recorded reasons create belief that a person has committed money-laundering or possesses proceeds of crime, relevant records, or property connected with crime. The subject land had vested in the local body under a registered gift deed and was subsequently acquired for the national highway project. The unilateral cancellation of the registered gift deed was void. The cancellation and the sale deeds in favour of the petitioner were registered consecutively on the same day, with common witnesses and document writer. The substantial disparity between the declared market value and sale consideration, followed by receipt of acquisition compensation, supported the recorded belief that the petitioner was involved in the transaction and had benefited from proceeds of crime. The authorised officer possessed and recorded the requisite reasons before conducting the search and seizure.

Conclusion: The search and seizure complied with Section 17 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and were lawful.

Issue (ii): Whether the petitioner's arrest complied with Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Section 19 authorises arrest where the authorised officer, on material in possession and recorded reasons to believe, believes that a person is guilty of an offence under the Act, and requires communication of the grounds of arrest. The recorded reasons detailed the petitioner's role in the cancellation and subsequent conveyance of government land, receipt of compensation, partial refund, retention of the balance amount, and alleged concealment of the proceeds. The arrest order and grounds of arrest were furnished on the date of arrest. These materials and communications fulfilled the statutory safeguards; the authorities relied upon by the petitioner were factually distinguishable.

Conclusion: The arrest complied with Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and was lawful.

Final Conclusion: The statutory conditions for investigation, search, seizure, and arrest under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 were satisfied on the recorded material concerning the petitioner's alleged acquisition of government land and retention of compensation.

Ratio Decidendi: A search or arrest under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 is valid where the authorised officer possesses material, records reasons to believe as required by statute, and communicates the grounds of arrest to the arrested person.

Issues: (i) Whether the constitutional challenge to the statutory pre-deposit requirements for first and second appeals warranted consideration; (ii) Whether Furnace Oil and Light Diesel Oil are distinct commodities, so that Furnace Oil can be taxed at the rate applicable to Light Diesel Oil.

Issue (i): Whether the constitutional challenge to the statutory pre-deposit requirements for first and second appeals warranted consideration.

Analysis: The challenge to the pre-deposit provisions had remained pending for sixteen years and had been raised to avoid the statutory deposit requirement. The classification dispute could be adjudicated through the appellate mechanism, including in connected proceedings already before the appellate forum.

Conclusion: The constitutional challenge was not considered, and the petitioner was relegated to appellate adjudication on merits.

Issue (ii): Whether Furnace Oil and Light Diesel Oil are distinct commodities, so that Furnace Oil can be taxed at the rate applicable to Light Diesel Oil.

Analysis: The uncontroverted technical material showed material differences in pour point, distillation range, carbon-chain composition, sedimentation, ash and water content, sulphur content, viscosity, and end-use. Furnace Oil is a heavier residual fuel fraction and cannot substitute Light Diesel Oil in machinery designed for lighter fuel. Where Light Diesel Oil has a specific tariff entry, its rate cannot be extended to Furnace Oil merely because both are used as fuel.

Conclusion: Furnace Oil and Light Diesel Oil are distinct commodities. Furnace Oil cannot be taxed at the rate applicable to Light Diesel Oil in the absence of a specific entry covering Furnace Oil.

Final Conclusion: The impugned classification of Furnace Oil as Light Diesel Oil was unsustainable, and the assessing authority must make a fresh determination treating the two products as different commodities.

Ratio Decidendi: A commodity cannot be subjected to the rate prescribed under a specific tariff entry for another commodity merely because both have a common generic use, where their commercial identity, technical characteristics, and functional use are materially distinct.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration could be sustained where the order failed to consider the assessee's reply asserting that an earlier show-cause notice on the same grounds had been dropped.

Analysis: The show-cause notice invoked Rule 21(b) on the allegation of invoices being issued without supply. The reply specifically asserted that earlier proceedings founded on the same reasons had already been dropped and that no further particulars or fresh queries were provided. The cancellation order did not address this material response and merely recorded the allegation of circular transactions. A registration-cancellation order must disclose consideration of the reply and contain reasons dealing with material objections.

Conclusion: The cancellation order could not stand because it was unreasoned and did not consider the material reply; the matter requires fresh consideration after affording an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether sufficient cause existed to direct urgent listing of the appeal without awaiting completion of ordinary Registry scrutiny.

Analysis: The procedural rules preserve inherent powers, recognise urgent matters and early-hearing applications, and permit exemption from procedural requirements where sufficient cause is shown to render substantial justice. The pleaded continuing inability to conduct business following cancellation of GST registration established urgency; the exemption was confined to Registry scrutiny and did not dispense with substantive statutory requirements.

Outcome: The application for urgent hearing was allowed, and the main appeal was directed to be listed for admission.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings initiated after a completed scrutiny assessment were invalid as being founded on a change of opinion and on grounds not disclosed in the recorded reasons.

Analysis: The original scrutiny had specifically addressed the share sale, its valuation, the purchaser's identity and creditworthiness, the transaction's genuineness, and the consequential capital-gains exemption claim. The claim was accepted after detailed inquiry under the scrutiny assessment. An assessment order need not discuss every query or record detailed reasons while accepting a claim; acceptance following inquiry establishes formation of an opinion. The subsequent notice sought to reopen the assessment on the same share transaction and material, and was therefore founded on a change of opinion. Further, the proposed challenge to the exemption claim based on the nature of the agreement for acquisition of residential property was absent from the show-cause notice. Recorded reasons cannot be supplemented or improved through an affidavit or oral submissions.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings were invalid as based on a change of opinion, and the notice under Section 148A(b), the order under Section 148A(d), and the consequential notice under Section 148 were quashed.

Issues: Whether a reassessment notice could validly be issued in the name of an entity that had ceased to exist upon merger with the petitioner.

Analysis: The merger had been sanctioned with effect from 01.04.2019, and the erstwhile entity no longer existed when the notice for assessment year 2022-23 was issued. The revenue authorities had also been informed of the merger, and the petitioner had conducted the business thereafter. A notice issued against the dissolved entity was therefore legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice issued in the name of the non-existent merged entity was quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether income-tax arrears not claimed before the committee of creditors survive after approval of a resolution plan by the adjudicating authority.

Analysis: An approved resolution plan is binding upon all stakeholders. Its purpose is to enable the corporate debtor to revive on a fresh slate without being exposed to claims that were not included in the plan. As no claim concerning the impugned tax arrears was placed before the committee of creditors or incorporated in the approved resolution plan, those arrears stood frozen upon approval of the plan.

Conclusion: The income-tax claims not forming part of the approved resolution plan do not survive, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether late-payment charges described as interest on delayed payment for supplied industrial gases constitute a taxable declared service.

Analysis: A declared service must involve consideration. Amounts payable as damages, liquidated damages or penalties for an undesired act, breach or unanticipated situation are consequences of breach and not consideration for any obligation to tolerate an act or situation. Late-payment charges in the nature of such damages, notwithstanding their description as interest, lack the requisite element of consideration.

Conclusion: Late-payment charges received as damages for delayed payment do not constitute a declared service and are not liable to service tax. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the appellant, whose writ petition concerning forfeiture of earnest money deposit was relegated to the statutory remedy, should be permitted to approach the Debts Recovery Tribunal notwithstanding the expiry of the ordinary limitation period.

Analysis: Section 17(1) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 provides an efficacious remedy before the Debts Recovery Tribunal against measures taken by the secured creditor. Rule 8(7)(f) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 requires disclosure of facts necessary for a purchaser to know the nature and value of the property; whether non-disclosure of a subsisting attachment falls within that requirement, and whether it was material to the auction purchaser, are matters for the Tribunal. The appellant had pursued the writ remedy diligently after refusal of refund, the Bank had objected only on the ground of alternative remedy, and the challenge disclosed an arguable case.

Conclusion: The appellant may file an application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal within three weeks, which shall be accepted without requiring an application for condonation of delay; the Tribunal shall decide the matter on merits in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether anticipatory bail should be granted where the investigation is complete, charge-sheet has been filed, charges have been framed, and the trial is in progress.

Analysis: The investigation had concluded, and the matter had progressed to trial after filing of the charge-sheet and framing of charges. Custodial interrogation was therefore no longer required.

Conclusion: Anticipatory bail was granted, subject to conditions imposed by the investigating officer, continued cooperation, and appearance before the jurisdictional court.

Issues: Whether the order giving effect to the appellate order could stand despite denial of the expressly contemplated opportunity of hearing to the assessee.

Analysis: The operative portion of the order dated 29.03.2025 contemplated a reasonable opportunity of hearing. It was conceded that no such hearing had been afforded. The earlier High Court orders had also specifically required an opportunity of hearing. Denial of that opportunity warranted reconsideration by the Assessing Officer, with all contentions kept open.

Conclusion: The order dated 29.03.2025 and the impugned High Court judgment were set aside, and the matter was directed to be reconsidered after hearing the assessee. The issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an order initiating reassessment could be sustained where the assessee's uploaded reply was not considered and the time to respond was curtailed.

Analysis: The statutory response period was curtailed despite time being available to complete the process. The assessee had sought further time before expiry of the curtailed deadline and uploaded its reply before the order was made. Non-consideration of that reply caused prejudice and constituted an irregularity violating principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The order under Section 148A(d) and the consequential notice under Section 148 were set aside, with a direction to make a fresh determination after considering the reply; this is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether interest expenditure attributable to borrowings allegedly used for acquiring land was disallowable where the land was used as a business storage yard and sufficient interest-free funds were available.

Analysis: Section 36(1)(iii) allows interest on capital borrowed for business purposes, while its proviso restricts deduction up to the date on which an acquired asset is first put to use. The evidence of deliveries, unloading, electricity consumption and photographs supported the use of the open land as a storage yard for bulky trading stock. Construction of an additional structure on part of the land, shown as capital work-in-progress, did not negate the business use of the remaining land. No specific borrowing or quantifiable interest was identified as directly attributable to construction of the incomplete structure. Further, capital and interest-free loans were sufficient to meet the land cost; in the absence of a direct nexus between interest-bearing borrowings and the investment, the investment was presumed to have been made from interest-free funds.

Conclusion: The interest disallowance under Section 36(1)(iii) was not sustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.