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Issues: Whether the appellant was entitled to interest on the settled sum of Rs. 2.85 crore from the date of settlement and, if so, from what date and at what rate.
Analysis: The settlement recorded that the amount was to be paid in one go, though the respondent later sought to pay in instalments and did not clear the amount by the proposed outer date of 15.04.2010. The earlier limited award of interest for 07.01.2022 to 28.02.2023 was found to be unsupported by cogent reasoning. The rate of interest fixed by the Tribunal was not disturbed, but the period for which interest was allowed was held to be erroneous. The respondent was treated as being in default at least from 16.04.2010, and the appellant was found entitled to interest from that date until the principal amount stood deposited, with any interest already paid to be adjusted.
Conclusion: The appellant succeeded in part. Interest was held payable at 6% per annum from 16.04.2010 until deposit of the settled amount, instead of being confined to the shorter period earlier awarded.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether the licence granted by the airport lessee to run duty free shops is taxable as "airport service" under clause 65(105)(zzm) of the Finance Act, 1994 for the periods in dispute, or is more appropriately classified as "renting or letting of immovable property" under clause 65(105)(zzzz) after applying Section 65A?
2. Whether retrospective amendment(s) and Circulars affecting the taxable scope (in particular effect from 01.06.2007 and 01.07.2010) alter the classification and taxability for the relevant periods.
3. Whether a refund claim filed under Section 11B of the Central Excise Act read with Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 is maintainable: (a) as to timeliness (relevant date and one-year limitation) and (b) as to non-passage of incidence of service tax to any other person (unjust enrichment).
4. Whether rejection of the refund claim on the ground of failure to fulfil classification is sustainable where the classification issue has been finally determined by the High Court and accepted by the Department.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Classification: Airport Service (zzm) v. Renting of Immovable Property (zzzz)
Legal framework: Clause 65(105)(zzm) defines "airport service"; clause 65(105)(zzzz) defines "renting or letting of immovable property"; Section 65A(2) mandates that the sub-clause providing the most specific description is preferred over more general descriptions for classification.
Precedent treatment: The Delhi High Court adjudicated the same licence arrangement and held that the licence could not be taxed under (zzm) prior to 01.07.2010 and that, after retrospective amendment, (zzzz) is the more appropriate entry for the period from 01.06.2007 to 2009-10. The judgment relied on prior authority (Home Solutions - I) and a Government Circular dated 17.09.2004 clarifying that renting or letting out was not part of airport services prior to certain dates.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court applied Section 65A(2), determining that if the transaction is characterized as letting of immovable property, clause (zzzz) is the specific entry and displaces (zzm). The Tribunal noted that the High Court analysed the temporal applicability of provisions and amendments, concluding that prior to 01.06/01.07.2007 renting was not exigible, and w.e.f. 01.06.2007 retrospective amendment made (zzzz) the appropriate entry until legislative exclusion of Section 65A recourse w.e.f. 01.07.2010.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - application of Section 65A(2) to prefer (zzzz) over (zzm) for the relevant pre-01.07.2010 period where the transaction is essentially letting of immovable property. Obiter - contextual references to Circulars and Home Solutions authority supporting temporal non-taxability.
Conclusion: For the period 2006-07 (w.e.f. 01.06.2007) to 2009-10 and April-June 2010, the more appropriate taxing entry is (zzzz) (renting of immovable property); the activity cannot be sustained as taxable under (zzm) (airport service) for the periods in dispute. The Tribunal accepts the High Court's classification and observes departmental acceptance thereof.
Issue 2 - Effect of Retrospective Amendments and Temporal Applicability
Legal framework: Retrospective amendments to taxable entries and the exclusion of recourse to Section 65A from 01.07.2010 affect which sub-clause governs classification for specific date ranges.
Precedent treatment: The High Court considered the dates on which clauses and amendments became operative and concluded different taxability regimes for pre-01.06/01.07.2007, 01.06.2007-30.06.2010, and w.e.f. 01.07.2010.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal follows the High Court's temporal mapping: (i) prior to 01.06/01.07.2007 renting not exigible (Circular and Home Solutions); (ii) retrospective operation of amendment makes (zzzz) applicable from 01.06.2007; (iii) w.e.f. 01.07.2010 the legislative scheme prevents recourse to Section 65A, making (zzm) applicable thereafter. The Tribunal treats these temporal distinctions as decisive for the refund periods claimed.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - temporal application of taxing entries governs taxability and classification; Obiter - narrative on legislative history and administrative circulars supporting temporal conclusions.
Conclusion: Temporal application of amendments and Section 65A results in (zzzz) being the proper entry for the claimed periods; therefore collection/invoicing under (zzm) for those periods was incorrect.
Issue 3 - Maintainability of Refund under Section 11B/Section 83: Timeliness
Legal framework: Section 11B provides refund where duty becomes refundable as consequence of judgment or order of an appellate authority; the claim must be filed within one year from the "relevant date" as defined (including date of judgment).
Precedent treatment: The High Court granted liberty to file refund application; the Tribunal considered the definition of "relevant date" and the date on which liability became refundable by virtue of the Court's judgment.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal identifies the relevant date as the date of the High Court judgment (30.07.2014). The refund was filed on 03.07.2015 (filed pursuant to liberty granted and within one year of the relevant date). The Tribunal holds the timeliness condition under Section 11B satisfied.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - a refund claim filed within one year from the appellate judgment date satisfies the limitation requirement of Section 11B where the duty became refundable as a consequence of that judgment.
Conclusion: The refund claim was filed within the statutory period and is timely under Section 11B/Section 83.
Issue 4 - Maintainability of Refund: Non-passage of Incidence / Unjust Enrichment
Legal framework: Section 11B requires that the incidence of duty has not been passed on to any other person; refund may be denied if the claimant has passed on the tax burden.
Precedent treatment: The appellant relied on documentary confirmation from the service-provider (airport lessee) that service tax collected from the appellant was deposited with the department and that the service tax liability for the relevant period stood discharged by the provider.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal places weight on the letter/confirmation from the lessee (DIAL) confirming payment of service tax collected from the appellant to the department, and on departmental record confirming completion of DIAL's assessments. On these facts the Tribunal finds the appellant has not passed on the incidence to others and therefore there is no unjust enrichment bar to refund.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - documentary confirmation that the service-provider has deposited collected tax and completed assessment supports finding that claimant did not pass on incidence; Obiter - commentary on sufficiency of the provider's letter as evidence in absence of contrary proof.
Conclusion: The non-passage condition of Section 11B is fulfilled; refund entitlement is not barred by unjust enrichment.
Issue 5 - Legitimacy of Rejecting Refund Solely on Classification Grounds After Final Determination by High Court
Legal framework: Principles of judicial protocol and finality of judgments require administrative/quasi-judicial authorities to give effect to court determinations; refund claims filed pursuant to court liberty must be considered on merits consistent with judicial findings.
Precedent treatment: The High Court had adjudicated classification and granted liberty to seek refund; the Department has not appealed that High Court decision to the Supreme Court and has accepted the position.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal notes that rejection of the refund by original and appellate authorities on the ground of classification ignored the High Court determination and the departmental acquiescence. Given the High Court's final ruling and the appellant's compliance with statutory preconditions for refund, refusal on classification alone is unsustainable and contrary to judicial protocol.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - once classification has been finally determined by a competent Court and accepted by the Department, rejecting a refund claim on the same ground is impermissible; Obiter - remarks on administrative obligation to render assistance as earlier undertaken by the lessee.
Conclusion: The rejection of the refund claim on classification grounds is unsustainable; the refund claim must be allowed in accordance with the Court's decision and statutory requirements.
Final Disposition (as derived from conclusions)
Both statutory conditions for refund under Section 11B/Section 83 (timeliness and non-passage of incidence) are satisfied. The classification issue in favour of "renting or letting of immovable property" for the periods in dispute has been finally determined by the High Court and accepted by the Department. Consequently, rejection of the refund claim on classification grounds was unsustainable and the refund is to be allowed.
Issues: Whether a penalty imposed for concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars is sustainable where the statutory notice does not specify the applicable limb of the penalty provision.
Analysis: The notice invoked both concealment of particulars of income and furnishing of inaccurate particulars without identifying the specific charge. Since penalty proceedings are distinct from assessment proceedings, the assessee must be clearly informed of the precise limb under which penalty is proposed. A notice that leaves the charge ambiguous is legally defective and cannot sustain the penalty.
Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable because the notice failed to specify the applicable limb of the penalty provision; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
Issues: Whether a co-operative society is entitled to deduction under section 80P(2)(d) in respect of interest earned on deposits with a co-operative bank registered as a co-operative society.
Analysis: The Surat District Co-operative Bank was undisputedly registered as a co-operative society under the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961. Binding jurisdictional High Court decisions establish that interest earned by a co-operative society on investments or deposits with a co-operative bank, which itself is a co-operative society, qualifies for deduction under section 80P(2)(d). The contrary reliance on decisions concerning different factual settings did not displace this jurisdictional position.
Conclusion: Interest of Rs. 2,26,96,240 earned on deposits with the Surat District Co-operative Bank qualifies for deduction under section 80P(2)(d); the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.
Ratio Decidendi: Interest income earned by a co-operative society from deposits with a co-operative bank registered as a co-operative society is deductible under section 80P(2)(d).
Issues: Whether the applicant should be enlarged on bail for the alleged offence of money laundering.
Analysis: The investigation had concluded and the complaint had been filed, while trial was yet to commence. The applicant had remained in custody since April 2024, had obtained bail in the scheduled-offence cases and other connected cases, and co-accused had been granted bail in the present matter. These circumstances warranted release without expressing any view on the merits.
Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to bail.
Issues: (i) whether the assessee was entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 1/2011-CE after paying proportionate CENVAT credit with interest; (ii) whether the demand could be sustained when the adjudicating authority adopted a quantification method for Rule 6(3A) reversal without putting the basis to the assessee and whether the matter required remand.
Issue (i): whether the assessee was entitled to the benefit of Notification No. 1/2011-CE after paying proportionate CENVAT credit with interest.
Analysis: The governing principle applied was that reversal of proportionate credit with interest satisfies the condition for availing the exemption, and denial of the exemption is unsustainable once such compliance is made. The earlier payment and compliance with the proportionate reversal mechanism was treated as sufficient for the exemption issue.
Conclusion: The Revenue's challenge to denial of Notification No. 1/2011-CE failed, and the benefit of the exemption could not be denied on that ground.
Issue (ii): whether the demand could be sustained when the adjudicating authority adopted a quantification method for Rule 6(3A) reversal without putting the basis to the assessee and whether the matter required remand.
Analysis: For Rule 6(3A), only common input service credit attributable to exempted clearances is relevant, and the formula cannot be applied without a disclosed and verifiable basis. Since the method adopted for quantification was not communicated to the assessee and the assessee's computation also required verification, the confirmation of demand could not stand as framed. A fresh decision after giving a reasonable opportunity of hearing was necessary.
Conclusion: The demand, interest, and penalty were set aside and the matter was remanded for de novo adjudication.
Final Conclusion: The Revenue appeals were rejected, while the assessee's appeal succeeded to the extent of setting aside the quantified demand and obtaining remand for fresh adjudication.
Ratio Decidendi: Payment of proportionate CENVAT credit with interest is sufficient to preserve the exemption, and reversal under Rule 6(3A) must be confined to common input service credit on a disclosed and verifiable basis after affording a fair opportunity to the assessee.
Issues: (i) Whether additions made under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of cash deposits and bank credits were justified. (ii) Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for concealment of income was leviable. (iii) Whether penalty under section 271AAC(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for income determined under section 69A was sustainable.
Issue (i): Whether additions made under section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on account of cash deposits and bank credits were justified.
Analysis: The bank accounts stood linked to the assessee, and the material brought by the Assessing Officer in reassessment and remand proceedings showed substantial unexplained cash deposits and credits. The assessee failed to furnish credible evidence to establish that the accounts were forged or misused by others, did not satisfactorily explain the source and nature of the money, and did not rebut the remand report despite opportunity. The burden under section 69A remained undischarged.
Conclusion: The addition under section 69A was upheld and the issue was decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether penalty under section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for concealment of income was leviable.
Analysis: The concealment penalty followed the sustained quantum addition, and the assessee did not show any reasonable cause or produce material to negate the finding of concealment. There was persistent non-compliance before the lower authorities, and the explanation offered was found unsupported and inconsistent.
Conclusion: The penalty under section 271(1)(c) was upheld and the issue was decided against the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether penalty under section 271AAC(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for income determined under section 69A was sustainable.
Analysis: The additions related to income covered by section 69A, and the assessee had not filed a return under section 139 incorporating such income or paid tax in the manner contemplated by section 115BBE. In the absence of any acceptable explanation or reasonable cause, the statutory conditions for levy of penalty under section 271AAC(1) were satisfied.
Conclusion: The penalty under section 271AAC(1) was upheld and the issue was decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal sustained the quantum additions as well as the consequential penalties, and all the appeals were rejected.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the assessee fails to discharge the burden of explaining money found in bank accounts, the addition under section 69A is sustainable, and consequential penalties under sections 271(1)(c) and 271AAC(1) follow in the absence of a credible explanation or reasonable cause.
Issues: Whether the seized documents were liable to be released to the appellants in the absence of a prosecution complaint being filed within the stipulated period after confirmation of retention.
Analysis: The complaint had not been filed within 365 days from the date of confirmation of retention. The closure of the predicate complaint had already been accepted by the Magistrate, and no further order of any superior court was shown to prevent consideration of the matter. Although an SLP concerning investigation of the complaint was pending and notice had been issued, there was no stay operating against the proceedings before the Tribunal. The seizure had taken place on 31.01.2023, and sufficient time was available to the respondent to initiate the prosecution complaint if retention of the documents was to continue.
Conclusion: The seized documents were directed to be released to the appellants within six weeks, with liberty to the respondent to obtain and authenticate copies before release.
Issues: Whether a notice issued under Section 12AB(4)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 on the ground of cancellation of an organisation's FCRA certificate, while the challenge to that cancellation is pending adjudication, is premature and liable to be set aside.
Analysis: The notice under Section 12AB(4)(a) was issued because the FCRA certificate had been cancelled; the cancellation itself was the subject matter of pending adjudication in a writ petition. Given that the factual and legal basis for the notice is the cancellation decision which remains under judicial consideration, proceeding on that basis would be premature. The appropriate course is to refrain from sustaining an administrative notice that depends on a decision not finally adjudicated and to permit the authorities to act after the challenge to the cancellation has concluded.
Conclusion: The notice dated 29.07.2025 issued under Section 12AB(4)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is quashed as premature; relief is granted in favour of the petitioner with liberty to the respondents to proceed in accordance with law after conclusion of the proceedings challenging the FCRA cancellation.
Issues: Whether the petitioners are entitled to quash the order cancelling the GST registration and to have the cancellation revoked despite expiry of the time limit under Section 30 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017, when returns were not filed, a show cause notice remained unanswered, and no sufficient explanation for the delay has been furnished.
Analysis: The statutory provision for revocation under Section 30 prescribes a time limit for filing an application for revocation of cancellation; relief by condonation of delay requires a satisfactory explanation for non-compliance with the prescribed timeline. The petitioners admitted non-filing of returns and non-response to the show cause notice and furnished only a bald, unsupported assertion of internal disputes between partners without particulars or evidence. The absence of any explanation addressing why returns were not filed or why the time limit could not be met, and the failure to respond to the show cause notice, preclude exercise of discretion to condone delay or to direct revocation of registration.
Conclusion: The petitioners' request to quash the cancellation order and to direct revocation of registration is rejected; there is no basis to condone the delay or grant the relief sought. (Decision in favour of the Revenue.)
ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1. Whether the assignment of financial facilities to the Financial Creditor is open to challenge in the Section 7 proceedings after being upheld by the High Court.
2. Whether withdrawal of earlier Section 7 petitions by erstwhile lenders operates as res judicata to bar fresh Section 7 petitions filed by assignee Financial Creditor.
3. Whether the Cash Management Agreement (CMA) and amounts in the Retention Account must be considered in determining default as on the alleged date of default (15.11.2022).
4. Whether the alleged excess withdrawal/appropriation from the Retention Account (claimed excess Rs.10,35,88,444) negates the existence of default on 15.11.2022.
5. Whether amounts held in Debt Service Reserve Account (DSRA) were required to be appropriated to avert default and whether such appropriation would remove default on 15.11.2022.
6. Whether the ECLGS disbursements and their alleged diversion to service other facilities (evergreening) preclude treating ECLGS dues as repayable/defaulted.
7. Whether the Lender's recall notice dated 15.02.2023 was validly exercisable under the loan agreement and whether subsequent recall affects the default analysis.
8. Whether the Adjudicating Authority properly applied Section 7 IBC principles (existence of debt and default) and whether admission was vitiated by malafide intent or failure to consider relevant material.
ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of assignment and challengeability
Legal framework: Assignment of loan claims is governed by applicable contract law and related statutes; judicial pronouncements recognize finality of High Court determinations on assignment.
Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal noted the High Court had upheld the assignment and treated that judicial determination as binding in these proceedings.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that once the High Court had upheld the assignment, the assignee's title to sue under Section 7 could not be re-litigated in the Section 7 proceeding. The Adjudicating Authority was entitled to act on that status.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - a High Court's upholding of assignment precludes re-opening its validity in the subsequent Section 7 admission stage.
Conclusion: Assignment not open to challenge in these appeals; the Adjudicating Authority correctly proceeded on the basis of a valid assignment.
Issue 2 - Effect of prior withdrawal (res judicata) of Section 7 petitions
Legal framework: Principles of res judicata and finality; effect of withdrawal of a petition versus adjudication on merits.
Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal previously held (in remand order) that withdrawal of earlier petitions by erstwhile lender would not operate as res judicata to bar the assignee's Section 7 petitions.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court reiterated that mere withdrawal of earlier petitions does not preclude a fresh aggrieved creditor (assignee) from instituting Section 7, especially where this Tribunal had declined to express conclusive opinion on substantive issues in the remand order.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - withdrawal does not result in res judicata against a different creditor bringing fresh proceedings; the remand order did not create conclusive findings that bind the Adjudicating Authority.
Conclusion: Section 7 petitions by the assignee were maintainable; res judicata did not bar admission.
Issue 3 - Role of Cash Management Agreement (CMA) and Retention Account in determining default
Legal framework: Contractual mechanism (CMA) channels hotel revenues: 66% to Expense Account, 34% to Retention Account for servicing debt; Clause 18.39 obliges borrowers to pay from other funds if retention insufficient.
Precedent Treatment: Remand directed Adjudicating Authority to consider CMA and retention account; Adjudicating Authority complied and examined reconciliations and statements of accounts.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted that CMA is a mechanism relevant to determine sufficiency of funds; however, CMA does not absolve borrower from primary obligation to repay. Clause 18.39 mandates borrowers to supply other acceptable funds when retention is insufficient. The Adjudicating Authority inspected retention balances (including specific appropriations) and found retention funds insufficient on 15.11.2022.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - CMA must be considered but cannot override borrower's contractual repayment obligation; absence of sufficient funds in retention does not preclude finding default where borrower failed to supply other funds as contracted.
Conclusion: CMA and Retention Account were properly considered; insufficiency of retention funds did not negate default because borrower bore the duty to top up.
Issue 4 - Alleged excess withdrawal/appropriation from Retention Account
Legal framework: CMA prescribed reconciliation and procedure for overdraws; obligation to refund overdrawn amounts placed on both financier and owner; overdrawn amounts may be appropriated toward borrower obligations if not disputed by operator action.
Precedent Treatment: Adjudicating Authority examined monthly reconciliations and relevant CMA clauses and noted overdraws did not pertain to the precise period material to default and that appropriations were applied to borrower obligations.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found the claimed excess withdrawal was an appropriation toward obligations and not an advance payment relieving future obligations; overdrawn sums were used to satisfy obligations which the borrower otherwise had to meet under Clause 18.39. No evidence was shown that withdrawals exceeded lender entitlement to service loan obligations.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - mere claim of excess withdrawal does not negate default absent demonstration that lender took amounts beyond entitlement and that such withdrawal resulted in pre-payment obviating due instalments.
Conclusion: Excess withdrawal claim did not establish absence of default on 15.11.2022; Adjudicating Authority rightly rejected this defence.
Issue 5 - Appropriation of DSRA and effect on default
Legal framework: DSRA constituted under Loan Agreement; rules of appropriation (Clause 29.1) require pro-rata adjustment across facilities; DSRA in loan agreement did not extend automatically to ECLGS facilities.
Precedent Treatment: Adjudicating Authority computed pro-rata entitlement of DSRA to ECLGS interest and principal and concluded that even full appropriation would not eliminate default.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted the Adjudicating Authority's pro-rata approach: DSRA could be applied pro-rata across obligations but its quantum (e.g., Rs.3 crores) was insufficient to wipe out outstanding dues under all credit facilities; appropriation of DSRA would in any event increase loan outstanding in certain respects and could not be unilaterally applied solely to ECLGS unless contractual entitlements permitted.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - DSRA appropriation must follow agreed rules and pro-rata application; limited DSRA balances did not prevent finding of default.
Conclusion: DSRA utilization would not have eliminated default; Adjudicating Authority's conclusion stands.
Issue 6 - Use of ECLGS funds to service other facilities (evergreening) and liability under ECLGS
Legal framework: Purpose of ECLGS disbursements may be specific, but contractual adjustments/appropriations with borrower consent can change application; Clause 18.39 allows borrower obligations to be serviced from other funds as acceptable to the lender.
Precedent Treatment: Tribunal had earlier flagged potential misuse (evergreening) but remanded for fresh consideration; Adjudicating Authority considered evidence and concluded adjustments occurred with mutual consent and resulted in reduced interest/principal under other facilities.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed that even if disbursements deviated from original sanctioned purpose, documented appropriations and lack of contemporaneous grievance by borrower indicated acquiescence; such adjustments do not negate the assignee's entitlement to repayment of ECLGS disbursements as obligations had arisen.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - alleged diversion of ECLGS funds to service other loans does not per se absolve borrower of ECLGS obligations where parties consented or acquiesced; it is a matter of contractual fact to be examined.
Conclusion: ECLGS dues remained payable; evergreening allegation did not preclude finding default.
Issue 7 - Validity of recall notice (15.02.2023) and its effect
Legal framework: Loan agreement clause granting lender right to recall upon anniversaries and on occurrence of events of default; recall accelerates outstanding amounts.
Precedent Treatment: Adjudicating Authority found clause granting recall right post-five year anniversary and upheld lender's exercise by notice dated 15.02.2023.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court endorsed the Adjudicating Authority's view that clause 7.2.6 conferred a contractual right to recall after specified anniversaries and that the recall notice validly accelerated liabilities; recall and subsequent defaults were properly considered cumulatively.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - contractual recall rights when exercised validly accelerate debt and are relevant in default analysis.
Conclusion: Recall notice upheld; it legitimately affected the quantum and timing of obligations and supported admission under Section 7.
Issue 8 - Admission under Section 7: debt, default, discretion and allegations of malafide
Legal framework: Section 7 IBC requires proof of debt and default; once NCLT/NCLAT is satisfied default occurred, discretion to refuse admission is limited (citing Supreme Court authority that default being established usually mandates admission).
Precedent Treatment: The Court applied established principles (including cited Supreme Court authority) that existence of debt and non-payment when due is determinative of admission under Section 7, subject to limited judicial discretion where exceptional circumstances exist.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Adjudicating Authority evaluated statements of account, CMA, DSRA, ECLGS schedules and concluded defaults existed on 15.11.2022; positive EBITDA did not negate inability to meet contractual repayment obligations. Allegation of malafide motive by the Financial Creditor was rejected on facts (e.g., existence of large claimed dues, recall notice, and OTS indicating admitted indebtedness). The Tribunal emphasized remand order did not express conclusive views; the Adjudicating Authority's fresh consideration satisfied statutory test for admission.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - where, after full consideration of contractual documents and accounts, debt and default are established, admission under Section 7 is appropriate; commercial solvency or profit metrics (EBITDA) do not automatically negate default.
Conclusion: Adjudicating Authority correctly admitted Section 7 petitions; allegations of mala fides and other defenses were insufficient to displace findings of debt and default. Appeals dismissed; order of admission sustained.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
Whether a notice issued under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (and proceedings under Section 148A(1)/(3)) for a given assessment year is vitiated because it was issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer (JAO) rather than by the Faceless Assessing Officer (FAO).
Whether interim relief (stay of operation of notices/proceedings) should be granted by the High Court pending adjudication of conflicting decisions in appeal before the Supreme Court.
Whether the High Court is bound to follow its earlier Division Bench decision holding concurrent jurisdiction of JAO and FAO (and related consequences for petitions challenging notices issued by JAO).
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of notices under Section 148 issued by JAO vs FAO
Legal framework: Section 148 confers power to the tax authority to issue notice for reopening assessment. Section 148A prescribes procedural safeguards for initiation of reassessment proceedings. The scheme contemplates exercise of power by a competent tax authority; the mode of issuance (faceless versus jurisdictional officer) is challenged as affecting jurisdiction and validity.
Precedent Treatment: A prior Division Bench decision of this High Court held that both the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer and the Faceless Assessing Officer possess concurrent jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148. Another High Court had taken the contrary view (holding issuance by JAO fatal), and that contrary view is the subject of pending proceedings before the Supreme Court. The earlier Division Bench ruling of this Court was expressly followed in subsequent petitions and relied on to dismiss or cause withdrawal of proceedings challenging JAO-issued notices.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court observed that the question is no longer res integra within this jurisdiction because of the Division Bench precedent holding concurrent jurisdiction of JAO and FAO. The mere pendency of appeals to the Supreme Court against other High Court decisions (including decisions adopting the contrary position) does not displace a binding Division Bench precedent of this Court. Where a binding intra-court precedent exists, petitions asserting invalidity solely on the ground that a JAO (and not an FAO) issued the notice must fail unless the Court refers the question to a larger bench or the binding precedent is stayed or set aside.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - The authoritative holding applied is that both JAO and FAO have concurrent jurisdiction to issue notices under Section 148; accordingly, issuance by JAO is not, by itself, vitiating. Obiter - Observations regarding judgments of other High Courts and their pendency before the Supreme Court are incidental to the application of the binding Division Bench decision.
Conclusions: Challenges to notices under Section 148 (and related orders under Section 148A) solely on the ground that they were issued by the JAO and not by the FAO are not sustainable in this High Court in view of the binding Division Bench precedent affirming concurrent jurisdiction. The petitions on that ground are to be dismissed.
Issue 2 - Grant of interim relief pending Supreme Court consideration of conflicting High Court decisions
Legal framework: The grant of interim relief in writ jurisdiction is governed by principles of judicial restraint, balance of convenience, and regard for binding precedent. Interim orders must not frustrate the effect of binding intra-court precedents unless exceptional circumstances exist (e.g., stay of the precedent by a superior court or a larger bench reference).
Precedent Treatment: The Court noted that the Supreme Court is seised of appeals arising from other High Court decisions, including those adopting a contrary view. However, there is no stay of this Court's Division Bench decision affirming concurrent jurisdiction. Other High Courts have taken different approaches - some following the contrary decision and quashing notices, some refusing interim relief - and those differences are before the Supreme Court.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that pendency of appeals or special leave petitions in the Supreme Court against other High Court decisions will not automatically justify grant of interim relief where a binding Division Bench decision of the same High Court governs the matter. The Court examined representations that interim protection had been granted elsewhere but concluded that where this Court's binding precedent remains operative and unsuspended, continuation of proceedings is permissible and interim relief is not warranted. The Court further relied on the fact that similar petitions in this Court have been dismissed or withdrawn following the binding precedent, reinforcing the propriety of refusing interim protection in the present petitions.
Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Absence of stay of a binding Division Bench decision precludes grant of interim relief that would be inconsistent with that precedent. Obiter - Comments on orders of other High Courts and the pendency of assorted appeals before the Supreme Court are explanatory and not determinative of the intra-court binding precedent issue.
Conclusions: Interim stay of the impugned notices was not appropriate where the High Court's own Division Bench decision affirming concurrent jurisdiction remained binding and unsuspended. The petitions seeking interim relief on that ground were denied and the substantive challenge dismissed accordingly.
Cross-references and consequential directions
The Court indicated that, in the event the binding Division Bench precedent is set aside or stayed by a larger bench or the Supreme Court, the Revenue may be permitted to revive disposed petitions without a fresh interim application, but such revival would require adjudication on merits of all raised issues at that stage. The Court also noted that divergent High Court decisions and their pendency before the Supreme Court do not operate to displace an existing binding internal precedent absent a superior court order.
Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority erred in rejecting IA No.1100/2022 filed under Section 66 read with Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, on the ground that the forensic audit report relied upon was inconclusive and unsupported by corroborative evidence.
Analysis: The Court examined whether a standalone forensic audit report, which the report itself characterises as incomplete due to non-cooperation of the management and which lacks supporting documents and verification, can form the sole basis for imposing liability on suspended directors under Section 66 read with Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The Court noted that where supporting evidence is absent because of non-cooperation, the resolution lies in criminal investigation to unearth evidentiary material and that an incomplete forensic report cannot substitute for contemporaneous corroborative documents or proof required to establish fraudulent or wrongful trading for the purposes of Section 66.
Conclusion: The rejection of IA No.1100/2022 by the Adjudicating Authority on the ground that the forensic audit report was inconclusive and unsupported by necessary evidence was legally sustainable; the appeal is dismissed and no interference with the Impugned Order is warranted.
Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer on 30/03/2023 is valid where CBDT Notification dated 29/03/2022 and section 144B require issuance of notices and conduct of reassessment proceedings by the Faceless Assessment Unit.
Analysis: The Court examined the sequence of events and the applicable statutory and regulatory framework, specifically Section 148, Section 144B and Section 151A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and CBDT Notification No. 18/2022 dated 29/03/2022 mandating faceless issuance and conduct of reassessment proceedings. The Court considered coordinate-bench decisions and the Punjab & Haryana High Court rulings holding that notices issued by the jurisdictional AO after the notification are contrary to the mandatory faceless procedure and therefore without jurisdiction. The Revenue did not place any material distinguishing this case from those precedents and there was no stay of the High Court decisions by the Supreme Court.
Conclusion: The notice under section 148 issued by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer on 30/03/2023 is without jurisdiction and void; the reassessment proceedings and order are quashed. The appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.
Issues: Whether the Adjudicating Authority ought to have exercised jurisdiction to admit a petition under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, when a scheme of arrangement sanctioned earlier by the High Court under Sections 391-394 of the Companies Act, 1956 was in existence and subsisting.
Analysis: The Court examined the temporal primacy and binding effect of a High Court-sanctioned scheme of arrangement under Sections 391-394 of the Companies Act, 1956 and its operation as a judgment in rem binding on all creditors; noted statutory provisions including Section 391(3) which renders a sanctioned scheme binding and Section 391(6) which stays coercive action; considered that the scheme had been sanctioned on 23.07.2019 prior to the Section 7 admission dated 02.07.2024; reviewed that questions about withdrawal of creditor consent and recall of the sanction were sub judice before the Division Bench in APP No.14/2022 and that the recall order was stayed; observed that Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 uses discretionary language and that admission could have been kept in abeyance pending the High Court appeal; and found that the NCLT admitted the Section 7 petition without adequately accounting for the existence and legal effect of the sanctioned scheme and the pending High Court proceedings.
Conclusion: The admission order passed by the Adjudicating Authority under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is set aside and the appeal is allowed; the Section 7 petition is to remain pending and the Adjudicating Authority shall reconsider the matter after disposal of APP No.14/2022 before the Punjab & Haryana High Court.
Issues: (i) Whether the delay of 594 days in filing the recall application was satisfactorily explained so as to warrant condonation; (ii) Whether the order dismissing the company petition as withdrawn could be recalled under the Tribunal's inherent powers.
Issue (i): Whether the delay of 594 days in filing the recall application was satisfactorily explained so as to warrant condonation.
Analysis: The Appellant had knowledge of the withdrawal order shortly after it was passed and remained inactive for an inordinately long period. The explanation that he was awaiting action by the Company Secretary was found unacceptable, especially when the authority of the representative had not been withdrawn and the record showed participation in the proceedings. The delay was therefore treated as unexplained and inordinate.
Conclusion: The delay was not condoned and the finding is against the Appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the order dismissing the company petition as withdrawn could be recalled under the Tribunal's inherent powers.
Analysis: The withdrawal order was treated as an order obtained through the Appellant's authorised representative and, on the facts, as a consent order. Inherent powers under the Tribunal Rules could not be used to secure a review or recall of such an order, particularly where there was no satisfactory explanation for the delay and no legal vacuum requiring exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Invocation of recall was therefore held to be impermissible.
Conclusion: The recall application was not maintainable and the finding is against the Appellant.
Final Conclusion: The Tribunal affirmed the rejection of condonation and the connected recall relief failed as a consequence, leaving the challenge unsuccessful.
Ratio Decidendi: Inherent powers cannot be invoked to recall a consent order procured through an authorised representative when the applicant had knowledge of the order and the delay in seeking recall remains inordinate and unexplained.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Validity of notice issued under section 148A(b) when less than "seven clear days" are afforded to the assessee to respond.
1.2 Consequential validity of the reassessment order passed under section 147 read with section 144C where the foundational notice under section 148A(b) is invalid.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity of notice issued under section 148A(b) when less than "seven clear days" are afforded to the assessee
Legal framework
2.1 The Court reproduced and relied upon section 148A(b), which mandates that an opportunity of being heard must be provided by serving a notice to show cause "within such time, as may be specified in the notice, being not less than seven days and but not exceeding thirty days from the date on which such notice is issued...".
2.2 The Court referred to the interpretation of this provision by the jurisdictional High Court, which held that "minimum 7 days is required to be given to the Assessee for filing reply" and that such 7 days are to be calculated by "ignoring the date of issue and the last date of submission", i.e., seven clear days.
2.3 The Court noted that the jurisdictional High Court, in turn, relied on the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in relation to the phrase "not being less than one month", holding that when "not less than" a specified period is prescribed, both terminal days (the date of issuance and the last date for compliance) are to be excluded.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The notice under section 148A(b) was issued on 14.03.2022, directing the assessee to submit its response on or before 21.03.2022.
2.5 Applying the principle that both the date of issuance of notice and the last date for submission of reply are to be excluded, the Court examined whether the assessee had been granted seven clear days for response.
2.6 The Court followed a Co-ordinate Bench decision which, on identical language and computation, held that if, after excluding both terminal days, the assessee is left with fewer than seven clear days to respond, the mandate of section 148A(b) is violated.
2.7 Relying on the jurisdictional High Court's construction of section 148A(b), the Court accepted that the statutory requirement is mandatory: the assessee must be afforded not less than seven clear days, and non-compliance renders the notice invalid.
Conclusions
2.8 The Court held that the assessee was not provided with the statutorily required seven clear days to respond to the notice under section 148A(b).
2.9 The notice issued under section 148A(b) was held to be in violation of the mandate of section 148A(b) and the binding interpretation of the jurisdictional High Court.
2.10 The notice under section 148A(b) was therefore quashed.
Issue 2: Consequential validity of reassessment order under section 147 read with section 144C based on invalid section 148A(b) notice
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The Court observed that initiation of reassessment proceedings under section 147 was predicated upon the impugned notice issued under section 148A(b).
2.12 Once the foundational notice under section 148A(b) is held invalid and quashed, all subsequent proceedings flowing from such notice, including the reassessment order, lose their legal substratum and cannot be sustained.
Conclusions
2.13 Consequent upon quashing of the notice under section 148A(b), the reassessment order passed under section 147 read with section 144C was held to be a nullity and was quashed.
2.14 The appeal was allowed on this jurisdictional ground alone.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a delay of four days in filing the appeal before the Tribunal warranted condonation.
1.2 Whether, for Assessment Year 2019-20, the assessee-trust was required to furnish the audit report in Form 10B at least one month prior to the due date for filing the return of income, and whether belated uploading of Form 10B justified denial of exemption under section 11, including application and accumulation of income.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Condonation of short delay in filing appeal
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Tribunal noted that there was a delay of four days in filing the appeal and that an application supported by an affidavit of the trustee explaining the delay had been filed.
2.2 Considering the averments made and the shortness of the delay, the Tribunal considered it fit to condone the delay.
Conclusions
2.3 The delay of four days in filing the appeal was condoned, and the appeal was admitted for adjudication on merits.
Issue 2: Due date for furnishing audit report in Form 10B for AY 2019-20 and entitlement to exemption under section 11
Legal framework as discussed
2.4 The Tribunal considered section 12A(1)(b) of the Income-tax Act, which mandates that where the total income of a charitable trust exceeds the maximum amount not chargeable to tax, its accounts must be audited and an audit report in the prescribed form (Form 10B) furnished by the "specified date" referred to in section 44AB.
2.5 The Tribunal examined section 44AB and its Explanation, under which, for the relevant period, the "specified date" for furnishing the audit report was the same as the due date for furnishing the return of income.
2.6 The Tribunal noted that the amendment requiring furnishing of the audit report at least one month prior to the due date for filing the return of income was introduced by the Finance Act, 2020 with effect from 01.04.2020 and applied from AY 2020-21 onwards.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.7 The Tribunal recorded that the assessee is a charitable trust registered under section 12A and that its return of income for AY 2019-20 was filed on 31.10.2019, claiming exemption under section 11.
2.8 The Centralized Processing Centre had denied exemption under section 11 on the ground that the registration document under section 12A was not attached with the return; on appeal, the appellate authority accepted that the assessee was validly registered but denied exemption on the ground that Form 10B was not furnished by 20.09.2019, i.e., one month prior to the due date for filing the return.
2.9 The Tribunal accepted the assessee's contention that, for AY 2019-20, the law in force required the audit report in Form 10B to be furnished by the same due date as prescribed for filing the return under section 139(1), i.e., 31.10.2019, and not one month prior.
2.10 It was noted that the assessee had filed Form 10B along with the return of income on 31.10.2019, which was within the statutory due date applicable for AY 2019-20 under the then-prevailing provisions.
2.11 The Tribunal held that the appellate authority's reliance on the requirement of filing Form 10B one month prior to the due date for filing the return was based on a legal position introduced only with effect from AY 2020-21 and was not applicable to AY 2019-20.
Conclusions
2.12 For AY 2019-20, the due date for furnishing the audit report in Form 10B was the same as the due date for filing the return of income under section 139(1), i.e., 31.10.2019.
2.13 Since the assessee filed Form 10B along with the return of income on 31.10.2019, the statutory requirement under section 12A(1)(b) read with section 44AB stood complied with.
2.14 The denial of exemption under section 11, including disallowance of application of income and accumulation of income solely on the ground of alleged belated filing of Form 10B, was unwarranted in law for AY 2019-20.
2.15 The impugned appellate order was set aside; the disallowances made by the lower authorities were ordered to be deleted; and the Assessing Officer was directed to allow exemption/deduction under section 11 to the assessee in accordance with law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether deduction under section 54F of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was allowable where the assessee, on the date of transfer of the original asset, held only fractional/joint interests in residential properties and not more than one residential house in his absolute ownership.
1.2 Whether a memorandum of family settlement and consequential transfers, though formally registered after the date of transfer of the original asset, could be disregarded for purposes of determining "ownership" of residential houses under the proviso to section 54F.
1.3 Whether disallowance of the indexed cost of acquisition of shares, resulting in taxation of the entire sale consideration as capital gains, was justified when the assessee had produced ledger accounts and confirmations from the issuing company evidencing acquisition and cost of such shares.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2 - Eligibility for deduction under section 54F where assessee holds joint interests in residential properties and effect of family settlement
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Assessing Officer denied deduction under section 54F on the basis that the assessee had disclosed income from three house properties and, therefore, allegedly owned more than one residential house on the date of transfer of shares, and further held that ownership was not transferred until execution and registration of sale/gift deeds in 2020 and 2021, rendering the family settlement dated 05.04.2019 ineffective for the relevant date.
2.2 The appellate authority examined the factual matrix and found that: (i) House No. 3114, Sector 21-D, Chandigarh was jointly owned by the assessee and his brother; (ii) House No. C-01, SRS Lotus Garden, Sector 9, Thanesar, Kurukshetra was jointly owned by the assessee and his wife; and (iii) only House No. 75, Sector 4, Urban Estate, Kurukshetra was in the sole name of the assessee prior to the family settlement. Post-settlement, the Chandigarh property was to go to the brother, the Kurukshetra Urban Estate property to the assessee's son, and the SRS Lotus Garden property remained in joint ownership.
2.3 The appellate authority held that even if, for argument's sake, the memorandum of family settlement was ignored or its registration treated as subsequent, the assessee, at best, had absolute ownership of only one property and fractional/joint ownership in the other properties. The proviso to section 54F contemplates ownership of more than one residential house in the sense of absolute, full ownership and not mere co-ownership.
2.4 Relying on judicial precedents discussed in the appellate order, particularly the reasoning adopted in decisions such as ITO v. Rasiklal N. Satra and Ashok G. Chauhan v. ACIT, it was emphasized that:
- The expression "a residential house" and the word "own" in section 54F refer to a complete residential house fully and wholly owned by the assessee.
- Joint or fractional ownership does not amount to "ownership" of a residential house for the purpose of the exclusion in the proviso to section 54F.
- Where property is jointly owned, none of the co-owners can be regarded as the absolute owner to the exclusion of all others; ownership in such context is distinct from co-ownership.
- The legislature, having amended section 32 to include the expression "owned wholly or partly" after the decision in Seth Banarsi Dass Gupta, but not having similarly amended section 54F, indicates that part/joint ownership is not intended to fall within the mischief of the proviso to section 54F.
2.5 The Tribunal noted that the appellate authority had appropriately applied the above principles, and further relied on the coordinate bench decision in Ashok G. Chauhan, where it was held that shared interest in a residential house does not preclude deduction under section 54F, since such shared interest does not amount to full ownership.
Conclusions
2.6 For purposes of the proviso to section 54F, only a residential house wholly and exclusively owned by the assessee is to be counted; fractional/joint interests do not constitute "ownership" of that residential house.
2.7 As the assessee did not hold more than one residential house in his absolute ownership on the date of transfer of shares, his claim for deduction under section 54F in respect of investment in the Pune residential property was rightly allowed by the appellate authority.
2.8 The Tribunal upheld the appellate authority's decision and refused to interfere with the allowance of deduction under section 54F.
Issue 3 - Disallowance of indexed cost of acquisition of shares and evidentiary sufficiency
Interpretation and reasoning
3.1 The Assessing Officer disallowed the indexed cost of acquisition of Rs. 1,54,28,619/- on sale of 74,024 shares of Tirupati Medicare Ltd., on the ground that the assessee allegedly failed to furnish evidence of acquisition and cost, thereby effectively taxing the entire sale consideration as capital gains.
3.2 The appellate authority found, on examination of the record, that the assessee had filed detailed ledger accounts from the books of Tirupati Medicare Ltd. for the relevant financial years, which contained:
- Date-wise and year-wise entries of share investments;
- Details of cheque payments, including cheque numbers and dates;
- Bank details through which payments were made; and
- Confirmations from the company in respect of the transfer and holding of shares in the assessee's name.
3.3 It was further found that the assessee was a regular assessee since 2007 and an initial shareholder and director of the company, and that the jurisdiction over the company lay with the same Assessing Officer. In these circumstances, there was no justification to ignore the documentary evidence of cost and acquisition placed on record, nor to refuse the indexed cost of acquisition while simultaneously accepting that the assessee was the owner of the very shares sold.
3.4 The Tribunal noted that the matter was essentially factual; the appellate authority had verified the ledgers and confirmations in detail and concluded that the cost of acquisition was adequately established and that disallowance of such cost was contrary to law and facts.
Conclusions
3.5 Documentary evidence in the form of detailed company ledger accounts, cheque/payment details, and confirmations from the issuing company constituted sufficient proof of acquisition and cost of shares for computation of long-term capital gains.
3.6 The disallowance of Rs. 1,54,28,619/- as indexed cost of acquisition was unsustainable and was rightly deleted by the appellate authority.
3.7 The Tribunal upheld the deletion of the disallowance of indexed cost of acquisition and dismissed the Revenue's grounds on this issue.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a company appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, challenging admission of a Section 7 application, is maintainable at the instance of a shareholder of the corporate debtor.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Maintainability of appeal by shareholder under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1.1 The challenge before the Tribunal arose from an order admitting an application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and commencing CIRP against the corporate debtor. The appeal was filed under Section 61 of the Code by an appellant whose status is that of a shareholder of the corporate debtor.
2.1.2 The question whether a shareholder/promoter falls within the ambit of an "aggrieved person" under Section 61 and thus has locus to challenge an order of admission under Sections 7 or 9 was earlier referred to a larger Bench of the Tribunal. The larger Bench, by judgment dated 22.07.2025, held that a company appeal at the behest of a shareholder is not maintainable.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.3 The Tribunal noted that the appellant's only capacity is that of "shareholder" of the corporate debtor, and that the specific issue of maintainability of an appeal by a shareholder against an order under Section 7 has already been conclusively answered by the larger Bench.
2.1.4 The Tribunal treated the larger Bench pronouncement as binding, observing that it had "already laid the question to rest" by holding that a company appeal at the behest of a shareholder is not maintainable. Consequently, once the status of the appellant as shareholder was established, the appeal failed on maintainability alone.
2.1.5 Although the respondent's counsel had mentioned non-appearance of the appellant on multiple dates, the substantive basis for disposal of the matter was the legal position settled by the larger Bench that a shareholder has no locus to maintain such an appeal under Section 61 against an order admitting a Section 7 application.
Conclusions
2.1.6 The Tribunal concluded that, in light of the larger Bench judgment dated 22.07.2025, a company appeal under Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, challenging the admission of a Section 7 application, is not maintainable at the instance of a shareholder of the corporate debtor.
2.1.7 On that ground alone, the appeal was dismissed as "not maintainable."
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