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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether interest on amounts paid during investigation and as mandatory pre-deposit is payable from the date of such deposits till the date of refund, or only from three months after the date of refund application.
1.2 Whether the interest already sanctioned and paid on the entire amount of Rs. 70,00,000/- could be treated as "erroneously refunded" so as to justify recovery under Sections 11A and 11AA and imposition of penalty under Section 11AC(1)(a).
1.3 Whether, in light of CBEC Circular No. 984/08/2014-CX dated 16.09.2014, only the statutory pre-deposit portion (7.5% of the confirmed demand) qualifies for interest from the date of deposit, and the balance paid during investigation attracts interest only under Sections 11B/11BB.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Entitlement and period of interest on amounts paid during investigation and as pre-deposit
(a) Legal framework as discussed
2.1 The Tribunal considered Sections 11B, 11BB, 11A, 11AA and 11AC(1)(a) of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and the scheme of Sections 35F and 35FF (mandatory pre-deposit and interest on refund of pre-deposit). The Tribunal also noted CBEC Circular No. 984/08/2014-CX dated 16.09.2014, particularly paras 3.1-3.3, concerning treatment of payments during investigation as pre-deposit to the extent of 7.5% / 10%.
2.2 The Tribunal took note of decisions of various High Courts and of the Tribunal, including Team HR Services Pvt. Ltd., Commissioner of Customs v. DD International Pvt. Ltd., Commissioner of Customs (Exports) v. S.S. Automotive Pvt. Ltd., and Ebiz.com Pvt. Ltd., in which interest on amounts deposited during investigation was granted from the date of deposit till the date of refund.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tribunal distinguished between "duty" and "deposit". It held that sums paid during investigation or by way of mandatory pre-deposit, prior to final adjudication, are in the nature of deposits and not tax or duty per se. The Department cannot have any beneficial interest in such deposits unless and until they are appropriated as duty pursuant to adjudication that has attained finality.
2.4 The Tribunal reasoned that, where ultimately it is held through the appellate process that the amount is not payable to the Department, the deposited sums remain mere deposits. In such circumstances, the Department is obliged to return these deposits along with interest from the date of deposit till the date of refund, since the Department had use of the assessee's money without lawful basis.
2.5 It was specifically noted that the case law cited by the appellant consistently supports the principle that interest on deposit (including amounts paid during investigation and towards pre-deposit) runs from the date of payment of such deposit to the date of actual refund, and not merely from three months after the date of a refund application.
2.6 The Tribunal rejected the approach that would split the amount into (i) statutory pre-deposit attracting interest from date of payment and (ii) balance amount paid during investigation attracting interest only under Sections 11B/11BB after three months from refund claim. It treated the entire amount as deposit for purposes of interest computation once it was judicially determined that no duty was payable.
(c) Conclusions
2.7 The Tribunal held that the assessee was entitled to interest on the entire amount deposited (Rs. 70,00,000/-), including amounts paid during investigation and towards pre-deposit, from the respective dates of deposit till the dates of refund.
2.8 Interest earlier sanctioned and paid on that basis was held to be in accordance with law, and not excessive or beyond entitlement.
Issue 2: Validity of treating interest already granted as "erroneous refund" and recovery under Sections 11A, 11AA and 11AC(1)(a)
(a) Legal framework as discussed
2.9 The Tribunal examined the provisions for recovery of duties and interest under Sections 11A and 11AA and imposition of penalty under Section 11AC(1)(a) in the context of alleged "erroneous refund". It also referred to the refund provisions under Section 11B and contrasted them with the regime applicable to deposits and pre-deposits, including the interpretation of Section 35FF.
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 The Department's case rested on the premise that, in view of CBEC Circular No. 984/08/2014-CX, only 7.5% of the confirmed duty demand could be treated as pre-deposit under Section 35F, and that interest from date of deposit was legally payable only on such pre-deposit portion. On this basis, the authorities below had treated the interest earlier paid on the balance amount as "erroneously sanctioned", initiating recovery under Section 11A along with interest under Section 11AA and penalty under Section 11AC(1)(a).
2.11 The Tribunal contrasted this departmental view with the judicial precedents cited, which consistently treated sums deposited during investigation and as pre-deposit-when ultimately found not payable-as deposits on which interest runs from the date of deposit to the date of refund. It observed that such deposits are not "duty" for purposes of the refund provisions under Section 11B, and thus cannot be brought within the "erroneous refund" framework that presupposes refund of duty or tax under that section.
2.12 The Tribunal held that deposits stand on a different footing from "refund of duty" under Section 11B. Where a deposit is directed to be returned after adjudication in favour of the assessee, the Department has no statutory authority to invoke "erroneous refund" provisions to recover interest already paid on such deposit in accordance with settled judicial principles.
2.13 It emphasised that, in light of the case law and the nature of deposits, there was no legal error in the earlier grant of interest on the entire deposit from the date of payment. The Department's reliance on the circular to curtail such interest was held to be contrary to the judicially settled position and could not override binding precedent.
(c) Conclusions
2.14 The Tribunal concluded that there was no "erroneous refund" of interest in law; therefore, the show cause notice and the impugned order demanding recovery of Rs. 16,55,345/- as excess interest, along with interest under Section 11AA and penalty under Section 11AC(1)(a), were unsustainable.
2.15 Consequently, the recovery proceedings and penalty were set aside. The appeal was allowed with consequential relief, and it was held that no portion of the interest earlier refunded to the appellant could be recovered by treating it as erroneously sanctioned.
Issue 3: Effect and scope of CBEC Circular No. 984/08/2014-CX vis-à-vis judicially recognised entitlement to interest on deposits
(a) Legal framework as discussed
2.16 The Tribunal considered para 3 of CBEC Circular No. 984/08/2014-CX dated 16.09.2014, which provides that amounts paid during investigation or audit, to the extent of 7.5% / 10% of the confirmed demand (subject to monetary limits), may be treated as deposit for fulfilling the statutory pre-deposit requirement under Section 35F, and that any excess over such percentage "shall not be treated as deposit under the said sections".
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.17 The appellate authority below had relied on this circular to hold that only the 7.5% component qualified as "pre-deposit" entitled to interest from date of payment under Section 35FF, while the balance amount paid during investigation would be treated as duty and thus attract interest only under the refund provisions of Section 11B/11BB (i.e., after three months from the date of refund application).
2.18 The Tribunal, however, found that this circular could not diminish or restrict the judicially declared right of an assessee to interest on deposits from the date of deposit to the date of refund, where ultimately no duty is adjudged payable. It held that a circular cannot override or nullify binding precedents of High Courts and of the Tribunal, which recognise such interest on the entire deposit amount, whether or not it strictly falls within the percentage of statutory pre-deposit under Section 35F.
2.19 The Tribunal further held that the nature of the amount-as deposit versus duty-must be determined by the substantive facts and the final adjudicatory outcome, not merely by administrative circular language. When the adjudicatory process concludes that the assessee's liability does not exist, sums paid earlier, regardless of label or quantum compared to 7.5%, retain the character of deposits and must be refunded with interest from the date of deposit.
(c) Conclusions
2.20 The Tribunal held that CBEC Circular No. 984/08/2014-CX cannot be relied upon to deny interest from the date of deposit on amounts paid during investigation that are ultimately found not payable, nor to justify treating such interest as "erroneous refund".
2.21 Accordingly, the circular did not support the Department's position, and the earlier grant of interest on the entire amount deposited remained legally valid and unrecoverable.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the sale proceeds of unlisted equity investments, held and sold by amalgamating companies and subsequently received by the assessee on amalgamation, could be assessed as unexplained cash credits under section 68 in the hands of the assessee.
1.2 Whether the amalgamating companies could be treated as paper/shell entities so as to disregard their recorded investments and sale transactions, despite earlier scrutiny assessments accepting such investments.
1.3 Whether, after holding that section 68 was not attracted on the sale of investments, an ad hoc estimation of profit at 5% of the sale consideration could be sustained in the absence of any specific basis or material.
1.4 Whether the above findings and relief for one assessment year should be applied mutatis mutandis to the remaining assessment years covered in the batch of appeals.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Section 68 addition on sale of investments; characterisation of amalgamating companies as shell entities
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal examined the applicability of section 68 to amounts received as sale proceeds of investments and considered the precedents cited in the assessment and appellate orders, including the decision of the Supreme Court in relation to unexplained share capital and the jurisdictional High Court and Tribunal decisions on prior acceptance of investments/share capital and subsequent sale thereof.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Tribunal recorded that the unlisted equity investments in question were held by the amalgamating companies and were reflected in their balance sheets for earlier years. These investments, and the related share capital/funding, had been specifically examined and accepted in scrutiny assessments under section 143(3) in the cases of both amalgamating companies for earlier years, where notices under sections 143(2) and 142(1) had raised queries on investments in private equity shares and such queries were duly replied to and accepted.
2.3 The Tribunal observed that no revisional proceedings had been initiated against those earlier scrutiny assessments, which had attained finality. In those circumstances, the Assessing Officer could not subsequently treat the very same investments, earlier accepted as genuine, as unexplained merely because the shares were later sold and the amalgamating companies were subsequently amalgamated with the assessee.
2.4 It was further noted that the amalgamating companies had themselves sold the investments and realised the sale consideration prior to amalgamation. The buyers of the unlisted shares were issued summons under section 131 and they duly responded, filed confirmations and supporting evidences, thereby establishing the existence of the purchasers and the flow of consideration.
2.5 The Tribunal held that the Assessing Officer's allegation that the amalgamating companies were shell/paper entities was based on suspicion and was not supported by any new or substantive material, especially in the face of earlier scrutiny assessments where the same investments and capital had been accepted. The mere reference to entry operators and earlier investigations, already in the department's knowledge at the time of past assessments, could not, without more, justify treating the companies as shell entities in the year of sale.
2.6 The decision of the Supreme Court in the cited case on unexplained share capital was distinguished on facts. In that case, the investors were not traceable and the assessee failed to discharge the burden under section 68. In the present case, purchasers of the shares had responded to summons, filed confirmations and supporting documents, and there was no failure on the part of the assessee (or the amalgamating companies) to establish identity, creditworthiness and genuineness.
2.7 The Tribunal relied on the coordinate Bench decision in the case concerning sale of long-held unlisted investments where earlier acceptance of share capital and investments under scrutiny assessments barred their later treatment as unexplained under section 68 merely on sale, and on the jurisdictional High Court's affirmation of that view in a case where the remand report itself accepted that the amount in dispute represented sale proceeds of investments and not unexplained credits.
Conclusions
2.8 Once investments in unlisted equity shares and related share capital/ funding have been specifically examined and accepted in earlier scrutiny assessments of the amalgamating companies, and those assessments have attained finality, the same investments cannot be re-characterised as unexplained when sold in a later year and the proceeds received.
2.9 In the absence of fresh tangible material, the amalgamating companies cannot be treated as shell/paper companies merely on suspicion; their recorded investments and sale transactions must be regarded as genuine.
2.10 The conditions for invoking section 68 on the sale proceeds of such investments were not satisfied; the addition of the entire sale consideration as unexplained cash credits in the hands of the assessee was unsustainable and was rightly deleted by the first appellate authority.
Issue 3: Sustainability of ad hoc estimation of 5% profit on sale of investments
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The first appellate authority, while deleting the section 68 addition, had directed that 5% of the total sale consideration be brought to tax as "estimated business profit" embedded in the sales, relying on certain Tribunal decisions where similar percentages had been applied.
2.12 The Tribunal noted that, in the present case, the first appellate authority had not recorded any independent factual basis, comparative data, or material to support a 5% profit estimation. The direction was founded solely on presumption that some profit "might" have been earned from the sale of investments and on reliance on other decisions without demonstrating factual parity or applying any discernible method.
2.13 The Tribunal emphasised that, once the investments and their sale were accepted as genuine and no defect was found in the recorded sale consideration, and where there was no specific finding or material indicating under-statement of sale price or suppression of profit, an ad hoc addition based on pure surmise could not be sustained.
2.14 The Tribunal applied and followed the earlier coordinate Bench decision, affirmed by the jurisdictional High Court, where similar ad hoc profit estimation on sale of accepted investments had been set aside as being without substantive basis.
Conclusions
2.15 The direction to estimate and add 5% of the total sale consideration as profit was arbitrary, unsupported by any specific material or reasoning, and based only on presumptions.
2.16 The partial sustenance of addition at 5% by the first appellate authority was set aside in toto; no separate profit element was directed to be taxed on the impugned sale of investments.
Issue 4: Application of findings to multiple assessment years
Interpretation and reasoning
2.17 The Tribunal recorded that the facts and issues in all the assessment years from 2016-17 to 2021-22 were identical, involving the same assessee, the same amalgamating companies, and the same pattern of investments and sale of unlisted shares, with similar additions made and partially sustained.
2.18 Having decided in detail, for the principal assessment year, that section 68 additions were not sustainable and that no ad hoc profit addition at 5% could be made, the Tribunal held that the same reasoning applied mutatis mutandis to all the remaining years in the batch.
Conclusions
2.19 For all assessment years under appeal, additions made under section 68 on account of sale of investments were deleted, and the direction to estimate 5% profit on sale consideration was also deleted.
2.20 Consequently, the assessee's appeals for all years were allowed in full, and the revenue's appeals for all years were dismissed.
Issues: (i) Whether the statements retracted by the appellant and co-noticee could be relied upon for sustaining the findings of contravention when supported by independent corroborative material. (ii) Whether the penalty imposed on the appellant required reduction on the facts and circumstances of the case.
Issue (i): Whether the statements retracted by the appellant and co-noticee could be relied upon for sustaining the findings of contravention when supported by independent corroborative material.
Analysis: A retracted statement is not automatically excluded from consideration. It may be acted upon if the authority applies its mind to the retraction and if the statement is shown to be voluntary and is corroborated by independent and cogent evidence. The Tribunal found that the adjudicating authority had considered the retractions with reasons, and that the record contained corroborating material, including seized documents, cash recovery, evidence of travel expenses being funded, interception of foreign currency, and other connected statements pointing to the appellant's involvement.
Conclusion: The retracted statements were not rendered inadmissible merely by retraction, and the findings of contravention were sustained against the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the penalty imposed on the appellant required reduction on the facts and circumstances of the case.
Analysis: While upholding the substance of the adjudication, the Tribunal took note of the appellant's age, the amount already seized and adjusted, and the sum earlier deposited pursuant to the prior proceedings. In these circumstances, the Tribunal held that the ends of justice would be met by reducing the monetary penalty to a lower figure and directing adjustment of the amounts already available with the department.
Conclusion: The penalty was reduced to Rs. 9,00,000/- with adjustment of the amounts already deposited and seized.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the extent of reduction of penalty, while the finding of liability under the foreign exchange law was maintained.
Ratio Decidendi: A retracted statement may be relied upon when it is found to be voluntary and is materially corroborated by independent evidence; however, the quantum of penalty may still be moderated on equitable considerations without disturbing the substantive finding of contravention.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether a demand of central excise duty alleging clandestine manufacture and clearance can be sustained solely on the basis of electricity consumption without corroborative evidence.
1.2 Whether, in the absence of statutory norms and unit-specific investigation for electricity consumption, theoretical/arithmetic calculations of production based on power usage can validly form the basis of excise demand.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Sustainability of excise demand based solely on electricity consumption
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Tribunal noted that the show cause notice and the impugned demand were founded exclusively on the alleged excess consumption of electricity in the induction furnace, applying assumed units of power per metric tonne of ingots and inferring suppressed production on that sole basis.
2.2 The Tribunal held that, for alleging clandestine manufacture and clearance, the burden lies on the Department to adduce corroborative evidence covering, inter alia, purchase of additional raw materials, actual manufacture of finished goods, dispatch and movement of finished goods, details of alleged buyers and vendors, and financial flow (including cash transactions) connected with such alleged clearances.
2.3 It was observed that while the Department is not required to establish every single detail with mathematical precision, it must at least produce "proper corroborative evidence" to support the allegation of clandestine production; mere reliance on electricity consumption, in isolation, is insufficient.
2.4 The Tribunal emphasized that in the present case no corroborative evidence of excess procurement of inputs, conversion into finished products, or clearance of such goods was produced; the demand rested entirely on electricity consumption and a theoretical production formula.
2.5 The Tribunal referred to and relied upon judicial precedents where it has been held that electricity consumption alone cannot be treated as substantive evidence of clandestine production, including decisions holding that excess or abnormal power consumption is, at best, a corroborative factor and not an independent foundation for duty demand.
2.6 The Tribunal noted that High Court decisions, as discussed in the order, have consistently affirmed that mere excess electricity consumption, without supporting evidence regarding raw materials, manufacture, and clearances, does not raise a presumption of duty evasion, and that such view has been left undisturbed by the Supreme Court.
Conclusions
2.7 The Tribunal concluded that a central excise demand cannot be sustained solely on the basis of electricity consumption data, in the absence of corroborative evidence of clandestine manufacture and removal.
2.8 As the Department had relied only on electricity consumption, with no independent or supporting material, the demand was held to be unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside.
Issue 2: Validity of theoretical production calculations and absence of statutory norms/unit-specific investigation
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.9 The Tribunal took note of the legal position, as discussed in earlier judicial pronouncements, that norms of electricity consumption for determining production under central excise cannot be arbitrarily assumed and that, where specific rules contemplate fixation of norms, the competent authority is required to prescribe and notify such norms and investigate deviations taking into account factors such as type and quality of inputs, labour, material, power conditions, and plant-specific variables.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 The Tribunal observed that production capacity in induction furnaces depends on several variables, including product mix, quality of scrap, quality and efficiency of power, and other operational conditions; hence, a universal or uniformly applicable standard of electricity consumption per metric tonne cannot be mechanically adopted.
2.11 It was noted that there was no experiment or study conducted in the appellants' own factory to devise unit-specific norms of electricity consumption for producing one metric tonne of steel ingots, and no statutory norm was shown to have been fixed or notified for the appellants' unit.
2.12 The Tribunal referred to judicial findings that electricity consumption varies from heat to heat, day to day, and even within the same day, and therefore an "imaginary" or theoretical production figure based solely on a standard unit-consumption ratio, without factory-specific investigation, cannot validly determine excise liability.
2.13 The Tribunal also noted that reliance on general or theoretical reports on electricity consumption (such as the report commonly attributed to a technical expert) has been judicially criticized, and that such material, without corroboration and unit-specific verification, does not constitute substantive evidence of suppressed production.
Conclusions
2.14 The Tribunal held that, in the absence of prescribed statutory norms and without any experiment or unit-specific investigation in the appellants' factory, the theoretical/arithmetic calculation of production based on assumed electricity consumption per metric tonne could not form a valid legal basis for raising duty demand.
2.15 It was concluded that the methodology adopted by the Department-deriving alleged excess production solely from power consumption figures and presumed norms-was contrary to the settled legal position and unsustainable.
Overall Disposition
2.16 Applying the above reasoning, and following the ratio of the cited High Court decisions, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order and allowed the appeals with consequential relief in accordance with law.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the conditions for valid assumption of jurisdiction under sections 147 and 148 were satisfied where the reassessment was initiated on the basis of alleged unexplained investment in immovable property.
1.2 Whether the reasons recorded for reopening, containing incorrect and incomplete factual assumptions regarding purchasers, consideration and assessment year, vitiated the "reason to believe" that income had escaped assessment.
1.3 Whether the approval/sanction for issuance of notice under section 148, granted without proper verification of the sale deed and relevant facts, rendered the reassessment proceedings invalid.
1.4 Consequentially, whether the addition made under section 69 on account of alleged unexplained investment in purchase of property could survive once the reassessment proceedings were held invalid.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of reassessment under sections 147/148 - correctness and sufficiency of "reasons to believe" based on facts concerning purchase of immovable property
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal proceeded on the settled principle, as emerging from authorities cited and followed in the order, that: (i) reopening of a completed assessment must be founded on correct and existing facts; (ii) the reasons recorded must be read as they are; (iii) if reasons are based on wrong, non-existent or incomplete facts, the "reason to believe" is vitiated and reassessment is void ab initio; and (iv) where reopening is premised on such incorrect assumptions, the defect is not curable by later explanations that the errors were inadvertent.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Assessing Officer recorded reasons alleging that the assessee had purchased an immovable property for Rs. 78,00,000/- from a single seller, that the sale deed was executed for Rs. 15,00,000/- only, and that the assessee neither disclosed this investment in the return nor during earlier assessments under sections 143(3) and 263. On this basis, the Assessing Officer claimed failure to disclose material facts and escapement of income within section 147.
2.3 The Tribunal found, on examination of the record, that:
(a) The sale deed and the agreement to sell reflected that the property was purchased by three buyers, not by the assessee alone.
(b) The Assessing Officer treated the assessee as sole purchaser in the recorded reasons, ignoring that the property and its possession were in favour of three purchasers.
(c) The very basis of the assumption that the assessee alone had made the entire investment of Rs. 78,00,000/- was, therefore, factually incorrect.
2.4 Further, the Tribunal noted that although the transaction pertained to the year relevant to assessment year 2011-12, the notice under section 148 was in fact issued for assessment year 2012-13, and the reasons specifically mentioned issuance of notice for that wrong assessment year. The Tribunal treated this mis-recording of the assessment year in the reasons as a material factual error going to the root of jurisdiction.
2.5 The Tribunal also recorded that the Assessing Officer had reopened the assessment despite earlier scrutiny assessment under section 143(3) and a subsequent assessment under section 143(3) read with section 263, and that the alleged transaction was not correctly noted or appreciated in the reasons. The premise that the assessee had failed to disclose the true facts was founded on the erroneous assumption that he alone purchased the property and that the notice pertained to the correct assessment year.
2.6 Relying on and reproducing the reasoning of a Coordinate Bench decision (involving similar reopening on incorrect facts), the Tribunal reiterated that:
(a) Reopening on the basis of factually wrong reasons cannot lead to a valid "reason to believe".
(b) The reasons must be tested as recorded; subsequent explanations or pleas that factual mistakes were inadvertent are of no avail.
(c) Where reasons are based on suspicion, borrowed or incomplete information, or non-existent/incorrect facts, the reassessment is invalid.
2.7 Applying those principles, the Tribunal held that in the present case:
(a) The assumption that the assessee was the sole purchaser of the property for Rs. 78,00,000/- was contrary to the sale deed and agreement to sell, which named three purchasers and handed over possession to all three.
(b) The notice was issued for an incorrect assessment year as per the reasons themselves.
(c) These factual errors were not minor or clerical; they were central to the formation of belief about escapement of income and failure to disclose material facts.
2.8 On the objection of the Departmental Representative that the sale deed showed only one buyer (the assessee) with signatures, thumb impressions and photograph, the Tribunal rejected this contention, holding that "as per sale deed three persons purchased the property and the possession was handed over to the buyers," and that the arguments treating the assessee as sole buyer had no force in light of the document as read by the Tribunal.
Conclusions
2.9 The Tribunal concluded that:
(a) The Assessing Officer had reopened the assessment on incorrect and incomplete facts regarding the identity and number of purchasers, the quantum attributable to the assessee, and the relevant assessment year.
(b) Such incorrect factual premises vitiated the "reason to believe" under section 147.
(c) The reassessment proceedings initiated under section 148 were not valid in law and were liable to be quashed as void ab initio.
Issue 3: Validity of approval/sanction for issue of notice under section 148
Interpretation and reasoning
3.1 The Tribunal examined the manner in which approval was granted for issuance of notice under section 148. It found that the approval was accorded mechanically and without proper application of mind to the core documents, namely the sale deed and the fact that three persons had purchased the property and taken possession jointly.
3.2 The Tribunal observed that the approving authority did not consider that the sale deed itself recorded purchase by three purchasers and not exclusively by the assessee, and that this crucial fact was omitted from the recorded reasons. The approval thus proceeded on the same incorrect and incomplete facts as those underlying the reasons.
Conclusions
3.3 The Tribunal held that the approval/sanction for reopening, having been granted mechanically and without considering the correct factual matrix emerging from the sale deed, could not cure the fundamental defect in the reasons recorded and further reinforced the invalidity of the reassessment proceedings.
Issue 4: Sustainability of the addition under section 69 for alleged unexplained investment once reassessment is held invalid
Interpretation and reasoning
4.1 The addition of Rs. 78,00,000/- under section 69, made by treating the full claimed investment in the property as unexplained in the hands of the assessee, was challenged before the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner (Appeals) had sustained the addition, inter alia, by treating the registered deed as showing only one buyer and by rejecting additional evidence, while the assessee had produced affidavits of co-purchasers and other materials.
4.2 However, having already held that the reassessment proceedings themselves were invalid and quashed the notice and consequential assessment, the Tribunal held that no further adjudication on merits of the quantum addition or on the question of admission/rejection of additional evidence was necessary or possible.
Conclusions
4.3 The Tribunal concluded that:
(a) Once the reassessment proceedings were quashed as void ab initio, the assessment order passed under section 143(3) read with section 147 stood annulled.
(b) Consequently, the addition of Rs. 78,00,000/- under section 69 did not survive for consideration and was effectively set aside along with the reassessment.
(c) In view of the quashing of reassessment, all other grounds, including those on merits of the addition and on rejection of additional evidence, became academic and required no separate decision.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Reassessment validity where no addition is made on the very issue forming the recorded reasons for reopening under sections 147/148.
1.2 Legality of making additions on issues different from those forming the basis of "reasons to believe" in reassessment proceedings.
1.3 Reasonableness of estimation of commission income for accommodation entries in sales, purchases, and loans, including applicable commission rates.
1.4 Whether intra-group transactions are to be excluded while computing commission income of an accommodation entry provider.
1.5 Status of remaining grounds not argued at the hearing.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Reassessment validity where no addition is made on the issue forming the recorded reasons; legality of additions on different issues in reassessment
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.1 The Court examined the scope of section 147 read with section 148, with reference to the ratio of the jurisdictional High Court in "CIT v. Jet Airways (I) Ltd." and "PCIT v. Lark Chemicals (P) Ltd." (SLP dismissed by Supreme Court), and the decision of the Gujarat High Court in "CIT v. Mohmed Juned Dadani".
2.2 As per these decisions, the Assessing Officer must first assess or reassess "such income" which formed the basis of the belief of escapement of income. Only upon doing so can any other income which comes to notice during the proceedings be assessed. If the original issue is ultimately not added, the Assessing Officer cannot independently tax other income under the same reassessment; a fresh notice under section 148 would be necessary.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.3 In the identified six appeals, the recorded reasons uniformly asserted that the assessees were beneficiaries of bogus accommodation entries in the form of loans, advances, sales or purchases, based on search information and Insight portal data.
2.4 On perusal of the reasons and assessment orders, the Court found that:
* In the lead case, reassessment was initiated on information that the assessee was a beneficiary of accommodation entries aggregating to specified amounts. However, no addition was made in the hands of the assessee as beneficiary. Instead, the assessee was treated as an accommodation entry provider, books were rejected, and commission income was estimated on sales, purchases and loans.
* Similar divergence between recorded reasons and actual additions was found in the remaining five appeals: reasons alleged beneficiary status or certain specific escapement; final assessments treated the assessees as entry providers and only estimated commission income.
2.5 The Court held that the additions made were on issues distinct from, and not traceable to, the precise escapement alleged in the recorded reasons. The income for which "reason to believe" was formed (beneficiary accommodation entries or specified suspicious transactions) was not brought to tax at all.
2.6 Applying the principle laid down in "Jet Airways (I) Ltd." and "Lark Chemicals (P) Ltd.", the Court noted that where the income which formed the sole basis of reopening is ultimately not assessed, the Assessing Officer is not empowered under the same reassessment to tax other income discovered later. Such action renders the reassessment invalid.
Conclusions:
2.7 Since no addition was made on the very issues forming the basis of the recorded reasons, and the additions were confined to a different head (commission as entry provider), the reassessments in the six identified appeals were held to be bad in law.
2.8 All six such appeals were allowed by annulling the reassessment orders.
Issue 3: Reasonableness of estimation of commission income for accommodation entries in sales, purchases, and loans
Legal framework (as discussed):
3.1 The Court proceeded on the basis that the assessees were accommodation entry providers and that estimation of commission income was permissible, but subject to judicially accepted norms on reasonableness.
3.2 The Court considered:
* "PCIT v. Alag Securities (P) Ltd." (Bombay High Court), upholding commission income estimation in similar accommodation entry cases at around 0.1% to 0.15%.
* Decision of the Surat Bench in "Sanjay Kumar Choudhary (HUF) v. ACIT" concerning commission rates and treatment of intra-group transactions.
* Recent Mumbai Tribunal decision in "Buniyad Chemicals Ltd. v. ACIT", which, following earlier Tribunal and Bombay High Court views (including in "Goldstar Finvest Pvt. Ltd."), restricted commission to 0.15% of deposits in accommodation entry cases and accepted that estimation necessarily involves approximation guided by precedent.
Interpretation and reasoning:
3.3 In the remaining appeals (other than the six allowed in full), the assessments arose from search and investigation findings on a group alleged to be providing accommodation entries in diamonds and loans. The Assessing Officer:
* Rejected the books of account.
* Estimated commission at 0.5% of total sales and purchases.
* Estimated commission at 3% of total loans and advances.
3.4 The Court noted that the Assessing Officer claimed to rely on statements of key persons (including statement answers indicating commission/premium of 10 to 14 paisa per hundred rupees on daily outstanding), but his working in the order extrapolated this to 2%-3% on loans and 0.5% on sales/purchases, without cogent supporting material.
3.5 On scrutiny of the relevant statement (particularly answer to question referring to 12 paisa per Rs.100 on daily outstanding), the Court held that the Assessing Officer's conclusion that commission ranged from 10 to 50 paisa per hundred, representing 10% to 50% of interest charged, and justifying 2%-3% on loans and 0.5% on sales/purchases, was contrary to the statement itself and unsupported by independent evidence.
3.6 The Court took note that in comparable accommodation entry cases, including those referred to in "Alag Securities (P) Ltd." and "Buniyad Chemicals Ltd.", commission rates judicially upheld were in the narrower band of about 0.1%-0.15%, and that the tax department itself had in other entry-provider cases generally accepted substantially lower rates than 3% on loans and 0.5% on sales/purchases.
3.7 Recognising that estimation of commission is necessarily approximate but must be based on evidence and consistent with prevailing judicial norms, the Court found the Assessing Officer's estimates of 3% on loans and 0.5% on sales/purchases to be excessive and not justifiable on the record.
Conclusions:
3.8 Following the ratio of the jurisdictional High Court in "Alag Securities (P) Ltd." and consonant Tribunal decisions, the Court directed that:
* Commission on loan transactions be restricted to 0.50% of the outstanding loan liability at the end of the financial year.
* Commission on sales and purchase transactions be restricted to 0.40% of such transactions.
3.9 All assessees in the second group of appeals were granted partial relief by reducing the commission additions to the above rates.
Issue 4: Exclusion of intra-group transactions from computation of commission income
Interpretation and reasoning:
4.1 The Court observed that, while estimating commission income, the Assessing Officer had included transactions between group concerns (intra-group or within the same controlled entities) in the base figures for sales, purchases, and loans.
4.2 Referring to the principle recognised in the Surat Bench decision in "Sanjay Kumar Choudhary (HUF) v. ACIT" and the general commercial logic, the Court held that an entity cannot be said to earn commission income from its own group concerns for mere routing of internal funds.
4.3 Therefore, including intra-group transactions in the turnover base would artificially inflate the commission income, contrary to the real nature of the activity.
Conclusions:
4.4 The Court directed the Assessing Officer, in all appeals where commission estimation survives, to exclude intra-group transactions (transactions within the assessee's own group concerns) while computing commission income.
Issue 5: Status of other grounds not argued
Interpretation and reasoning:
5.1 The assessees had raised multiple additional grounds (including challenges to rejection of books under section 145(3), levy of interest and initiation of penalty, and other legal/contentious issues).
5.2 At the time of hearing, the authorised representative confined submissions to the two principal sets of issues: (i) validity of reassessment where no addition was made on the recorded reasons, and (ii) reasonableness and scope of commission estimation (including intra-group exclusion). No arguments were advanced on the remaining grounds.
Conclusions:
5.3 The Court treated all other grounds, on which no submissions were made, as not pressed and dismissed them accordingly.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether assessments framed under section 153A read with section 143(3) could validly sustain additions in the absence of incriminating material found and seized during the search in the case of the assessee, where the additions were based essentially on the statement of a third party.
1.2 Whether, on the facts, any additions based solely on material or statements pertaining to a third person could be brought to tax under section 153A, instead of by following the procedure prescribed under section 153C.
1.3 Whether the approval granted under section 153D, by issuing a single, same-day and consolidated approval for multiple assessment years and two different assessees without recording application of mind, was valid and legally sustainable.
1.4 Consequentially, whether the assessment orders for the relevant assessment years stood vitiated, and whether the Revenue's appeal for the corresponding year became infructuous.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Validity of additions under section 153A without incriminating material and based on third-party material, and necessity of section 153C
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Tribunal referred to section 153A governing assessments pursuant to search under section 132, and to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Abhisar Buildwell (P) Ltd., holding that in respect of completed/unabated assessment years, additions under section 153A must be based on incriminating material unearthed during search in the case of the person searched; in the absence of such incriminating material, no addition can be made under section 153A.
2.2 The Tribunal also discussed section 153C, as interpreted by various High Courts and coordinate benches, holding that where incriminating material or information pertains to a person other than the person searched, the proper course is to follow section 153C, after recording satisfaction and transferring such material, and then to frame assessments under section 153A read with section 153C in the case of such "other person."
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tribunal found, on perusal of the assessment orders and the record, that the additions in the assessee's case were made de hors incriminating material seized from the assessee during the search. The Revenue failed to point out any specific seized document or material from the assessee that formed the basis of the additions.
2.4 The Tribunal recorded that the only substantive basis for the additions was the statement on oath of one third party, namely, Mr. Raj Kumar Modi. No supporting incriminating document found from the assessee's premises in the search was cited by the Revenue.
2.5 Applying the ratio of Abhisar Buildwell, the Tribunal held that assessments under section 153A for completed/unabated years cannot sustain additions when no incriminating material pertaining to the assessee is found during search. Therefore, additions solely on the basis of such third-party statement, without seized incriminating material from the assessee, were contrary to the settled law.
2.6 The Tribunal further accepted the assessee's contention, fortified by the coordinate bench decision in Gulshan Investment Pvt. Ltd. (arising from the same search on PMC group and based on the same statement of Mr. Raj Kumar Modi), that even assuming such statement could be relied upon, any assessment based on material or statements pertaining to a third party should have been routed through the mechanism of section 153C and not under section 153A simpliciter.
2.7 The Tribunal noted the reasoning in Gulshan Investment Pvt. Ltd. and other decisions (including those in Trilok Chand Chaudhary and Om Prakash Tantia) that incriminating material or statements found in the case of another person cannot be used to make additions under section 153A in the hands of the assessee searched; the proper recourse is to section 153C, after compliance with the conditions prescribed therein, including recording of satisfaction and handing over of material.
2.8 In the present case, the Tribunal observed that no proceedings under section 153C were initiated in the assessee's case, and yet the entire foundation of the additions was a third-party statement, not incriminating material seized from the assessee.
Conclusions
2.9 The Tribunal held that the assessments were framed under section 153A de hors any incriminating material seized from the assessee during the search. Hence, in view of Abhisar Buildwell, the additions so made could not be sustained.
2.10 The Tribunal further held that, to the extent the Revenue sought to rely on the statement of a third party and material pertaining to such third party, the proper statutory route was section 153C, which was not followed. Consequently, framing assessments under section 153A on that basis was legally impermissible.
2.11 On this combined reasoning, the Tribunal allowed Ground No. 3 of the assessee's appeals and held that the assessment orders, as sustained by the first appellate authority, were liable to be set aside on this ground.
Issue 3: Validity of approval under section 153D - mechanical, consolidated, and same-day approval
Legal framework (as discussed)
3.1 The Tribunal examined section 153D, which mandates that no order of assessment or reassessment shall be passed by an Assessing Officer below the rank of Joint Commissioner in respect of each assessment year referred to in section 153A(1)(b) except with the prior approval of the Joint Commissioner.
3.2 The Tribunal relied extensively on the judgments of the jurisdictional High Court and other High Courts, particularly:
- Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shiv Kumar Nayyar;
- Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sapna Gupta;
- Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Serajuddin & Co.;
- Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Anuj Bansal;
- Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Subhash Dabas;
wherein it was held in substance that:
(a) approval under section 153D must be granted for "each assessment year" and "each assessee" separately;
(b) such approval cannot be mechanical or a mere formality/rubber stamping; it must reflect at least a minimal indication of application of mind to the draft assessment order and material on record;
(c) the approving authority is required to verify whether the Assessing Officer has followed the required procedure and whether the draft assessment order meets the requirement of law;
(d) mechanical or perfunctory approval vitiates the assessment itself and is not a mere procedural irregularity; and
(e) in Serajuddin & Co., the High Court explicitly held that the absence of any indication of application of mind by the approving authority and mere formal approval does not satisfy the statutory mandate under section 153D; the SLP against that judgment was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
Interpretation and reasoning
3.3 The Tribunal perused the approval letter dated 30/09/2021 issued by the Additional Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Range, Meerut to the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (OSD), Central Circle-1, Noida. On its face, the approval was granted on the same day on which it was sought, and the assessments were also passed on the same day.
3.4 The Tribunal noted that the approval letter did not contain any discussion or even a brief reference to:
- the nature or quantum of proposed additions;
- the issues involved in the draft assessment orders;
- the material or seized documents relied upon; or
- any indication that the case records or draft orders had been perused.
3.5 The Tribunal found that a single consolidated approval had been accorded covering 14 assessment years and two different assessees, without separate and specific treatment for each assessment year and each assessee.
3.6 Having regard to the reasoning in Shiv Kumar Nayyar and Sapna Gupta, the Tribunal held that section 153D requires the approving authority to apply its mind for each assessment year in respect of each assessee separately, and that a blanket or consolidated approval without any indication of independent examination does not satisfy this statutory requirement.
3.7 The Tribunal rejected the Revenue's contention that section 153D only requires existence of an approval and not application of mind, observing that the consistent judicial interpretation of section 153D, including by the jurisdictional High Court, has read into the provision the requirement of meaningful and not mechanical approval, and such interpretation is binding.
3.8 The Tribunal also rejected the argument that the challenge to approval under section 153D was belated or merely technical, in view of the judicial pronouncements treating non-compliance with section 153D as a defect going to the root of the assessment and vitiating it.
3.9 It further observed that there was no material on record indicating any prior or contemporaneous communication detailing the involvement of the approving authority in examining the seized material, draft assessments or issues in each year. In the absence of any such evidence, and in light of the same-day and consolidated nature of the approval, the Tribunal inferred that the approval bore the hallmark of "performa" approval and was mechanical and ritualistic.
Conclusions
3.10 The Tribunal concluded that:
- the approval granted under section 153D was a single, consolidated approval for multiple assessment years and two assessees;
- it was accorded on the very same day on which it was sought and on which assessments were passed; and
- it contained no indication of application of mind or perusal of draft assessment orders and records.
3.11 Applying the binding precedents of the jurisdictional High Court and other High Courts, the Tribunal held that such mechanical and perfunctory approval does not meet the statutory requirement of section 153D, and consequently, the assessments based on such approval are vitiated in law.
3.12 On this ground, the Tribunal allowed Ground No. 5 of the assessee's appeals and held that the impugned assessment orders were liable to be quashed.
Issue 4: Consequences for the assessments and the Revenue's appeal
Interpretation and reasoning
4.1 Having held that:
- the assessments under section 153A were invalidly framed de hors incriminating material and in disregard of the requirements of sections 153A and 153C; and
- the mandatory approval under section 153D was invalid as being mechanical and consolidated, thereby vitiating the assessments,
the Tribunal considered the effect of these findings on all years under appeal.
4.2 The Tribunal observed that once the assessment orders themselves are quashed on foundational legal grounds, it is unnecessary to adjudicate on the remaining grounds (including those relating to limitation, jurisdiction, merits of additions under sections 69A, 69C, treatment of share purchase consideration, etc.), as such adjudication would be purely academic.
Conclusions
4.3 The Tribunal quashed the assessment orders for Assessment Years 2013-14, 2015-16 and 2016-17. Consequently, the assessee's appeals for these years were allowed.
4.4 As the assessment order for Assessment Year 2015-16 stood quashed, the Tribunal held that the Revenue's appeal for that year, challenging relief granted by the first appellate authority, had become infructuous and accordingly dismissed the Revenue's appeal.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the addition made under section 68 of the Act in respect of share capital and share premium received by the assessee was justified when the assessee had furnished documentary evidence to establish the identity, genuineness and creditworthiness of the share subscribers.
1.2 Whether mere low income, meagre revenue from operations, low fixed assets and large reserves and surplus of the subscriber companies, coupled with non-appearance in response to summons, is sufficient to treat share capital and share premium as unexplained cash credits under section 68 of the Act.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Justification of addition under section 68 in respect of share capital/share premium and evidentiary burden regarding identity, genuineness and creditworthiness
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The assessment was framed treating the share capital and share premium received by the assessee as unexplained cash credits under section 68 of the Act. The appellate authority examined whether the assessee had discharged the onus cast under section 68 by producing evidence of identity, genuineness and creditworthiness of the share subscribers, and whether the Assessing Officer could sustain the addition based on perceived weaknesses in the financials of the subscribers and their non-appearance.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Tribunal recorded that during the relevant year the assessee raised share capital and share premium aggregating to Rs. 3,32,00,000/- from 12 subscribers, and that the assessee had filed before the Assessing Officer as well as before the appellate authority confirmations of the subscribers, copies of bank accounts, income-tax return acknowledgements, allotment letters and replies to summons issued under section 131 of the Act.
2.3 It was noted that the Assessing Officer, despite having these documents and replies on record, made the addition mainly on the grounds that (i) the subscribers had low income, meagre revenue from operations, almost no fixed assets, and large reserves and surplus and investments; (ii) there was no personal appearance by directors/shareholders in response to summons; and (iii) the transactions were viewed as circulation of funds, leading to an inference that the assessee was a dummy company for building share capital.
2.4 The Tribunal observed that the first appellate authority had affirmed the addition by a "very cryptic order" without properly dealing with or rebutting the evidences furnished by the assessee and the replies to summons by the subscribers.
2.5 The Tribunal held that, in the facts of the case, the assessee had discharged its initial onus under section 68 by producing all relevant documentary evidences in respect of all the subscribers. Once such evidence was on record, the addition could not be sustained merely on the basis that the subscribers had low income, meagre revenue, low fixed assets or large reserves and surplus, or that they did not appear personally, in the absence of further adverse material.
2.6 Reliance was placed on the principles emerging from judicial precedents cited before the Tribunal, including that where confirmations, bank statements and tax records of creditors/investors are on file and there is no contrary finding on those materials, additions under section 68 cannot be made solely on conjectures regarding their financial profile or on mere suspicion.
Conclusions
2.7 The Tribunal concluded that the assessee had satisfactorily established the identity of the share subscribers, the genuineness of the share capital/share premium transactions and the creditworthiness of the parties through the documents filed.
2.8 The Tribunal further concluded that low income, meagre revenue, low fixed assets or large reserves and surplus of subscriber companies, and their non-appearance despite filing documentary responses, do not by themselves justify treating the share capital and share premium as unexplained cash credits under section 68, in the absence of specific adverse findings on the evidences produced.
2.9 The order of the first appellate authority upholding the addition was set aside, and the Assessing Officer was directed to delete the entire addition made under section 68 in respect of the share capital and share premium.
Issues: Whether interest on income-tax refund under Section 244A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 earned by a foreign company is chargeable to tax at the maximum marginal rate of 40%.
Analysis: The Tribunal followed its earlier coordinate bench decision, which had relied on the jurisdictional High Court's view that interest on refund under Section 244A arising to a foreign company is taxable at the maximum marginal rate. The issue was treated as already settled and no different view was taken.
Conclusion: The interest on income-tax refund under Section 244A arising to a foreign company is taxable at the maximum marginal rate of 40%.
Issues: (i) Whether the subsidized deduction made by the applicant from employees towards the canteen facility provided through a canteen service provider is a supply under section 7 of the GST law. (ii) Whether the subsidized deduction made by the applicant from contractual workers towards the canteen facility provided through a canteen service provider is a supply under section 7 of the GST law and, if so, the value on which GST is payable.
Issue (i): Whether the subsidized deduction made by the applicant from employees towards the canteen facility provided through a canteen service provider is a supply under section 7 of the GST law.
Analysis: The canteen facility for employees was treated as part of the employment arrangement and as a statutory welfare obligation connected with the factory operations. The reasoning proceeded on the basis that the amount recovered from employees represented a perquisite in the course of employment and did not constitute an independent supply by the applicant. The Authority relied upon the treatment of employee benefits under Schedule III and the clarification in Circular No. 172/04/2022-GST dated 06.07.2022.
Conclusion: The subsidized deduction made from employees towards canteen facility is not a supply by the applicant.
Issue (ii): Whether the subsidized deduction made by the applicant from contractual workers towards the canteen facility provided through a canteen service provider is a supply under section 7 of the GST law and, if so, the value on which GST is payable.
Analysis: The contractual workers were held not to be employees of the applicant because the agreement placed control, supervision, disciplinary responsibility, wages, statutory liabilities, and indemnity obligations on the contractor. On that footing, the canteen recovery from contractual workers was treated as a taxable outward supply made by the applicant in the course of business, with the amount recovered from the contractor constituting consideration. The Authority followed its earlier ruling in the Troikaa Pharmaceuticals matter and distinguished the relied-upon employee-canteen authorities on the absence of employer-employee relationship here.
Conclusion: The subsidized deduction made from contractual workers towards canteen facility is a supply by the applicant, and GST is payable on the amount recovered from the workers' contractor.
Final Conclusion: The ruling grants relief to the applicant only in relation to employee recoveries, but upholds taxability for recoveries attributable to contractual workers.
Ratio Decidendi: Recoveries for canteen facilities from employees are not taxable where they form part of the employment relationship, but recoveries from contractual workers are taxable when the workers remain under the contractor's control and the recovered amount constitutes consideration for a supply in the course of business.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether an advance ruling application is maintainable where the question relates to eligibility of GST registration for multiple unrelated businesses (clients) at the applicant's premises as "Principal Place of Business".
1.2 Whether the question raised falls within the permissible scope of matters on which advance ruling can be sought under Section 97(2) of the CGST Act, 2017.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Maintainability of application when the question pertains to clients' GST registration at applicant's premises
Legal framework
2.1 The Court considered Section 95(a) of the CGST Act, which defines "advance ruling" as a decision provided by the Authority to an applicant on matters or questions specified in Section 97(2) or Section 100(1), in relation to the supply of goods or services or both being undertaken or proposed to be undertaken by the applicant.
2.2 Section 103 of the CGST Act provides that an advance ruling is binding only on the applicant and the concerned officer/jurisdictional officer in respect of the applicant.
2.3 Section 98(2) empowers the Authority not to admit an application where the questions raised do not fall within the scope of Section 97(2).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Court found that the question posed was whether GST registration can be granted to multiple unrelated businesses (clients) using distinct, identifiable and demarcated seats/time slots at the applicant's address as their "Principal Place of Business".
2.5 The Court held that the question directly concerns the registration status and entitlement of the applicant's clients, and not the supply of goods or services being undertaken or proposed to be undertaken by the applicant within the meaning of Section 95(a).
2.6 Since an advance ruling is intended to operate only in relation to the applicant's own supplies, the query seeking determination of whether the clients can be granted registration falls outside the statutory definition of "advance ruling".
2.7 The Court also noted that, in terms of Section 103, any ruling would be binding only on the applicant and not on its clients; hence, the ruling sought would not practically or legally govern the clients' registration, underscoring the mismatch between the statutory scheme and the relief sought.
Conclusions
2.8 The application, to the extent it seeks a ruling on the eligibility of GST registration for the applicant's clients at the applicant's address, is not maintainable under Section 95(a) of the CGST Act.
Issue 2: Whether the question falls within any of the clauses of Section 97(2) of the CGST Act
Legal framework
2.9 The Court examined Section 97(2) of the CGST Act, which exhaustively lists the questions on which advance ruling can be sought, namely: (a) classification of goods or services; (b) applicability of notifications; (c) determination of time and value of supply; (d) admissibility of input tax credit; (e) determination of liability to pay tax; (f) whether the applicant is required to be registered; and (g) whether any particular act of the applicant amounts to a supply.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.10 The Court noted that in the application form, the applicant had marked clause (f) - "whether applicant is required to be registered" - as the relevant category.
2.11 The Court found this classification to be incorrect because the applicant was already registered under GST, and the substantive question raised did not concern whether the applicant is required to be registered, but whether multiple registrations can be granted to different clients at the same premises.
2.12 The Court held that the question does not fall under any of the categories specified in Section 97(2), as it neither pertains to classification, notification applicability, time and value of supply, input tax credit, tax liability, the applicant's own registration requirement, nor characterization of any particular act of the applicant as "supply".
Conclusions
2.13 The question raised does not fit within any of the heads enumerated in Section 97(2) of the CGST Act; therefore, the application is not admissible within the statutory scope of advance ruling.
Issue 3: Effect of prior advance rulings cited and decision on admission under Section 98(2)
Legal framework
2.14 The Court referred to Section 98(2) of the CGST Act, which authorises the Authority to reject (not admit) an application where the questions raised are not covered by Section 97(2).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.15 The applicant cited prior rulings of other State Advance Ruling Authorities which had addressed similar questions on shared/virtual office space registrations.
2.16 The Court observed that in those rulings, the Authorities had not examined the threshold questions of admissibility and scope under Sections 95 and 97(2) in the manner now undertaken.
2.17 The Court noted that in another proceeding involving a similar fact situation, the Tamil Nadu Authority for Advance Ruling had refused to admit the application under Section 98(2) on similar grounds of non-coverage under Section 97(2), aligning with the approach now adopted.
Conclusions
2.18 The cited rulings of other Authorities were not treated as binding, and in view of Sections 95, 97(2) and 98(2), the application was rejected at the admission stage.
2.19 The application was held to be "not admitted" under Section 98(2) of the CGST Act, 2017, and was rejected on the ground that the questions asked do not fall within the matters specified in Section 97(2) and are not in relation to supplies undertaken or proposed to be undertaken by the applicant.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether leasing of a building, classified and described in the lease deed as a "commercial building", by the applicant to an unregistered company for running long-term residential accommodation for students and working professionals, qualifies as exempt "services by way of renting of residential dwelling for use as residence" under Entry 12 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) and the corresponding State notification.
1.2 If the above exemption is inapplicable, how the service supplied by the applicant is to be classified for GST purposes, what rate of tax applies, and on whom the liability to pay GST falls.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Applicability of exemption under Entry 12 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT(R)
Legal framework discussed
2.1 The Court examined Entry 12 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate), as amended from time to time, particularly:
(a) Pre-18.07.2022: "Services by way of renting of residential dwelling for use as residence".
(b) From 18.07.2022: "Services by way of renting of residential dwelling for use as residence except where the residential dwelling is rented to a registered person".
(c) From 01.01.2023: same entry with Explanation 1 regarding renting by a proprietor in personal capacity.
(d) From 15.07.2024: Entry 12 confined to Heading 9972 (renting of immovable property), with Explanation 1 (proprietor using for own residence) and Explanation 2 excluding "accommodation services for students in student residences" and "accommodation services provided by Hostels, Camps, Paying Guest accommodations and the like"; new Entry 12A for "accommodation services" under Heading 9963.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court accepted that there are two distinct supplies:
(i) Renting of immovable property by the applicant to the lessee, classifiable under Heading 9972;
(ii) Accommodation services by the lessee to students/working professionals, classifiable under Heading 9963.
2.3 The Court agreed with the applicant on four of the conditions enumerated by the applicant but disagreed on the second and third conditions, namely:
(a) Whether the property rented is a "residential dwelling"; and
(b) Whether such dwelling is rented "for use as residence".
2.4 On the nature of the property, the Court relied on the language of the draft lease agreement, which describes the subject premises as a "Commercial Building" and proceeds on the footing that it is a commercial property, registered and held as such. On this basis, the Court held that the premises is commercial, not residential, and therefore the ratio of authorities dealing with residential premises is not directly applicable.
2.5 The Court distinguished the Delhi High Court decision interpreting "residential accommodation" under the Delhi Rent Control law, noting that in that case the premises were residential and being partly used as office; whereas in the present case the premises are a "commercial building" ab initio, so the reasoning in that judgment does not assist the applicant.
2.6 The Court further examined the Karnataka High Court decision in Taghar Vasudeva Ambrish, noting two aspects:
(a) The accommodation used there as hostel for students/working women was classified as "residential" in the relevant Master Plan, unlike the present case where the premises are classified and described as commercial; and
(b) A Special Leave Petition has been filed against that judgment and leave has been granted by the Supreme Court, placing the High Court judgment "in jeopardy" and preventing it from attaining finality as a binding precedent, in line with the principles laid down in Kunhayammed and West Coast Paper Mills.
2.7 The Madras High Court decision in Thai Mookambikaa Ladies Hostel was also held distinguishable, as in that case the petitioners themselves were directly providing residential hostel accommodation and claiming exemption, whereas here the applicant is only leasing a commercial building to another entity that provides accommodation. Additionally, that judgment relied on Taghar Vasudeva Ambrish, whose precedential value is already uncertain due to the pending appeal, and a writ appeal has also been filed against the Madras High Court judgment.
2.8 The Court considered the evolution of Entry 12 and held that the subsequent amendments are indicative of legislative intent. By inserting the phrase "except where the residential dwelling is rented to a registered person" and later the explanations limiting exemption to personal residential use (in the case of proprietors) and carving out accommodation/hostel/PG services separately under Heading 9963, the Government's intent is to restrict the exemption to genuine residential use in personal capacity and not to premises used commercially, even if ultimately occupied for residence by third parties.
2.9 Applying this intent to the facts, the Court held that the lessee is not using the premises as its own residence but for a commercial activity of providing residential accommodation (with possible ancillary services such as meals, laundry, wi-fi etc.) to students and working professionals for consideration. The use of the property is therefore commercial in nature and not "for use as residence" in the sense contemplated by the exemption.
Conclusions on Issue 1
2.10 The premises leased by the applicant is a commercial building and not a "residential dwelling" in the sense required by Entry 12.
2.11 The lessee does not use the premises as its own residence but for a commercial business of providing accommodation to others; the exemption is intended only for use as personal residence and not for such commercial exploitation.
2.12 Authorities relied upon by the applicant, including Taghar Vasudeva Ambrish and Thai Mookambikaa Ladies Hostel, are factually distinguishable and/or under challenge and do not govern the present case.
2.13 The applicant's supply does not qualify for exemption under Entry 12 of Notification No. 12/2017-Central Tax (Rate) or the corresponding State notification.
Issue 2 - Classification, rate and liability to pay GST on the applicant's supply
Legal framework discussed
2.14 The Court referred to Heading 9972 (Real estate services) and specifically SAC 997211 (rental or leasing services involving own or leased residential property).
2.15 The Court examined Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) prescribing GST rates on services, and particularly Entry 16 under Heading 9972:
(i) Lease of land by Government, etc. - Nil;
(ii) Certain composite construction-related land leases - Nil; and
(iii) "Real estate services other than (i) and (ii) above" - taxed at 9% CGST (18% total, including SGST).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.16 The Court accepted the applicant's own characterization that the service provided to the lessee is "renting of immovable property" falling under Heading 9972.
2.17 Since the applicant is not covered by sub-entries (i) or (ii) of Entry 16, the rental service supplied falls under residual sub-entry (iii) - "Real estate services other than (i) and (ii) above".
2.18 There is no reverse charge mechanism notified for this transaction; therefore, as a registered supplier of the renting service, the applicant is liable to discharge GST under the forward charge mechanism.
Conclusions on Issue 2
2.19 The renting service supplied by the applicant to the lessee is classifiable under Heading 9972 as "real estate services other than (i) and (ii) above" in Entry 16 of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate).
2.20 The supply attracts GST at 18% (9% CGST + 9% SGST), as applicable from time to time.
2.21 The liability to pay GST on the said renting service rests on the applicant (landlord) under the forward charge mechanism.
Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to refund of excess dividend distribution tax under section 115-O of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether the beneficial provisions of the India-Slovenia DTAA could be invoked through the Most Favoured Nation clause.
Analysis: The appeals were covered by the Special Bench decision in Dy. CIT v. Total Oil India P. Ltd., which was treated as governing the controversy. On that basis, the claim for refund of excess dividend distribution tax and the plea for application of the India-Slovenia DTAA through the Most Favoured Nation clause were not accepted.
Conclusion: The issues were decided against the assessee and in favour of the Revenue.
Issues: Whether Acrylonitrile imported for non-insecticidal use was exempt from the registration and import-permit requirements under the Insecticides Act, 1968, and whether the impugned public notice could validly insist on such permit.
Analysis: Acrylonitrile was accepted to be a scheduled substance under the Act, but the record also showed that the petitioner imported it only as a raw material for manufacture of synthetic rubber and other goods, i.e. for non-insecticidal purposes. Section 38 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 begins with a non obstante clause and expressly provides that nothing in the Act applies to any scheduled substance intended for purposes other than preventing, destroying, repelling or mitigating insects and similar life forms. Once the respondents did not dispute non-insecticidal use, the consequence was that the Act itself did not apply to such imports, and the registration requirement under Section 9 could not be insisted upon. The impugned public notice, insofar as it made import permit mandatory for Acrylonitrile even for non-insecticidal use, was inconsistent with the statutory exemption. The Court also noticed the persuasive force of the Kerala High Court's reasoning on an identical issue and found no contrary central notification requiring such permit.
Conclusion: The requirement of import permit and registration for Acrylonitrile imported for non-insecticidal use was held inapplicable, and the challenge to the public notice succeeded in favour of the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a scheduled insecticidal substance is admittedly imported for a purpose covered by the statutory exemption in Section 38, the Insecticides Act, 1968 does not apply and registration or import-permit conditions cannot be imposed by executive notice.
Issues: Whether the Council's recommendation under section 21 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 was sustainable when it did not record independent reasons after considering the respondent's representation and instead substantially reproduced the Disciplinary Committee's report.
Analysis: Section 21(3) of the Act and Regulation 16 of the Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1988 require the Council to consider the Disciplinary Committee's report along with the respondent's written representation and to record its own findings. The expression "findings" imports an application of mind and a reasoned conclusion; mere endorsement of the committee's report does not satisfy the statutory duty. The Council's report, though reciting that it had considered the representations, did not deal with the respondent's contentions in any meaningful manner and instead reproduced the committee's report almost verbatim. Such a mechanical and cut-paste exercise was held to be inconsistent with the statutory scheme and the principles governing quasi-judicial decision-making.
Conclusion: The Council's recommendation was unsustainable for want of independent reasoning and was liable to be set aside.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a statutory authority is required to consider a report and the delinquent's representation and to record findings, the authority must independently apply its mind and give reasons; a verbatim or mechanical adoption of the subordinate report is not a valid finding.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Scope of power under Rule 86A of the GST Rules, 2017: Whether Rule 86A permits blocking of the Electronic Credit Ledger by an amount exceeding the Input Tax Credit actually available, resulting in a negative balance ("negative blocking").
1.2 Procedural safeguards under Rule 86A: Whether prior notice or show cause notice is mandatory before exercising the power to block the Electronic Credit Ledger under Rule 86A.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Scope of power under Rule 86A and permissibility of "negative blocking"
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.1 The Court examined Rule 86A of the Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, in light of its earlier decision, and judgments of other High Courts, particularly the reasoning of the Gujarat High Court in interpreting Rule 86A. The provision empowers the Commissioner or an authorised officer to disallow debit of Input Tax Credit from the Electronic Credit Ledger where there is "reason to believe" that such credit has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible, for an amount equivalent to such credit.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.2 The Court reiterated that the right to avail and utilise Input Tax Credit is a statutory right, subject to conditions provided in the statute.
2.3 Relying on and endorsing the Gujarat High Court's construction, the Court held that availability of credit in the Electronic Credit Ledger is a condition precedent for invoking Rule 86A. If no Input Tax Credit is available in the ledger on the date of blocking, Rule 86A cannot be validly invoked.
2.4 The Court adopted the reasoning that Rule 86A is divided into: (i) conditions for invocation (including that Input Tax Credit must be available in the ledger and there must be recorded "reasons to believe" of fraudulent or ineligible availing), and (ii) the consequences (temporary restriction on debit of an equivalent amount). If the preconditions are not satisfied, the consequences cannot operate.
2.5 It was emphasised that Rule 86A only authorises temporary disallowance of debit of existing credit; it does not authorize the officer to create debit entries or impose a negative balance in the Electronic Credit Ledger. Any such negative entry would amount to permanent recovery, which must be effected only through statutory mechanisms such as proceedings under Sections 73 or 74 of the PGST/CGST Acts.
2.6 The Court endorsed the view that once Input Tax Credit is credited to the Electronic Credit Ledger, it forms part of a fungible pool; the rule therefore speaks of blocking "an amount equivalent" to the allegedly fraudulent or ineligible credit, presupposing the existence of sufficient credit in the ledger. In the absence of such available credit, there can be no blocking under Rule 86A.
2.7 Concerns that a taxpayer may persistently avail and utilise fraudulent credit were held not to justify an extended interpretation of Rule 86A beyond its plain language. The Court noted that other statutory measures remain available to the authorities, including recovery under Sections 73/74, cancellation of registration under Section 29, and provisional attachment under Section 83.
2.8 The Court characterised the power to restrict debit from the Electronic Credit Ledger as "extremely harsh" and preventive in nature, applied at a stage anterior to determination of liability, and therefore to be strictly confined to the specific statutory language.
2.9 The Court reaffirmed its earlier view that there is no ambiguity in Rule 86A, and that literal construction does not lead to absurdity; therefore, there can be no action based on supposed intendment to justify "negative blocking" when no credit is available.
2.10 The Court expressly agreed with the interpretation of the High Courts of Gujarat, Delhi, Telangana and Bombay, and expressly declined to follow the contrary view of the High Courts of Calcutta, Allahabad and Andhra Pradesh on this specific issue.
Conclusions:
2.11 Rule 86A can be invoked only when Input Tax Credit is actually available in the Electronic Credit Ledger on the date of the blocking order.
2.12 Blocking of the Electronic Credit Ledger in excess of the credit available, resulting in a negative balance ("negative blocking"), is beyond the scope of Rule 86A and is without jurisdiction and illegal.
2.13 Orders or entries disallowing debit from the Electronic Credit Ledger beyond the amount of Input Tax Credit available at the time of the decision are unsustainable and liable to be set aside to that extent.
Issue 2 - Requirement of prior notice or show cause notice before blocking under Rule 86A
Legal framework (as discussed):
2.14 The Court considered the nature of Rule 86A as a preventive, temporary measure, operating on the basis of "reasons to believe" recorded by the competent authority, and its relationship to the detailed recovery provisions under Sections 73 and 74 of the PGST/CGST Acts.
Interpretation and reasoning:
2.15 The Court reiterated its earlier interpretation that Rule 86A is designed to meet an emergent situation, and is invoked at a pre-assessment, pre-demand stage, distinct from the final determination of liability under Sections 73 and 74.
2.16 In this preventive context, the Court endorsed the view that the rule does not require issuance of a prior notice or show cause notice before blocking the Electronic Credit Ledger, so long as the statutory prerequisites (including "reasons to believe" recorded in writing) are met.
Conclusions:
2.17 Prior notice or a show cause notice is not a mandatory precondition for exercise of power under Rule 86A to temporarily disallow debit of available Input Tax Credit.
2.18 However, even in the absence of prior notice, the authority's action must remain within the limits of Rule 86A and cannot extend to negative blocking or permanent recovery, for which separate statutory procedures are prescribed.
Ancillary conclusion - Liberty to pursue other statutory remedies
2.19 While setting aside the impugned blocking to the extent it exceeded the available credit, the Court clarified that the authorities remain at liberty to undertake recovery or other proceedings in accordance with law, including recourse to the statutory mechanisms under the PGST/CGST Acts for determination and recovery of wrongly availed or utilised Input Tax Credit.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether Rule 86A of the Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits blocking of the Electronic Credit Ledger in an amount exceeding the input tax credit actually available therein, resulting in a negative balance ("negative blocking").
1.2 Whether, under Rule 86A of the Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, prior notice or show cause notice is a precondition for temporarily disallowing debit of input tax credit in the Electronic Credit Ledger.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Scope of Rule 86A: power to block Electronic Credit Ledger beyond available ITC / negative blocking
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.1 The Court referred to and relied upon its own earlier decision rendered on 04.11.2025, which had analysed Rule 86A of the Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 and endorsed the view taken by the High Courts of Gujarat, Delhi, Telangana and Bombay. The Court reproduced in detail the reasoning of the Gujarat High Court in "Samay Alloys India Pvt. Ltd." on the construction of Rule 86A, including: (i) the precondition that "credit of input tax should be available in the electronic credit ledger" before Rule 86A can be invoked; (ii) that Rule 86A enables only a temporary disallowance of debit from the ledger and is not a provision for permanent recovery; and (iii) that blocking cannot be invoked where there is no credit or where the credit has already been utilised.
2.2 The Court reiterated that under Rule 86A(1): (a) existence of input tax credit in the Electronic Credit Ledger; (b) reasons to believe, recorded in writing, that such credit has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible; and (c) restriction only to an amount "equivalent" to such credit are cumulative statutory conditions for exercise of power.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court noted as an undisputed factual position that the petitioner's Electronic Credit Ledger was blocked from 01.09.2025 to 23.09.2025, and that the blocking entries dated 02.09.2025 resulted in a negative balance in the ledger.
2.4 Relying on its earlier judgment in CWP-23675-2025 (decided on 04.11.2025), the Court endorsed the reasoning that Rule 86A presupposes existence of input tax credit in the Electronic Credit Ledger at the time of invocation, and that "availability of credit in the ECL is a condition precedent for exercise of power under Rule 86-A of Rules, 2017." If no input tax credit is available, blocking the ledger and inserting a negative balance is "wholly without jurisdiction and illegal."
2.5 The Court adopted the distinction drawn in the Gujarat judgment between: (i) the "opening part" of Rule 86A(1), which sets conditions for invocation of the rule; and (ii) the "second part," which deals with the consequences (temporary restriction of debit). It held that where the conditions (including actual availability of credit) are not satisfied, Rule 86A cannot be invoked and its consequences cannot apply.
2.6 The Court accepted that once input tax credit is entered in the Electronic Credit Ledger, it forms a fungible pool, and the rule therefore speaks of restriction on an "amount equivalent" to the allegedly fraudulent or ineligible credit; however, this restriction necessarily presupposes existence of such credit in the ledger. On the "plain language" of Rule 86A, there can be no action without availability of credit; any attempt to justify negative blocking on the basis of supposed legislative intent was rejected as contrary to settled principles of statutory interpretation.
2.7 The Court reiterated that Rule 86A is a harsh, preventive measure operative at a stage anterior to final assessment or demand and therefore must be strictly construed. In particular, it cannot be used as a mechanism for permanent recovery; such recovery must be undertaken through the statutory provisions under Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 or other specific recovery/attachment provisions.
2.8 The Court expressly aligned itself with the views of the High Courts of Gujarat, Delhi, Telangana and Bombay on this interpretation and recorded its disagreement with the contrary views of the High Courts of Calcutta, Allahabad and Andhra Pradesh. It also noted that the view of the Delhi High Court in "Kings Security Guard Services Pvt. Ltd." and "Karuna Rajendra Ringshia" had been upheld by the Supreme Court upon dismissal of special leave petitions.
Conclusions
2.9 The Court held that under Rule 86A of the Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, the competent authority can only disallow debit of the Electronic Credit Ledger to the extent of input tax credit actually available in the ledger at the time of passing the blocking order. The rule does not authorise blocking that creates a negative balance or disallows debit in excess of the existing credit.
2.10 Any "negative blocking" or disallowance beyond the amount of input tax credit available in the Electronic Credit Ledger is without jurisdiction and unsustainable in law.
2.11 Applying this principle, the impugned entries/orders were set aside to the extent they disallowed debit from the petitioner's Electronic Credit Ledger in excess of the input tax credit available at the relevant time.
2.12 The Court clarified that the authorities remain at liberty to resort to the specific statutory remedies for determination and recovery of wrongly availed or utilised input tax credit, including proceedings under Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and other available recovery mechanisms, in accordance with law.
Issue 2 - Requirement of prior notice or show cause notice before blocking under Rule 86A
Legal framework (as discussed by the Court)
2.13 In referring to its earlier decision in CWP-23675-2025, the Court considered the nature of Rule 86A as a provision for temporary, preventive restriction on utilisation of input tax credit pending determination of its legitimacy, and contrasted it with the detailed adjudicatory procedures under Sections 73 and 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 for final determination and recovery.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.14 The Court reaffirmed the view taken in its earlier judgment that Rule 86A is "for meeting an emergent situation" and is in the nature of an interim, temporary measure. On this basis, it endorsed the view that issuance of prior notice or show cause notice is not a precondition to the exercise of power under Rule 86A to temporarily disallow debit from the Electronic Credit Ledger, provided the statutory conditions (including reasons to believe recorded in writing) are met.
2.15 The Court, however, balanced this by reiterating that the temporary nature of the measure and the requirement of strict compliance with the conditions of Rule 86A, including existence of credit in the ledger, are essential safeguards against abuse; in the absence of such credit, the authority cannot resort to "negative blocking."
Conclusions
2.16 The Court held that Rule 86A does not require issuance of a prior notice or show cause notice before temporarily restricting debit of input tax credit in the Electronic Credit Ledger, as the provision is designed to address emergent situations.
2.17 Nevertheless, such power can be exercised only within the limits of Rule 86A, namely, to the extent of credit actually available in the ledger and subject to the conditions prescribed therein; any negative blocking remains impermissible and invalid even if undertaken without prior notice.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the writ petition under Article 226 challenging an order-in-original raising GST demand for alleged fraudulent availment of Input Tax Credit is maintainable in view of the statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the CGST Act.
1.2 Whether there was any violation of principles of natural justice in passing the impugned order, specifically on the grounds of alleged denial of personal hearing and non-consideration of the petitioner's written reply.
1.3 Whether, in the facts of the case, the petitioner should be relegated to the statutory appellate remedy with appropriate directions regarding limitation and pre-deposit, and whether previously imposed costs were liable to be waived.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Maintainability of writ petition in presence of statutory appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act in cases of alleged fraudulent ITC
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1.1 The Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in 'The Assistant Commissioner of State Tax & Ors. v. M/s Commercial Steel Limited', wherein it was held that although the existence of an alternate remedy is not an absolute bar to a writ petition under Article 226, such jurisdiction should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances such as: (i) breach of fundamental rights; (ii) violation of principles of natural justice; (iii) excess of jurisdiction; or (iv) challenge to vires of statute or delegated legislation.
2.1.2 The Court also relied on its own earlier decisions in matters involving fraudulent availment of ITC, including Mukesh Kumar Garg, M/s Sheetal and Sons, and M/s MHJ Metal Techs, wherein it had consistently held that in such cases, considering the burden on the exchequer, impact on the GST regime, complexity and factual nature of the disputes, writ jurisdiction ought not to be exercised and parties should be relegated to the remedy of appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.3 The Court noted that the matter arises out of serious allegations of fraudulent availment of ITC involving multiple non-existent firms, large-scale transfer of ITC, and complex transactional chains, similar to matters previously considered by the Court.
2.1.4 The Court reiterated its settled view that disputes relating to fraudulent ITC involve complex factual analysis, examination of voluminous evidence and detailed findings of the tax authorities, which are not suitable for adjudication in writ proceedings.
2.1.5 The Court emphasized that in such ITC fraud cases, a balance has to be drawn between the burden on the public exchequer and the impact on the GST regime on one hand, and the interests of the taxpayers on the other, which are adequately safeguarded by the statutory appellate mechanism under Section 107.
2.1.6 The Court observed that it had already considered a writ petition challenging the very same impugned order in another matter and, following its earlier view, had relegated the petitioner therein to the appellate remedy. It considered it appropriate to follow the same approach in the present case, arising from the same adjudication.
Conclusions
2.1.7 The Court held that this was not a fit case for exercise of extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226, given the serious allegations of fraudulent ITC, the complex factual matrix, and the existence of an effective alternative remedy of appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act.
2.1.8 The writ petition was held to be not entertainable on the ground of availability of a statutory appellate remedy, and the petitioner was relegated to pursue such remedy.
2.2 Alleged violation of principles of natural justice in passing the impugned order
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.1 The petitioner contended that no personal hearing was granted and that its reply dated 5 August 2024 was not considered in the impugned order, thereby alleging violation of principles of natural justice.
2.2.2 The respondents refuted this and pointed out that the impugned order itself records the filing of the reply and indicates that it was considered while passing the detailed order.
2.2.3 The Court noted that the petitioner was well aware of the notices issued and that a reply had in fact been filed by the petitioner, which is recorded in the impugned order.
2.2.4 The Court, in line with its approach in analogous matters, did not undertake a detailed factual inquiry into the nature or adequacy of hearing or the extent of consideration of the reply, holding that such issues are best examined by the appellate authority in statutory appeal proceedings.
Conclusions
2.2.5 The Court did not find sufficient grounds to hold that there was a violation of principles of natural justice warranting interference under Article 226, especially in the face of an available statutory appeal.
2.2.6 The Court concluded that any grievance relating to the extent of hearing or consideration of the reply may be appropriately urged before the appellate authority.
2.3 Direction to avail appellate remedy; extension of limitation and waiver of earlier costs
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.1 Following its consistent practice in similar ITC fraud cases, the Court, while declining to entertain the writ, considered it appropriate to safeguard the petitioner's right to appeal by granting specific time to file an appeal under Section 107 along with pre-deposit.
2.3.2 The Court directed that if the appeal is filed by the stipulated date along with the requisite pre-deposit, the appellate authority shall adjudicate the appeal on merits and shall not dismiss it on the ground of limitation.
2.3.3 Considering the reasons set out in the interlocutory application, the Court also waived the costs that had earlier been imposed on the petitioner by a prior order.
2.3.4 The Court clarified that any observations made in the order would not affect the merits of the matter before the appellate authority.
Conclusions
2.3.5 The Court disposed of the writ petition by relegating the petitioner to the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the CGST Act, granting time up to 5 January 2026 to file the appeal with pre-deposit, directing that such appeal not be rejected as time-barred if so filed, and waiving the previously imposed costs.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether a reassessment order under Section 147, passed pursuant to a notice under Section 148 and an order under Section 148A(d) which had already been quashed by the Court and had attained finality, is without jurisdiction.
(2) Whether the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter concerning limitation for reassessment proceedings (popularly referred to as the "Rajeev Bansal" decision) automatically revived or validated reassessment proceedings in all cases across India, including those where notices under Section 148 and orders under Section 148A(d) had already been quashed and not appealed.
(3) Whether the notice under Section 148 dated 25.07.2022 for A.Y. 2014-15 was barred by limitation, applying the "surviving period" concept as laid down by the Supreme Court, having regard to Section 149, the Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation and Amendment of Certain Provisions) Act, 2020 (TOLA), and the decision in Ashish Agarwal.
(4) Whether the absence of a reply by the assessee to the show-cause notice under Section 148A(b) affects the computation of limitation and the "surviving period" for issuance of a notice under Section 148 under the new regime.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Validity of reassessment order based on quashed Section 148 notice and Section 148A(d) order
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court noted that the notice under Section 148 and the order under Section 148A(d), both dated 25.07.2022 for A.Y. 2014-15, had been quashed by the Court in an earlier writ petition by order dated 03.04.2024 on the ground of limitation. That order was not challenged before the Supreme Court and hence attained finality. Despite this, the Assessing Officer proceeded to issue a notice under Section 142(1), and ultimately passed a reassessment order under Section 147 on 17.10.2025 relying on paragraph 115 of the Supreme Court's judgment in the case referred to as "Rajeev Bansal" to justify "revival" of the case.
The Court examined paragraph 115 of that judgment and found that it merely set aside or modified certain specified High Court judgments "to the extent of the observations made" in the Supreme Court's judgment and did not state that all pending cases across India, irrespective of their stage or status, would stand automatically governed or revived. The Court emphasised that there was no direction in that judgment similar to the explicit "PAN India" applicability direction that had been given by the Supreme Court in Ashish Agarwal. The Court also observed that the Revenue continued to file special leave petitions in other, similar matters after the "Rajeev Bansal" decision, which indicated that even the Revenue did not treat that judgment as automatically covering all reassessment matters nationwide.
Conclusions
The Court held that once the notice under Section 148 and the order under Section 148A(d) were quashed by the High Court and that order attained finality, the Assessing Officer could not proceed to pass a reassessment order pursuant to such quashed notice. The impugned assessment order dated 17.10.2025, being founded on the quashed Section 148 notice dated 25.07.2022 and the quashed Section 148A(d) order of the same date, was held to be wholly without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.
Issue (2): Scope of applicability of the Supreme Court's "Rajeev Bansal" decision
Legal framework discussed
The Court referred to paragraph 115 of the "Rajeev Bansal" judgment, in which specified High Court judgments were set aside "to the extent of the observations made" in that judgment. The Court contrasted this with paragraph 92 of the Supreme Court's decision in Ashish Agarwal, where the Supreme Court expressly stated that its directions would apply to designated categories of cases and added that "the present order shall be applicable PAN INDIA."
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court held that, unlike Ashish Agarwal, the "Rajeev Bansal" judgment did not contain a statement that it would apply PAN India or that it would revive or govern all cases irrespective of the status of the notices. The reference in paragraph 115 to specified existing judgments and "other judgments ... which relied on these judgments" was read as confined to the approximately 900 cases listed and tagged along with that batch, and not as a blanket directive covering all reassessment disputes.
The Court also reasoned that if "Rajeev Bansal" were meant to apply universally to all similar reassessment cases, there would have been no necessity for the Revenue to continue challenging other High Court judgments in the Supreme Court on the very same issues; the fact that such SLPs continued indicated that "Rajeev Bansal" was not of universal automatic application of the type asserted by the Assessing Officer.
Conclusions
The Court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in "Rajeev Bansal" could not be invoked to revive or reopen reassessment proceedings that had already been quashed by a final High Court order in the present case. It did not confer jurisdiction on the Assessing Officer to ignore or override the final order dated 03.04.2024 of the High Court quashing the Section 148 and Section 148A(d) proceedings.
Issue (3): Limitation and "surviving period" for issuance of notice under Section 148 dated 25.07.2022 for A.Y. 2014-15
Legal framework discussed
The Court applied and relied on:
(i) Section 149(1) and its first proviso, which requires that a notice issued on or after 1 April 2021 must be within the time permissible under the unamended Section 149(1);
(ii) TOLA, which extended time limits for issuing reassessment notices up to 30.06.2021;
(iii) The Supreme Court's decisions in Ashish Agarwal and "Rajeev Bansal", particularly paragraphs 108 to 114 of "Rajeev Bansal", which clarified the effect of the legal fiction deeming old Section 148 notices to be show-cause notices under Section 148A(b), and laid down the manner of computing the "surviving" limitation period after exclusion of specified time segments.
Interpretation and reasoning
The Court summarised the Supreme Court's reasoning in "Rajeev Bansal" as follows:
* Old regime Section 148 notices issued between 01.04.2021 and 30.06.2021 are deemed to be notices under Section 148A(b);
* The "legal fiction" created in Ashish Agarwal stops the limitation clock from the date of the old Section 148 notice until specified milestones are completed; the remaining (surviving) period under the Act read with TOLA is then available for completing the Section 148A procedure and issuing a fresh Section 148 notice under the new regime;
* The period to be excluded for computing limitation includes: (a) the time from the date of the deemed notice under Section 148A(b) until supply of information/material to the assessee in terms of Ashish Agarwal; and (b) a further two weeks granted to the assessee to respond to such material, as recognised by the third proviso to Section 149;
* After expiry of the excluded period, the "surviving" time, calculated as the number of days between the date of the deemed notice and 30.06.2021, begins running from the date of receipt of the assessee's reply (or, where no reply is filed, from the last date by which such reply could have been filed); within this surviving time, the Assessing Officer must (i) consider the reply or absence thereof, (ii) pass an order under Section 148A(d), and (iii) issue a notice under Section 148 of the new regime; any notice beyond this surviving period is time-barred.
The Court also recorded that, for A.Y. 2014-15, under unamended Section 149(1)(b), the last permissible date for issuing a notice under the old regime was 31.03.2021, and the Supreme Court, in "Rajeev Bansal", had accepted the principle that, post-1 April 2021, the validity of a Section 148 notice must be tested with reference to the law then in force, including the first proviso to Section 149(1)(b) and TOLA.
Applying the above framework to the present facts, the Court laid out the chronology:
* 30.06.2021 - old Section 148 notice (deemed Section 148A(b) notice);
* 25.05.2022 - information and reasons for reopening supplied to the assessee, granting two weeks' time to reply;
* 08.06.2022 - expiry of the two weeks allowed for reply; no reply was filed;
* 25.07.2022 - order under Section 148A(d) and fresh Section 148 notice issued.
The Court, following the method prescribed in "Rajeev Bansal", computed that only one day of the "surviving period" remained for the Revenue to complete the Section 148A(d) procedure and issue a fresh Section 148 notice. That one day expired on 09.06.2022 (i.e., the day after the last date for filing the reply, 08.06.2022). Thus, any notice under Section 148 issued after 09.06.2022 would be beyond the surviving period.
Conclusions
The Court held that the notice under Section 148 dated 25.07.2022 was issued after expiry of the surviving period, was therefore barred by limitation, and was liable to be set aside. Consequently, even apart from the earlier quashing order, the foundation for the impugned reassessment order failed on limitation grounds.
Issue (4): Effect of non-filing of reply to Section 148A(b) notice on limitation and "surviving period"
Interpretation and reasoning
The Revenue argued that since the assessee did not file any reply to the notice issued on 25.05.2022 under Section 148A(b), the limitation computation and the notion of "surviving period" as set out in "Rajeev Bansal" would not apply, and consequently the Section 148 notice could not be treated as time-barred. It was contended that under Section 148A(d) the order was to be passed within one month from the end of the month in which the reply was to be filed, and since no reply was actually filed, the limitation constraint should be deemed inapplicable.
The Court rejected this contention. It noted that "Rajeev Bansal" expressly held that: (i) the period from the deemed Section 148A(b) notice until supply of information/material under Ashish Agarwal, and (ii) a further two weeks for the assessee to respond, were to be excluded from the computation of limitation. There was no indication in "Rajeev Bansal" that if no reply was filed by the assessee, the limitation period would become open-ended or that the surviving period would cease to exist.
The Court held that where no reply is filed, the surviving period must be computed as beginning from the last date on which the reply could have been filed (in this case, 08.06.2022). The Assessing Officer is then required to complete all subsequent steps-consideration of material, passing of an order under Section 148A(d), and issuance of a Section 148 notice-within the balance surviving period calculated in accordance with "Rajeev Bansal".
Conclusions
The Court concluded that non-filing of a reply by the assessee to the show-cause notice under Section 148A(b) does not suspend, extend, or eliminate the limitation period. The surviving period starts from the expiry of the time granted to reply and continues to bind the Assessing Officer. Accordingly, in the present case, the Section 148 notice dated 25.07.2022 remained time-barred despite the absence of a reply.
Final operative outcome
Conclusions
On both jurisdictional and limitation grounds, the Court quashed and set aside:
* the assessment order under Section 147 dated 17.10.2025, together with the computation sheet, notice of demand, and consequential penalty show-cause notice; and
* the notice under Section 148 dated 25.07.2022, the order under Section 148A(d) of the same date, and the original show-cause notice under Section 148A(b) dated 30.06.2021.
No order as to costs was made.
Issues: Whether the approval granted under section 148B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was mechanical and application of mind, rendering the reassessment proceedings and consequent assessments unsustainable.
Analysis: The approval dated 23.05.2023 was found to be a combined approval covering six assessees, including the present assessees, and was held to be mechanical and without application of mind. The reasoning adopted in a coordinate Bench decision on identical facts was followed, where such combined approval had been treated as not sustainable and the assessments had been quashed on the ground of invalid approval.
Conclusion: The approval under section 148B was invalid, and the assessments for AYs 2021-22 and 2022-23 were quashed. The appeals were allowed in favour of the assessees.
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