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Issues: Whether the writ petition challenging the seizure order and seeking provisional release of the detained goods should be entertained when the petitioner had already invoked the statutory remedy under Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962.
Analysis: The goods had been detained for a substantial period before the seizure order was passed, and the application for provisional release had remained pending for more than ten days. The goods were described as perishable and bearing an expiry date. In these circumstances, the statutory remedy for provisional release was treated as efficacious and already availed. The Court therefore declined to enter upon the merits of the seizure challenge at this stage and directed the authority to decide the pending application by a reasoned order within a fixed time.
Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to decide the provisional release application expeditiously.
Issues: Whether the appeal raised any substantial question of law, and whether the issue stood covered by an earlier decision on the same question.
Analysis: The appeal was filed under Section 260A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Court noted that the issue involved had already been decided against the Revenue and in favour of the assessee in an earlier decision concerning the same assessee for a different assessment year. For parity of reasons, the Court found that no substantial question of law arose for consideration in the present appeal.
Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed and the challenge failed.
Issues: Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail in a prosecution under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, having regard to the statutory presumption, the burden of proof, and the twin conditions governing bail.
Analysis: The bail request was examined on the basis of the allegations of receipt, transfer, and use of alleged proceeds of crime through the account of the petitioner's proprietorship concern. The statutory framework under Sections 3, 4, 24, and 45 of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was applied. The burden under Section 24 was treated as operating against the petitioner, and the material on record was found insufficient to rebut the presumption of involvement in money-laundering. The Court found that the petitioner had not shown reasonable grounds for believing that he was not guilty of the offence, and the record indicated active involvement in acquisition, disposal, transfer, concealment, and use of the alleged proceeds of crime. The stringent twin conditions under Section 45 were held not to be satisfied.
Conclusion: Bail was declined, as the petitioner failed to satisfy the statutory requirements for release under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.
Issues: (i) Whether the appeal against the CESTAT order is maintainable where question of taxability is raised; (ii) Whether the services rendered by the respondent constitute intermediary services under Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 or amount to export of services under Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.
Issue (i): Whether the appeal is maintainable where the question of taxability is raised.
Analysis: The question presented required determination of points of substantive tax law concerning classification of services and their place of provision; precedents addressing identical legal questions were available and applied to the facts.
Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed and thus the result is against the appellant and in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the respondent's services are intermediary services under Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 or constitute export of services under Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.
Analysis: The definition of 'intermediary' requires arranging or facilitating a supply by one person for another; a supplier who renders services on its own account does not fall within that definition. The identity of the contractual recipient and the party responsible for payment are determinative of the recipient for purposes of place of provision. Precedents applying the same statutory framework and analogous factual arrangements were relied upon to determine whether the foreign universities were the contractual recipients and whether payment was in convertible foreign exchange.
Conclusion: The services do not qualify as intermediary services; they constitute export of services and the impugned demand is not sustainable. This conclusion is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The CESTAT's decision setting aside the demand and holding the services to be export of services is upheld; there is no substantial question of law warranting interference and the appeal is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a person renders services as the supplier on its own account and the contract and payment obligation identify the foreign entity as the recipient, the provider is not an intermediary under Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012, and the place of provision is determined by the recipient contractually entitled to receive the service, supporting treatment as export under Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994.
Issues: Whether the penalty imposed under section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for disallowance of health and education cess (AY 2020-21) is sustainable where the assessee had a bona fide, judicially supported claim, had withdrawn the claim and filed the prescribed form under section 155(18) / section 270AA within the prescribed time and complied with the statutory scheme for immunity.
Analysis: Section 155(18) deems claims of deduction of surcharge or cess which are not allowable under section 40 as under-reported income for the purposes of section 270A, subject to a proviso granting immunity where the assessee makes an application in the prescribed form and pays the differential tax within the specified time. Section 270AA provides a statutory route for immunity from penalty where statutory conditions (payment of tax/interest, no appeal, prescribed application within time and that penalty proceedings were not initiated for misreporting under section 270A(9)) are satisfied. Section 270A distinguishes under-reporting (section 270A(2)) from misreporting (section 270A(9)), and penalty severity depends on whether misreporting is established. A bona fide claim supported by then-existing judicial precedent and voluntarily withdrawn before completion of assessment, with disclosure of material facts and timely filing of the prescribed form, engages the exclusions in section 270A(6) and the proviso to section 155(18)/the immunity scheme under section 270AA. Where the assessing authority fails to specify which limb of section 270A(9) is attracted and does not demonstrate misreporting ingredients, initiation and imposition of penalty under the misreporting limb is procedurally and substantively unsustainable. Applying these principles to the facts, the assessee had a bona fide claim based on judicial decisions, withdrew the claim and filed the prescribed form within the prescribed period, and the authorities did not bring contrary material to establish misreporting or satisfy the specific limbs of section 270A(9).
Conclusion: Penalty under section 270A confirmed by the appellate authority is deleted and the appeal is allowed in favour of the assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in view of Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, initiation of proceedings by the State tax authority bars the Central tax authority from initiating parallel adjudicatory proceedings on the same subject-matter.
1.2 Whether the summons/notice earlier issued by the State authority prevails over the subsequent notice issued by the Central authority, and to what extent both authorities may continue inquiry or investigation without violating the prohibition against parallel proceedings.
1.3 What directions are required to ensure compliance by the authorities and the assessee with the legal position and guidelines laid down in the binding precedent governing Section 6(2)(b) CGST Act.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Bar on parallel proceedings under Section 6(2)(b) CGST Act where one authority has already initiated proceedings on the same subject-matter
Legal framework
2.1.1 The Court noted that Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act prohibits initiation of any proceedings by one authority on the same subject-matter where such proceedings have already been initiated by another jurisdictional authority. The Court relied on the binding interpretation and guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court regarding (a) the meaning of "initiation of any proceedings"; (b) the meaning of "subject matter"; and (c) the interrelationship between Central and State GST authorities.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.2 The Court recorded that the Supreme Court has conclusively held: (i) Section 6(2)(b) bars initiation of proceedings on the same subject-matter; (ii) "initiation of any proceedings" refers to formal commencement of adjudicatory proceedings by issuance of a show cause notice and does not include steps such as summons, search or seizure; (iii) "subject matter" refers to tax liability, deficiency or obligation arising from a particular contravention; and (iv) where two proceedings seek to assess or recover identical or overlapping liability arising from the same contravention, the bar is attracted.
2.1.3 It was emphasized that while intelligence-based enforcement and investigative steps, including issuance of summons under Section 70, may be undertaken by either Central or State administration, parallel adjudicatory proceedings on the same subject-matter by both authorities are impermissible once one authority has first initiated such proceedings.
2.1.4 The Court further noted that the Supreme Court prescribed a twofold test to determine "same subject matter": (i) whether an authority has proceeded on an identical liability or alleged offence on the same facts; and (ii) whether the demand or relief sought is identical. When both conditions are satisfied, Section 6(2)(b) is immediately attracted.
2.1.5 Applying the above principles, the Court observed that in the present case summons/notice dated 29.06.2022 was issued by the State authority, and a subsequent summons/notice dated 29.07.2022 was issued by the Central authority under Section 74 of the CGST Act. The petitioner's contention was that these constituted parallel proceedings on the same subject-matter.
Conclusions
2.1.6 The Court held that, in view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, once one authority (Central or State) has initiated proceedings first in point of time, the other authority is barred from commencing parallel adjudicatory proceedings on the same subject-matter under Section 6(2)(b). However, legitimate investigative steps, such as issuance of summons under Section 70, may continue so long as they do not result in parallel adjudication.
2.1.7 The Court concluded that, in the circumstances of the case, there was no need for an independent or further adjudication on the legal issue beyond ensuring adherence to the law and guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court. The relief sought by way of outright quashing of the impugned notice was therefore not granted; instead, the matter was directed to be dealt with by the authorities strictly in accordance with the binding precedent.
2.2 Priority between State and Central GST actions and permissible scope of inquiry/investigation
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.1 The core factual issue identified was whether the earlier summons/notice dated 29.06.2022 issued by the State authority should prevail over the subsequent notice dated 29.07.2022 issued by the Central authority under Section 74, and whether the latter is hit by the bar on parallel proceedings.
2.2.2 The Court noted that, under the law as clarified by the Supreme Court, when one authority has first initiated adjudicatory proceedings in respect of a particular subject-matter, any subsequent show cause notice or adjudicatory proceeding by the other authority in respect of the same liability and contravention must give way and cannot be sustained.
2.2.3 At the same time, the Court emphasized that both Central and State authorities are entitled to undertake and continue inquiry or investigation - including issuance of summons - until it is ascertained whether both are examining the identical liability and contravention, and whether a show cause notice has already been issued covering that liability.
2.2.4 The Court recorded the statement of counsel for State and Central authorities that they would abide by Section 6(2)(b) and by the principles and guidelines set out by the Supreme Court, and would maintain appropriate coordination to avoid parallel adjudicatory proceedings.
Conclusions
2.2.5 The Court did not make a factual determination as to which specific notice would ultimately prevail or whether the subject-matter was in fact identical; instead, it left those determinations to be made by the authorities themselves through mutual coordination, applying the tests and guidelines prescribed by the Supreme Court.
2.2.6 The Court directed both authorities to coordinate so that the assessee is not subjected to multiple adjudicatory processes on the same subject-matter, with any subsequent proceeding inconsistent with Section 6(2)(b) yielding to the proceeding first initiated.
2.3 Directions to parties and authorities to operationalize the Supreme Court guidelines
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.1 The Court, instead of entering into an adjudication on facts or merits, chose to structure the relief in line with directions issued by other High Courts in similar matters, where assessees were directed to present their case before the authorities and the authorities were directed to proceed in accordance with the Supreme Court's conclusions and guidelines.
2.3.2 The Court considered it sufficient and appropriate to dispose of the petition by ensuring (i) full compliance by the assessee with summons/notices issued by both authorities, and (ii) inter-authority communication and coordination to verify overlap of inquiries and to avoid duplication, in terms of the Supreme Court's para 96 and 97 guidelines.
Conclusions
2.3.3 The Court directed the petitioner to appear before both Central and State authorities, file responses to the summons/notices, raise all contentions (including those based on Section 6(2)(b) and the Supreme Court judgment), and furnish all relevant documents by a specified date. The petitioner was mandated to comply with all lawful requisitions and to assist in inquiry/investigation.
2.3.4 The Court directed that, after receiving the petitioner's responses, the State authority shall communicate with the Central authority to verify the assessee's claim of overlapping inquiries, in accordance with the Supreme Court's guidelines, and that both authorities shall coordinate to ensure that the petitioner is not subjected to multiple adjudicatory processes on the same subject-matter.
2.3.5 It was further directed that, after such coordination, the competent adjudicatory authority shall proceed in accordance with law, including providing the petitioner an opportunity of being heard, and that any show cause notice issued in respect of a liability already covered by an existing show cause notice would be liable to be quashed in terms of the Supreme Court's ruling.
2.3.6 The Court expressly clarified that it was not expressing any opinion on the merits of the allegations or on the validity of the summons/notices, and that all rights and contentions of the parties remained open, to be considered by the authority dealing with the show cause notice in light of the binding Supreme Court decision.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in view of Section 6(2)(b) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the issuance of a show cause notice under Section 74 by the Central tax authority, after prior action by the State tax authority on the same subject matter, amounts to impermissible parallel adjudicatory proceedings.
1.2 What directions should be issued to the taxpayer and the Central and State GST authorities to ensure compliance with Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act and the principles laid down in the decision of the Supreme Court in Armour Security (India) Ltd. regarding "initiation of proceedings", "same subject matter", and coordination between authorities.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Bar on parallel adjudicatory proceedings under Section 6(2)(b) CGST Act where both Central and State authorities act on the same subject matter
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court proceeded on the basis of Section 6(2)(b) of the CGST Act, which bars the "initiation of any proceedings" on the "same subject matter" once proceedings have been initiated by either the Central or State tax administration.
2.2 The Court relied on and reproduced in extenso the conclusions and guidelines in paragraphs 96 and 97 of the Supreme Court judgment in Armour Security (India) Ltd., which, inter alia, held that:
(i) "Initiation of any proceedings" in Section 6(2)(b) refers to formal commencement of adjudicatory proceedings by issuance of a show cause notice, and not to summons, search, seizure, or other investigative steps;
(ii) "Subject matter" refers to the tax liability, deficiency or obligation arising from a particular contravention which the Department seeks to assess or recover;
(iii) Parallel adjudicatory proceedings on the same subject matter by the other authority, when one authority has already initiated adjudicatory proceedings, are barred;
(iv) Intelligence-based enforcement action may be initiated by either authority, and legitimate investigation (including summons) can continue until it is ascertained that both authorities are examining the identical liability/contravention or issuing overlapping show cause notices; and
(v) Any show cause notice in respect of a liability already covered by an existing show cause notice must be quashed.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court noted the factual matrix that: (a) the State authority had issued multiple summons/notices dated 13.05.2022, 10.01.2023, 14.03.2023 and 16.03.2023, and an intimation in DRC-01A dated 01.04.2024 under Rule 142(1A); and (b) the Central authority had issued a summons/notice dated 09.05.2023 and a show cause notice dated 11.07.2024 under Section 74.
2.4 The core question identified was whether the summons issued by the State authority could be said to "prevail upon" the show cause notice issued by the Central authority so as to render the latter a barred "parallel proceeding" under Section 6(2)(b).
2.5 The Court observed that, in light of Armour Security (India) Ltd., the matter stood substantially covered and no fresh adjudication on the substantive interpretation of Section 6(2)(b) was required. The Supreme Court had already delineated: (i) what constitutes "initiation of proceedings"; (ii) how "same subject matter" is to be tested; and (iii) how potential overlaps and duplication between Central and State authorities are to be handled.
2.6 The Court recorded the stand of the Central and State authorities that they would abide by Section 6(2)(b) and the principles in paragraphs 96 and 97 of Armour Security (India) Ltd., and that they would maintain appropriate coordination to avoid parallel adjudicatory proceedings.
2.7 Having regard to the binding precedent and the authorities' undertaking, the Court considered it unnecessary, in this writ jurisdiction, to determine itself whether the impugned show cause notice was, in fact, a barred parallel proceeding on the same subject matter. Instead, it treated the controversy as one to be resolved administratively between the authorities in accordance with Armour Security (India) Ltd.
Conclusions
2.8 The Court declined to quash the impugned show cause notice or summons at this stage and refrained from pronouncing upon their validity or on whether Section 6(2)(b) was actually attracted in the facts.
2.9 It concluded that the controversy should be resolved by the Central and State authorities themselves, strictly following the legal position and guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Armour Security (India) Ltd., including determination of any overlap in "subject matter" and ensuring that the assessee is not subjected to multiple adjudicatory processes on the same subject matter.
2.10 The petitioner was left to raise all contentions under Section 6(2)(b) and Armour Security (India) Ltd. before the adjudicating authority, which would decide in accordance with law.
Issue 2 - Directions to taxpayer and authorities for coordination and conduct of proceedings in light of Armour Security (India) Ltd.
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.11 The Court expressly relied on paragraphs 96 and 97 of Armour Security (India) Ltd., which prescribe:
(i) that an assessee must comply with summons and show cause notices in the first instance;
(ii) that, upon learning of overlapping inquiries, the assessee must inform the second authority;
(iii) that authorities must inter-communicate to verify overlap and either continue distinct inquiries or designate one authority to proceed, sharing material as necessary; and
(iv) that courts may intervene under Article 226 where the guidelines are not followed.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 The Court noted that various High Courts had, post-Armour Security (India) Ltd., directed assessees to place their contentions and documents before the competent GST authorities, who were then to decide issues of overlap and bar under Section 6(2)(b) in light of Armour Security (India) Ltd.
2.13 Adopting the same approach, the Court considered that the appropriate course was not to undertake a merits adjudication in writ proceedings, but to channel the controversy into the statutorily competent authorities, with structured obligations of cooperation and coordination imposed on both the assessee and the tax administrations.
2.14 The Court emphasized that:
(i) the petitioner must fully cooperate with both the Central and State authorities by responding to summons and notices, furnishing documents, and raising legal objections, including those based on Section 6(2)(b) and Armour Security (India) Ltd.;
(ii) the State and Central authorities must then communicate with each other to verify the petitioner's claim of overlap in subject matter; and
(iii) the authorities must ensure that no multiple adjudicatory processes on the same subject matter are pursued, and that only the appropriate authority proceeds to adjudication, consistent with Armour Security (India) Ltd.
Conclusions
2.15 The Court disposed of the petition by issuing specific directions:
(a) The petitioner shall appear before the Central authority, file a response to the show cause notice under Section 74, and raise all contentions with supporting documents, in terms of Armour Security (India) Ltd., within the time stipulated.
(b) The petitioner shall comply with summons and intimation in DRC-01A under Rule 142(1A) issued by the State authority, respond to all lawful requisitions, and specifically inform the State authority of the issuance of the Central show cause notice, in terms of paragraph 97(a) & (b) of Armour Security (India) Ltd.
(c) Upon such intimation, the State authority shall communicate with the Central authority to verify the assessee's claim of overlapping inquiries, in terms of paragraph 97(c) of Armour Security (India) Ltd.
(d) The Central and State authorities shall coordinate so that the assessee is not subjected to multiple adjudicatory processes on the same subject matter and shall follow the verdict in Armour Security (India) Ltd. in deciding which authority proceeds with adjudication.
(e) The adjudicating authority, as so determined, shall thereafter proceed in accordance with law, including affording the petitioner an opportunity of being heard.
2.16 The Court expressly clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations, or on the validity of the show cause notice or the summons/notices, and that all rights and contentions of the parties, including those under Armour Security (India) Ltd., were left open to be urged before the competent authority.
Issues: Whether a fresh company petition could be entertained as a means to enforce or execute the earlier final order and whether such petition was barred by res judicata, constructive res judicata, and Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Analysis: The reliefs sought in the subsequent petition substantially overlapped with the earlier petition and its amendment application. The earlier final judgment had granted only partial relief and had expressly rejected the remaining reliefs, which were therefore deemed to have been refused under Explanation V to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The liberty to file a fresh petition was confined to grievances arising from the EGM-directed relief and could not be expanded into a general right to re-litigate settled claims. The proper remedy for non-compliance with the earlier order was execution under Section 424(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Rules 56 and 57 of the NCLT Rules, 2016, not a fresh petition. The petition also amounted to splitting of claims and re-agitation of matters that could and ought to have been pursued earlier.
Conclusion: The fresh company petition was not maintainable and was rightly rejected.
Issues: (i) whether a Special Economic Zone unit seeking refund of input tax credit was entitled to have its claim examined in the light of the law governing refund claims under the GST regime and the binding effect of the existing High Court ruling; (ii) whether the matter required remand for verification of whether the services were for authorised operations endorsed by the specified officer.
Issue (i): whether a Special Economic Zone unit seeking refund of input tax credit was entitled to have its claim examined in the light of the law governing refund claims under the GST regime and the binding effect of the existing High Court ruling.
Analysis: The refund was rejected on the premise that only the supplier could claim refund. The appellate authority declined to follow the Gujarat High Court ruling on the ground that it had been challenged before the Supreme Court, but the later Supreme Court order kept the question of law open while dismissing the special leave petition. In that situation, the law declared by the High Court continued to operate, and the authorities were bound to consider the petitioner's claim accordingly.
Conclusion: The petitioner's refund claim could not be rejected merely on the ground that it was a recipient SEZ unit, and the authorities were bound to apply the existing legal position.
Issue (ii): whether the matter required remand for verification of whether the services were for authorised operations endorsed by the specified officer.
Analysis: A separate objection was raised that no finding had been recorded on whether the services were for authorised operations with the necessary endorsement. Since this aspect had not been examined below and the petitioner had no opportunity to meet it, fresh consideration was necessary.
Conclusion: The matter was required to be remanded for fresh adjudication on that aspect.
Final Conclusion: The impugned refund rejection and appellate orders were set aside, and the refund claims were sent back for fresh consideration in accordance with the governing law.
Ratio Decidendi: A subordinate tax authority remains bound by an existing High Court ruling unless displaced by a contrary decision, and where a factual eligibility requirement for refund has not been examined, the matter may be remanded for fresh determination.
Issues: (i) Whether the rejection of the assessee's application for final registration/approval under section 10(23C)(iv) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was maintainable where Form No.10AB erroneously mentioned clause (ii) instead of clause (iv), and whether relief in the form of reconsideration or deeming the application to have been filed under the correct clause should be granted.
Analysis: The assessee held provisional registration under section 10(23C)(iv) and filed Form No.10AB for permanent registration; the form erroneously indicated clause (ii) instead of clause (iv). The impugned order rejected the application as non-maintainable on the basis of the incorrectly specified clause. The appellate body found that the record showed the assessee's intent and supporting annexures consistent with registration under clause (iv), and that the application was disposed of without giving the assessee a proper and sufficient opportunity to explain or to correct the clerical error. Relief by reconsideration or treating the filing as made under the correct clause was identified as an appropriate remedy to avoid rejection for a mere mistake in mentioning the provision.
Conclusion: The impugned order is set aside and the matter is restored to the file of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) with directions to give the assessee a proper and sufficient opportunity of being heard and to consider the application for registration under section 10(23C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 treating the application filed under section 10(23C)(ii) as having been filed under section 10(23C)(iv), or alternatively permitting filing of a fresh application to be deemed originally filed.
Issues: (i) Whether approval of the Resolution Plan by the Committee of Creditors and the Adjudicating Authority (impugned order dated 02.05.2024) is vitiated by alleged defects in consideration and quantification of employees' claims where those claims were partially admitted/rejected by the Liquidator and not challenged under Section 42; (ii) Whether the Appellants could challenge the approval of the Resolution Plan under Section 32 read with Section 61 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, notwithstanding their failure to challenge earlier partial rejection of claims; (iii) Whether the approved Resolution Plan provided for statutory employee dues (EPF, gratuity, earned leave) and afforded priority and enforceable payment mechanisms as required by law.
Issue (i): Whether approval of the Resolution Plan is vitiated by defects in consideration and quantification of employees' claims where claims were partially admitted/rejected by the Liquidator and not challenged.
Analysis: The Tribunal examined the record of claim verification under the insolvency code and the IBBI liquidation regulations, including requirements of Regulation 19 and Schedule II for proof of claims by workmen/employees, and the Liquidator's partial rejection order of September 2023. The Tribunal noted absence of compliant proof under Regulation 19 by the Appellants, the CoC's considered admission figures, the Form H compliance certificate and performance bank guarantee under Regulation 36B(4A), and that the Appellants did not avail statutory remedy under Section 42 to challenge the Liquidator's partial rejection. The Tribunal applied principles that verification and admission of claims under Sections 38 and 39 followed by non-challenge under Section 42 attain finality and that CoC approval based on those admissions (with 100% voting) is not susceptible to re-examination on merits.
Conclusion: Approval of the Resolution Plan is not vitiated; the contention fails and is against the Appellants.
Issue (ii): Whether the Appellants could challenge the approval of the Resolution Plan under Section 32 read with Section 61 notwithstanding failure to challenge partial rejection of claims earlier.
Analysis: The Tribunal considered the statutory appeal routes and timing under the insolvency code and noted that the Appellants had an available remedy under Section 42 to contest the Liquidator's determination which they did not pursue. Given finality of the Liquidator's partial admissions and the CoC's unanimous approval, the Tribunal held that challenging the plan at the approval stage without having contested the claim determination is estopped by waiver and conduct. The Tribunal further observed that judicial interference with CoC commercial decisions is limited, especially where approval is by 100% voting and requisite compliance (including Form H and performance security) is on record.
Conclusion: The Appellants cannot successfully challenge plan approval under Section 32/61 after failing to challenge the Liquidator's partial rejection; the challenge fails and is against the Appellants.
Issue (iii): Whether the approved Resolution Plan provided for statutory employee dues and afforded priority and enforceable payment mechanisms.
Analysis: The Tribunal reviewed the impugned order and the Resolution Plan extract showing admitted claim amounts and amounts provided in the plan, including priority allocation for EPFO, gratuity and other employee dues, and the fact that EPF amounts had been paid. The Tribunal noted adjustments made from secured financial creditor recovery to meet mandatory payments under Section 53 read with Section 36(4)(a)(iii) and accepted assurances by Respondents to satisfy any marginal shortfall in gratuity/earned leave subject to RP's determination. The Tribunal also observed the availability of remedies (including enforcement under the Companies Act) if payments are not made as per the plan.
Conclusion: The Resolution Plan provided for statutory employee dues with priority and enforceable mechanisms; the Appellants' challenge on this ground fails and is against the Appellants.
Final Conclusion: The appellate challenge to the impugned order approving the Resolution Plan is dismissed; the CoC approval (by 100% voting) and the Adjudicating Authority's approval stand affirmed, and the Resolution Professional is to ensure payment in accordance with the approved plan and its terms.
Ratio Decidendi: Where claims of workmen/employees were verified and partially admitted by the Liquidator in accordance with regulation 19 and related verification provisions and not challenged under the statutory remedy, and where the Committee of Creditors approved the Resolution Plan with full voting and requisite compliance (including performance security and Form H), judicial review is limited and the plan approval will not be set aside for re examining commercial decisions or claim quantification absent demonstrable legal infirmity.
Issues: (i) Whether the Applicant is eligible to avail input tax credit (ITC) on input services used for construction of foundation and structural support for plant and machinery installed at the Applicant's factory for manufacture of lyophilized injectables in terms of Section 17(5)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
Analysis: The Authority examined the application, submissions, supporting documents, and the jurisdictional officer's comments. The Advance Ruling scheme under Section 95-97 contemplates a decision in relation to supplies being undertaken or proposed to be undertaken by the applicant. The material on record, including contractor ledgers and invoices, indicated that the construction of foundations and structural supports had been completed in the financial years 2023-24 and 2024-25 prior to filing of the application. The Authority observed that determining the quantum or admissibility of ITC on completed works would require on-site inspection and verification of books, contracts, measurements and invoices which cannot be undertaken in the advance ruling process for past/completed supplies. Consequently, the question falls outside the scope of an advance ruling which is limited to supplies being undertaken or proposed to be undertaken.
Conclusion: The Authority declined to extend a ruling on the eligibility of ITC for the completed foundation and structural support works because the matter relates to supplies already undertaken and not to supplies being undertaken or proposed to be undertaken; accordingly no ruling on the fiscal merits (ITC admissibility) is given.
Issues: (i) Whether the transactions described by the applicant are goods or services and their HSN/SAC classification with applicable GST rate; (ii) Whether the applicant's query on the category of business and documents to be maintained is admissible for advance ruling; (iii) Classification of time and value of supply for the applicant's transactions; (iv) Whether the applicant can obtain refund of tax from input tax credit (ITC) availed; (v) Whether the applicant should raise invoices as export/nil-rated/exempt/zero-rated and entitlement to refund of previously paid tax; (vi) Whether the applicant is required to register under GST given the cross-border movement of goods.
Issue (i): Whether the transactions are goods or services and the HSN/SAC classification with applicable GST rate.
Analysis: The applicant described dealing in household items but did not furnish specific and detailed descriptions of the goods/services sufficient to determine HSN codes or applicable rates. Classification under Section 97(2)(a) is admissible but requires particularised information to apply tariff headings and rates.
Conclusion: The authority could not classify the items or specify HSN/SAC codes and GST rates due to lack of specific details from the applicant.
Issue (ii): Whether the question on the category of business and documents to be maintained is within the scope of advance ruling under Section 97(2).
Analysis: Section 97(2) enumerates specific matters eligible for advance ruling. The question on the applicant's business category and document maintenance does not fall within clauses (a)-(g) of Section 97(2) and thus is not a permissible subject for advance ruling.
Conclusion: The question is not covered by Section 97(2) and is rejected as not admissible for advance ruling.
Issue (iii): Classification of time and value of supply for the applicant's transactions.
Analysis: Time of supply and value of supply are governed by Sections 12, 13 and 15 of the CGST Act, 2017 and related chapters. Determination requires transaction-specific facts; the authority observed the pertinent statutory tests but could not classify time and value generically for the applicant without application to each transaction.
Conclusion: Time and value of supply cannot be generally classified by the authority; the applicant must determine them for each transaction in accordance with Sections 12, 13 and 15 of the CGST Act, 2017.
Issue (iv): Whether the applicant can obtain refund of tax from ITC availed.
Analysis: Admissibility of refunds is not among the matters covered by clauses (a)-(g) of Section 97(2) for advance ruling. Refund eligibility must be determined by the proper/jurisdictional officer on an appropriate refund application.
Conclusion: The question on entitlement to refund from ITC is not admissible for advance ruling and is rejected.
Issue (v): Whether invoices should be raised as export/nil-rated/exempt/zero-rated and entitlement to refund of previously paid tax.
Analysis: The question of proper invoicing designation and retrospective refund entitlement does not fall within Section 97(2)(a)-(g) and requires factual and procedural adjudication by the jurisdictional authorities; hence not admissible for advance ruling.
Conclusion: The question is not admissible for advance ruling and is rejected.
Issue (vi): Whether the applicant is required to register under GST given that goods are procured and delivered outside India while invoices are raised on an Indian entity.
Analysis: Schedule III paragraph 7 excludes supply of goods from a place in the non-taxable territory to another place in the non-taxable territory where goods do not enter India. However, Schedule II paragraph 1(a) treats transfer of title in goods as supply of goods. Here the applicant raises invoice on an Indian recipient (transfer of title between persons in India) even though physical movement occurs outside India; therefore the transaction constitutes supply within the taxable territory and attracts GST registration and tax liability.
Conclusion: GST is applicable to the applicant's described transactions and the applicant is required to register under GST.
Final Conclusion: The Authority has partially answered the questions: specific classification (HSN/SAC and rates), time and value determinations could not be given due to lack of particulars and must be determined transaction-wise by the applicant; questions outside the scope of Section 97(2) (business category, document maintenance, refund entitlement, invoicing designation and retrospective refund) are rejected as inadmissible for advance ruling; however, on the material before it the Authority concludes that the described transactions amount to supply of goods between persons in India and therefore attract GST registration and tax liability.
Ratio Decidendi: Where transfer of title in goods is effected between persons located in India, the transaction constitutes a supply within the taxable territory under Schedule II paragraph 1(a) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and GST registration and liability arise notwithstanding that physical movement of goods occurs outside India.
Issues: (i) Whether the show cause notice under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act was issued within the mandatory six month period and, if not, whether adjudication proceedings must be dropped and the seized goods returned.
Analysis: The Court examined the factual and procedural dispute limited to the timing and service of the show cause notice under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act. The petitioner's case is that the mandatory six month period for issuing the show cause notice was not complied with; the department contends service was effected by email. The adjudication proceedings remain pending before the Adjudicating Authority and evidence concerning issuance and service can be led there. The Court directed that any plea on time-bar and evidence in support be considered by the Adjudicating Authority and that the Authority decide the matter in accordance with law within six months, without being influenced by prior High Court observations.
Conclusion: The Special Leave Petitions are disposed of with the direction that the Adjudicating Authority consider any plea and evidence regarding compliance with Section 110(2) and decide the adjudication on merits within six months.
Issues: (i) Whether M/s. Nihilent Limited was a valid comparable for benchmarking software development services; (ii) whether corporate guarantee given to an associated enterprise constituted an international transaction and the appropriate arm's length commission; (iii) whether expenditure on hardware and software consumables was capital in nature; (iv) whether foreign tax credit was allowable in India on dividend income from Oman although no tax was actually paid there.
Issue (i): Whether M/s. Nihilent Limited was a valid comparable for benchmarking software development services
Analysis: The company's annual report showed diversified activities, including enterprise transformation, digital transformation, enterprise IT services and other consultancy-oriented operations. Segmental information for a pure software development profile was not available, and the company was not shown to be a routine software development service provider. The conclusion was supported by earlier co-ordinate bench decisions excluding the company on functional grounds.
Conclusion: M/s. Nihilent Limited was rightly excluded as a comparable, against the Revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether corporate guarantee given to an associated enterprise constituted an international transaction and the appropriate arm's length commission
Analysis: In view of the statutory expansion of the definition of international transaction, corporate guarantee to an associated enterprise falls within section 92B. For benchmarking, bank guarantee rates cannot be directly transplanted to corporate guarantees because the risk profile and commercial setting are different. The rate of 0.5% was consistent with the binding and persuasive precedents relied upon.
Conclusion: Corporate guarantee was correctly treated as an international transaction and 0.5% was correctly adopted, against the Revenue.
Issue (iii): Whether expenditure on hardware and software consumables was capital in nature
Analysis: The materials showed that the purchases were made for supply and use in customer contracts as consumables forming part of the executed work. The expenditure did not result in acquisition of an enduring asset or an intangible advantage in the hands of the assessee. It was therefore not capital expenditure.
Conclusion: The expenditure was rightly treated as revenue expenditure, against the Revenue.
Issue (iv): Whether foreign tax credit was allowable in India on dividend income from Oman although no tax was actually paid there
Analysis: The treaty allowed credit for tax paid or deemed to have been paid under the Omani tax incentives. The clarificatory letter issued by the Omani authorities was not a taxpayer-specific precondition. The treaty did not require each taxpayer to obtain a separate certificate, and the Supreme Court authority recognised entitlement to credit in such circumstances.
Conclusion: Foreign tax credit was allowable and the disallowance was incorrect, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The transfer pricing comparability challenge and the claim for foreign tax credit succeeded for the assessee, while the Revenue's objections to the corporate guarantee adjustment and the revenue nature of the hardware and software expenditure failed.
Ratio Decidendi: A company engaged in diversified consultancy and IT-enabled transformation activities without segmental software-development data is not a valid comparable for a routine software development service provider; corporate guarantees to associated enterprises are international transactions and may be benchmarked at a reasonable commission rate; and treaty-based foreign tax credit cannot be denied by importing a taxpayer-specific certification requirement not found in the treaty.
Issues: Whether Rule 86A of the Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits the Commissioner or an officer authorised by him to block a taxpayer's Electronic Credit Ledger by an amount exceeding the input tax credit available in the ledger at the time of issuance of the blocking order.
Analysis: Rule 86A authorises provisional restriction on debit from the Electronic Credit Ledger where (i) input tax credit is available in the ledger, (ii) the Commissioner or an authorised officer has reason to believe that such credit has been fraudulently availed or is ineligible, and (iii) reasons are recorded in writing. The provision's opening part sets out conditions precedent to invocation; the later part prescribes the consequences when those conditions are satisfied. Judicial decisions cited establish that the power under Rule 86A presupposes the existence of credit in the ECL and permits restriction only to an amount equivalent to the credit claimed to be fraudulent or ineligible. Rule 86A is a provisional, remedial measure and does not authorise making debit entries that create a permanent negative balance; statutory recovery and determination of wrongly availed credit are governed by Sections 73 and 74 of the CGST Act. Accordingly, blocking that results in a negative balance exceeding available ITC is beyond the scope of Rule 86A.
Conclusion: Rule 86A cannot be invoked to block or disallow debit from a taxpayer's Electronic Credit Ledger in excess of the input tax credit available in the ledger at the time of the order. Orders/entries that disallow debit from the ECL in excess of the available ITC are set aside. The writ petition is allowed in these terms in favour of the petitioner.
Issues: Whether dishonour of a cheque on account of unauthenticated alteration in the amount constitutes an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and whether the question as to which party made the material alteration can be determined at the interlocutory stage.
Analysis: The legal framework includes Section 138 (dishonour of cheque) and Section 87 (effect of material alteration) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in decisions such as Lakshmi Dyechem and Veera Exports. If an act or omission by the drawer is intended to prevent the cheque from being honoured (for example, by unauthenticated overwriting or by appending a mismatching signature), the resulting dishonour may fall within Section 138 subject to satisfaction of other statutory conditions including service of notice. An alteration in the amount is a material alteration under Section 87; whether the alteration was made by the drawer or by the payee (with or without the drawer's consent) is a question of fact requiring evidence at trial. Where the drawer fails to respond to the statutory demand notice, the determination of who effected the alteration becomes a matter for trial.
Conclusion: Dishonour of a cheque due to an unauthenticated material alteration can constitute an offence under Section 138 if the alteration was made by the drawer with the intention to prevent the cheque being honoured; the issue of which party made the alteration is a factual question to be decided at trial and cannot be finally determined at the interlocutory stage.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether capital gains arising from the transfer connected with the first-floor unit (agreed to be sold prior to completion and possession) were liable to be assessed as short-term capital gains by treating the unit as a "new asset" held and transferred within three years, or as long-term capital gains on transfer of a capital asset/right arising under the development arrangement.
(ii) Whether the amount paid towards construction of the area required to be provided to the original lessor under the lease obligation was deductible in computing capital gains as an allowable expenditure connected with the transfer.
(iii) Whether exemption under section 54(2) could be allowed where unutilized capital gains were placed in term deposits with a nationalized bank (not expressly under the Capital Gain Deposit Scheme), but were subsequently utilized for construction/finishing/extension of the residential house within the stipulated time, with the utilization and purpose not being disputed.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
(i) Characterisation of gains on transfer relating to the first-floor unit: short-term vs long-term; treatment as "new asset"
Legal framework: The Court examined the application of section 54(1)(ii) in the context of treating a unit as a "new asset" and taxing gains as short-term when the "new asset" is transferred within three years of its purchase/construction, as applied by the revenue authorities.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court focused on the factual finding that the agreement for sale of the first-floor unit was entered into much before completion of the building and before the assessee received possession of the allocated flats. The developer, under the tripartite arrangement, was obligated to complete construction and to hand over possession directly to the buyer. The Court found that possession of the first-floor unit was never received by the assessee, and the buyer acquired and possessed it during construction. The Court held that assessing the transaction as if the assessee held and transferred a completed "new asset" was based on conjecture and contrary to the material facts, particularly because the developer delivered possession directly to the buyer and the conveyance was executed accordingly.
Conclusions: The Court concluded that the revenue authorities erred in computing profit on the transfer of the first-floor unit as short-term capital gain by treating it as a "new asset" held by the assessee. The Court held that the assessee had correctly computed the gain as long-term capital gain, and directed that the amount assessed as short-term capital gain be treated as long-term capital gain, setting aside the contrary view.
(ii) Deductibility of expenditure incurred to provide constructed area to the original lessor while computing capital gains
Legal framework: The Court considered deduction of expenditure in computation of capital gains in light of the assessee's obligation under the lease arrangement, and the disallowance made by applying the view that the obligation was "personal" and not linked to transfer.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found that the lease terms imposed an existing obligation on the assessee to provide a specified constructed area to the original lessor upon redevelopment after demolition. The Court accepted that the expenditure was incurred to fulfil a binding obligation embedded in the lease arrangement governing the property under development. On that basis, the Court treated the cost as necessarily incurred under obligation and therefore allowable while computing the gain from the property.
Conclusions: The Court set aside the disallowance and directed deletion of the addition, holding that the construction cost incurred for the area to be provided to the lessor was allowable in computation of capital gains.
(iii) Eligibility of exemption under section 54(2) where deposit was in bank term deposits not expressly under CGDS, but amount was later utilized for eligible construction purposes
Legal framework: The Court examined section 54(2), noting the requirement that unutilized capital gains (not appropriated or utilized before filing the return under section 139) should be deposited in an account maintained in accordance with the Capital Gain Deposit Scheme, to be utilized as per the scheme.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court acknowledged that the assessee made term deposits in a nationalized bank without specifying the CGDS. However, it emphasized that the intention from inception was to utilize the funds towards construction-related activity for the residential house (including super finishes and extension), and that subsequent utilization for such construction purposes was not disputed. The Court treated the lapse of not depositing under the specific scheme as technical in nature in the circumstances, and held that the purpose and actual utilization within the stipulated time were decisive for allowing the benefit.
Conclusions: The Court set aside the denial of exemption and directed allowance of the claimed amount under section 54(2), holding that exemption could not be denied merely because the deposit was not explicitly under CGDS when the funds were demonstrably and undisputedly used for eligible construction within time.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether, for computing long-term capital gain, the "full value of consideration" should be taken as the stamp duty value reduced by the amount paid to confirming parties, where such payment was made out of the transaction proceeds.
(ii) What fair market value (FMV) as on 01.04.1981 should be adopted for the inherited land for purposes of computing indexed cost, where the Assessing Officer and the assessee relied on different per-square-meter rates.
(iii) Whether indexation should be applied with reference to the cost inflation index as on 01.04.1981 (CII 100) rather than a later year linked to an aborted agreement, when the property was admittedly inherited in 1981.
(iv) Whether the assessee is entitled to relief for investment in a new residential flat (jointly purchased), and how such relief should be given while recomputing long-term capital gain.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Treatment of payment to confirming parties while determining consideration for capital gains
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that although the stamp duty valuation was higher than the stated sale consideration, a substantial amount was paid to confirming parties who had earlier entered into an agreement to purchase the land. The Court held that, if stamp duty valuation is adopted for computation, the payment made to confirming parties cannot be ignored because it affects the amount attributable to the actual sellers/co-owners from the transaction.
Conclusion: The Court directed that, for computation of long-term capital gain, the consideration should be taken at Rs. 1,79,00,000/- (i.e., stamp duty value of Rs. 2,79,00,000/- reduced by Rs. 1,00,00,000/- paid to confirming parties), and the assessee's proportionate share should be applied to such figure.
Issue (ii): Adoption of FMV as on 01.04.1981 for inherited land
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found that the Assessing Officer adopted a lower per-square-meter rate than the assessee's valuation report, and considered that adopting a "middle path" would better serve real adjudication and substantial justice. It therefore chose a compromise FMV rate between the two competing rates to resolve the factual valuation dispute without prolonging litigation.
Conclusion: The Court directed the Assessing Officer to adopt FMV as on 01.04.1981 at Rs. 17.50 per sq. mtr. for purposes of computing the cost of acquisition and indexation, and then recompute the assessee's long-term capital gain on a proportionate basis.
Issue (iii): Base year for indexation where property was inherited in 1981 and a later agreement was aborted
Legal framework (as discussed): The Court examined the competing use of cost inflation index figures and the rationale for selecting the relevant base year for indexation in the facts of an inherited property.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted that the property was inherited in 1981 and found no logic in applying the cost inflation index of a later year merely because of an agreement executed in that later period, particularly when that agreement was described as aborted. The Court therefore preferred indexation from 01.04.1981.
Conclusion: The Court directed that indexation be computed by adopting CII 100 as on 01.04.1981 (and not CII 172 of FY 1989-90) while recomputing the long-term capital gain.
Issue (iv): Relief for investment in a new residential flat (joint purchase)
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated the claim of investment in a new flat as plausible on the record, noting that the assessee had intimated such investment and that the purchase was joint with a brother, with the assessee's share quantified. The Court held that relief should be granted in recomputation, but linked it to verification of the alternative claim regarding the new flat investment.
Conclusion: The Court directed the Assessing Officer, while recomputing long-term capital gain, to give relief in respect of Rs. 11,15,320/- invested in the jointly purchased new property, subject to verification as required in implementing the direction.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether interest paid for delayed deposit/remittance of TDS under section 201(1A) is allowable as a deduction as business expenditure under section 37(1).
(ii) Whether payments made to an overseas technical expert engaged for the project were in substance "salary" (employer-employee relationship) requiring TDS under section 192, and consequently disallowable under section 40(a)(i) for non-deduction.
(iii) Whether the disallowance of certain head-office staff reimbursements (treated by the assessment order as disallowable) required fresh adjudication due to absence of a clear finding on the evidences noted.
(iv) Whether bank guarantee/performance bond guarantee charges are subject to TDS under section 194H as "commission or brokerage", and consequently disallowable under section 40(a) for non-deduction.
(v) Whether a ground challenging mere initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A is maintainable at the assessment-appeal stage.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Allowability of interest under section 201(1A) as business expenditure
Legal framework: The Court examined deduction under section 37(1) in relation to interest paid under section 201(1A) for delayed remittance of TDS.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated the decisive question as whether such interest assumes the character of business expenditure. It preferred the reasoning of a High Court authority discussed in the order, and noted that a contrary Tribunal decision relied upon by the assessee had not considered that binding principle. The Court accepted the view that interest under section 201(1A) takes colour from the nature of the underlying levy connected with income-tax/TDS obligations and therefore does not qualify as a compensatory business outgo for section 37(1) purposes.
Conclusion: Interest paid under section 201(1A) for delayed remittance of TDS is not allowable as a deduction under section 37(1); the disallowance was upheld.
Issue (ii): Characterisation of payment to overseas expert-salary vs independent consultancy; disallowance under section 40(a)(i)
Legal framework: The Court examined whether TDS was required under section 192 (salary) and, upon failure, whether disallowance under section 40(a)(i) was attracted.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the determinative test is the substance of the working relationship emerging from contractual terms and conduct, not labels used by parties. On examining the agreement, it found features aligning with employment: reporting to a managerial hierarchy, receipt of instructions, exclusive full-time assignment, entitlement to leave subject to approval, placement as team leader within the organisational framework, and a monthly fixed remuneration structure. The Court rejected the assessee's reliance on GST reverse charge treatment as non-determinative for income-tax characterisation.
Conclusion: The payment was treated as salary attracting TDS under section 192; since TDS was not deducted, the disallowance under section 40(a)(i) was upheld.
Issue (iii): Disallowance relating to head-office staff reimbursements-need for remand
Legal framework: The Court considered whether the expense disallowance required re-adjudication where evidences were stated to have been furnished but no clear finding existed on the claim.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that relevant factual assertions and evidences were recorded in the directions, yet there was no clear finding/adjudication on the specific disallowance in question. Given this absence of a conclusive determination on the merits despite reference to materials, the Court considered it appropriate, in the interest of justice, to restore the matter for fresh examination with opportunity to the assessee to substantiate its claim with supporting documents (including those already placed earlier).
Conclusion: The issue was set aside/remanded to the assessing authority for fresh adjudication; the ground was allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue (iv): TDS on bank guarantee/performance bond guarantee charges-applicability of section 194H and disallowance under section 40(a)
Legal framework: The Court examined whether such charges constitute "commission or brokerage" requiring TDS under section 194H, and whether non-deduction triggers disallowance under section 40(a).
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court adopted the reasoning of a coordinate bench decision applied in the judgment: issuance of a bank guarantee does not create a principal-agent relationship between the bank and the payer, which is a necessary condition for section 194H. On that basis, the Court held the guarantee charges cannot be treated as commission/brokerage for section 194H purposes. Consequently, failure to deduct TDS under section 194H could not justify disallowance under section 40(a).
Conclusion: No TDS was required under section 194H on bank guarantee/performance bond guarantee charges; the disallowance under section 40(a) was held unsustainable and deletion was directed (ground allowed for statistical purposes).
Issue (v): Maintainability of appeal against initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A
Legal framework: The Court considered whether a challenge lies against mere initiation of penalty proceedings.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that initiation of penalty is a consequential and preliminary step; the cause of action arises only upon passing of an actual penalty order. Therefore, an appellate challenge at this stage is premature.
Conclusion: The ground challenging initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A was held premature and dismissed as infructuous.
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