Loading...
By creating an account you can:
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
Issues: Whether the rejection of the petitioner's request for payment of tax arrears in instalments under Section 80 required reconsideration by the authority after affording a personal hearing, and whether interim protection should continue pending fresh orders.
Analysis: The request for instalment facility was rejected on the premise that the petitioner did not satisfy the conditions in Rule 158 of the Tamil Nadu Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017. The Court noted the petitioner's assertion that a substantial amount had already been paid, that a further payment was proposed, and that the rejection was passed without proper notice and hearing. Since the matter turned on a fresh consideration of the petitioner's entitlement to instalment relief and the factual position regarding arrears and recovery, the matter was sent back to the first respondent for reconsideration on merits after giving an opportunity of personal hearing. The Court also directed an additional payment and kept further proceedings pursuant to the garnishee notice in abeyance subject to compliance.
Conclusion: The impugned rejection was set aside for reconsideration, and the petitioner obtained a remand with interim protection subject to payment.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the adjudication order suffered from a jurisdictional error by confirming/creating a demand far in excess of the demand proposed in the show cause notice.
(ii) Whether the adjudication order was vitiated for violation of rules of natural justice, including non-confrontation of adverse material, non-supply of relied upon documents, and lack of due opportunity of hearing.
(iii) Whether, given the above defects, the Court should exercise writ jurisdiction to set aside the adjudication order and prescribe a fresh adjudication process rather than relegating the petitioner to the appellate remedy.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Adjudication beyond the show cause notice (jurisdictional error)
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated adjudication beyond the scope of the show cause notice as a jurisdictional infirmity. It noted that the show cause notice proposed a disputed demand of tax and penalty of Rs. 1,71,79,347.92, whereas the adjudication order determined demand at Rs. 9,42,21,714.94, which was "far and excess of the demand pressed to be confirmed".
Conclusion: The Court found that a jurisdictional error "may have crept in" because the adjudication created a demand greatly exceeding the proposed demand, rendering the order unsustainable.
Issue (ii): Violation of natural justice (non-confrontation of adverse material; lack of hearing; laconic order)
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted that adverse material was not confronted and that effective opportunity of hearing remained to be provided. It also found the impugned adjudication order to be "wholly laconic", reinforcing the conclusion that the process was unfair. The Court emphasized that where adverse material is used, the affected party must be enabled to object after being supplied the material and given an opportunity of hearing.
Conclusion: On account of the uncontroverted lack of opportunity and non-confrontation of adverse material, the adjudication order was set aside.
Issue (iii): Maintainability of writ despite availability of appeal; appropriate relief and remand directions
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that where a jurisdictional error or violation of natural justice exists, relegating the petitioner to the appellate authority would serve no useful purpose, and the petitioner remains entitled to seek extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. Given the defects found, the Court chose to quash the order and structure a fresh, time-bound opportunity-based adjudication process.
Conclusion: The Court disposed of the writ by setting aside the adjudication order and directing: (a) issuance of further notice in continuation of the original show cause notice within two weeks, annexing copies of all relied upon documents; (b) one month for filing detailed reply/objections; (c) personal hearing with 15 days' advance notice; and (d) expeditious conclusion of proceedings preferably within four months from issuance of the further notice, with petitioner's cooperation recorded.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the determination of the arm's length price (ALP) of payments for intra-group "management consultancy services" at NIL, without applying any of the prescribed transfer pricing methods and without comparable analysis, was sustainable.
(ii) Whether the assessee's benchmarking framework-primary reliance on "Other Method" with a corroborative aggregation-based TNMM analysis-was acceptable on the facts and material placed on record.
(iii) Whether, after the transfer pricing determination, an alternate disallowance under section 37(1) could survive in the present facts where such disallowance was directed by the DRP though not proposed in the draft assessment order and without notice, and where the ALP adjustment itself was deleted.
(iv) Whether additional legal grounds could be admitted when they raised pure questions of law not requiring fresh fact-finding.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (iv): Admission of additional legal grounds
Legal framework: The Tribunal considered that additional grounds may be admitted where they are legal in nature, directly connected with validity of proceedings, and do not require investigation of new facts, applying the principle recognised in binding Supreme Court authorities cited and followed by the Tribunal.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal found that the additional grounds raised were legal issues and could be adjudicated on the existing record without verification of fresh facts. The opposition did not show any statutory bar to such admission.
Conclusion: The additional grounds were admitted.
Issue (i) & (ii): Sustainability of NIL ALP for management consultancy services and acceptance of assessee's benchmarking
Legal framework (as discussed by the Tribunal): The Tribunal examined the statutory mandate that ALP must be determined by applying one of the prescribed methods under sections 92C/92CA read with Rules 10B and 10C, including the requirement of method selection and benchmarking based on reliable data and comparability. The Tribunal also evaluated the matter through OECD-based principles expressly relied upon and applied in its reasoning, including acceptability of aggregation for closely linked transactions and the benefit-based understanding of intra-group services.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal held that the assessee's benchmarking in its transfer pricing study-using "Other Method" as primary method and a corroborative TNMM aggregation as cross-validation-was consistent with the statutory framework and the OECD principles applied by the Tribunal. The Tribunal accepted that the services formed part of an integrated suite of support functions linked with the assessee's operations and that aggregation for corroboration was permissible on these facts. It further found that the assessee had placed substantial documentation on record evidencing the nature of services and commercial relevance, and that the TPO neither undertook a cogent examination rebutting this material nor applied any prescribed method or identified any comparable uncontrolled transaction. The Tribunal concluded that determining ALP at NIL merely on alleged insufficiency of benefit/value demonstration, without applying a recognised method or comparable analysis, was inconsistent with the Act/Rules as applied by the Tribunal. The Tribunal also noted that the TPO had not verified the benchmarking contained in the transfer pricing study.
Conclusions: (a) The NIL ALP determination was unsustainable and the transfer pricing adjustment was deleted. (b) The Tribunal directed the AO/TPO to verify the assessee's benchmarking contained in the transfer pricing study by applying the "Other Method" as the primary method, while keeping in view the corroborative TNMM results as supportive validation. The related grounds were allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue (iii): Survival of alternate disallowance under section 37(1) directed by the DRP
Legal framework (as discussed by the Tribunal): The Tribunal addressed the propriety of the DRP directing an alternate disallowance under section 37(1) where such addition was not proposed in the draft assessment order and where the assessee alleged lack of opportunity/notice. The Tribunal also considered the relationship between a transfer pricing adjustment on an AE transaction and parallel disallowance under general deduction provisions in the facts as decided.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Tribunal found from the record that no section 37 disallowance was proposed in the draft assessment order and that the DRP issued directions for an alternate addition without issuing notice. Independently, the Tribunal held that, in view of its findings deleting the NIL ALP adjustment and accepting the assessee's benchmarking framework (subject to verification), no further adjustment under the general deduction provisions could survive on the same payment in the present facts.
Conclusion: The additional grounds challenging the alternate section 37 disallowance/directions were allowed, and the Tribunal held that no such further disallowance would survive.
Issues: Whether the payment made to the labour union was incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business and was allowable as a deduction under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
Analysis: The payment was examined in the light of the surrounding labour dispute, the memorandum of settlement, and the assessee's claim that the amount was paid to facilitate resolution of workmen issues and ensure uninterrupted business operations. The record showed that the settlement was entered into with the assistance of the labour union, covered identified workmen of the assessee, and resulted in agreed terms for resignation and payment of dues and ex gratia amounts. On these facts, the expenditure was found to have a direct nexus with the assessee's business activities and to satisfy the test of commercial expediency.
Conclusion: The payment was held to be allowable as business expenditure under section 37(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the disallowance was deleted.
Final Conclusion: The addition made on account of the labour-union payment could not be sustained, and the assessee succeeded in the appeal.
Ratio Decidendi: An expenditure incurred to facilitate a genuine labour settlement and to secure smooth business operations, with a demonstrable business nexus, may qualify as deductible business expenditure if it is laid out wholly and exclusively for business purposes.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(i) Whether the appellate order dismissing the appeal under the tax statute was vitiated for absence of reasons and for not specifying the "necessary documents" allegedly missing, despite the assessee's written representation being on record.
(ii) Whether, in deciding the appeal, the Appellate Authority was required to consider the effect of ITC claimed in the annual return (Form GSTR-9) and address the assessee's contention regarding adjustment/offset of such ITC against the demanded CGST and SGST, and whether the failure to do so warranted judicial interference.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (i): Validity of the appellate order on the ground of non-speaking reasons and vague findings
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined the appellate order and found that the Appellate Authority rejected the assessee's plea by stating it was "devoid of logic, facts & proper explanation" and that relief could not be granted "in absence of necessary documents" and "representation". The Court held that such conclusions were reached without explaining why the plea lacked logic or facts, and without identifying what specific documents were required but missing. The Court further found the observation about absence of representation to be incorrect because a written representation before the Appellate Authority was annexed with the writ petition.
Conclusion: The appellate order was set aside for want of an informed, reasoned decision and for recording unsupported/vague findings regarding absence of documents and representation.
Issue (ii): Duty to consider ITC claimed in annual return (GSTR-9) and the assessee's offset contention
Legal framework (as discussed in the judgment): The controversy arose from proceedings under Section 73, appeal under Section 107, and the assessee's claim of ITC through the annual return (GSTR-9). The Court noted a prior Division Bench view emphasizing consideration of particulars in GSTR-9 so that filing an annual return does not become redundant.
Interpretation and reasoning: The assessee's consistent case was that ITC relating to IGST for certain months was missed in monthly returns (GSTR-3B) but later claimed in the annual return (GSTR-9), and that such ITC should be considered and offset against the demand of CGST and SGST, leaving only a reduced differential liability. The Court found that the Appellate Authority did not indicate why ITC claimed in GSTR-9 would not benefit the assessee, nor why such amount could not be considered for offset against the demand. This omission, coupled with the lack of reasons, rendered the appellate decision unsustainable.
Conclusion: The matter required reconsideration by the Appellate Authority with a reasoned determination addressing the effect of ITC claimed in GSTR-9 and the assessee's specific contentions; therefore, the Court remanded the appeal for fresh consideration in accordance with law, while expressly declining to decide the merits of entitlement.
Relief and directions flowing from the above determinations: The impugned appellate order was set aside and the appeal was remanded for fresh, informed decision-making. The assessee was permitted to file further representation/clarification within two weeks and to bring to the Appellate Authority's notice the asserted payment of the differential tax amount. The Court clarified it had not adjudicated the substantive entitlement, leaving the Appellate Authority free to decide on merits with reasons.
Issues: Whether the imported OTG component kit, lacking the front glass door assembly and power cord/plug sourced domestically, was classifiable as a complete or essentially complete oven under tariff item 8516.60.00 by application of Rule 2(a) of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the First Schedule to the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, or as parts under tariff item 8516.90.00.
Analysis: Heading 8516 covers electro-thermic domestic appliances, while tariff item 8516.60.00 applies to complete ovens, cookers, grillers and roasters and tariff item 8516.90.00 covers parts. Section XVI Note 2(b) supports classification of parts suitable solely or principally with a particular machine under the relevant machine heading or parts heading. Rule 2(a) extends a heading to incomplete or unassembled articles only when, as presented, they have the essential character of the finished article. The imported kit had the approximate shape of an OTG and the components were dedicated to OTG use, but the consignment omitted components essential for operation and safe functioning, namely the glass door and power cord/plug. Without those items, the appliance could not retain heat or be connected to power and therefore was inoperative as an OTG in its imported state. The missing items were not merely minor accessories but functionally critical components, so the essential character of a finished OTG was absent. The settled approach to Rule 2(a) therefore did not support treating the goods as a complete appliance.
Conclusion: The imported goods were not classifiable as complete or essentially complete OTG appliances under tariff item 8516.60.00 and were correctly classifiable as parts under tariff item 8516.90.00.
Final Conclusion: The advance ruling was answered in favour of classification as parts, and the proposed imports were held to fall within tariff item 8516.90.00.
Ratio Decidendi: Rule 2(a) applies only when an incomplete or unassembled article, as presented, has the essential character of the finished article; where essential functional components are absent, the goods remain classifiable as parts.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, in writ petitions challenging orders-in-original on the ground of delayed adjudication, the Court should itself examine the delay or relegate the parties to the statutory appellate remedy in light of the order of the Supreme Court in relation to delayed adjudication.
1.2 Whether, where petitioners have bona fide pursued writ proceedings against orders-in-original, the statutory appeals filed thereafter should be entertained without being defeated on limitation.
1.3 What directions are appropriate in writ petitions where adjudication pursuant to show cause notices is still pending, in the context of the Supreme Court's order requiring deferment of consideration of the issue of delayed adjudication.
1.4 Whether the Court should examine the merits of the disputes or the contention of delayed adjudication in these petitions, or leave all such contentions open for adjudication by the statutory authorities.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Course to be adopted where orders-in-original are challenged on the ground of delayed adjudication
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court referred to its earlier disposition of a similar writ petition, where liberty had been granted to the petitioner to file an appeal against the order-in-original raising all permissible contentions, including delayed adjudication, and where the appellate authority was directed to act in accordance with law while taking cognisance of the Supreme Court's order dated 02 May 2025 in a pending special leave petition concerning delayed adjudication.
2.2 The Court noted that, by the Supreme Court's order dated 02 May 2025, courts have been required to defer consideration of the issue of delayed adjudication till disposal of the said special leave petition.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court held that, given the Supreme Court's specific direction to defer consideration of the issue of delayed adjudication, it would not be appropriate for it, in writ jurisdiction, to adjudicate upon that issue at this stage.
2.4 The Court reasoned that, in cases where orders-in-original have already been passed, delayed adjudication is not the only ground of challenge; if that ground were to fail, petitioners would still wish to agitate other grounds on merits.
2.5 The Court observed that it may not be possible or appropriate, in writ jurisdiction, to examine all such additional grounds on merits, whereas the appellate authority would be better placed to consider all grounds, including delayed adjudication, subject to the outcome of the Supreme Court proceedings.
2.6 For consistency with its earlier order in a comparable matter, and to align with the Supreme Court's directions, the Court adopted the same course of relegating petitioners to the appellate remedy instead of deciding the issue of delay itself.
Conclusions
2.7 The petitions relating to cases where orders-in-original had been passed were disposed of by granting liberty to file statutory appeals against the orders-in-original, with express liberty to raise all permissible contentions, including delayed adjudication, before the appellate authority.
2.8 The Court itself did not decide the issue of delayed adjudication, leaving it to be considered by the appellate authority in accordance with law and in light of the Supreme Court's order dated 02 May 2025 and subsequent orders in the pending special leave petition.
Issue 2: Treatment of limitation where writ petitions were bona fide pursued instead of statutory appeals
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Court recorded the petitioners' statement that they would file appeals within six weeks from the date of uploading of the order, complying with all prescribed formalities including pre-deposit.
2.10 Recognising that the petitioners had bona fide pursued writ remedies before the Court, the Court considered that penalising them on limitation for having taken that course would be inappropriate.
Conclusions
2.11 The Court directed that, if appeals are filed within six weeks from the date of the order, the appellate authority shall dispose of such appeals on their own merits without adverting to the issue of limitation.
2.12 The appellate authority was directed, while hearing such appeals, to take cognisance of the Supreme Court's order dated 02 May 2025 in respect of the issue of delayed adjudication.
Issue 3: Directions in cases where adjudication is still pending and orders-in-original are yet to be passed
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.13 The Court referred to the Supreme Court's order dated 02 May 2025 requiring that the issue of delayed adjudication be kept in abeyance until the special leave petition (concerning delayed adjudication) is decided.
2.14 The Court also referred to its own prior approach in similar matters where adjudication was pending, under which parties were relegated to seek deferment from the adjudicating authority in light of the Supreme Court's order.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.15 Given that final determinations on delayed adjudication are sub judice before the Supreme Court, the Court considered it appropriate not to interfere directly in the pending adjudication proceedings on that ground.
2.16 The Court held that the proper course is for the petitioners to apply to the adjudicating authority itself for deferment of proceedings, which authority must then decide such applications consistent with the Supreme Court's directions.
Conclusions
2.17 The petitions in which adjudication orders had not yet been issued were disposed of by granting liberty to the petitioners to apply to the adjudicating authority for deferment of adjudication proceedings on the ground of delayed adjudication.
2.18 The adjudicating authority was directed to consider such applications in the light of the Supreme Court's order dated 02 May 2025 and to take appropriate decisions thereon.
Issue 4: Scope of examination of merits and delayed adjudication by the Court
Interpretation and reasoning
2.19 The Court explicitly stated that it was not examining the merits of the parties' disputes or the contention regarding delayed adjudication, in view of the pending consideration of that issue before the Supreme Court and the availability of statutory forums competent to decide all issues.
2.20 The Court emphasised that all contentions, both on merits and regarding delayed adjudication, should remain open to be urged before the appellate authority (for completed adjudication) or the adjudicating authority (for pending adjudication), subject to the parameters set by the Supreme Court's order.
2.21 The Court also stressed the need for consistency with its earlier orders in similar matters and with the overarching directions of the Supreme Court, which guided its choice not to render any findings on the substantive disputes.
Conclusions
2.22 The Court declined to adjudicate on the merits of the disputes or to decide the issue of delayed adjudication, expressly leaving all such contentions open for consideration by the appropriate statutory authorities in accordance with law and subject to the Supreme Court's directions.
2.23 All interim applications were held to have become infructuous and were disposed of consequent upon the disposal of the writ petitions.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether questions relating to requirement or generation of e-way bill fall within the permissible scope of advance ruling under Section 97(2) of the CGST Act.
1.2 Whether the provisions regarding e-way bill, introduced through notifications and rules (including Rule 138 and related rules and state notifications), can be treated as questions on "applicability of a notification issued under the provisions of this Act" under Section 97(2)(b) of the CGST Act so as to confer jurisdiction on the Authority.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Scope of advance ruling under Section 97(2) and questions on e-way bill
Legal framework
2.1 The Court referred to Section 97(2) of the CGST Act, which exhaustively specifies the questions in respect of which an advance ruling may be sought, namely: (a) classification of goods or services; (b) applicability of a notification issued under the Act; (c) determination of time and value of supply; (d) admissibility of input tax credit; (e) determination of liability to pay tax; (f) whether the applicant is required to be registered; and (g) whether a particular activity amounts to "supply".
2.2 The Court noted that "matters related to e-way bill" are not enumerated in any of the clauses (a) to (g) of Section 97(2).
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court observed that the applicant sought rulings on: (i) whether it is compulsory to generate e-way bill for movement of goods between own godowns within the same State by an unregistered person; and (ii) whether it is compulsory to generate e-way bill when an unregistered person sells goods from his godown to an unregistered person within the State.
2.4 Examining Section 97(2), the Court found no express entry permitting advance ruling on compliance requirements relating to e-way bill. Since e-way bill provisions are not covered by any of the specified subject-matters, questions confined to e-way bill requirements fall outside the statutory jurisdiction of the Authority.
2.5 The Court also relied on its earlier decision in "Re: Jitendra Equipment", where it had already taken the view that e-way bill does not find mention in Section 97(2)(a) to (g) and that, consequently, the Authority should refrain from answering questions relating to e-way bill.
Conclusions
2.6 Questions relating to requirement or generation of e-way bill do not fall within any of the categories specified in Section 97(2) of the CGST Act.
2.7 The Authority lacks jurisdiction to answer questions solely pertaining to e-way bill compliance, and therefore refrains from answering both questions posed by the applicant.
Issue 2 - Whether e-way bill provisions fall under "applicability of a notification" in Section 97(2)(b)
Legal framework
2.8 The applicant relied on Notification No. 27/2017-CT dated 30.08.2017 (introducing e-way bill provisions, including Rules 138 and 138A-138F, made effective from 01.02.2018) and Notification No. 74/2017-CT dated 29.12.2017, as well as a State notification (Notification No. GSL/GST/Rule-138(14)/B.19 dated 19.09.2018) concerning e-way bill exemptions, to contend that their case falls under Section 97(2)(b) - "applicability of a notification issued under the provisions of this Act".
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Court rejected the contention that, merely because e-way bill rules were introduced by notification, any question about e-way bill automatically becomes a question on "applicability of a notification" under Section 97(2)(b).
2.10 The Court pointed out that all CGST Rules, 2017, have been introduced through notifications issued under Section 164 of the CGST Act (for example, initial rules via Notification No. 3/2017-CT dated 19.06.2017, and subsequent rules through further notifications). Accepting the applicant's argument would mean that any matter governed by any rule, and by extension most matters under the Act, could be brought within the ambit of advance ruling merely because the rule originated from a notification.
2.11 The Court held that such an expansive reading of Section 97(2)(b) would defeat the legislative intent of restricting advance ruling to the specific categories enumerated in clauses (a) to (g) of Section 97(2).
2.12 Regarding the State notification specifying cases where no e-way bill is to be generated, the Court held that once e-way bill matters are found to be outside the ambit of Section 97(2), any notification concerning applicability or non-applicability of e-way bill also cannot be brought within the scope of Section 97(2)(b).
Conclusions
2.13 The introduction or regulation of e-way bill provisions through notifications and rules does not, by itself, render questions on e-way bill as questions on "applicability of a notification" under Section 97(2)(b).
2.14 Notifications and rules relating to e-way bill do not confer jurisdiction on the Authority to entertain advance ruling applications on e-way bill requirements.
2.15 Consequently, the Authority declined to answer both questions regarding the compulsory generation of e-way bill for (i) intra-State movement between own godowns, and (ii) sales to unregistered persons within the State, and recorded them as "Not answered, for the reasons mentioned aforesaid."
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether an advance ruling can be given on the question whether receipt of consideration in the form of non-voting, irredeemable preference shares satisfies the requirement of "receipt of consideration in convertible foreign exchange" under Section 2(6)(iv) of the IGST Act, 2017.
(2) Consequentially, whether the Authority can determine the liability to pay GST on the supply of services (customization and licensing of a proprietary platform to an overseas client) when such determination is predicated upon the above question of mode of receipt of consideration.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Maintainability of question on mode and form of export consideration under Section 97(2) of the CGST Act, 2017
Interpretation and reasoning
(1) The applicant's core query was whether export proceeds received in the form of non-voting, irredeemable preference shares of a foreign entity would qualify as "receipt of consideration in convertible foreign exchange" as required under Section 2(6)(iv) of the IGST Act, 2017.
(2) The Authority noted that Rule 96A of the CGST Rules, 2017 permits export of services without payment of IGST under bond or Letter of Undertaking, subject to receipt of payment in convertible foreign currency within the prescribed period; failure to receive such payment results in liability to pay tax with interest.
(3) The Authority found that, for purposes of Rule 96A and Section 2(6)(iv) of the IGST Act, the primary question is whether preference shares received from the foreign entity can be treated as the requisite "convertible foreign exchange" consideration for export of services.
(4) The Authority examined Section 97(2) of the CGST Act, 2017, which exhaustively lists the questions on which advance ruling may be sought, namely: (a) classification; (b) applicability of notifications; (c) determination of time and value of supply; (d) admissibility of input tax credit; (e) determination of liability to pay tax; (f) requirement of registration; and (g) whether any activity amounts to supply.
(5) The Authority held that the applicant's primary question, concerning whether preference shares received from a foreign entity constitute "receipt of consideration in convertible foreign exchange" under Section 2(6)(iv) of the IGST Act, does not fall within any of the categories specified in Section 97(2).
(6) The Authority observed that, although the applicant attempted to bring the question within Section 97(2)(e) by framing it as one of determination of liability to pay tax, the true and primary issue remained the characterization of the mode of receipt of export proceeds, which is outside the statutorily permitted scope of advance ruling.
Conclusion
(7) The Authority concluded that it lacks jurisdiction under Section 97(2) of the CGST Act, 2017 to pronounce an advance ruling on whether receipt of non-voting, irredeemable preference shares satisfies the requirement of "receipt of consideration in convertible foreign exchange" under Section 2(6)(iv) of the IGST Act, 2017.
Issue (2): Ability to determine GST liability on export of services when the foundational question is outside Section 97(2)
Interpretation and reasoning
(8) The applicant also sought, as an ancillary aspect, a ruling that if such receipt of preference shares is treated as receipt of consideration under Section 2(6)(iv) of the IGST Act, there would be no liability to pay GST on the export of the said services.
(9) The Authority held that determination of liability to pay GST in this case is contingent upon a prior finding that the receipt of preference shares constitutes the requisite consideration in convertible foreign exchange.
(10) As the primary question on characterization of consideration is itself beyond the scope of Section 97(2) and cannot be answered, the Authority reasoned that it cannot proceed to answer the consequential question on tax liability.
Conclusion
(11) The Authority declined to answer the question regarding liability to pay GST on the supply of services (customization and licensing of the proprietary platform to the overseas client), since it is corollary to and dependent on a primary question that lies outside the statutory scope of questions permissible for advance ruling under Section 97(2) of the CGST Act, 2017.
Issues: (i) Whether PVC/plastic raincoats are classifiable under Chapter 39 as articles of plastics or under Chapter 62 as articles of apparel and clothing accessories; (ii) what rate of GST is leviable on PVC/plastic raincoats.
Issue (i): Whether PVC/plastic raincoats are classifiable under Chapter 39 as articles of plastics or under Chapter 62 as articles of apparel and clothing accessories.
Analysis: Chapter 39 expressly covers articles of plastics and the explanatory notes to heading 3926 include articles of apparel and clothing accessories made by sewing or sealing sheets of plastics, including raincoats. The product in question is manufactured from PVC sheets and the parts are heat-welded or chemically bonded, so it is not a woven textile fabric. Chapter 62 applies only to made up articles of textile fabric, and the claim that PVC raincoats are man-made fibre textile material was not accepted.
Conclusion: PVC/plastic raincoats are classifiable under HSN 3926 in Chapter 39 and fall under Entry No. 127 of Notification No. 9/2025-CT (R) dated 17.09.2025.
Issue (ii): What rate of GST is leviable on PVC/plastic raincoats.
Analysis: Once the goods are classified under Chapter 39, the applicable rate follows the entry prescribed for other articles of plastics rather than the concessional rate applicable to Chapter 62 apparel. On that classification, the product attracts GST at the rate prescribed for the relevant Chapter 39 entry.
Conclusion: The GST rate leviable on PVC/plastic raincoats is 18%.
Final Conclusion: The ruling rejects the applicant's claimed Chapter 62 classification and confirms taxability under Chapter 39 with the corresponding higher rate of GST.
Ratio Decidendi: PVC raincoats made from sealed or welded plastic sheets are classifiable as articles of plastics under Chapter 39 because Chapter 62 applies only to made up articles of textile fabric.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether a goods transport agency that has exercised the statutory option to pay tax under forward charge can discharge GST at the notified rate on its GTA services under the relevant rate and reverse charge notifications.
(2) Whether such goods transport agency, paying GST under forward charge, is entitled to avail full input tax credit on inputs including renewable hydrocarbon bio-diesel (Mileage Diesel) used as fuel in goods carriages, having regard to Sections 16 and 17(5) of the CGST Act and the conditions under the applicable rate notification.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Option for GTA to pay GST under forward charge at notified rate
Legal framework: The Court examined Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate), as amended (rate notification), particularly Entry 9(iii)(b) relating to "Services of Goods Transport Agency (GTA) in relation to transportation of goods", and the mechanism of option-declaration in Annexure V and reversion via Annexure VI. It also referred to Notification No. 13/2017-Central Tax (Rate), as amended (reverse charge notification), governing when GTA services are taxable under reverse charge, i.e., where the GTA does not exercise the option to pay tax itself.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that Entry 9(iii)(b) specifically permits a GTA to exercise an option to itself pay GST on the services supplied by it, by filing a declaration in Annexure V within the prescribed time window (1st January to 31st March of the preceding financial year, with special timelines for certain years and for new registrants). Once exercised, the option continues for subsequent financial years until the GTA files Annexure VI to revert to reverse charge. Within this option, two effective rate positions exist: (a) payment of GST at 5% where no input tax credit on goods and services used in supplying the GTA service is availed; or (b) payment of GST at 18% where credit is availed. The Court recorded that the applicant had filed Annexure V on 09.03.2023 opting for forward charge for FY 2023-24 and was charging GST at 12% earlier and 18% with effect from 22.09.2025, in line with the applicable rate structure under the notification as amended.
Conclusions: The Court held that, having validly exercised the option under Entry 9(iii)(b) of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) to pay tax under forward charge and complied with the Annexure V procedure, the GTA is entitled to discharge GST on its services at the applicable notified rate (12% prior to 22.09.2025 and 18% thereafter), subject to the conditions in the notification.
Issue (2): Entitlement to input tax credit on bio-diesel fuel used in trucks by GTA paying tax under forward charge
Legal framework: The Court considered Sections 16 and 17 of the CGST Act, 2017. Section 16(1) entitles every registered person, subject to prescribed conditions and restrictions, to take credit of input tax charged on any supply of goods or services or both to him which are used or intended to be used in the course or furtherance of his business. Section 16(2)-(4) lay down conditions for availing ITC (possession of tax invoice, receipt of goods or services, tax payment to Government, filing of returns, non-claim of depreciation on tax component, and time limits). Section 17(5) sets out "blocked credits", including restrictions linked to motor vehicles for transport of persons, but does not similarly block credit in relation to goods carriages. The Court also linked this to the conditions in Entry 9(iii)(b) of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate), which distinguish between the concessional rate without ITC and the standard rate with ITC.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found as a fact that the applicant is a GTA and that the input in question-renewable hydrocarbon bio-diesel (Mileage Diesel)-is used directly as fuel in trucks employed for providing taxable GTA services. It held that such fuel is clearly used "in the course or furtherance" of the GTA business within the meaning of Section 16(1), thereby satisfying the basic eligibility criterion for ITC. The Court then examined Section 17(5) to determine whether the fuel-related credit is blocked. It concluded that the statutory bar under Section 17(5) applies only with respect to motor vehicles for transport of persons and related goods/services, and not to goods carriages used for transportation of goods. Consequently, use of bio-diesel in goods carriage vehicles is not covered by any blocking provision. Accordingly, where the GTA has opted to pay tax under forward charge at the higher rate (18%), the notification scheme does not prohibit availing ITC on such fuel inputs, and the statutory provisions under Sections 16 and 17 do not block this credit.
Conclusions: The Court held that a GTA which has opted, under Entry 9(iii)(b) of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate), to pay GST on its services under forward charge at the applicable rate (12% prior to 22.09.2025 and 18% thereafter) is entitled to avail full input tax credit on bio-diesel used as fuel in its goods carriages. Such credit is admissible as the fuel is used in the course or furtherance of business and is not blocked under Section 17(5). This entitlement is subject to fulfilment of all other statutory conditions for ITC under Section 16 of the CGST Act and the specific conditions stipulated in Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate), as amended.
Issues: (i) Whether transportation of empty containers by rail by a Container Train Operator falls under Entry No. 9(i) of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) or Entry No. 9(iv), and what GST rate applies. (ii) Whether Entry No. 9(i) applies to transportation of empty containers only on compliance with the input tax credit restriction.
Issue (i): Whether transportation of empty containers by rail by a Container Train Operator falls under Entry No. 9(i) of Notification No. 11/2017-Central Tax (Rate) or Entry No. 9(iv), and what GST rate applies.
Analysis: Entry No. 9(iv) applies only where goods are transported in containers by rail by a person other than Indian Railways. Empty containers are not treated as goods being transported in containers for the purpose of that specific entry. In the absence of a specific entry for empty containers, the residual transport-by-rail entry under Entry No. 9(i) applies. The expression "goods" in Section 2(52) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was treated as wide enough to include empty containers.
Conclusion: Transportation of empty containers by rail is taxable at 5% under Entry No. 9(i), not 12% under Entry No. 9(iv).
Issue (ii): Whether Entry No. 9(i) applies to transportation of empty containers only on compliance with the input tax credit restriction.
Analysis: Entry No. 9(i) carries a condition that credit of input tax charged in respect of goods used in supplying the service is not utilised for payment of central tax or integrated tax on the supply of the service. That restriction was treated as mandatory for the concessional rate under the said entry.
Conclusion: Entry No. 9(i) applies only if the applicant does not avail or utilise the relevant input tax credit while charging GST at 5%.
Final Conclusion: The ruling recognizes empty containers as falling under the general rail-transport entry and grants the concessional rate of GST, while also requiring compliance with the prescribed input tax credit condition.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a specific notification entry does not expressly cover a service, the general entry applies, and the term "goods" may include empty containers for the purpose of classifying rail transport services under GST.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether input tax credit is admissible on integrated tax paid as differential IGST pursuant to a pre-consultation letter issued under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, when such tax is paid through a duty challan (TR-6) and not by reassessment of the original bill of entry.
(2) If such input tax credit were otherwise admissible, whether its availment would be barred by the time limit prescribed in Section 16(4) of the CGST Act, 2017.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Admissibility of ITC on differential IGST paid on the basis of pre-consultation letter / TR-6 challan
Legal framework discussed
(a) Section 16(2)(a) of the CGST Act, 2017 - requiring possession of a tax invoice, debit note, or "such other tax paying documents as may be prescribed" for entitlement to input tax credit.
(b) Rule 36(1) of the CGST Rules, 2017 - prescribing the documents on the basis of which input tax credit may be availed, including under clause (d) "a bill of entry or any similar document prescribed under the Customs Act, 1962 or rules made thereunder for the assessment of integrated tax on imports".
(c) Circular No. 16/2023-Customs dated 07.06.2023 - explaining, post Supreme Court directions, that:
* ICES has no functionality to collect additional customs duties on a bill of entry after Out-of-Charge except where there is provisional assessment; such post-OOC payments are made only through TR-6 challan.
* Under GST law, the bill of entry for assessment of IGST/Compensation Cess on imports is a prescribed document for ITC; a TR-6 challan is not.
* The prescribed procedure, where additional IGST/cess is payable, is to cancel OOC, reassess the bill of entry, pay tax and interest against an electronic challan generated in the Customs EDI system, and then issue a notional OOC so that the revised bill of entry data (including IGST and its date of payment) transmits to the GSTN portal and reflects for ITC as per GST provisions.
Interpretation and reasoning
(i) The authority bifurcated the applicant's single question into two parts, holding that it must first determine whether any ITC is admissible on the basis of the pre-consultation letter and duty challan, before considering the limitation under Section 16(4).
(ii) The pre-consultation letter issued under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act and the TR-6 challan evidencing payment of the differential IGST do not figure as prescribed documents in Section 16(2)(a) of the CGST Act or Rule 36(1) of the CGST Rules.
(iii) On the applicant's contention that such documents are covered by Rule 36(1)(d) as "any similar document" to a bill of entry:
* The expression "any similar document" in Rule 36(1)(d) must be read ejusdem generis with "bill of entry".
* The "similar document" contemplated is of the same class as a bill of entry, such as courier bills of entry or other declarations/forms prescribed under the Customs Act or rules "for the assessment of integrated tax on imports".
* A pre-consultation letter, being a communication issued prior to issuance of a show cause notice under Section 28, is not an assessment document and cannot be equated with a bill of entry or similar assessment document.
* Likewise, a duty-paying document such as a TR-6 challan is only a mode of payment and is not a prescribed assessment document for ITC purposes.
(iv) With reference to Circular No. 16/2023-Customs, the Tribunal observed that:
* Post-OOC additional duty payments via TR-6 challan are not, by themselves, documents that enable availment of ITC under the GST framework.
* The only recognised route for the additional IGST to become eligible for ITC is reassessment of the bill of entry by Customs, followed by electronic transmission of the reassessed bill of entry to the GSTN portal so that the increased IGST reflects in GSTR-2B.
* In the present case, the applicant did not follow such reassessment procedure; instead, the differential IGST was paid merely against the pre-consultation letter by way of a challan.
(v) The authority found support for this view from:
* The advance ruling in Re: Mitsubishi Electric India Pvt. Ltd., where ITC on IGST paid as differential customs duty was held inadmissible and questions on time limit and documents were declined once inadmissibility was found.
* The ruling in Re: Becton Dickinson India Private Limited, where the Authority (upheld by Appellate AAR) held that neither a TR-6 challan alone, nor a TR-6 challan read with SVB orders or letters, constitutes an eligible document for ITC.
Conclusions on Issue (1)
(a) A pre-consultation letter under Section 28(1) of the Customs Act is not a prescribed document under Section 16(2) of the CGST Act read with Rule 36(1) of the CGST Rules for availment of ITC.
(b) A TR-6 challan or similar duty-paying challan evidencing payment of differential IGST is not a "bill of entry or any similar document" within the meaning of Rule 36(1)(d), and is therefore not a valid tax-paying document for ITC.
(c) Consequently, input tax credit cannot be availed on the differential IGST of Rs. 27,14,559/- paid by the applicant on the basis of the pre-consultation letter and corresponding duty challan.
Issue (2): Applicability of time limit under Section 16(4) of the CGST Act to such ITC
Interpretation and reasoning
(i) The Tribunal noted that this issue is only a corollary to the first, and would arise for consideration only if ITC were otherwise found to be admissible.
(ii) Having held under Issue (1) that the applicant is not entitled to ITC on the differential IGST paid on the basis of the pre-consultation letter/TR-6 challan, the Tribunal considered it unnecessary to examine whether any such credit would be hit by the time limit prescribed under Section 16(4) of the CGST Act.
(iii) Reliance was placed on the approach adopted in Re: Mitsubishi Electric India Pvt. Ltd., where, once ITC was held inadmissible, the authority declined to answer questions on the limitation and validity of documents for such ITC.
Conclusions on Issue (2)
(a) Since ITC on the differential IGST itself is held to be inadmissible, the question of applying the time limit under Section 16(4) of the CGST Act, 2017 does not arise and is not answered.
Issues: (i) Whether supply of goods to Anand Municipality Corporation for fresh waste processing is exempt from GST under Notification No. 12/2017-CT(R) dated 28.06.2017. (ii) If GST is payable, what is the applicable rate on the goods supplied.
Issue (i): Whether supply of goods to Anand Municipality Corporation for fresh waste processing is exempt from GST under Notification No. 12/2017-CT(R) dated 28.06.2017.
Analysis: The exemption under Serial No. 3 applies only to pure services provided to a Governmental or local authority in relation to functions entrusted under Article 243G or Article 243W of the Constitution of India. Serial No. 3A applies only to composite supplies of goods and services where the value of goods does not exceed 25 per cent of the composite supply. The supply in question was found to be a supply of machinery and other goods for a fresh waste processing plant, and not a pure service or a qualifying composite supply.
Conclusion: The supply is not exempt and is liable to GST.
Issue (ii): If GST is payable, what is the applicable rate on the goods supplied.
Analysis: The goods supplied were treated as machinery falling under Chapter 84, particularly HSN 8479, 8428, 8462 and 8474. On that basis, the applicable GST rate for the goods covered by the invoices was determined.
Conclusion: The applicable rate of GST is 18%.
Final Conclusion: The supply of machinery to the local authority is taxable, and the goods attract GST at the rate of 18%.
Ratio Decidendi: Exemption for local authority-related municipal functions applies only to pure services or to a composite supply satisfying the specified goods-value threshold, and a standalone supply of goods does not qualify.
Issues: Whether imported quicklime with calcium oxide content below 98% was classifiable under Customs Tariff Item No. 2522 1000 as claimed by the assessee or under Customs Tariff Item No. 2825 9090 as contended by Revenue.
Analysis: The goods were found, on the chemical test reports relied upon, to contain calcium oxide in the range of about 87.20% to 90.50%, and therefore below 98%. The relevant tariff scheme and HSN Explanatory Notes indicate that quicklime falls under Chapter 25, while Chapter 28 covers calcium oxide only in the pure state, that is, at a high degree of purity of about 98% or more. The residuary heading under Chapter 28 could not be preferred when the product specifically answered the description of quicklime under Chapter 25 and the requisite purity for Chapter 28 was not met. The Tribunal also followed its earlier coordinate bench view on the same classification issue.
Conclusion: The goods were rightly classifiable under Customs Tariff Item No. 2522 1000 and not under Customs Tariff Item No. 2825 9090; Revenue's reclassification was rejected.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether initiation of proceedings under Section 74 of the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017, on the basis of a show-cause notice dated June 14, 2024, in respect of the period July 2017 to March 2018 and in the context of TRAN-1 scrutiny, was within the jurisdiction of the GST authorities.
1.2 Whether the show-cause notice dated June 14, 2024, founded on alleged non-furnishing of documents, was vitiated for vagueness for not specifying the particular documents allegedly not supplied.
1.3 Whether the existence of an appellate remedy under Section 107 of the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017 barred the exercise of writ jurisdiction when a jurisdictional challenge and challenge to the validity of the show-cause notice were raised.
1.4 Whether, pending final adjudication of the writ petition, interim protection against coercive action pursuant to the adjudication order dated February 5, 2025, ought to be granted.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Jurisdiction of GST authorities to invoke Section 74 in the given factual context
2.1.1 Legal framework (as noticed by the Court)
The proceedings were initiated under Section 74 of the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017, on the basis of a show-cause notice dated June 14, 2024, alleging liability for the period July 2017 to March 2018 and arising out of scrutiny of TRAN-1 returns filed on transition from the service tax regime to the GST regime.
2.1.2 Interpretation and reasoning
The petitioners contended that: (i) the extended limitation under Section 74 could not be invoked in the manner adopted by the authorities for the said tax period; and (ii) the authorities had no jurisdiction to investigate affairs pertaining to service tax for the same period in the guise of scrutinizing TRAN-1 returns under the GST regime. The State respondents maintained that jurisdiction had been properly exercised and that the matter involved factual enquiry not warranting interference in writ jurisdiction.
The Court recorded that, in the facts and circumstances disclosed, it "needs to be assessed" whether the GST authorities "had/have jurisdiction" to issue the impugned show-cause notice under Section 74. On the materials presently available, the Court formed a prima facie view in favour of the petitioners on the jurisdictional challenge, treating it as a serious and arguable issue justifying examination in writ proceedings.
2.1.3 Conclusions
The Court held that a prima facie case had been made out questioning the jurisdiction of the GST authorities to issue the show-cause notice under Section 74 in the given factual matrix. Final determination was expressly reserved for decision after full hearing.
2.2 Validity of the show-cause notice - vagueness and non-specification of documents
2.2.1 Interpretation and reasoning
The petitioners asserted that: (i) the show-cause notice was premised solely on alleged non-furnishing of documents sought by the Central GST authorities; (ii) they had responded to the requisitions; and (iii) the notice failed to specify which documents were allegedly not provided, rendering it vague and unsustainable.
The Court noted, prima facie, that the show-cause notice was "vague" inasmuch as it was issued on the footing that "certain documents, which ought to have been provided...have not been provided", yet "the notice does not indicate or specify which document according to the respondent authorities was lacking". The Court observed that, on this ground alone, the show-cause notice "may not withstand scrutiny of Court", subject to a final decision after hearing all parties.
2.2.2 Conclusions
The Court concluded, at the prima facie stage, that the impugned show-cause notice suffered from vagueness due to non-specification of the missing documents and therefore may not withstand judicial scrutiny. The ultimate validity of the notice was kept open for final adjudication.
2.3 Maintainability of writ petition despite availability of alternative remedy under Section 107
2.3.1 Legal framework (as noticed by the Court)
The State respondents relied on the appellate remedy under Section 107 of the WBGST/CGST Act, 2017 as an "equally efficacious alternative remedy". The petitioners contended that the writ was maintainable as a jurisdictional issue had been raised and because the very foundation of the proceedings-the show-cause notice-was under challenge.
2.3.2 Interpretation and reasoning
The Court accepted that the matter involved a jurisdictional challenge as well as a challenge to the validity of the show-cause notice for vagueness. It took note of authorities cited by the petitioners where courts had intervened even at the show-cause stage on similar jurisdictional or foundational infirmities, and of a Co-ordinate Bench order granting protection in an "identical fact situation".
On consideration of submissions and material, the Court held that the petitioners had made out a prima facie case warranting interference notwithstanding the existence of a statutory appellate remedy, particularly because the jurisdiction of the authority and the legality of the show-cause notice itself were in question.
2.3.3 Conclusions
The Court implicitly held the writ petition to be maintainable at this stage despite the remedy under Section 107, since jurisdictional issues and foundational defects in the show-cause notice were involved. The matter was directed to be listed for further consideration on a subsequent date.
2.4 Grant of interim protection against coercive action on the basis of the adjudication order
2.4.1 Interpretation and reasoning
Noting that: (i) there was a pending jurisdictional challenge; (ii) the show-cause notice was, prima facie, vague and possibly unsustainable; and (iii) a "prima facie case" had been made out by the petitioners, the Court considered that allowing coercive steps to continue on the strength of the adjudication order dated February 5, 2025 would prejudice the petitioners before final adjudication of their challenge.
2.4.2 Conclusions
The Court restrained the GST authorities from taking any coercive action on the basis of the impugned adjudication order dated February 5, 2025 until further orders, and directed that the matter be listed for further consideration on a specified future date.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether activities of a State University in imparting and regulating higher education are commercial in nature so as to constitute "supply" in the course or furtherance of "business" under Section 7 read with Section 2(17) of the CGST/KGST Acts.
(2) Whether activities and receipts incidental or ancillary to education (including various fees from students and affiliated colleges) can be brought to tax under GST as business activities.
(3) Whether fees collected by a University (including affiliation, registration, admission, convocation and other similar fees) constitute "consideration" under Section 2(31) read with Section 7 of the CGST/KGST Acts.
(4) Whether the activities undertaken by a University under its parent statute are statutory/regulatory functions, and if so, whether such functions fall outside the charging provisions of Section 7 read with Section 9 of the CGST/KGST Acts.
(5) Whether services provided by a University in relation to education, including affiliation-related activities, are exempt from GST under Entry 66 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate) dated 28.06.2017.
(6) Whether CBIC Circulars dated 17.06.2021 and 11.10.2024, to the extent they treat affiliation and similar fees of Universities as taxable and restrict exemption under Entry 66, are legally valid.
(7) Whether affiliation fees, PG registration fees, admission fees, convocation fees and other sums collected by the University from colleges/students are exigible to GST, and whether the impugned show cause notices and adjudication orders demanding GST are sustainable.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Nature of University activities - "business" / "supply" under GST
Legal framework considered
The Court set out and examined Section 7 (scope of "supply"), Section 9 (levy and collection), and Section 2(17) ("business") of the CGST/KGST Acts, and adopted the interpretative approach and conclusions of a prior decision of a Co-ordinate Bench and of another High Court on the same question.
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) Section 7(1) covers supplies of goods or services made "for a consideration... in the course or furtherance of business". Section 2(17) defines "business" to include "trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure, wager or any other similar activity...", and incidental/ancillary activities to such main activities.
(b) On the nature of "commercial activity" and "education", the Court adopted the reasoning that GST is intended to apply to "commercial activities" and that "education" has consistently been treated in constitutional and tax jurisprudence as a public/welfare function, not as trade or commerce, and not as business in the profit-oriented sense.
(c) The Court noted that "education per se cannot fit" into the expressions trade, commerce, manufacture, profession, vocation, adventure or wager; the phrase "any other similar activity" in Section 2(17)(a) is read noscitur a sociis and is confined to activities akin to "wager", not to education.
(d) Relying on constitutional jurisprudence, the Court observed that education is not "trade" or "business", and "vocation" in the company of trade/commerce is to be read as gainful occupation, which generally does not include education.
(e) By analogy with a decision holding that regulatory functions of statutory commissions are not "business" under Section 2(17)(i), the Court applied the same reasoning to Universities discharging statutory regulatory functions in the field of education.
Conclusions
The activities of the University in imparting and regulating education are not "commercial" and do not constitute "business"; consequently, such activities cannot be treated as "supply" in the course or furtherance of business under Section 7, and fall outside the basic charge to GST.
Issue (2): Taxability of activities incidental/ancillary to education
Legal framework considered
The Court examined the structure of Section 2(17)(a) and (b), and adopted the reasoning that incidental or ancillary activities are "business" only if the main activity itself qualifies as business.
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) Section 2(17)(b) brings within "business" any activity "in connection with or incidental or ancillary to" the main activities listed in clause (a). If the primary activity does not fall within clause (a), clause (b) cannot be invoked.
(b) Since the dominant/main activity of the University is education, which is not "business", incidental or ancillary receipts and activities (e.g. various fees, sale of prospectus, interest income, residential rents to staff) cannot be treated as business unless an independent intention to carry on business in those incidental activities is established by the Department.
(c) The Court endorsed the view that mere reflection of income in financial statements does not convert such income into taxable "supply"; there must be a qualifying taxable activity under GST.
Conclusions
Where the University's main activity (education) is not "business", its incidental or ancillary activities/receipts from students and colleges cannot be brought to tax under GST as business activities.
Issue (3): Whether University fees constitute "consideration" under GST
Legal framework considered
The Court set out Section 2(31) defining "consideration" and read it with Section 7 (requirement of consideration for supply), and considered precedents holding that statutory/regulatory fees collected in discharge of statutory functions are not "commercial consideration".
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) "Consideration" contemplates payment or monetary value of an act/forbearance in respect of or in response to a supply, implying a contractual quid pro quo in a commercial setting.
(b) The Court adopted the view that fees such as affiliation, PG registration, convocation and similar charges collected by a University are in the nature of statutory or regulatory fees prescribed under the University's parent statute, not contractual commercial payments.
(c) The activity of affiliation and related regulatory functions is carried out in discharge of public/statutory duty; there is no contractual bargain with colleges/students in the commercial sense, nor an element of "inducement" to supply.
(d) Since the University is a statutory body performing public functions and is not engaged in "business" under Section 2(17), fees for such statutory functions cannot be characterised as "consideration" in the GST sense.
Conclusions
Fees collected by the University in discharge of statutory/regulatory functions, including affiliation, registration, admission, examination-related and convocation fees, do not constitute "consideration" for a taxable "supply" under the CGST/KGST Acts.
Issue (4): Character of University functions - statutory/regulatory vs. commercial
Legal framework considered
The Court examined the constituent University enactments (state University Acts) which create the University and prescribe its powers, functions and fee-levying authority, and relied on precedents treating similar statutory bodies' functions as public/statutory and non-commercial.
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The relevant University statutes show that the purpose is to ensure proper and systematic instruction, teaching, training and research in specified disciplines, and to regulate and control affiliated colleges through affiliation, recognition, supervision and withdrawal of affiliation.
(b) The power to grant/renew/withdraw affiliation or recognition, and to levy fees, late fees, fines and penalties, is conferred by statute and exercised in discharge of public duties aimed at regulating standards of education.
(c) Drawing analogies from decisions on statutory development and regulatory corporations, the Court accepted that amounts charged in performance of such statutory mandates are not commercial receipts, but compulsory/statutory levies in aid of public functions.
(d) The Court noted that where the functions are statutory/regulatory and non-commercial, the charging provisions under Section 9 read with Section 7 do not apply, as the preconditions of "supply" for consideration in the course or furtherance of business are absent.
Conclusions
The University's activities, including affiliation and regulation of colleges, are statutory/regulatory functions performed under the University Act; such functions are non-commercial and fall outside the ambit of "business" and "supply" under the CGST/KGST Acts, rendering the charging provisions inapplicable.
Issue (5): Applicability of GST exemption under Entry 66 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate)
Legal framework considered
The Court set out Entry 66 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate), dated 28.06.2017, and paragraph 2(y) defining "educational institution". The Court considered prior judicial interpretation of a similar exemption under the erstwhile service tax regime and of the same Entry 66, and examined the purpose of the exemption as clarified by CBIC.
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) Entry 66 exempts: (i) services provided by an "educational institution" to its students, faculty and staff; and (ii) specified services provided to an educational institution, including "services relating to admission to, or conduct of examination by, such institution".
(b) "Educational institution" in the Notification includes an institution providing education as part of a curriculum for a qualification recognised by law. The Court accepted that a University granting affiliation, conducting examinations and awarding degrees falls within this definition; students in affiliated colleges are effectively students of the University.
(c) The Court agreed that exemption cannot be confined to classroom teaching; it extends to the broader educational process, including curriculum design, affiliation of colleges to ensure standards, admission processes and examinations leading to recognised qualifications.
(d) Affiliation and related activities are intrinsically linked to admission and examination, and thus are covered both under clause (a) (services by an educational institution to its students) and clause (b)(iv) (services relating to admission or conduct of examination) of Entry 66.
(e) While exemption notifications must be interpreted strictly, such interpretation cannot defeat the object of promoting education and shielding students from GST burden. Imposing GST on Universities would lead to the tax being passed on to colleges and students, undermining the exemption's purpose.
Conclusions
Even assuming any element of "service", the University qualifies as an "educational institution", and its affiliation, admission, examination and related educational activities and fees fall within Entry 66 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate) and are exempt from GST.
Issue (6): Validity of CBIC Circulars dated 17.06.2021 and 11.10.2024
Legal framework considered
The Court considered Sections 7 and 9 of the CGST/KGST Acts, Entry 66 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate), and the legal principles governing the binding nature and limits of circulars when contrary to statutory provisions or notifications.
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The impugned circulars proceed on the assumption that affiliation and similar fees collected by Universities constitute taxable "supply" and further purport to restrict the scope of the exemption under Entry 66, by treating affiliation services as not related to admission or conduct of examination.
(b) The Court, following earlier reasoning, held that University activities in question do not constitute "supply" under Sections 7 and 9; therefore, clarifications premised on the contrary assumption are inconsistent with the statute.
(c) The Court reiterated that circulars cannot override or amend statutory provisions or valid exemption notifications, nor can they insert new conditions or restrict the scope of exemptions beyond what the notification provides.
(d) The specific clarification that affiliation services are not related to admission or conduct of examination was found to be contrary to judicially settled understanding of "affiliation" as an activity essentially connected with admission to courses and public examinations leading to degrees.
Conclusions
The CBIC Circulars dated 17.06.2021 and 11.10.2024, insofar as they treat Universities' affiliation and similar fees as taxable supplies and restrict the exemption under Entry 66, are contrary to the CGST/KGST statutory scheme and the exemption notification, and are invalid in law.
Issue (7): GST liability on University fees and sustainability of impugned show cause notices and orders
Legal framework considered
The Court applied its findings on Sections 7, 9, 2(17), 2(31), Entry 66 of Notification No. 12/2017-CT (Rate), and the invalidity of the relevant CBIC circulars, to the concrete demands raised through the impugned orders and show cause notices.
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Court held that the University's core activities are not "business", its statutory fees are not "consideration", and thus the basic conditions of "supply" under Section 7 are not met; consequently, GST cannot be levied on such activities on first principles.
(b) Even if any part of the activities were treated as "services", they are covered by the exemption in Entry 66 as services of and to an "educational institution", particularly those relating to admission and conduct of examinations, of which affiliation is an integral part.
(c) As the circulars underpinning the demands are invalid and the activities are either outside the charging provision or exempt, the show cause notices and adjudication orders founded on those premises suffer from lack of jurisdiction and legal error.
Conclusions
(i) Affiliation fees, PG registration fees, admission fees, convocation fees and other similar sums collected by the University from colleges/students are not exigible to GST.
(ii) The impugned adjudication orders and related demand/summation orders, as well as the underlying show cause notices seeking to levy GST on such fees, are unsustainable and stand quashed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether, on the facts, expenses under the heads royalty, management fee, legal and professional expenses, corporate overheads, advertisement and business promotion, and seminars and meetings could be reallocated by the Assessing Officer from non-10A units to 10A units so as to reduce deduction under Section 10A.
1.2 Whether the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal on allocation of expenses between 10A and non-10A units were perverse or otherwise gave rise to any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 260A.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Reallocation of common/corporate expenses to 10A units and disallowance under Section 10A
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Assessing Officer treated royalty, management fee, legal and professional expenses and in one year corporate overheads, advertisement, publicity, business promotion, seminars and meetings as common to both 10A and non-10A units, and reallocated them between units in proportion to revenue, thereby reducing the deduction under Section 10A.
2.2 The Commissioner (Appeals), on detailed examination of the assessee's business divisions, cost centres, agreements and invoices, found that: (i) distinct cost codes existed for non-10A units, 10A units, and common costs; (ii) royalty was computed strictly as per clause 3 of the licence agreement on revenue from third parties, and only non-10A divisions (consulting and human resource outsourcing) earned such third-party revenue; the 10A units were captive units rendering services only to group entities and could not be liable for such royalty; (iii) management fee under the Regional Headquarters Services Agreements was charged only in respect of consulting and human resource outsourcing divisions; Asia Pacific regional resources did not provide services to captive 10A units; invoices and workings showed that fees were computed solely with reference to non-10A divisions' revenue and cost consumption; (iv) corporate overhead charges under the Corporate Services Agreement were similarly computed and charged on the basis of non-10A units' revenue and actual consumption, with charges relating to 10A units retained by the foreign affiliate.
2.3 As regards legal and professional expenses, the Commissioner (Appeals) found, on sample invoices, that: (i) independent consultants and group entities rendered services for specific client/third-party projects (e.g. development centres and HR consulting assignments for various named clients), all relating to consulting and human resource outsourcing divisions; (ii) such expenditure was directly attributable to non-10A units and had been booked accordingly; (iii) in one year, approximately 77% of the total legal and professional expenses were already debited to 10A units, demonstrating actual, not manipulative, allocation and leaving no basis for further apportionment to 10A units.
2.4 For advertisement, publicity, business promotion, seminars and meetings, the Commissioner (Appeals) recorded that: (i) these expenses related to HR conferences, sponsorships and marketing events aimed at third-party business development, clearly connected with consulting and human resource outsourcing (non-10A) divisions; (ii) 10A units were captive service providers to group companies and had no requirement for such marketing expenditure; (iii) actual expenditure incurred by each unit had been debited to that unit and could not be reallocated to 10A units.
2.5 The Commissioner (Appeals) concluded that the assessee's allocation of all these expenses between 10A and non-10A units was based on actual nexus, contractual terms, specific cost codes and accepted costing principles, and that it followed Accounting Standard-17 for segmental apportionment.
2.6 The Tribunal endorsed these factual findings, holding that: (i) the assessee had five/six units in India with clear segregation between 10A and non-10A units; (ii) the allocation method was based on common principles of costing and was reasonable; (iii) the assessee's adherence to Accounting Standard-17 for apportionment stood uncontroverted by the Revenue; (iv) without any adverse material brought on record, the Assessing Officer's revenue-based reallocation could not displace the assessee's method.
2.7 The Court noted that the Tribunal, in paragraph 9 of its order, had categorically agreed with the Commissioner (Appeals) that the assessee's allocation "cannot be disturbed" and that the disallowance of deduction under Section 10A was rightly deleted.
Conclusions
2.8 The Court held that there was a clear factual basis for the Commissioner (Appeals) to conclude that: (i) royalty and management fee were incurred exclusively for non-10A units on the basis of third-party revenue and identified divisional usage; (ii) legal and professional, corporate overhead, advertisement, publicity, business promotion, seminar and meeting expenses in dispute pertained to non-10A divisions and were already allocated on an actual and reasonable basis; (iii) 10A captive units neither generated the relevant third-party revenue nor consumed the services in question so as to justify the Assessing Officer's reallocation.
2.9 Consequently, the reallocation of these expenses to 10A units by the Assessing Officer, and the resultant reduction of deduction under Section 10A, was not justified, and the deletion of the disallowance by the Commissioner (Appeals), as upheld by the Tribunal, stood affirmed.
Issue 2 - Perversity of findings and existence of substantial question of law under Section 260A
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.10 The Court proceeded on the footing, supported by authorities cited by the respondent, that allocation of expenses between units is essentially a question of fact; that where there is no statutory formula, apportionment involves approximation, and a proportion fixed by the Tribunal on relevant material is not to be disturbed; and that a plausible view of the Tribunal, absent perversity, does not give rise to a substantial question of law under Section 260A.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The Court observed that the Commissioner (Appeals) had rendered detailed factual findings on the nature of each unit, the terms of the relevant inter-company agreements, the specific cost centre structure, and the contents of invoices and workings evidencing that the disputed expenditures related only to non-10A units or had already been appropriately charged to 10A units.
2.12 These findings were fully endorsed by the Tribunal, which specifically recorded that the assessee's basis of allocation, including adherence to Accounting Standard-17, remained uncontroverted by the Revenue, and that no adverse material was produced to justify overriding that allocation with a simple revenue-share formula.
2.13 The Court held that, in these circumstances, the conclusion of the Commissioner (Appeals) and the Tribunal constituted a plausible factual view, based on evidence, and could not be characterised as perverse.
2.14 The Court further noted that the allocation methodology followed by the assessee had been consistently accepted by the Revenue in earlier and later assessment years (2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2009-10), reinforcing the conclusion that the method adopted was reasonable and not contrived for the disputed years.
2.15 The Court found the precedents relied on by the Revenue to be distinguishable on the facts of the present case.
Conclusions
2.16 The Court concluded that no substantial question of law arose from the Tribunal's order, as the findings on allocation of expenses and eligibility for deduction under Section 10A were purely factual, supported by material on record, consistent with accepted accounting standards, and had been consistently applied across years.
2.17 The appeals were dismissed and the proposed questions of law were declined, as they did not merit consideration under Section 260A in the facts of the case.
Issues: Whether notices initiating assessment proceedings against the petitioners under Section 153C could be sustained where material found in the search of a third person had no nexus with them.
Analysis: The seized mobile images comprised an MoU between persons other than the petitioners and did not mention or connect them with the transaction. The broker stated that he had not brokered the transaction, while land-record forms were supplied after the search and the sale-deed details were independently obtained from the public domain. The inference of undisclosed investment was founded only on a presumed difference between the consideration in the unrelated MoU and the consideration in the petitioners' registered sale deed. No incriminating material found during the search related to or pertained to the petitioners, and the post-search information did not establish the requisite live nexus for jurisdictional satisfaction.
Conclusion: The notices under Section 153C were without jurisdiction and were quashed.
Note
Bookmark
Share
Download
Don't have an account? Register Here
TaxTMI