Loading...
By creating an account you can:
Press 'Enter' to add multiple search terms. Rules for Better Search
Use comma for multiple locations.
---------------- For section wise search only -----------------
No Folders have been created
Are you sure you want to delete "My most important" ?
NOTE:
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether disallowance under section 43B in respect of bonus payable, made on account of mismatch between the return of income and the tax audit report, was justified when the assessee claimed the bonus on payment basis in the subsequent year, alleging that no deduction had been claimed in the relevant earlier year.
1.2 Whether disallowance of deduction claimed on account of reversal of provision for payment to employees was justified when the assessee asserted that such provision had already been added back and offered to tax in the immediately preceding assessment year.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Disallowance under section 43B towards bonus payable due to mismatch with tax audit report
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Tribunal noted that the business loss was reduced in processing under section 143(1) by disallowing the bonus payable under section 43B based on a mismatch between the return of income and the tax audit report.
2.2 It was recorded that the bonus related to the financial year ended 31.03.2022 (relevant to assessment year 2022-23), was paid before the due date for filing the return, and was reported in the tax audit report for that year, wherein the bonus payable was charged to the profit and loss account and offered for tax.
2.3 The assessee contended that no deduction had been claimed in the return of income for assessment year 2022-23 in respect of this bonus, and therefore it was claimed as an expenditure in the year under appeal on payment basis. The Tribunal found this line of argument as, in principle, convincing, subject to factual verification of whether the deduction had actually not been claimed in the earlier year.
Conclusions
2.4 The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to verify whether any expenditure on account of the impugned bonus had been claimed in assessment year 2022-23; if it is found that no such expenditure was claimed in that year, the deduction is to be allowed in the year under appeal on payment basis under section 43B. The ground was thus treated as partly allowed for statistical purposes.
Issue 2 - Deduction on reversal of provision for payment to employees allegedly already disallowed in preceding year
Interpretation and reasoning
2.5 The second adjustment related to provisions for payment to employees. The assessee's case was that an amount of Rs. 1,10,13,000/- had been added back and offered to tax as an unascertained liability in the return of income for assessment year 2022-23.
2.6 In the year under appeal, the said provision was written back in the books and credited to the profit and loss account; since it had already been subjected to tax in the preceding year, the assessee claimed a corresponding deduction in the computation of income for the year under appeal.
2.7 The Tribunal treated this as a pure question of fact, turning on whether the same amount had indeed been offered to tax in the immediately preceding assessment year.
Conclusions
2.8 The Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to verify the assessee's claim that the amount of Rs. 1,10,13,000/- had been offered to tax in assessment year 2022-23; if so found, no further addition was to be made in the year under appeal on this account. This ground also was treated as partly allowed for statistical purposes.
Issues: (i) Whether non-fulfilment of the condition in Notification No. 20/2007-CE by taking re-credit before exhaustion of Cenvat credit justified disallowance of the entire demand. (ii) Whether the demand for the extended period, along with interest and penalty, was sustainable when the relevant particulars were disclosed in monthly returns.
Issue (i): Whether non-fulfilment of the condition in Notification No. 20/2007-CE by taking re-credit before exhaustion of Cenvat credit justified disallowance of the entire demand.
Analysis: The condition in the notification was treated as mandatory and could not be ignored merely on the ground that the transaction was revenue neutral. At the same time, the reasoning recognised that the appellant did not obtain any enduring gain and that, at most, the premature re-credit could justify an interest liability for the intervening period. The Tribunal therefore declined to accept the plea that absence of immediate revenue loss by itself would nullify the condition, while also observing that the Revenue could not sustain a demand by disallowing the entire credit in the manner adopted.
Conclusion: The appellant did not succeed on the revenue-neutrality based challenge to the condition, but the demand could not be sustained in the manner confirmed by the Revenue.
Issue (ii): Whether the demand for the extended period, along with interest and penalty, was sustainable when the relevant particulars were disclosed in monthly returns.
Analysis: The credit availment, utilisation, and re-credit figures were reflected in the monthly returns, and the Department took no action for a substantial period despite the audit pointing out the issue. On that basis, the Tribunal held that the ingredients necessary to invoke the extended period were absent. Once the extended period was held unavailable, the connected levy of interest and penalty for that part of the demand also could not stand.
Conclusion: The extended period demand, interest thereon, and penalty were set aside.
Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded only to the extent of the time-barred demand, with the extended period confirmation and its consequential additions being annulled and consequential relief left to be worked out according to law.
Ratio Decidendi: Where the relevant credit transactions are fully disclosed in monthly returns, a belated demand without timely departmental action cannot be sustained under the extended period of limitation.
Issues: Whether disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D could be sustained when the assessee had not earned any exempt income during the relevant year, and whether the Explanation inserted with effect from 01.04.2022 could apply retrospectively.
Analysis: The assessee had not earned any exempt income during the year. The binding precedent relied upon holds that no disallowance under Section 14A is warranted where there is no exempt income. The later Explanation to Section 14A was treated as prospective in operation and therefore could not govern the assessment year in question.
Conclusion: The disallowance under Section 14A was deleted and the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the outstanding amount of Rs. 2,02,00,000/- shown as advance from a corporate entity could be treated as unexplained cash credit under section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, on the basis of a discrepancy in the creditor's name and alleged lack of verification.
1.2 Whether the assessee had discharged the onus under section 68 to establish the identity and creditworthiness of the creditor and the genuineness of the transaction, in light of the banking trail, statutory records, and subsequent repayment.
1.3 Whether non-materialisation of the underlying commercial transaction, contemporaneous deposits in the creditor's bank account, and non-appearance of the creditor in response to summons under section 131, justified an adverse inference under section 68.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Treatment of the outstanding credit of Rs. 2,02,00,000/- under section 68 in view of name discrepancy
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Tribunal noted that the addition under section 68 was primarily founded on a clerical variation in the spelling of the creditor's name in the assessee's ledger, where the creditor was described as "Emm Kay Industries" instead of "Emkay Industries Ltd.", leading the Assessing Officer to presume non-existence of the creditor.
2.2 The Tribunal examined the evidences furnished: MCA Master Data, ROC filings, PAN details, confirmation letters, audited financial statements and past Tribunal orders, all in the name of "Emkay Industries Ltd.", and found that these collectively and unequivocally established the existence of an incorporated company holding a valid PAN and regularly assessed to tax.
2.3 The Tribunal held that when PAN, ROC particulars and audited records of a corporate entity remain undisputed, a mere typographical variation in the spelling of the creditor's name in internal accounts cannot override such substantive evidence. It observed that PAN is a primary statutory identifier, and the staff-level error in the description "Emm Kay" did not detract from the clearly proved identity of the creditor.
Conclusions
2.4 The Tribunal concluded that the identity of the creditor was duly established and that the addition could not be sustained merely on account of a clerical misdescription in the ledger. The first limb of section 68 stood satisfied.
Issue 2: Satisfaction of requirements of section 68 - identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction
Interpretation and reasoning - Genuineness and banking trail
2.5 The Tribunal found that the entire amount of Rs. 2,02,00,000/- was received through banking channels from the bank account of the said company, and that the ledger accounts of both parties tallied with the corresponding bank statements. No discrepancy in the banking trail was shown by the Revenue at any stage.
2.6 The Tribunal further noted that the assessee had fully repaid the same amount in subsequent financial years through account-payee banking channels to the same bank account of the creditor, with repayment entries matching the earlier receipts. This factual position remained uncontroverted.
2.7 The Tribunal emphasised that neither the Assessing Officer nor the first appellate authority questioned the bank name, bank account number, or movement of funds from and to the bank account of the creditor. Once continuous, verifiable inflow and outflow through regular banking channels stood established, the allegation of non-existence of the creditor or lack of genuineness of the transaction became untenable.
Interpretation and reasoning - Non-materialisation of commercial transaction
2.8 On the objection that no sale of goods ultimately took place between the parties, the Tribunal held that section 68 is confined to examining identity, creditworthiness and genuineness of the credit, and does not mandate that an advance or loan must culminate in a successful commercial transaction.
2.9 The Tribunal accepted the explanation that the advance was given against a proposed purchase of copper, which could not be completed as the balance consideration was not paid, and that the amount was thereafter refunded. This explanation was neither found false nor shown to be implausible by the Revenue.
2.10 The Tribunal held that non-materialisation of an intended business transaction does not, by itself, convert a documented and bank-routed advance into an "unexplained cash credit" under section 68.
Interpretation and reasoning - Creditworthiness
2.11 The Tribunal examined the Assessing Officer's inference that contemporaneous deposits in the creditor's bank account prior to advancing the funds indicated lack of creditworthiness. It noted that no enquiry under section 133(6) was conducted to verify the source of such deposits and that no material was brought on record to show that the creditor was a shell or paper company.
2.12 The Tribunal took into account that the creditor was a regular income-tax assessee with audited books and statutory filings, and that proceedings, including appeals by both the company and the Revenue, were on record in respect of that entity, evidencing it to be an active taxpaying concern.
2.13 In absence of any contrary material from the Revenue to dislodge these statutory and banking records, the Tribunal held that the documentary evidence adduced by the assessee regarding the creditor's financial capacity and status ought to have been accepted.
Interpretation and reasoning - Non-compliance with summons
2.14 Regarding the creditor's non-appearance in response to summons under section 131, the Tribunal observed that settled legal position is that non-compliance with summons alone is not conclusive where primary evidences establishing identity, creditworthiness and genuineness are already on record and remain uncontroverted.
2.15 It held that, since the assessee had discharged its burden by producing statutory records and a complete banking trail, and the Revenue had not pursued further enquiry or produced rebuttal evidence, mere non-appearance of the creditor could not justify the adverse inference under section 68.
Conclusions
2.16 The Tribunal concluded that all three requirements under section 68-identity of the creditor, creditworthiness, and genuineness of the transaction-had been satisfactorily established by the assessee through PAN, ROC and other statutory records, corroborated ledger accounts, and an undisputed banking trail of both receipt and repayment.
2.17 It held that the reasons advanced by the Revenue, namely typographical error in the creditor's name, absence of completed sale transaction, deposit pattern in the creditor's bank account, and non-appearance under section 131, did not, either individually or collectively, justify treating the impugned sum as unexplained cash credit.
2.18 Accordingly, the addition of Rs. 2,02,00,000/- made under section 68 of the Act was directed to be deleted, and the appeal was allowed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the notice issued under section 148 on 30-08-2022, pursuant to earlier notices covered by TOLA and the directions in Union of India v. Ashish Agrawal, was within the period of limitation read with section 149 and the doctrine of "surviving time" as explained in later judicial precedents.
1.2 Consequences for the reassessment order and for the appeals on merits, if the notice under section 148 is held to be time-barred and without jurisdiction.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Validity and limitation of notice under section 148 dated 30-08-2022
Legal framework
2.1 The Tribunal examined the validity of the reassessment notice in the context of: (i) section 147, section 148, section 148A, section 149 of the Act; (ii) Taxation and Other Laws (Relaxation of Certain Provisions) Ordinance, 2020 (TOLA); (iii) the Supreme Court decisions in Union of India v. Ashish Agrawal and Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal; and (iv) the jurisdictional High Court decisions in Dhanraj Govindram Kella v. ITO and Rakesh Rameshchandra Patel v. ITO.
2.2 The concept of "surviving time" for limitation was applied as clarified in Rajeev Bansal and as worked out by the jurisdictional High Court in Dhanraj Govindram Kella and followed in Rakesh Rameshchandra Patel, whereby the validity of notices issued under the new regime is tested with reference to the remaining period of limitation available as on 30-06-2021, after giving effect to TOLA and Ashish Agrawal.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Tribunal noted that, in line with the jurisdictional High Court, each case has to be examined individually on the basis of dates: (i) original notice under section 148 under TOLA (old regime), (ii) surviving time available as on 30-06-2021, (iii) date of providing information under section 148A(b), (iv) due date and actual date of reply, and (v) date of order under section 148A(d) and fresh notice under section 148 (new regime).
2.4 Relying on the High Court's tabular analysis approach in Dhanraj Govindram Kella and its application in Rakesh Rameshchandra Patel, the Tribunal reproduced and applied the same methodology, including the principle that reassessment notices under the new regime must be issued within the "surviving time" computed as per Rajeev Bansal.
2.5 The Tribunal recorded the undisputed factual matrix in the present case as follows: (i) Original notice under section 148 issued on 29-06-2021; (ii) surviving days as on 30-06-2021: 2 days; (iii) information under section 148A(b) furnished on 30-05-2022; (iv) due date for reply: 20-06-2022; (v) actual reply filed on 24-06-2022; (vi) order under section 148A(d) and fresh notice under section 148 issued on 30-08-2022; (vii) last permissible date for issuing notice under section 148 as per proviso to section 149 and surviving time: 27-06-2022.
2.6 The assessee contended that, applying the above framework and jurisdictional precedents, the notice dated 30-08-2022 was issued beyond the limitation/surviving time and hence was invalid and without jurisdiction; consequently, the entire reassessment proceedings were void.
2.7 The Revenue argued that a fresh notice under section 148A(b) dated 27-08-2022 was issued only because of an inadvertent mistake in the reasons uploaded for the original notice dated 26/29-06-2021, and therefore the reassessment was within the provisions of the Act.
2.8 The Tribunal held it to be an undisputed fact that the original notice was issued on 29-06-2021 and that, as per the proviso to section 149, the last date for issuing a valid notice under section 148, after considering TOLA and surviving time, was 27-06-2022. Since the effective notice under section 148 was actually issued on 30-08-2022, it fell beyond the permissible limitation period.
2.9 Applying the binding decisions of the Supreme Court in Ashish Agrawal and Rajeev Bansal and the jurisdictional High Court in Dhanraj Govindram Kella and Rakesh Rameshchandra Patel, the Tribunal concluded that any notice issued beyond the surviving period is time-barred and invalid, and that orders under section 148A(d) and all consequential reassessment proceedings cannot survive.
Conclusions
2.10 The Tribunal held that the notice under section 148 dated 30-08-2022 was issued beyond the limitation period/surviving time prescribed by section 149 read with TOLA and the binding judicial precedents, and therefore was invalid in law.
2.11 Consequently, the reassessment proceedings initiated on the basis of such time-barred notice were held to be without jurisdiction, and the entire reassessment order was quashed.
Issue 2: Effect of invalid reassessment notice on merits of additions and cross-appeals
Interpretation and reasoning
2.12 Having quashed the reassessment on the jurisdictional/limitation ground, the Tribunal held that it was unnecessary to adjudicate the remaining grounds raised by the assessee (including grounds on merits under sections 68 and 69C) and by the Revenue (challenging deletions by the first appellate authority).
Conclusions
2.13 The assessee's appeal was allowed on the jurisdictional ground by quashing the reassessment order.
2.14 The Revenue's appeal, being directed against an order that itself stood quashed for want of jurisdiction, was dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can be invoked in respect of opening balances of sundry creditors where no fresh credits have arisen during the relevant previous year.
1.2 Whether GST paid during the relevant previous year, arising from suppliers' failure to deposit GST collected in an earlier year and resulting in denial of input tax credit, is an allowable deduction as bad debt under section 36(1)(vii) or as business expenditure under section 37(1).
1.3 Whether entire purchases from certain suppliers treated as non-genuine/untraceable are liable to be disallowed as bogus purchases, or whether only a profit element or gross profit rate can be added when books are not rejected and sales/stock tally are accepted.
1.4 Whether addition on account of alleged difference between purchases as per books and as per GST data is justified when reconciliation shows the difference arises from comparison of figures excluding and including GST and opening balances.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Section 68 addition on account of opening balances of sundry creditors
Legal framework (as discussed): Section 68 permits addition of any sum found credited in the books of an assessee for which identity, creditworthiness, and genuineness are not satisfactorily explained. The Court referred to decisions holding that section 68 applies only to credits arising in the relevant previous year.
Interpretation and reasoning: The impugned creditor balances were undisputedly opening balances carried forward from the preceding year; no fresh credit entries were made during the relevant previous year. The assessee had written off these balances in a subsequent year and offered them to tax then. Since no sum was "found credited" in the books in the year under consideration, the foundational condition for invoking section 68 was absent. Reliance was placed on tribunal and High Court precedents holding that section 68 cannot be applied to opening balances.
Conclusions: Section 68 could not be invoked in respect of opening balances where no fresh credits arose during the year. The deletion of the addition under section 68 was upheld and the Revenue's challenge was rejected.
2.2 Deductibility of GST paid due to supplier default and denial of ITC
Legal framework (as discussed): The Court considered section 36(1)(vii) (bad debts) and section 37(1) (business expenditure) of the Income-tax Act, alongside section 16(2)(c) of the CGST Act, 2017 regarding conditions for input tax credit and the consequences of supplier default. Reliance was placed on a Supreme Court decision allowing similar business expenditure.
Interpretation and reasoning: The assessee had originally borne GST charged by suppliers for an earlier year, but those suppliers failed to deposit the tax, resulting in denial/forfeiture of input tax credit as per GST law. The assessee, under statutory compulsion, deposited the GST during the year in dispute. The liability thus crystallized in the relevant previous year. The amount represented a business loss/debt arising out of normal trading transactions and became irrecoverable, and was, therefore, allowable as a bad debt under section 36(1)(vii); alternatively, it was an expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purposes of business and not of a capital or personal nature, hence allowable under section 37(1). The Revenue's contention that this was a voluntary payment of another's liability was rejected in view of the statutory obligation under GST law and the nexus with business operations.
Conclusions: The GST payment was a business outgo crystallizing during the year and was deductible either as a bad debt under section 36(1)(vii) or as business expenditure under section 37(1). The disallowance was rightly deleted and the Revenue's ground was dismissed.
2.3 Disallowance of alleged bogus/unverifiable purchases and scope for profit element addition
Legal framework (as discussed): The Court applied judicial principles on bogus purchases where sales are accepted, including High Court and tribunal decisions (e.g., that only the profit element can be taxed where purchases are doubted but sales and quantitative records are accepted, and that outright disallowance of entire purchases is unwarranted unless books are rejected).
Interpretation and reasoning: The Assessing Officer treated the entire purchases from specified suppliers as bogus on the basis that notices under sections 133(6) and 131 were not complied with, suppliers were non-existent/non-traceable, and GST compliance was absent. However, the assessee produced purchase invoices, E-way bills, stock registers, lorry/toll receipts, GST returns, and bank statements evidencing payments through banking channels. The books of account were audited and not rejected under section 145(3); sales were fully accepted; stock and quantitative tally were not disturbed.
The CIT(A) and the Court held that where sales and stock records are accepted and books are not rejected, complete disallowance of purchases is not justified merely because suppliers are untraceable or non-compliant. At most, a profit element embedded in such purchases can be brought to tax. Applying this principle, the CIT(A) restricted the addition to an amount equivalent to the average gross profit rate (0.84%) on the disputed purchases, resulting in a limited addition. The Court noted that this sustained GP addition was itself conservative and in favour of the Revenue, and the Revenue had not rebutted the factual findings supporting the genuineness of quantitative records and sales.
Conclusions: Entire disallowance of purchases was unwarranted in the absence of rejection of books and where sales and stock tally were accepted. Only a limited addition on account of profit element was justified. The restriction of the addition to the gross profit element (0.84% of the disputed purchases) was affirmed, and the Revenue's plea for restoring the full disallowance was rejected.
2.4 Addition on account of alleged difference between purchases as per books and GST data
Interpretation and reasoning: The Assessing Officer had compared purchase figures as per the assessee's records with GST data and computed a difference, leading to an addition for alleged inflated purchases. The CIT(A) found, on examination of reconciliation and supporting documents, that the Assessing Officer had erroneously compared net purchase values excluding GST in the assessee's books with gross figures including GST and opening balances in supplier ledgers, thereby creating an artificial difference. The assessee had furnished a detailed reconciliation supported by invoices, supplier ledgers, and bank payment records, which fully reconciled the amounts. Books of account were not rejected and no specific defect in reconciliation was pointed out by the Revenue before the Court.
Conclusions: The alleged difference in purchases arose from a miscomparison of figures excluding and including GST and opening balances and stood satisfactorily reconciled. The addition on account of difference in purchases was rightly deleted, and the Revenue's ground was dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether reassessment proceedings initiated under sections 147/148, based on subsequent CBDT information regarding withdrawal of approval under section 35(1)(ii) of the donee institution, were valid in law.
1.2 Whether deduction claimed under section 35(1)(ii) in respect of donation made to an institution whose CBDT approval under that provision stood withdrawn with retrospective effect could be allowed.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of reopening under sections 147/148 based on CBDT withdrawal of approval to donee institution
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The assessee had made a donation of Rs. 30,00,000 to a research institution on 25.03.2015 and claimed deduction of Rs. 52,50,000 under section 35(1)(ii).
2.2 Subsequently, CBDT Notification No. 3/2019 dated 25.01.2019, circulated on 28.02.2019, withdrew the approval earlier granted to the said institution under section 35(1)(ii) with effect from 01.04.2011 and recorded that the institution had misused the provision by providing accommodation entries to donors for bogus weighted deductions.
2.3 The Tribunal held that such notification and findings of misuse constituted fresh tangible information coming to the Assessing Officer after completion of the original assessment under section 143(3), and directly impacted the allowability of the deduction earlier granted.
2.4 On these facts, the Tribunal concluded that the Assessing Officer was justified in forming a belief that income had escaped assessment and in reopening the assessment; the reopening was therefore "good in law".
Conclusion
2.5 Reassessment proceedings under sections 147/148, founded on the subsequent CBDT notification withdrawing approval of the donee institution and recording misuse of section 35(1)(ii), are valid and sustainable.
Issue 2 - Allowability of deduction under section 35(1)(ii) for donation to institution whose approval was withdrawn
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.6 Section 35(1)(ii) provides weighted deduction on sums paid to an approved research association or institution; eligibility depends on the institution being duly approved for the relevant period.
2.7 The CBDT notification in question withdrew the approval of the recipient institution with effect from 01.04.2011 and recorded that the institution was engaged in providing accommodation entries and facilitating false weighted deductions; the withdrawal was described as substantive and not technical.
2.8 The Tribunal relied on its earlier coordinate bench decision concerning donations to another institution (Shri Arvindo Institute of Applied Scientific Research Trust), where it had held that: (i) the trust was not approved under section 35(1)(ii) for the relevant years; (ii) CBDT communications showed that certificates were forged and donations were bogus; and (iii) even bona fide claims cannot be allowed if ineligible in law.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 The Tribunal noted parity of facts between the present case and the earlier cases: donation made to an institution whose approval stood withdrawn for the relevant period and which was found to have misused section 35(1)(ii) for bogus deductions.
2.10 Following the reasoning of the coordinate bench in the earlier decision, the Tribunal emphasized that what is material is legal eligibility of the donee under section 35(1)(ii) during the relevant year, not the assessee's or Assessing Officer's bona fide belief or the fact that payment was made through banking channels and receipts/certificates were produced.
2.11 As the CBDT notification clearly withdrew approval with effect from a date prior to the donation and recorded substantive misuse, the institution was not a validly approved entity under section 35(1)(ii) at the time of donation; consequently, the assessee's claim of weighted deduction was legally ineligible.
Conclusion
2.12 The donation made to the said institution, whose approval under section 35(1)(ii) stood withdrawn with effect from 01.04.2011, does not qualify for deduction under section 35(1)(ii); the disallowance of Rs. 52,50,000 is upheld and the appeal is dismissed in toto.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether deduction under section 57 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is allowable in respect of proportionate expenditure of Rs. 62,57,776/- against interest income assessed under the head "Income from Other Sources" under section 56.
1.2 What degree and nature of "nexus" between expenditure and interest income is required under section 57(iii), particularly in the context of a co-operative credit society earning bank interest from deployment of its funds.
1.3 Whether levy of interest under sections 234A, 234B and 234C requires independent adjudication when quantum is modified.
1.4 Whether a ground challenging initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A is maintainable at the stage of appeal against the assessment order.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Deduction of proportionate expenditure under section 57 against interest income taxed under section 56
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1.1 The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the relevant provision is section 57(iii), which permits deduction of expenditure (not being capital expenditure) "laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of making or earning" income chargeable under the head "Income from Other Sources".
2.1.2 It was also noted that the interest income in question had been assessed under section 56 as "Income from Other Sources" and that the assessee claimed deduction under section 57 on a proportionate basis.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.3 The Tribunal recorded that the assessee is a registered co-operative credit society, governed by the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, engaged in accepting deposits from members and advancing credit facilities, and that placement of funds in deposits with scheduled and co-operative banks is an integral and regular part of its business cycle for maintaining liquidity, complying with statutory requirements and deploying idle funds.
2.1.4 On facts, the Tribunal noted that audited financial statements reflected gross receipts of Rs. 3,41,06,842/- and total expenditure of Rs. 2,72,51,731/-, and that the assessee had demonstrated, through reconciliation, that Rs. 72,02,233/- was disallowable and Rs. 7,68,535/- was to be added back, resulting in total "allowable" expenditure of Rs. 2,08,20,033/-.
2.1.5 The Tribunal accepted that the assessee had adopted a "scientific" proportionate method by computing an expense-income ratio of 61.04% (Total Allowable Expenditure ÷ Total Income), and, applying this ratio, had attributed expenditure of Rs. 20,24,026/- to interest from scheduled banks and Rs. 42,33,750/- to interest from co-operative banks, aggregating to Rs. 62,57,776/-.
2.1.6 The Tribunal found that ledger extracts, audited statements, expenditure schedules and computation workings had been placed on record and were filed before the lower authorities; the genuineness of the expenditure and the audited books of account had not been doubted, nor had the books been rejected.
2.1.7 The Tribunal held that the disallowance was sustained by the lower authorities only on the premise that the assessee failed to establish a "one-to-one" or exclusive nexus between specific items of expenditure and the particular interest income assessed under section 56.
2.1.8 Interpreting section 57(iii), the Tribunal held that what is required is a "proximate and reasonable nexus" between the expenditure incurred and the income earned, and not an exclusive or direct transactional attribution. It observed that a co-operative credit society necessarily incurs administrative, operational, managerial and financial expenses for its statutory activities, and earning of bank interest is an integral part of such activities.
2.1.9 The Tribunal reasoned that once the Revenue chooses to tax such interest income under the head "Income from Other Sources", it cannot ignore the corresponding share of expenditure incurred in the course of the same activity that generated such income, so long as a reasonable and proximate connection is established.
2.1.10 Relying on a co-ordinate bench decision on materially identical facts (where proportionate expenditure was allowed under section 57 on interest earned from deployment of business funds assessed under section 56), the Tribunal found the present case to be on an equal or stronger footing, as the computation here was more elaborate and supported by audit records and detailed workings.
2.1.11 The Tribunal further noted that the Department had placed no material to show that the expenditure was fictitious, unrelated to the activity, capital in nature, or unsupported by records, nor had any specific defect been pointed out in the assessee's working or its reasonableness.
Conclusions
2.1.12 The Tribunal held that the assessee had established a sufficient proximate and reasonable nexus between the expenditure claimed and the interest income assessed under section 56, and that proportionate attribution on the basis of the expense-income ratio was acceptable in the facts.
2.1.13 It concluded that the assessee is entitled to deduction of Rs. 62,57,776/- under section 57 of the Act against the interest income brought to tax under "Income from Other Sources" and directed deletion of the disallowance, setting aside the order of the first appellate authority to that extent.
2.2 Nature of nexus required under section 57(iii) and permissibility of proportionate attribution
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.2.1 The Tribunal proceeded on the settled principle under section 57(iii) that deduction is admissible only in respect of expenditure (other than capital expenditure) laid out or expended wholly and exclusively for the purpose of making or earning income under the head "Income from Other Sources".
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2.2 The Tribunal reaffirmed that the statutory test is not of a strict "one-to-one" or direct transactional nexus but of a "proximate and reasonable connection" between the expenditure and the earning of the income in question.
2.2.3 It recorded that the funds placed in bank deposits were sourced from interest-bearing deposits collected from members and that the management and placement of such funds inherently involved administrative effort and expenditure, thereby creating a reasonable nexus between a portion of overall administrative expenditure and the interest income earned.
2.2.4 The Tribunal emphasized that only such proportion of the total expenditure as can reasonably be attributed to the earning of interest income taxable under section 56 can be allowed under section 57(iii), and that a proportionate, ratio-based allocation is permissible where it is backed by audited figures and a rational methodology.
2.2.5 It rejected the revenue authorities' insistence on an exclusive, direct item-wise linkage as being inconsistent with the statutory standard, and reiterated that consistent judicial view allows deduction when the assessee demonstrates proximate connection, even without granular transactional segregation.
Conclusions
2.2.6 The Tribunal held that, in the case of a co-operative credit society deploying funds arising from its core activities, a proportionate attribution of common administrative and related expenditure to interest income assessed under section 56 satisfies the requirement of section 57(iii).
2.2.7 It affirmed that denial of deduction solely on the ground of absence of direct, one-to-one nexus is legally unsustainable where the assessee has furnished a reasonable, audited and scientifically worked out basis of apportionment.
2.3 Levy of interest under sections 234A, 234B and 234C
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3.1 The Tribunal observed that liability to interest under sections 234A, 234B and 234C is generally consequential and dependent upon the assessed tax liability as finally determined.
Conclusions
2.3.2 It held that the ground challenging levy of interest under sections 234A, 234B and 234C does not call for separate adjudication and that the interest, if any, is to be recomputed consequentially in accordance with the final assessed income.
2.4 Challenge to initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4.1 The Tribunal noted that the assessee had raised a ground against initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A, though no penalty had yet been imposed.
2.4.2 It held that such a ground is premature at the stage of quantum appeal, as initiation of penalty is only a step in the subsequent, distinct penalty proceedings.
Conclusions
2.4.3 The Tribunal dismissed the ground challenging initiation of penalty proceedings under section 270A as premature, while reserving liberty to the assessee to contest the matter in accordance with law if and when any penalty order is actually passed.
Issues: Whether revision jurisdiction under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be exercised after the assessee had settled the dispute under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020.
Analysis: The settlement under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 was treated as a conclusive closure of the tax dispute. Section 5(3) makes the order determining the amount payable conclusive and bars reopening of matters covered by it in any other proceeding. Sections 6 and 8 reinforce that, once the statutory settlement is completed, the matter cannot be re-agitated through proceedings under the Income-tax Act. In view of this statutory finality and the binding jurisdictional view applied by the Tribunal, the later exercise of revision under section 263 was held to be impermissible.
Conclusion: The assumption of revision jurisdiction under section 263 after settlement under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020 was held to be invalid and unsustainable.
Ratio Decidendi: Once a tax dispute is conclusively settled under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020, matters covered by the settlement cannot be reopened or subjected to revision under the Income-tax Act, 1961.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the conditions for valid exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 263 were satisfied in respect of assessments framed under section 153C for the relevant assessment years.
1.2 Whether the Principal Commissioner could invoke section 263 on the ground of alleged non-examination or inadequate examination by the Assessing Officer of seized and survey material relating to TDR transactions, Makarba land documents, and survey-based disclosure, when the assessment record indicated enquiries and replies on these very issues.
1.3 Whether a mere preference for deeper or further enquiry, without a recorded finding of error in the assessment orders causing prejudice to the Revenue, constitutes a permissible basis for revision under section 263.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Validity of assumption of jurisdiction under section 263 over assessments framed under section 153C
(a) Legal framework as discussed
2.1.1 The Court reiterated that for assumption of jurisdiction under section 263, the Principal Commissioner must demonstrate, on the basis of material on record, that: (i) the assessment order is "erroneous"; and (ii) such error is "prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue". Both conditions must co-exist.
2.1.2 It was further noted that: (i) a mere possibility of a different or better view, or a desire for deeper or further enquiry, does not by itself confer jurisdiction under section 263; (ii) where the Assessing Officer has made enquiries, applied his mind and taken a plausible view, the Principal Commissioner cannot invoke section 263 merely because he considers the enquiry inadequate or the conclusion unacceptable; and (iii) revision cannot be sustained where it is founded on a mere "change of opinion".
(b) Interpretation and reasoning
2.1.3 The Court examined the assessment records and found that for both years the Assessing Officer had issued detailed notices under section 142(1), specifically calling for project-wise details, break-up of profits, explanations for seized/digital material, and supporting accounts.
2.1.4 The assessee had furnished comprehensive replies, including page-wise rebuttals of all seized and digital documents forming the foundation of the Principal Commissioner's show cause notices. These replies addressed: (i) page 260 of Volume I relating to alleged cash payment for TDR; (ii) pages 152 and 170 concerning alleged TDR payments involving "Malavbhai"; (iii) the document reflecting purchase of 10 TDRs at specified rates; (iv) pages relating to land at Makarba (survey numbers 430/3/1, 430/2, 430/4 and 429); and (v) statements recorded during search and survey.
2.1.5 As regards Makarba land, the Court noted that a statement under section 131 of the relevant individual had been recorded, confirming joint personal ownership of the land, clarifying that the lands had not been sold and were in litigation, and that these aspects were already on record before the Assessing Officer during the section 153C proceedings.
2.1.6 In relation to survey proceedings and the admission of undisclosed income of Rs. 43.52 crore, the Court noted that workings and details placed on record showed that income ultimately recorded in the books, project-wise and year-wise, exceeded the survey disclosure. These materials were also before the Assessing Officer.
2.1.7 The Court found that the Principal Commissioner, in the revisionary orders: (i) had merely reproduced extracts of seized documents found in the case of a third party; (ii) had broadly stated that the Assessing Officer "did not examine" the issues; but (iii) had not discussed a single reply filed during assessment, had not adverted to the page-wise rebuttals, and had conducted no independent verification or enquiry.
2.1.8 The Court emphasised that the Principal Commissioner did not verify the assessment records to contradict the existence of notices under section 142(1) or the assessee's detailed replies, nor did he confront the assessee with any specific adverse inference arising from those records.
2.1.9 Critically, the Court found that the Principal Commissioner failed to record any categorical finding that the assessment orders were erroneous on facts or in law, or to demonstrate how any alleged lapse resulted in prejudice to the Revenue. The orders were confined to a direction for "further examination" without identifying any actual error.
2.1.10 The Court held that, in substance, the Principal Commissioner's action amounted to substituting his opinion for that of the Assessing Officer and seeking a roving or fishing enquiry, which falls outside the permissible scope of section 263.
(c) Conclusions
2.1.11 The Court concluded that the mandatory jurisdictional requirement under section 263-namely, a demonstrable finding that the assessment orders were both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue-had not been satisfied.
2.1.12 The Court held that, since the Assessing Officer had made specific enquiries, considered detailed replies and adopted a plausible view on TDR transactions, Makarba land, and survey-related income, the Principal Commissioner could not validly invoke section 263 merely on the basis of a desire for deeper or further enquiry, or due to a mere difference of opinion.
2.1.13 Consequently, the assumption of revisional jurisdiction under section 263 for both assessment years was held to be unsustainable in law, and the revisionary orders setting aside the assessments were quashed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether, prima facie, the initiation of proceedings to finalize provisional assessments of Bills of Entry after a delay of about 12-15 years is impermissible as being beyond a reasonable period, warranting ad-interim restraint on further action under the impugned show cause notice.
(2) Whether the Petitioner has established a sufficient prima facie case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable prejudice to justify ad-interim relief restraining the authorities from proceeding further pursuant to the impugned show cause notice.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Delay in finalisation of provisional assessment and reasonable period
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The show cause notice seeks to finalize provisional assessments for Bills of Entry dated between August 2010 and September 2013, proposing re-classification and recovery of differential duty with interest under Section 18 of the Customs Act, 1962.
(b) The Court noted that the Jharkhand High Court, in a considered decision, after examining various circulars, held that provisional assessments of Bills of Entry "ought to be finalized within a reasonable period," and that such reasonable period would be "approximately 5 years."
(c) The Court recorded that in the present matter there is a delay of approximately 12 to 15 years in seeking to finalize the provisional assessments, which is substantially beyond the period considered reasonable by the Jharkhand High Court.
(d) The Court also found force, at least prima facie, in the contention that requiring the Petitioner, after 15 years, to furnish proof of end use of the imported goods by its customers would be practically impossible.
Conclusions
(e) The Court, on a prima facie assessment, accepted that there is considerable delay in finalizing the provisional assessments and that such delay, coupled with the impracticability of furnishing end-use proof after 15 years, supports the Petitioner's challenge for the purpose of interim relief.
Issue (2): Existence of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and grant of ad-interim relief
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) Taking into account the Jharkhand High Court's view on the requirement to finalize provisional assessments within a reasonable period (approximately 5 years) and the factual delay of about 12-15 years in the present case, the Court held that there is "considerable force" in the submissions advanced on behalf of the Petitioner.
(b) The Court also accepted, prima facie, that the requirement to now produce end-use evidence for imports made 12-15 years earlier would impose an onerous and practically impossible burden on the Petitioner.
(c) On these considerations, the Court held that the Petitioner has made out a "strong prima facie case" for grant of ad-interim relief and further held that, in the facts of the case, the "balance of convenience lies in favour of the Petitioner."
Conclusions
(d) The Court granted ad-interim relief in terms of the Petitioner's prayer restraining the authorities from taking any steps or proceedings pursuant to and in furtherance of the impugned show cause notice, including finalisation of the assessment of the Bills of Entry listed therein.
(e) The ad-interim relief is directed to operate until further orders, with timelines fixed for filing affidavit-in-reply and affidavit-in-rejoinder and the matter directed to be listed on a specified future date.
Issues: Whether the order taking cognizance and issuing summons against the petitioners, who were nominee non-executive directors, called for interference in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
Analysis: The petition challenged the summoning order on the grounds that the petitioners had been exonerated by other investigating agencies, were not in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the company, and that the special court had acted mechanically. The Court held that the stage of taking cognizance requires only a prima facie judicial satisfaction on the basis of the complaint and material placed before the court, and not a detailed evaluation of the merits or of disputed factual questions. It further held that exoneration by one investigating agency does not bind another agency or the court, particularly where the complaint under the Companies Act was founded on an independent SFIO investigation. The Court also noted that the question whether the petitioners were actually liable as non-executive or nominee directors, including in the light of Section 149(12) of the Companies Act, 2013, was a matter for trial and not for interference at the cognizance stage.
Conclusion: No ground for interference was made out. The summoning order was sustained and the challenge under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 failed.
Final Conclusion: The petitioners were left to raise their defences before the trial court at the appropriate stage, and the proceedings against them were permitted to continue.
Ratio Decidendi: At the stage of cognizance and summons, the court is concerned only with whether the materials disclose a prima facie case, and it should not undertake a roving inquiry into disputed facts or treat exoneration by another agency as determinative.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether CENVAT credit of service tax paid on transportation of goods by rail, availed on the basis of railway receipts and STTG Certificates for the period prior to 27.08.2014, is admissible under Rule 9 of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
1.2 Whether insertion of clause (fa) in Rule 9(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, with effect from 27.08.2014, excludes railway receipts and pre-27.08.2014 STTG Certificates as valid documents for availing CENVAT credit for the earlier period.
1.3 Whether interest and penalty are sustainable when CENVAT credit has been availed on railway receipts/STTG Certificates containing all particulars prescribed under Rule 9(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 & 2: Admissibility of CENVAT credit on the basis of railway receipts and STTG Certificates prior to 27.08.2014; effect of insertion of Rule 9(1)(fa)
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The Court noted that Rule 9(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 prescribes the documents on the basis of which CENVAT credit may be taken. By Notification No. 26/2014-CE(NT) dated 27.08.2014, clause (fa) was inserted in Rule 9(1), prescribing "a Service Tax Certificate for Transportation of goods by Rail (STTG Certificate) issued by the Indian Railways, along with the photocopies of the railway receipts mentioned in the STTG certificate" as a specified document.
2.2 The Court referred to the reasoning of the Tribunal in an earlier decision (JSW Steel) that Rule 9 regulates the nature of documents, is subservient to Rule 3 regarding admissibility of credit, and that Rule 9(2) read with Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules permits acceptance of any document containing the prescribed particulars as a proper duty-paying document.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court held that insertion of clause (fa) by Notification No. 26/2014-CE(NT) did not have retrospective effect and operated prospectively from 27.08.2014, but such insertion only prescribed an additional specified document; it did not render railway receipts or pre-27.08.2014 STTG Certificates invalid for availing credit.
2.4 It was observed that the appellant had availed CENVAT credit on transportation of goods by Indian Railways on the basis of railway receipts and STTG Certificates, which contained all relevant factual details required under Rule 9(1) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004.
2.5 Relying on the earlier Tribunal decision (JSW Steel) and its own subsequent decision (Jai Balaji Industries), the Court accepted that: (i) Rule 9 only prescribes forms of documents and cannot, by itself, determine substantive eligibility where the conditions of Rule 3 are satisfied; (ii) where the duty/tax payment, genuineness of the document, and receipt of input services are not in dispute, credit cannot be denied merely on technical objections as to the nature of the document; and (iii) documents like railway receipts and STTG Certificates, containing all particulars prescribed under Rule 9(1), are to be treated as valid duty-paying documents even for the period prior to 27.08.2014.
2.6 The Court emphasized that even after introduction of clause (fa), railway receipts containing all relevant details continued to be valid documents for availment of CENVAT credit, and STTG Certificates issued prior to 27.08.2014 also remained valid for this purpose because they contained all prescribed particulars.
Conclusions
2.7 The Court concluded that CENVAT credit of Rs. 49,16,972/-, availed on the basis of railway receipts and STTG Certificates for the period prior to 27.08.2014, was correctly taken and is admissible to the appellant.
2.8 The disallowance of CENVAT credit based on the ground that STTG Certificates were prescribed as eligible documents only from 27.08.2014 was held to be unsustainable, and the denial of credit in the impugned order was set aside.
Issue 3: Sustainability of interest and penalty
Interpretation and reasoning
3.1 Having held that the appellant was entitled to the CENVAT credit on the basis of railway receipts and STTG Certificates, the Court found that there was no irregularity or illegality in the availment of such credit.
3.2 Since the basic demand of CENVAT credit itself was unsustainable, there was no question of any liability to pay interest on such credit, nor any occasion to impose penalty.
Conclusions
3.3 The demand of interest confirmed in the impugned order was set aside.
3.4 The penalty imposed on the appellant in the impugned order was also set aside.
3.5 The appeal was allowed with consequential relief as per law.
Issues: Whether the product "Nescafe Premix" was classifiable under Entry C-II-3 of Schedule C Part II of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959 as "coffee" or "instant coffee", or under Entry C-II-18(2) as powders from which non-alcoholic beverages are prepared.
Analysis: The product was used by adding hot water to prepare the final drink, and its contents included soluble coffee powder along with sucrose, milk powder, and maltodextrin. The percentage of coffee was not ative for classification. For tax classification, the article had to be understood in common parlance or commercial sense, not by a scientific or technical analysis of ingredients. On that test, the product was understood as coffee or instant coffee. Entry C-II-3 was a specific entry covering coffee and instant coffee, while Entry C-II-18(2) was a general entry for powders from which non-alcoholic beverages are prepared. A specific entry prevails over a general one where the goods fit the specific description.
Conclusion: The product was correctly classifiable under Entry C-II-3 and not under Entry C-II-18(2), and the reference was answered in favour of the assessee.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the software consultancy and related services provided by the petitioner to its overseas parent company constitute "export of services" or "intermediary" services under the Integrated Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
1.2 Whether the petitioner's refund claims of unutilised input tax credit on zero-rated supplies were barred by limitation under Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Characterisation of services as "export of services" or "intermediary" services
Legal framework
2.1 The Court referred to Section 2(6) of the IGST Act defining "export of services", which requires, inter alia, that: (i) the supplier is located in India; (ii) the recipient is located outside India; (iii) the place of supply is outside India; and (iv) payment is received in convertible foreign exchange or permitted Indian rupees; and that supplier and recipient are not merely establishments of a distinct person as per Explanation 1 to Section 8.
2.2 The Court also referred to Section 2(13) of the IGST Act defining "intermediary" as a broker, agent or any other person who arranges or facilitates the supply of goods or services or both between two or more persons, but excluding a person who supplies such goods or services on his own account.
2.3 Section 16 of the IGST Act, providing for "zero rated supply" including export of services, was noticed as the governing provision for treating supplies as zero-rated.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.4 The Court examined the services agreement between the petitioner (Indian entity) and its US parent company, particularly clauses 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 4.2 and 4.4. Under clause 1.1.1, the petitioner is to assist the US entity in carrying on the business of providing information services and consultancy in the business of software development, editorial services, customer support, sales and marketing of information management products, including setting up consultations and meetings between globally based experts and globally based clients and participating in business as consultants, agents, sub-agents, liaison agents/sub-agents for the US entity and foreign clients. Clause 1.1.2 contemplates consultancy in designing and developing programs and related technical and administrative operations.
2.5 On the basis of these clauses, the Court held that the petitioner is itself providing substantive services (software consultancy, information services, technical and business support) on its own account to its parent company, and is not merely arranging or facilitating supplies between the parent company and its customers without supplying any service itself. The scope of work shows that the petitioner is engaged in carrying on and assisting the business of the parent, rather than acting as a conduit between two other parties.
2.6 The Court also considered the commercial terms: under clause 4.2, the petitioner raises monthly invoices to the parent company for work completed, and is paid a fee equal to its costs plus an 8% markup, signifying that it earns profit on services supplied. Under clause 4.4, this fee is the full consideration; the petitioner bears all its own expenses, including taxes and operational costs, confirming that it is operating as an independent service provider and not as a mere intermediary compensated by commission or facilitation charges.
2.7 Dispute resolution clause 7.2, providing for arbitration between the petitioner and the parent company in case of disputes arising from the agreement, reinforced that the petitioner is a distinct and independent contracting party with its own rights and obligations, not an ancillary facilitator in a tri-partite arrangement.
2.8 The Court noted that the agreement is bipartite, involving only the petitioner and its parent company. There is no third-party recipient with whom the petitioner is arranging or facilitating a supply. This absence of a tri-partite structure is inconsistent with the statutory notion of "intermediary", which contemplates the arrangement or facilitation of supply "between two or more persons".
2.9 The Court thus accepted the petitioner's contention, supported by CBIC Circular No. 159/15/2021-GST, that none of the essential elements of "intermediary" service as elaborated therein were satisfied on the facts of the case.
2.10 The Court relied on decisions which had similarly held that entities providing services on a principal-to-principal basis to overseas group entities are not "intermediaries" but exporters of services, including the Delhi High Court decision in M/s. Ernst and Young Limited. It noted that where the services are not intermediary services, the place of supply is determined by the location of the recipient, and when the recipient is outside India, such services fall within Section 2(6) as "export of services".
Conclusions
2.11 The Court held that on a proper reading of the service agreement and the factual arrangement, the petitioner supplies services on its own account to its overseas parent company and does not arrange or facilitate supplies between the parent company and any third party.
2.12 The services provided by the petitioner are not "intermediary" services under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act but qualify as "export of services" under Section 2(6) read with Section 16 of the IGST Act.
2.13 The finding of the authorities below that the petitioner was providing intermediary services was held to be erroneous and was set aside.
Issue 2 - Limitation for refund claim under Section 54 of the CGST Act
Legal framework
2.14 The Court proceeded on the basis of Section 54(1) of the CGST Act, which prescribes a two-year limitation period from the "relevant date" for filing a refund application, and the procedure prescribed under Circular No. 17/17/2017-GST and Circular No. 24/24/2017-GST for filing refund applications, including filing on the common portal and subsequent physical submission.
2.15 The Court referred to its earlier decision in Charomotolab and Biotech Solutions, which interpreted the effect of the CBIC circular of 15.11.2017 prescribing physical submission of refund applications in addition to filing on the common portal.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.16 In Charomotolab and Biotech Solutions, extracted in detail, the Court had held that when a refund application in Form GST RFD-01A is filed on the common portal within the prescribed period and an ARN is generated, the date of filing on the portal must be treated as the relevant date for limitation purposes under Section 54, and subsequent physical submission of documents pursuant to a procedural circular cannot be used to treat the application as time-barred.
2.17 The Court noted that in the present case it was not in dispute that the petitioner had submitted the refund application and that the question of limitation turned on how the date of filing should be reckoned, in light of the statutory provision and applicable circulars.
2.18 Applying the principles from Charomotolab and Biotech Solutions, the Court accepted that a procedural circular cannot override the statutory right to refund within the two-year period under Section 54, and the filing within that period could not be denied on the basis that supporting documents or physical submission occurred later.
Conclusions
2.19 The Court concluded that the petitioner's refund applications, being in respect of zero-rated supplies treated as export of services, were filed within the limitation prescribed under Section 54 of the CGST Act.
2.20 The rejection of the refund claims on the ground of limitation was unsustainable.
Overall disposition
2.21 The Court held that the authorities had erred in classifying the petitioner's services as "intermediary" services and in rejecting the refund claims as time-barred. The impugned appellate order and the order-in-original rejecting the refund were quashed and set aside.
2.22 The respondents were directed to process the petitioner's refund claims treating the services as export of services and the claims as within limitation, and to complete the exercise in accordance with law within twelve weeks of receipt of the judgment.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether surtax paid by the assessee is an allowable deduction in computing taxable income.
1.2 Whether the assessee could change the method of valuation of closing stock from total cost method to direct/variable cost method and whether specified indirect/establishment expenses must be included in the value of closing stock.
1.3 Whether the assessee is entitled to weighted deduction under Section 35B in respect of commission paid in relation to export promotion activities carried out through a foreign agent and an Indian agent, and the necessity of remand for factual determination.
1.4 Whether the assessee is entitled to deduction under Section 40A(5) as claimed.
1.5 Whether expenditure on air-conditioners, coolers, calculators and fans used by the research and development department qualifies for deduction as R&D expenditure.
1.6 Whether extra shift allowance on new plant and machinery is admissible on the plant and machinery as a whole or only on the basis of the number of days each machinery was put to use.
1.7 Whether excise duty is to be included in the valuation of closing stock.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
2.1 Deductibility of surtax paid by the assessee
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court recorded the assessee's own acknowledgment that the issue of allowability of surtax as a deduction already stands settled against the assessee by the Supreme Court. The Revenue also did not dispute this legal position.
Conclusions: The question relating to deduction of surtax paid by the assessee is answered against the assessee, holding that surtax is not an allowable deduction.
2.2 Change in method of valuation of closing stock and inclusion of indirect expenses
Legal framework (as discussed): The issue arose in the context of assessment under the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the Tribunal's order permitting the assessee to adopt either direct cost or total cost method for valuing closing stock, while directing inclusion of certain indirect/establishment costs in such valuation.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted that from assessment year 1982-83 onwards, the assessee adopted the direct/variable cost method, while the Revenue contended that the earlier total cost method must be continued. The Tribunal had held that the assessee was free to adopt either direct or total cost method, but ordered inclusion of certain indirect/establishment expenses in the value of closing stock. It was noticed that inclusion of such indirect costs in closing stock for one year would necessarily lead to their exclusion in the next year's computation, and counsel for the assessee could not controvert this. Counsel for the Revenue expressly stated before the Court that the Revenue had no objection to the method of valuation as applied and approved by the Tribunal.
Conclusions: Accepting the factual and legal position and the parties' statements, the Court answered the question relating to inclusion of expenses in the value of closing stock against the assessee, thereby upholding the Tribunal's direction requiring inclusion of the specified expenses. The Revenue's objection to the change in method of valuation itself was not sustained in view of its concession.
2.3 Weighted deduction under Section 35B on commission related to export promotion
Legal framework (as discussed): The issue concerned weighted deduction under Section 35B, particularly Clause (iv) of Section 35B(1)(b) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, in light of Supreme Court decisions including the remand directions in relation to commission to agents and the judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Stepwell Industries Ltd.
Interpretation and reasoning: It was recorded that the Supreme Court had in another matter remanded the issue of weighted deduction under Section 35B on commission paid to Indian agents to the Tribunal for factual examination. In the present case, the assessee claimed that it had appointed a foreign agent to promote its products outside India, and that this foreign agent, in turn, appointed an Indian agent; the assessee asserted eligibility to weighted deduction under Section 35B(1)(b)(iv). The Court found that the factual position regarding the nature of services rendered, the identity and role of the foreign and Indian agents, and the precise character of the commission payments required fresh examination. Counsel for the Revenue suggested, and both parties agreed, that the matter should be remanded for fact-finding and decision in accordance with the statutory mandate and applicable Supreme Court judgments.
Conclusions: The question of weighted deduction under Section 35B on commission payments is remanded to the Assessing Officer to examine the factual matrix and pass a fresh order in accordance with Section 35B and relevant Supreme Court decisions, specifically including Commissioner of Income Tax v. Stepwell Industries Ltd. The Court refrained from finally answering the question on merits, leaving it to the Assessing Officer.
2.4 Deduction under Section 40A(5)
Legal framework (as discussed): The controversy related to the allowability and scope of deduction under Section 40A(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and was noted to be governed by the Supreme Court's decision in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mafatlal Gangabhai & Co. (P) Ltd.
Interpretation and reasoning: The Court recorded that, as per the above Supreme Court authority, the legal issue stood settled against the Revenue. The Tribunal had decided the question of deduction under Section 40A(5) in favour of the assessee, and the Court saw no reason to take a different view in light of binding precedent.
Conclusions: The question under Section 40A(5) is answered in favour of the assessee, affirming the allowability of the deduction as determined in accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling.
2.5 R&D expenditure on air-conditioners, coolers, calculators and fans
Interpretation and reasoning: The assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 25,628/- in respect of air-conditioners, coolers, calculators and fans used by its research and development department, asserting that these formed part of R&D expenditure. The Revenue disputed that such items could be treated as R&D expenditure. After hearing the parties and considering the nature and use of these assets as forming part of the research and development department's infrastructure, the Court accepted the assessee's claim.
Conclusions: The question relating to deduction for expenditure on air-conditioning and coolers, calculators and fans used in R&D is answered in favour of the assessee, holding such expenditure as eligible for deduction as R&D-related.
2.6 Extra shift allowance on new plant and machinery
Legal framework (as discussed): The dispute centred on whether extra shift allowance on new plant and machinery is to be computed with reference to the plant and machinery as a whole or restricted to the number of days each item was put to use. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in South India Viscose Ltd. v. CIT.
Interpretation and reasoning: In view of the binding precedent, the Court held that the issue already stood concluded. No independent or contrary interpretation was warranted in the face of the Supreme Court's ruling.
Conclusions: The question of extra shift allowance on new plant and machinery is answered in favour of the assessee, in terms of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in South India Viscose Ltd., thereby sustaining the assessee's method of claiming extra shift allowance.
2.7 Inclusion of excise duty in valuation of closing stock
Legal framework (as discussed): The issue related to whether excise duty should be included in the valuation of closing stock. The Court referred to and followed the Supreme Court's decision in CIT v. Dynavision Ltd.
Interpretation and reasoning: Given that the Supreme Court had decided the principle governing inclusion of excise duty in closing stock, the Court applied that binding precedent to the present case. No separate reasoning beyond adherence to the Supreme Court's interpretation was undertaken.
Conclusions: The question of inclusion of excise duty in the value of closing stock is answered in favour of the assessee, in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Dynavision Ltd., thereby holding that excise duty is not to be included in the manner contended by the Revenue.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 263 directing verification of tax deduction at source on professional fees and lease rent, and disallowance of employees' contribution to PF/ESI under section 36(1)(va), was valid and sustainable.
1.2 Whether a ground claiming that additions are eligible for exemption under section 10AA, and hence the assessment order is not "erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue", can be entertained when such contention was neither raised before the revisional authority nor arises from the revisional order or the assessment order.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Validity of revision under section 263 concerning TDS verification and disallowance under section 36(1)(va)
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Tribunal noted that the revisional authority invoked section 263 after examining the assessment records and forming the view that the assessment order was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue on two aspects: (i) possible short deduction or non-deduction of TDS on substantial payments towards professional fees and land/building/furniture/rent; and (ii) non-disallowance of delayed remittance of employees' contribution to PF/ESI as per section 36(1)(va).
2.2 As regards TDS on professional services and land/building/furniture/rent, the revisional authority found that the Assessing Officer had allowed the expenditure without making necessary enquiry or verification regarding deduction of TDS at the applicable rates, including in cases where lower deduction certificates were claimed. The direction in revision was confined to verification of whether TDS was deducted at the current applicable rate on professional fees of Rs. 8,92,19,079/- and on land/building/furniture/rent of Rs. 6,36,41,216/-, and to reframe the assessment accordingly.
2.3 As regards employees' contribution to PF/ESI of Rs. 20,74,567/-, the revisional authority found that amounts received from employees were not remitted within the due dates prescribed under the respective Acts and therefore ought to have been disallowed under section 36(1)(va). The revisional order relied on the law laid down by the apex court on this issue.
2.4 Before the Tribunal, the assessee's representative reiterated that TDS had been deducted at the applicable rates, duly reported in the tax audit report, and accepted the revisional direction for verification. On the issue of employees' contribution to PF/ESI, the assessee expressly conceded to the disallowance in view of the binding apex court judgment relied on by the revisional authority and did not contest this point, acknowledging that there was effectively no grievance.
2.5 The Departmental Representative supported the revisional order on the ground that the Assessing Officer had failed to conduct proper enquiry and had allowed the expenditure claim mechanically.
Conclusions
2.6 The Tribunal held that the revision under section 263, limited to directing verification of TDS deduction at appropriate rates on professional fees and rent and to disallowing employees' contribution to PF/ESI not deposited within the due dates under the relevant Acts as per section 36(1)(va), was justified and sustainable.
2.7 In view of the assessee's concession on the PF/ESI employees' contribution issue and agreement to verification of TDS as directed, the Tribunal upheld the order passed under section 263.
Issue 2 - Entertainability of new ground based on section 10AA in appeal against section 263 order
Interpretation and reasoning
2.8 One of the grounds in appeal contended that the additions directed in revision were in any case eligible for exemption under section 10AA, and therefore the assessment order could not be regarded as erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.
2.9 The Tribunal observed that this contention had not been raised before the revisional authority and did not emanate from the revisional order or from the original assessment order. The issue of exemption under section 10AA had no foundation in the proceedings before the revisional authority.
Conclusions
2.10 The Tribunal declined to entertain the ground based on section 10AA and dismissed it on the basis that it did not arise from the order under section 263 or the assessment order.
2.11 Consequently, with the revisional order being upheld and the additional ground rejected, the appeal was dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether revisional orders passed under section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, can survive when the underlying assessment orders passed under section 143(3) have been quashed by the jurisdictional High Court.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Survival of section 263 revisional orders after quashing of underlying assessment orders
Interpretation and reasoning
2.1 The Tribunal noted that the impugned revisional orders under section 263 were passed to revise assessment orders framed under section 143(3) for the relevant assessment years.
2.2 It was brought on record that the assessee had challenged the validity of the assessment orders before the jurisdictional High Court by writ petitions, inter alia on the ground that the assessments were contrary to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and to the resolution plan approved by the National Company Law Tribunal.
2.3 The Tribunal recorded that, for the assessment year 2019-20, the High Court, by order dated 14 October 2025, had quashed the assessment order dated 28 September 2021, noting that (i) the assessment order was passed after approval of the resolution plan by the NCLT on 3 December 2020, and (ii) the concerned financial year fell prior to the effective date of the resolution plan, i.e., 22 December 2020.
2.4 The Tribunal held that, once the assessment order itself stands quashed by the High Court, the foundational order sought to be revised under section 263 ceases to exist in the eyes of law.
2.5 Consequently, the revisional order purporting to revise or revive such a non-existent assessment order cannot survive and becomes a nullity.
2.6 For the assessment year 2018-19, the Tribunal observed that the facts were identical and that the assessment order dated 22 April 2021 passed under section 143(3) had also been quashed by the High Court vide order dated 6 October 2025. Therefore, the same legal consequence followed in relation to the section 263 order for that year.
Conclusions
2.7 For the assessment year 2019-20, the Tribunal held that, since the assessment order dated 28 September 2021 under section 143(3) had been quashed by the High Court, the revisional order dated 29 March 2024 under section 263 did not survive and was liable to be quashed.
2.8 For the assessment year 2018-19, the Tribunal held that, as the assessment order dated 22 April 2021 under section 143(3) had been quashed by the High Court, the revisional order dated 28 March 2024 under section 263 also could not stand and was quashed.
2.9 Both appeals were allowed, and the impugned section 263 orders were set aside for the respective assessment years.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
(1) Whether the existence of an object permitting organization of religious programmes such as "Ramkatha, Bhagwat Katha, Navchandi Yagna, Gayatri Yagna etc." for raising funds renders the trust's objects "wholly or substantially religious" so as to disentitle it from approval under Section 80G(5) of the Income Tax Act.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue (1): Character of objects and eligibility for approval under Section 80G(5)
Legal framework (as discussed)
The Tribunal referred to Section 80G(5) of the Income Tax Act, noting that approval cannot be granted if any of the objects of the assessee is "wholly or substantially religious in nature". It was also noted that the bar under Section 80G(5B) relating to expenditure exceeding 5% on religious purposes was not attracted on the facts.
Interpretation and reasoning
(a) The Tribunal examined the trust's objects, which included: establishing and maintaining educational institutions, distributing educational material to needy students, developing computer skills, establishing blood bank, eye bank, burn centre and providing health-related support, providing help to poor persons and those affected by natural calamities, running water and food centres, providing shelter for widows, deserted women and orphans, and establishing "cow house (Panjrapole)" and helping animals through a diagnosis centre.
(b) The Tribunal held that these objects are charitable in nature, focused on education, medical relief, relief to the poor, welfare of public at large, and welfare of animals.
(c) With respect to object no. 9, which contemplated organizing "religious program like Ramkatha, Bhagwat Katha, Navchandi Yagna, Gayatri Yagya etc." for raising funds, the Tribunal observed that: (i) the stated purpose of these programmes was to raise funds for the charitable objects of the trust; (ii) the programmes such as Ramkatha and Bhagwat Katha are organised for the benefit of the public at large, irrespective of religion; (iii) such programmes, through preaching and narration of historical events, are intended to guide society towards a moral, spiritual, contented and happy life and away from sins and immoral conduct, thereby contributing to peace, progress and welfare of all.
(d) On this basis, the Tribunal concluded that the impugned object cannot be regarded as "wholly or substantially religious in nature" and does not amount to propagation of any particular religion in a manner attracting the embargo under Section 80G(5).
Conclusions
(a) The overall objects of the trust are charitable in nature and not wholly or substantially religious.
(b) The specific object of organizing religious programmes for raising funds, in the context of the trust's dominant charitable purposes and stated mode of utilization, does not disqualify the trust from approval under Section 80G(5).
(c) The rejection of approval by the authority on the ground of existence of a religious object was unjustified.
(d) The order rejecting approval under Section 80G(5) was set aside, and a direction was issued to grant approval under Section 80G(5) from the date of the application.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the Court could exercise writ jurisdiction to direct restoration of a cancelled GST registration despite expiry of the statutory periods for revocation and appeal and the plea of laches.
1.2 Consequential directions required for enabling filing of pending GST returns, payment of dues and future proceedings by the tax authorities upon restoration of registration.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Exercise of writ jurisdiction for restoration of GST registration despite limitation and laches
Legal framework (as discussed)
2.1 The cancellation of GST registration was based on non-filing of returns under Section 39 of the CGST Act, 2017. The appellate authority rejected the appeal as barred by limitation under Section 107 of the CGST Act, 2017. The department also relied on the lapse of more than three years since cancellation, to deny revocation.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.2 The Court noted that the show cause notice for cancellation ought to have been replied to by the petitioner but was not, resulting in cancellation of registration.
2.3 The Court took into account the peculiar facts, namely: (i) the petitioner's serious illness during the COVID period; (ii) a dispute with the Chartered Accountant who held the GST portal credentials; (iii) multiple written representations and personal visits to the GST Department seeking access to the portal and restoration of registration; and (iv) eventual issuance of new login credentials, which still did not allow complete filing of past returns.
2.4 The Court found that the petitioner was a bona fide trader intending to continue business and that cancellation of registration had effectively disabled him from carrying on his business.
2.5 While acknowledging that ordinarily delay would not be condoned and that the petitioner had not replied to the initial show cause notice, the Court held that the combination of medical reasons, professional dispute, persistent efforts to regularise compliance, and the impact on the petitioner's ability to do business justified invocation of writ jurisdiction notwithstanding the bar of limitation and the plea of laches.
2.6 The Court distinguished the general rule relied upon by the respondents (including the cited precedent on limitation) by treating the matter as an exceptional case warranting equitable relief.
Conclusions
2.7 The Court held that, in the peculiar facts, it was a fit case to exercise writ jurisdiction despite statutory time-bars and alleged laches.
2.8 The Court directed that the petitioner's GST registration be restored within one week from the date of the order.
Issue 2 - Directions regarding filing of pending returns, payment of dues, portal access, and future departmental action
Interpretation and reasoning
2.9 On a specific query, the petitioner expressed willingness to file all pending GST returns with late fee and interest, if any. The Court proceeded on this undertaking while granting relief.
2.10 To make the restoration effective, the Court directed that a username and password be provided to the petitioner to enable filing of all pending GST returns along with late payment fee and interest.
2.11 Recognising the petitioner's earlier difficulty in portal access, the Court directed that the GST portal be enabled for filing all pending returns, and if electronic filing was not possible, the petitioner be permitted to appear physically and file all returns with applicable dues.
2.12 The Court fixed a specific date, time and authority (Superintendent, Ward 49, CGST, North Commissionerate) before whom the petitioner must appear so that the concerned official can enable filing of all returns and compliances.
2.13 The Court further directed that access to the petitioner's electronic credit ledger be enabled after payment is made and returns are filed.
2.14 While granting these facilitative directions, the Court preserved the department's powers by clarifying that it is at liberty to take any action in accordance with law upon scrutiny of the returns and any discrepancies noticed.
2.15 Considering that GST returns were being permitted to be filed belatedly pursuant to the Court's order, the Court held that, if any show cause notice is to be issued to the petitioner, the usual statutory time limits prescribed for the department would not apply in this case.
Conclusions
2.16 The Court directed: (i) restoration of GST registration within one week; (ii) issuance of username and password; (iii) enabling of the GST portal for filing all pending returns, or alternatively permitting physical filing; (iv) petitioner's appearance before the specified Superintendent on the stipulated date and time to facilitate filing; and (v) re-enablement of the electronic credit ledger post-payment.
2.17 The Court clarified that the tax authorities may proceed in accordance with law on the basis of the returns so filed, without being constrained by the usual departmental limitation periods for issuance of show cause notices in this particular case.
Note
Bookmark
Share
Download
Don't have an account? Register Here
TaxTMI