Limitation for appeal runs from communication of an adverse order, not its mere recording in office files.

For an appeal against an order affecting rights, limitation begins when the order is communicated or otherwise made known to the affected party, not when it is merely recorded in the office file. The Court applied the principle that a person cannot be expected to appeal against an order of which they have no knowledge, whether actual or constructive. On the facts, the appeal filed within thirty days of receipt of the communication was within time, and the High Court was right to treat the date of communication as the relevant starting point for limitation.

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Issues: Whether, for the purpose of filing an appeal under Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicle Taxation Act, the starting point of limitation is the date on which the order is made or the date on which it is communicated to the affected party.

Analysis: The operative principle applied was that an order affecting rights does not become effective against the person concerned merely by being written in the office file. It must be made known, either directly or constructively, so that the affected party can exercise the right of appeal. On the facts, the party had no means of knowing of the rejection order until receipt of the communication, and the appeal filed within thirty days of that receipt was within time.

Conclusion: The date of communication of the order was the starting point of limitation, and the appeal was within time.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed because the High Court correctly treated communication of the order as the relevant date for limitation under Section 15.

Ratio Decidendi: For an appeal against an order affecting rights, limitation begins when the order is communicated or otherwise made known to the affected party, not when it is merely recorded in the office file.

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