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Issues: (i) Whether the Director of Consumer Goods or the District Magistrate having jurisdiction was the competent authority to initiate and conclude proceedings for cancellation or suspension of a kerosene agent's licence under paragraph 9 of the West Bengal Kerosene Oil Control Order, 1968. (ii) Whether the requirement in paragraph 9 that an order be passed within 30 days from the date of the show-cause notice or suspension required communication of the order within that period, or whether passing the order in writing within that period was sufficient.
Issue (i): Whether the Director of Consumer Goods or the District Magistrate having jurisdiction was the competent authority to initiate and conclude proceedings for cancellation or suspension of a kerosene agent's licence under paragraph 9 of the West Bengal Kerosene Oil Control Order, 1968.
Analysis: The scheme of the Control Order distinguishes between an agent and a dealer. A licence for an agent is granted by the Director under paragraph 5, while a dealer's licence may be granted by the Director or the District Magistrate having jurisdiction under paragraph 6. Paragraph 9 must therefore be read harmoniously with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. A literal reading suggesting concurrent jurisdiction for the Director and the District Magistrate would create inconsistency, because the authority empowered to grant the licence is the authority that can suspend or cancel it. On that construction, the District Magistrate's jurisdiction under paragraph 9 relates to dealer licences within the district, whereas an agent's State-level licence remains within the Director's authority.
Conclusion: The Director of Consumer Goods alone had jurisdiction to issue the show-cause notice and pass the final order under paragraph 9 in relation to the agent's licence.
Issue (ii): Whether the requirement in paragraph 9 that an order be passed within 30 days from the date of the show-cause notice or suspension required communication of the order within that period, or whether passing the order in writing within that period was sufficient.
Analysis: The 30-day prescription in paragraph 9 is to be understood purposively in the context of the Control Order's object of regulating kerosene distribution and preventing misuse. An order passed within time but communicated later does not become a nullity merely because service occurred after 30 days. The relevant act for compliance with paragraph 9 is making the order in writing within the prescribed period; paragraph 10's appeal period also runs from the date when the order becomes effective, that is, on communication to the affected party. A contrary view would defeat the statutory purpose and create an anomaly by making lawful orders vulnerable only because of delayed service.
Conclusion: The order need only be passed in writing within 30 days; delayed communication does not invalidate it.
Final Conclusion: The High Court's view was held unsustainable, the Director's order was restored as valid, and the respondent was left to pursue the statutory appeal before the State Government within the period directed by the Court.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute or control order confers licensing power on a particular authority, the power to suspend or cancel that licence ordinarily follows that grant authority by necessary implication, and a limitation framed with reference to passing an order is satisfied when the order is made within time even if communication follows later, unless the statutory scheme clearly requires otherwise.
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