Delegated licensing power must be exercised independently, and cancellation becomes effective only on communication where appeal rights depend on it.

A delegated control order vesting licence grant, suspension and cancellation in a specified authority must be exercised independently by that authority, and ministerial prior approval cannot replace the statutory decision-maker's function. The article further notes that where the scheme requires a final cancellation order within 30 days of suspension and provides a 30-day appeal period from the date of the order, communication is essential to effectiveness; an order kept uncommunicated cannot operate against the affected party. On the stated facts, delayed communication rendered the cancellation ineffective and the suspension could not continue.

---

---

Issues: (i) Whether the Minister could direct the Director of Consumer Goods to send the file for approval and thereby interfere with the statutory power conferred on the Director under the Control Order; (ii) whether an order of cancellation of licence had to be communicated within 30 days from the date of suspension so as to remain effective.

Issue (i): Whether the Minister could direct the Director of Consumer Goods to send the file for approval and thereby interfere with the statutory power conferred on the Director under the Control Order.

Analysis: The Control Order, made under the Essential Commodities Act, vested the power to grant, suspend, and cancel the licence in the Director of Consumer Goods. Once the statute assigned that function to a specified authority, the decision had to be taken by that authority alone in the manner prescribed. The Minister had no authority to control the exercise of that statutory function or to require prior approval before the final order was issued. The Court also found that the file had in fact been routed to the Minister and that the Director did not act independently.

Conclusion: The Minister's interference was unauthorized, and the cancellation order was vitiated for failure to follow the statutory procedure.

Issue (ii): Whether an order of cancellation of licence had to be communicated within 30 days from the date of suspension so as to remain effective.

Analysis: Paragraph 9 required the final order to be made within 30 days from suspension, and Paragraph 10 conferred a 30-day right of appeal from the date of the order. Reading the provisions together, the Court held that mere passing of the order without communication would defeat the appellate remedy. The order would take effect only when communicated, and an order kept in the file could not be treated as effective against the affected party. On the facts, communication occurred after the 30-day period.

Conclusion: The cancellation order was ineffective as it was communicated beyond the permissible period, and the suspension had also ceased to operate.

Final Conclusion: The licence cancellation and suspension were quashed, supply of kerosene was directed to be restored, and the writ petition succeeded with costs.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a statute or delegated order entrusts a specific authority with a power and prescribes the manner and time for its exercise, that authority must act independently and comply strictly with the prescribed procedure; an order affecting rights is effective only upon communication where the statutory scheme makes communication essential to the right of appeal.

---