Issues: Whether Section 122(1A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 operates prospectively or retrospectively.

Analysis: Section 122(1A) contains no express provision or necessary implication giving it retrospective operation. A statutory provision remains prospective unless retrospectivity is clearly established by its language or necessary implication.

Conclusion: Section 122(1A) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 operates prospectively and cannot be applied retrospectively.

Issues: Whether the writ jurisdiction should be exercised against an adjudication order under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 despite the available statutory appellate remedy, where disputed allegations of non-service of personal-hearing notices and denial of hearing were raised.

Analysis: An efficacious statutory appellate remedy ordinarily warrants restraint in the exercise of writ jurisdiction, although the remedy is not an absolute bar where recognised exceptions, including breach of natural justice, are established. The alleged non-service of hearing notices involved disputed questions concerning the email address recorded in the registration particulars, the communications issued by the Department, and whether the virtual-hearing details were duly conveyed. These questions, together with the challenge to consideration of the taxpayer's explanations and the merits of the demand, required examination of the relevant record and could appropriately be considered by the appellate authority.

Conclusion: The statutory appellate remedy is the appropriate forum for adjudicating the disputed service, hearing, and demand-related contentions; all such contentions remain open for consideration in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether a 200% penalty under Section 129(1)(a) could be sustained for non-generation of an e-invoice at dispatch owing to portal downtime, where the goods moved with an e-way bill, commercial invoice and delivery note and no intent to evade tax was shown; (ii) Whether payment of the penalty through DRC-03 to obtain release of detained goods precluded appellate relief and refund.

Issue (i): Whether a 200% penalty under Section 129(1)(a) could be sustained for non-generation of an e-invoice at dispatch owing to portal downtime, where the goods moved with an e-way bill, commercial invoice and delivery note and no intent to evade tax was shown.

Analysis: Section 68 read with Rule 138 required carriage of the prescribed transport documents, which were available with the consignment. Rule 55(4) was treated as accommodating situations in which an invoice cannot be issued at removal. Although Rules 48(4) and 48(5) require e-invoicing for notified persons, their application was harmoniously construed with operational impossibility caused by governmental portal downtime. The electronic invoice was generated on the following morning, and there was no discrepancy in the goods, value or tax particulars. Section 129 was treated as directed at deliberate tax evasion rather than a bona fide technical lapse; mens rea was regarded as indispensable to the penalty. The principle of lex non cogit ad impossibilia applied.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 129(1)(a) was unsustainable in the absence of mens rea and was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether payment of the penalty through DRC-03 to obtain release of detained goods precluded appellate relief and refund.

Analysis: Payment made to secure immediate release of detained commercial goods was treated as a payment under economic duress. Such payment did not amount to an estoppel against pursuing statutory appellate remedies.

Conclusion: The DRC-03 payment did not bar the assessee from obtaining appellate relief and refund.

Final Conclusion: The first appellate order affirming the penalty and the underlying penal demand could not stand, and the amount collected was liable to be restored with statutory interest.

Ratio Decidendi: A penalty for movement of goods without a contemporaneously generated e-invoice cannot be imposed under Section 129 solely for a technical portal-induced lapse where prescribed transport documents establish transaction transparency and no intent to evade tax is shown.

Issues: (i) Whether physical transport of taxable goods with wholly mismatched accompanying documents, followed by post-detention invoices without e-way bills, meets the statutory transit-document requirements; (ii) Whether subsequent ownership claims can displace the transporter's liability as a person other than the owner under Section 129(1)(b); (iii) Whether the market-based valuation of undocumented goods violates the applicable valuation framework.

Issue (i): Whether physical transport of taxable goods with wholly mismatched accompanying documents, followed by post-detention invoices without e-way bills, meets the statutory transit-document requirements.

Analysis: Section 68 and Rule 138A require mandatory transit documentation, including documents and e-way bill details matching the goods actually carried. The documents available at interception related to different commodities, while the physical consignment had no matching contemporaneous documentary coverage. The unsubstantiated explanation of a document exchange and invoices furnished only after detention could not provide retrospective validation. The absence of e-way bills independently established non-compliance with e-way bill compliance requirements.

Conclusion: The statutory transit-document requirements were not met; this issue is in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether subsequent ownership claims can displace the transporter's liability as a person other than the owner under Section 129(1)(b).

Analysis: Ownership identification for the goods in transit required valid and contemporaneous documents connecting an identifiable owner with the physical cargo. The later invoices were unsupported by e-way bills and did not cure the absence of matching ownership documents at interception. In these circumstances, the post-detention ownership claims did not establish a bona fide owner who had come forward for the goods.

Conclusion: The transporter was correctly liable as a person other than the owner under Section 129(1)(b); this issue is in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether the market-based valuation of undocumented goods violates the applicable valuation framework.

Analysis: In the absence of contemporaneous invoices matching the physical consignment and with buyers remaining untraceable, market-based valuation using product quality, specifications, and prevailing wholesale-market averages was treated as a rational basis for valuation.

Conclusion: The market-based valuation was valid and did not violate the applicable valuation framework; this issue is in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The seizure-related penalty consequences arising from the undocumented movement of goods and the adopted valuation remain legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Goods in transit must be supported by contemporaneous documents and e-way bill details matching the physical consignment; post-detention invoices or ownership claims cannot retrospectively cure their absence or displace transporter liability where no bona fide owner is identifiable at interception.

Issues: Whether the assessee should be afforded a further opportunity to furnish Forms 15G/15H for verification while giving effect to the appellate order concerning disallowance of interest expenditure.

Analysis: The appellate direction under Section 250 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 required verification of the relevant Forms 15G/15H and recomputation of disallowance under Section 40(a)(ia) read with Section 194A of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The consequential order recomputed the disallowance without examining all the forms, whereas the assessee undertook to furnish the remaining documents and the Department accepted that their genuineness could be examined.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to furnish the remaining Forms 15G/15H, which shall be verified by the Assessing Authority before passing a fresh order in accordance with the appellate direction.

Issues: (i) Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was filed within limitation where service of the Order-in-Original was not established and its copy was supplied under the RTI process; (ii) Whether absolute confiscation and penalty were sustainable in respect of unmarked gold carried by a domestic passenger when foreign origin was not proved and the sole inculpatory statement had been retracted.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was filed within limitation where service of the Order-in-Original was not established and its copy was supplied under the RTI process.

Analysis: The available records showed that the copy of the Order-in-Original was furnished on 30.10.2024 pursuant to the RTI application, and the appeal was filed on 25.11.2024. No evidence established an earlier service of the Order-in-Original upon the assessee.

Conclusion: The appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was timely, and its dismissal as delayed was erroneous, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether absolute confiscation and penalty were sustainable in respect of unmarked gold carried by a domestic passenger when foreign origin was not proved and the sole inculpatory statement had been retracted.

Analysis: Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 shifts the burden only where the goods are seized on a reasonable belief that they are smuggled. The gold strip was carried openly on a domestic journey, bore no foreign markings, had 99.7 percent purity, and was not shown to be of foreign origin. The case rested substantially on a statement retracted within days, without independent corroboration. A domestic passenger travelling from Kolkata to Agartala could not be equated with an international passenger required to make a baggage declaration under Section 77 of the Customs Act, 1962; consequently, the statutory ingredients of Sections 111(l) and 111(m) were absent.

Conclusion: The Revenue failed to establish the foreign origin of the gold or to validly shift the burden under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962; confiscation under Sections 111(d), 111(l) and 111(m), and penalty under Section 112(b), were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory presumption applicable to smuggled goods was unavailable on the established facts, leaving no legal basis for the confiscatory liability or penal consequence.

Ratio Decidendi: In a domestic seizure of unmarked gold, the burden under Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962 does not shift unless the Revenue first establishes reasonable belief of smuggling; an uncorroborated retracted statement cannot, without proof of foreign origin, sustain confiscation or penalty.

Issues: (i) Whether appeals presented within time but without the mandatory pre-deposit could be dismissed without notice of the defect or a hearing? (ii) Whether the Tribunal could finally determine appeals where the first appellate authority had not considered the merits? (iii) Whether recovery notices under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be issued while departmental appeals against refund-sanction orders were pending? (iv) Whether the confirmed demands survived after the orders forming their sole basis had been set aside or recalled?

Issue (i): Whether appeals presented within time but without the mandatory pre-deposit could be dismissed without notice of the defect or a hearing?

Analysis: The mandatory pre-deposit required for an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) and the distinct deposit required for an appeal before the Tribunal are separate statutory obligations. The deposit made before the Tribunal could not retrospectively satisfy the first-appellate pre-deposit. However, Section 129E of the Customs Act, 1962 bars entertainment of an appeal without the deposit; it does not prohibit presentation of such an appeal. A timely appeal lacking the deposit is a curable procedural defect, not a nullity. Section 128A(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 and the principles of natural justice required notice of the deficiency and an opportunity of hearing before dismissal.

Conclusion: The first-appellate pre-deposit requirement had not been met, but dismissal without notice and hearing was unsustainable. The issue is substantially in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Tribunal could finally determine appeals where the first appellate authority had not considered the merits?

Analysis: Final determination was permissible because the demands had no independent basis: each had been confirmed solely in aid of refund-review proceedings whose adverse orders were subsequently set aside or recalled. Giving effect to those later final orders involved judicial discipline and did not amount to a fresh original adjudication. Remand would have been an empty formality because the substantive refund issue already stood conclusively resolved between the parties.

Conclusion: The appeals could be finally decided without remand. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether recovery notices under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 could be issued while departmental appeals against refund-sanction orders were pending?

Analysis: Recovery of an erroneous refund under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 and review or appeal against a refund order under Sections 128 and 129D operate in distinct fields. The statutory recovery power was not excluded merely because the Department had pursued review and appellate remedies. Issuing notices while the departmental appeals remained pending was permissible, including to preserve recovery within the applicable limitation period. The notices, however, operated only in aid of the appellate proceedings and derived their enforceability from the outcome of those proceedings.

Conclusion: The notices were validly issuable under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962, but were consequential upon the refund-review outcomes. The issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the confirmed demands survived after the orders forming their sole basis had been set aside or recalled?

Analysis: The demands were confirmed solely because the departmental refund appeals had initially succeeded. Those orders were thereafter set aside or recalled, and the refunds were upheld on the merits on the basis that payment of tax at a nil applicable rate satisfied the refund notification. Since the refund determinations attained finality, the consequential demands lost both their formal and substantive foundation.

Conclusion: The confirmed demands and the underlying recovery proceedings could not survive. The issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A mandatory pre-deposit default in a timely appeal is curable and cannot justify dismissal without procedural fairness. Although recovery of an erroneous refund may proceed under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 alongside review proceedings, a demand founded exclusively on refund-review orders cannot survive once those orders are reversed and the refund entitlement has attained finality.

Issues: (i) Whether nondisclosure of shipping-bill-wise arithmetic in the show-cause notices invalidated the first group of proceedings; (ii) Whether documentary rebate claims under paragraph 3 were barred where the claimed amount fell short of the twenty-per-cent differential prescribed by clause (c); (iii) Whether an exporter that elected the paragraph 3 documentary route could obtain paragraph 2 Schedule-rate rebate in substitution on the same shipping bills, including in the absence of amendment of those bills; and (iv) Whether beneficial construction of the export-rebate notification overrides the route-selection and eligibility conditions.

Issue (i): Whether nondisclosure of shipping-bill-wise arithmetic in the show-cause notices invalidated the first group of proceedings.

Analysis: The notices identified clause (c) as the basis for partial rejection, while the relevant FOB values and claimed rebate figures originated from the exporter's own shipping-bill-wise documents. The adjudication applied the stated comparison method, and no erroneous shipping bill or actual prejudice from the absence of a worked calculation in the notices was established. Principles of natural justice do not invalidate proceedings in the absence of demonstrable prejudice.

Conclusion: No; the proceedings were not vitiated by breach of natural justice. Against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether documentary rebate claims under paragraph 3 were barred where the claimed amount fell short of the twenty-per-cent differential prescribed by clause (c).

Analysis: The notification establishes mutually exclusive routes: the Schedule-rate route under paragraph 2 and the document-based route under paragraph 3. Clause (c) is a mandatory substantive condition of eligibility for the latter route, prohibiting a paragraph 3 claim unless the documented rebate exceeds the Schedule rebate by at least twenty per cent. For a Schedule rate of 0.08 per cent of FOB value, the documented claim had to reach 0.096 per cent of FOB value. The rejected claims related to shipping bills falling below that threshold.

Conclusion: Yes; the paragraph 3 claims were rightly rejected to the extent that they failed the stipulated differential. Against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether an exporter that elected the paragraph 3 documentary route could obtain paragraph 2 Schedule-rate rebate in substitution on the same shipping bills, including in the absence of amendment of those bills.

Analysis: Paragraph 2 rebate is activated only by the prescribed declaration in the electronic shipping bill at the time of export, whereas a paragraph 3 claim is made subsequently through Form A-1. The route is elected shipping-bill-wise and becomes final upon presentation of the shipping bill. Allowing a post-export fallback to paragraph 2 after failure under paragraph 3 would render clause (c) ineffective. Further, the shipping bills were self-assessed without the paragraph 2 declaration and remained unamended; a refund proceeding cannot reopen or alter that self-assessment, and no amendment under the Customs Act was obtained or formed part of these proceedings.

Conclusion: No; paragraph 2 Schedule-rate rebate cannot be granted in substitution for the failed paragraph 3 claims on the unamended shipping bills. Against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether beneficial construction of the export-rebate notification overrides the route-selection and eligibility conditions.

Analysis: Export-related rebate serves a beneficial purpose and may be construed in accordance with that purpose. However, beneficial construction cannot displace clear and substantive conditions of eligibility. The mutually exclusive route requirement and the twenty-per-cent threshold are unambiguous policy conditions, not procedural or technical lapses capable of being overlooked.

Conclusion: No; beneficial construction does not override the express route-selection and eligibility conditions. Against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The rebate scheme requires a shipping-bill-specific election at the time of export. A document-based claim that does not meet the stipulated differential cannot be converted after export into a Schedule-rate claim.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a rebate notification prescribes mutually exclusive routes and makes the document-based route conditional upon a stipulated differential, the exporter must elect the Schedule route in the shipping bill at export and cannot obtain that route through a later refund claim without lawful modification of the self-assessment.

Issues: Whether the conviction for possessing assets disproportionate to known sources of income was sustainable.

Analysis: Under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the prosecution must first establish the public servant's known lawful income, assets and expenditure during the check period. Once a disproportion is established, the burden shifts to the public servant to satisfactorily account for the excess, since the source and acquisition of undisclosed assets are facts especially within that person's knowledge. The proved asset valuation, income and expenditure disclosed disproportionate assets exceeding 51% of known income. The challenge to building valuation and household expenditure lacked cogent documentary support; even upon accepting the claimed deductions, the unexplained disproportion remained above 26% of known income. The asserted rental income, salary and loan-related claims were also unsupported by reliable material.

Conclusion: The conviction under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is sustained.

Issues: Whether the delay in filing the statutory GST appeal should be condoned and the appeal restored for a decision on merits.

Analysis: The sole proprietor's illness with cancer, supported by medical certificates on record, furnished a sufficient basis for condoning the delay. Preference was given to adjudication on merits rather than foreclosure of the appeal on limitation, with a monetary condition imposed for restoration.

Conclusion: The delay was condoned and the appeal was restored for decision on merits, conditional upon deposit of costs.

Issues: Whether redetermination of tax, interest and penalty under Section 73(9) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, following rejection of proceedings under Section 74, must be independently and non-mechanically adjudicated.

Analysis: The appellate findings recorded that the purchaser had produced tax invoices, transport and other transaction records, made payment through banking channels, and that no fraud or collusion by the purchaser had been established; those findings were left undisturbed. Section 16(2)(c) concerning Input Tax Credit cannot be applied mechanically merely because the suppliers failed to deposit tax. The proper officer is required to apply an independent mind to the material, the relevant statutory framework, and the purchaser's evidence, and must afford a hearing before issuing a reasoned and speaking order.

Conclusion: The proper officer shall independently adjudicate the liability under the applicable law after hearing the parties and pass a reasoned and speaking order within four months; the appellate findings favourable to the purchaser remain undisturbed.

Issues: Whether accumulated input tax credit refund for zero-rated export goods is available where export invoices were issued during the relevant period but the corresponding goods were exported thereafter.

Analysis: Section 54 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 read with Rule 89(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 permits refund of the proportionate net input tax credit attributable to turnover of zero-rated supplies during the relevant period. Zero-rated supply includes export of goods, while export is completed when goods are taken out of India. Sections 12 and 31(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 require an invoice for goods involving movement to be issued before or at removal, and treat the supply for turnover purposes as arising at that stage. Accordingly, the value of invoices issued during the relevant period for goods cleared for export under bond or letter of undertaking forms part of the turnover of zero-rated supply, notwithstanding that the shipping bills evidence actual export after that period. Refund remains conditional upon proof that the goods were in fact exported.

Conclusion: Refund is admissible for invoices issued during the relevant period even if the corresponding goods were exported subsequently, provided actual export is established.

Issues: (i) Whether additional grounds raising a pure question of law were maintainable before the Tribunal; (ii) Whether application of the pre-amended Section 129(1)(a) rendered the proceedings void ab initio; and (iii) Whether invocation of Section 129 was valid for the inter-State movement of job-work goods.

Issue (i): Whether additional grounds raising a pure question of law were maintainable before the Tribunal

Analysis: A question confined to law and arising from facts already on record may be entertained in appellate proceedings where its determination is necessary to correctly assess tax liability.

Conclusion: The additional grounds were maintainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether application of the pre-amended Section 129(1)(a) rendered the proceedings void ab initio

Analysis: The amendment to Section 129(1)(a) changed the amount payable for release of detained goods to a penalty equal to 200% of the tax payable, but did not remove the proper officer's authority to detain goods upon a violation of the Act or the Rules. Application of the earlier tax-and-penalty mechanism was an error in the demand and not a jurisdictional defect invalidating the proceedings.

Conclusion: Application of the pre-amended Section 129(1)(a) did not render the proceedings void ab initio, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether invocation of Section 129 was valid for the inter-State movement of job-work goods

Analysis: Section 143 permits movement of inputs or capital goods for job work and return after processing without payment of tax. The e-way bill identified the movement as job work, and the delivery challan and e-way bill contained the particulars required by Rules 55 and 138. In the absence of identification of a taxable supply or another statutory contravention, non-charging of IGST on the delivery challan could not alone establish a defect warranting detention.

Conclusion: Section 129 was not validly invoked, and the imposition of tax and penalty was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory job-work framework governed the inter-State movement, rather than the tax-evasion premise used for detention.

Ratio Decidendi: Where goods move for job work under an e-way bill and delivery challan complying with the prescribed requirements, absence of IGST without identification of a taxable supply or other contravention cannot by itself justify detention under Section 129.

Issues: Whether penalty under Section 74(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, was sustainable for delayed reverse-charge tax payments and non-reversal of input tax credit where the assessee had paid tax with interest before the show-cause notice.

Analysis: Section 73 applies to tax short-paid or input tax credit wrongly availed for reasons other than fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, whereas Section 74(1) requires those aggravated ingredients. The statutory definition of suppression extends beyond returns to other documents furnished under the Act, but non-declaration in a return or payment following audit verification is not by itself conclusive of suppression or intent to evade tax. The notice and adjudication must disclose foundational facts supporting fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, rather than mechanically invoking those expressions.

Analysis: The explanations concerning payments made on behalf of clients for legal and sponsorship services, small expenses incurred through site supervisors, a bona fide understanding regarding rent-a-cab invoices, and recorded details relating to written-off vendor dues were not properly considered. The records had been made available and their genuineness was not disputed. The applicable exemption framework for supplies received from unregistered persons was also not verified. These circumstances established reasonable cause and did not disclose an intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 74(1) was unjustified and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether participation and cooperation in reassessment proceedings preclude an assessee from objecting to complete non-issuance of notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 under Section 292BB? (ii) Whether notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is required where the assessee requests that an earlier return filed under Section 139 be treated as the return in response to notice under Section 148? (iii) Whether a letter issued under Section 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 during reassessment proceedings constitutes compliance with the requirement of notice under Section 143(2)?

Issue (i): Whether participation and cooperation in reassessment proceedings preclude an assessee from objecting to complete non-issuance of notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 under Section 292BB?

Analysis: Section 292BB creates a deeming fiction concerning defects in service, delayed service, or improper service of a notice that was in fact issued. It does not operate where the Revenue admits complete non-issuance of the mandatory notice. Participation in reassessment proceedings cannot confer jurisdiction to frame an assessment under Section 143(3) read with Section 147 without notice under Section 143(2).

Conclusion: Section 292BB does not bar an objection to complete non-issuance of notice under Section 143(2), notwithstanding the assessee's participation in reassessment proceedings, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether notice under Section 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is required where the assessee requests that an earlier return filed under Section 139 be treated as the return in response to notice under Section 148?

Analysis: An assessee may elect to rely on the earlier return by treating it as the return furnished in response to notice under Section 148, without refiling it. That election does not dispense with the Revenue's mandatory obligation to issue notice under Section 143(2) before undertaking reassessment.

Conclusion: Notice under Section 143(2) remains mandatory where an earlier return is treated as the return in response to notice under Section 148, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether a letter issued under Section 142(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 during reassessment proceedings constitutes compliance with the requirement of notice under Section 143(2)?

Analysis: Notice under Section 143(2) is a sine qua non for reassessment proceedings and enables the assessee to support the return with evidence. A letter under Section 142(1), issued after commencement of the proceedings, cannot substitute for or cure the absence of notice under Section 143(2).

Conclusion: A letter issued under Section 142(1) does not amount to compliance with the mandatory notice requirement under Section 143(2), in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Reassessments framed without the mandatory notice under Section 143(2) are invalid despite the assessee's participation, treatment of an earlier return as the return in response to notice under Section 148, or correspondence under Section 142(1).

Ratio Decidendi: Section 292BB validates only defects in service of an issued notice and cannot cure complete non-issuance of the mandatory jurisdictional notice under Section 143(2) in reassessment proceedings.

Issues: Whether the notice reopening the assessments for AY 2008-09 and AY 2009-10 satisfied the statutory requirement of "reason to believe" and was valid.

Analysis: Section 147 requires reasons founded on tangible material having a rational connection or live link with the belief that income escaped assessment; the fact of escapement need not be conclusively established at the notice stage. Where reopening follows a completed assessment after four years, the proviso requires a prima facie basis to infer failure of full and true disclosure of material facts. Reassessment cannot rest on a mere change of opinion, which presupposes conscious formation of an opinion on the relevant issue during the original assessment. The post-assessment investigation report concerning overvaluation of the shares, use of sale proceeds for acquisition of property, adjustment of capital gains across years, and the deduction claimed constituted fresh tangible material. The original assessment orders did not disclose an opinion, expressly or by necessary implication, on those matters; an intimation under Section 143(1) likewise involved no prior assessment opinion.

Conclusion: The reopening notice was valid because it was based on recorded reasons and fresh tangible material having a rational nexus with the belief of income escaping assessment; it was not founded on a change of opinion.

Issues: (i) Whether adoption of a plausible tariff classification by a customs broker constituted a breach of the obligation to advise the client under Regulation 10(d) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018; (ii) Whether the customs broker failed to exercise due diligence under Regulation 10(e) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 by advising the client on that classification.

Issue (i): Whether adoption of a plausible tariff classification by a customs broker constituted a breach of the obligation to advise the client under Regulation 10(d) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018.

Analysis: Classification forms part of self-assessment under Section 17 of the Customs Act, 1962, and an incorrect self-assessment may be remedied by reassessment under Section 17(4). A customs broker must make declarations diligently from the documents available but is not required to predict whether a proper officer will later reject the adopted classification. The competing tariff entries were both plausible, and the goods had been cleared after instructions to verify the declared classification. No false factual declaration, knowledge of misdeclaration, or connivance was established.

Conclusion: Adoption of the classification on a bona fide and plausible understanding did not breach Regulation 10(d); decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the customs broker failed to exercise due diligence under Regulation 10(e) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 by advising the client on that classification.

Analysis: Due diligence requires reasonable care in information imparted for customs clearance, not impossible foresight of a subsequent departmental view on a debatable classification issue. The classification advice was based on the broker's understanding of the available material, without evidence of inaccurate factual information or deliberate non-compliance.

Conclusion: The customs broker did not fail to exercise due diligence and did not breach Regulation 10(e); decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Licence revocation, forfeiture of security, and penalty cannot rest solely on a later departmental disagreement with a plausible tariff classification in the absence of false declaration, knowledge, or connivance.

Ratio Decidendi: A customs broker does not violate obligations to advise the client or exercise due diligence merely because a bona fide and plausible classification adopted during self-assessment is subsequently disputed, absent evidence of factual misdeclaration, knowledge, or connivance.

Issues: (i) Whether a disputed tariff classification, without inaccurate factual particulars in the Bills of Entry, rendered the goods liable to confiscation and justified redemption fine; (ii) Whether interest and penalty could be levied on the IGST component for the relevant period; (iii) Whether duty, interest, confiscation, redemption fine and penalty could be demanded under the Customs Act for goods removed from a Special Economic Zone to the Domestic Tariff Area; (iv) Whether the extended period under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 was validly invoked and what part of the demand survived; and (v) Whether penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether a disputed tariff classification, without inaccurate factual particulars in the Bills of Entry, rendered the goods liable to confiscation and justified redemption fine.

Analysis: Section 111(m) applies where goods fail to correspond with the entry as to value or other particulars. The Bills of Entry correctly disclosed the goods, their part numbers, value, origin and physical description; the dispute concerned only the tariff item claimed. A classification claim under self-assessment is an interpretative position and does not become a misdeclaration merely because a different classification is later preferred. Redemption fine under Section 125 presupposes lawful confiscability; no basis existed once confiscation failed.

Conclusion: The goods were not liable to confiscation and the redemption fine was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest and penalty could be levied on the IGST component for the relevant period.

Analysis: IGST on imports was levied under Section 3(7) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. During the relevant period, Section 3(12) did not incorporate Customs Act provisions concerning interest, penalty or confiscation. The subsequent amendment extending Section 3(12) to such consequences operated prospectively from 16.08.2024 and did not govern the imports in question.

Conclusion: Interest on the IGST component, and any penalty attributable to that component, could not be levied; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether duty, interest, confiscation, redemption fine and penalty could be demanded under the Customs Act for goods removed from a Special Economic Zone to the Domestic Tariff Area.

Analysis: Section 30 of the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 creates the charge on goods removed to the Domestic Tariff Area but does not provide machinery for recovery of short-levied duty or for interest, confiscation and penalty. Rule 47(5) of the Special Economic Zones Rules, 2006 does not import Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962 or the associated penal provisions. The binding effect of the prior ruling on this issue was reinforced by dismissal of the statutory appeal, attracting the doctrine of merger. The classification merits in the two Special Economic Zone matters were consequently left open.

Conclusion: The authorities lacked statutory machinery to sustain the two Special Economic Zone-to-Domestic Tariff Area demands and all consequential interest, confiscation, redemption fines and penalties; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the extended period under Section 28(4) of the Customs Act, 1962 was validly invoked and what part of the demand survived.

Analysis: Invocation of Section 28(4) requires collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade duty. The import particulars were disclosed, the classification issue was interpretative, and the Revenue itself subsequently adopted the appellant's earlier classification for identical or comparable goods. The use of different tariff items, without evidence of deliberate evasion, did not establish wilful suppression. Under Section 28(10B), failure of the extended-period allegation confines the demand to the normal period.

Conclusion: The extended period was invalidly invoked. Only differential duty for Bills of Entry within the normal two-year period before the notice, with applicable interest on basic customs duty and social welfare surcharge, survives; the issue is decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether penalty under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustainable.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 114A depends upon the same elements of collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression required for the extended-period demand. Those elements were not established in the bona fide classification dispute.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 114A, including the amount paid under its proviso, was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The first customs demand is confined to the normal statutory period, without confiscatory or penal consequences and without IGST interest, while the Special Economic Zone-to-Domestic Tariff Area proceedings fail for absence of enabling recovery machinery. Limited remand is required for quantification, adjustment of payments and consequential relief.

Issues: Whether a pre-resolution-plan central excise demand, not forming part of an approved resolution plan, survives after approval of the plan under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: An approved resolution plan binds the corporate debtor, creditors, and governmental authorities in respect of statutory dues. Statutory dues not forming part of the approved plan stand extinguished upon approval, and proceedings for recovery of such pre-approval dues cannot continue.

Conclusion: The pre-resolution-plan central excise demand stood extinguished and could not be pursued.

Issues: (i) Whether redemption fine and penalties for attempted export of misdeclared restricted goods were excessive or unsustainable; (ii) Whether Customs could proceed with e-auction of the confiscated goods after disposal of the appeal.

Issue (i): Whether redemption fine and penalties for attempted export of misdeclared restricted goods were excessive or unsustainable.

Analysis: The goods were found to be natural garnet, whose export was canalised through the designated agency under Notification No. 26/2015-20 dated 21.08.2018 issued under Section 3 of the Foreign Trade (Development & Regulation) Act, 1992. Having regard to the redetermined value and the misdeclaration of the goods as refractory bed material, the redemption fine of approximately 13.5% of the value and the penalties under Sections 114(i) and 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were found reasonable. Appellate interference with discretionary fine or penalty requires mala fides, statutory violation, or extreme arbitrariness, including Wednesbury unreasonableness; none was established. The contention against redemption fine applicable to re-export of imported goods was inapplicable to an attempted export of restricted goods by misdeclaration.

Conclusion: The redemption fine and penalties are sustained; conclusion against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Customs could proceed with e-auction of the confiscated goods after disposal of the appeal.

Analysis: Section 110(1A) of the Customs Act, 1962 and the applicable notifications authorised disposal of seized goods where provisional release had not been availed within the stipulated period. As the appeal was being finally decided, the proposed auction could not be regarded as taking place during its pendency. The auction process nevertheless required prior proper notice allowing at least 30 days for objections and compliance with the applicable statutory requirements and instructions.

Conclusion: E-auction is legally authorised and may proceed only after due notice and statutory compliance; conclusion in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The customs consequences flowing from the misdeclared attempted export remain operative, while disposal of the confiscated goods is governed by the prescribed auction safeguards.

Ratio Decidendi: Discretionary customs redemption fine and penalty warrant appellate interference only upon mala fides, statutory violation, or extreme arbitrariness, and the rule concerning re-export of imported goods does not apply to an attempted export of restricted goods by misdeclaration.