Issues: (i) Whether the application under Section 95(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against the personal guarantor was filed within the applicable limitation period; and (ii) Whether admission of a creditor's claim by a resolution professional constitutes an acknowledgment extending limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issue (i): Whether the application under Section 95(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 against the personal guarantor was filed within the applicable limitation period.

Analysis: Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribed a three-year period. The limitation period commenced upon expiry of the period specified in the demand invoking the personal guarantee. After excluding the period directed to be excluded during the COVID-19 pandemic, the limitation period expired before the application was instituted.

Conclusion: The application was barred by limitation and was not maintainable, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether admission of a creditor's claim by a resolution professional constitutes an acknowledgment extending limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: A valid acknowledgment under Section 18 must be made by the person against whom the right is claimed, or an authorised person, before expiry of limitation, and must consciously and unequivocally admit the subsisting liability. Admission of a claim by a resolution professional is an administrative act of collating and recording claims, not an adjudicatory admission of liability by the corporate debtor.

Conclusion: Admission of the claim by the resolution professional did not amount to an acknowledgment and could not extend or renew limitation, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The limitation objection prevailed because no valid acknowledgment existed to preserve the claim beyond the applicable limitation period for initiating the personal-guarantor insolvency process.

Ratio Decidendi: A resolution professional's administrative admission of a claim is not an acknowledgment of debt capable of extending a subsisting limitation period under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Outcome: Delay condoned; civil appeals dismissed and accompanying interlocutory applications disposed of.

Outcome: Delay condoned; the civil appeal was dismissed and pending applications were disposed of.

Issues: (i) Whether filing ITR-7 instead of ITR-5 and delayed filing of Form 10B warranted denial of the assessee's exemption claim; (ii) Whether exemption could be restored despite late filing of the return; (iii) Whether the entire gross receipts could be brought to tax even if exemption was unavailable.

Issue (i): Whether filing ITR-7 instead of ITR-5 and delayed filing of Form 10B warranted denial of the assessee's exemption claim.

Analysis: A mismatch between the prescribed return form and the particulars furnished constituted a defective return within Section 139(9) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The return-processing mechanism under Section 143(1) did not show that the defect had been noticed or an opportunity to rectify it had been provided. The delayed Form 10B was treated as a technical defect that could not, by itself, defeat the exemption claim.

Conclusion: The ITR-7 filed by the assessee is a defective return, and the jurisdictional assessing officer must accept the correct ITR-5; the delayed Form 10B filing is not fatal to the exemption claim.

Issue (ii): Whether exemption could be restored despite late filing of the return.

Analysis: Returns covered by Sections 139(4A) and 139(4C) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 must be filed within the due date prescribed under Section 139(1). Relief from the consequence of delayed filing falls within the statutory condonation mechanism under Section 119(2)(b).

Conclusion: Exemption cannot be restored unless the prescribed authority condones the delay under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961; upon such condonation, the exemption must be restored.

Issue (iii): Whether the entire gross receipts could be brought to tax even if exemption was unavailable.

Analysis: The audited financial results disclosed a deficit. Computation under Section 143(1) must reflect the actual surplus or deficit and cannot treat the whole of the gross receipts as taxable income without considering the expenditure and declared loss.

Conclusion: The entire gross receipts cannot be taxed; the declared loss must be considered while recomputing income, together with any order condoning the delay.

Final Conclusion: The assessment requires recomputation after acceptance of the correct return form and consideration of the actual deficit, while restoration of exemption remains contingent on statutory condonation of the delayed return.

Issues: (i) Whether the consequential assessment was liable to be annulled because the original assessment was alleged to be invalid. (ii) Whether the addition under Section 68 in an unabated assessment was supported by incriminating material found during search. (iii) Whether the cash credits described as land advances were unexplained under Section 68. (iv) Whether the addition was eligible for telescoping against income considered in settlement proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the consequential assessment was liable to be annulled because the original assessment was alleged to be invalid.

Analysis: The revision order under Section 263 directing examination of the impugned credits remained operative. No specific statutory defect establishing invalidity of the consequential assessment, or material showing that the revision order had been set aside or had ceased to operate, was established.

Conclusion: The consequential assessment was not liable to be annulled; against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the addition under Section 68 in an unabated assessment was supported by incriminating material found during search.

Analysis: In an unabated assessment, an addition under Section 153A requires incriminating material found in search. The seized Tally data, Annexure III, bank-ledger entries, and corroborative statements specifically identified the cash receipts, linked them to the assessee, and indicated that they represented unaccounted cash. The addition was therefore based on search material rather than merely on entries in the regular books.

Conclusion: The addition was supported by incriminating material and was permissible in the unabated assessment; against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the cash credits described as land advances were unexplained under Section 68.

Analysis: Section 68 requires a satisfactory explanation of the nature and source of credits. The assessee did not provide the identities and addresses of the alleged payers, confirmations, land-transaction agreements, or other evidence substantiating the source of the cash receipts. Recording the receipts in the books and audited financial statements did not discharge this burden.

Conclusion: The cash credits were rightly treated as unexplained under Section 68; against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the addition was eligible for telescoping against income considered in settlement proceedings.

Analysis: Telescoping required proof that the specific unexplained credits had already been included in income considered in the settlement proceedings. No factual nexus was established between the impugned receipts and the additional income of another group entity or the relief already granted for other cash transactions.

Conclusion: Telescoping was not available; against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The consequential assessments and the additions for unexplained cash credits in the connected matters remain legally sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: In an unabated assessment, an addition under Section 153A may be sustained where seized evidence directly links the assessee to unexplained cash credits and the assessee fails to establish their nature and source.

Issues: Whether the omission of Rule 96(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017, without a saving clause, applies to pending claims for refund of integrated tax paid on exports.

Analysis: The Supreme Court ruling, accepted by the revenue authorities, was applied. Omission of Rule 96(10) without a saving or sunset clause extinguishes the restriction for pending proceedings; Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 does not preserve proceedings under an omitted rule. The recommendation that the omission operate prospectively was advisory and could not preserve the omitted restriction.

Conclusion: Rule 96(10) cannot be applied to pending export refund proceedings. Refund applications are to be considered afresh in accordance with law without prejudice from the earlier orders.

Issues: Whether the bail condition requiring deposit of the passport and prior permission for every foreign journey should be modified.

Analysis: Bail restrictions are intended to secure the accused's participation in trial. The applicant had complied with the existing condition, obtained permission for overseas travel on previous occasions, and redeposited the passport after each visit. The recurring requirement of obtaining release of the passport was found to hinder foreign travel, while advance intimation to the trial court adequately protected the purpose of the bail condition.

Conclusion: The passport-deposit requirement was dispensed with. The applicant must notify the trial court in writing thirty days before leaving India, specifying the foreign-travel schedule, and must inform the trial court in writing upon return.

Issues: Whether the public-interest challenge to the GST rate applicable to online legal research and legal educational data services was maintainable.

Analysis: The challenge concerned a tax rate in force since 2017. The petitioner, who had been practising since 2020, gave no explanation for the delayed challenge or for the asserted sudden awareness of the rate. These circumstances did not support the maintainability of the public-interest petition. No adjudication was made on the legality or reasonableness of the GST rate.

Outcome: Petition dismissed.

Issues: Whether rejection of the statutory appeal as time-barred without considering the grounds stated for condonation of delay was sustainable.

Analysis: The appellate order rejected the appeal solely by referring to the period of delay and did not address the explanation that the appellant lacked knowledge of the notices and order because the registered portal e-mail belonged to a former accountant. The requirement of a reasoned order obliged the appellate authority to consider the grounds advanced for condonation, whether accepted or rejected, before denying consideration of the appeal on merits.

Conclusion: The rejection of the appeal was unsustainable. The appellate order was set aside, the delay was condoned, and the appeal was directed to be decided on merits within three months, subject to payment of costs.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment order could be revised under section 263 where the Assessing Officer had examined foreign donations and their application; (ii) Whether payment to the recipient company attracted section 13(1)(c)(ii) read with section 13(3).

Issue (i): Whether the assessment order could be revised under section 263 where the Assessing Officer had examined foreign donations and their application.

Analysis: The assessment record showed that specific enquiries were made regarding the foreign contribution, its utilisation for COVID-19 relief activities, and the supporting funding and cost details. Detailed replies and documents were furnished and the returned income was accepted after such verification. The deeming conditions under Explanation 2 to section 263 were not attracted where the Assessing Officer had made the requisite enquiry and adopted a legally possible view; revision cannot rest merely on a different view of the Commissioner.

Conclusion: The jurisdiction under section 263 was invalidly invoked; this issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether payment to the recipient company attracted section 13(1)(c)(ii) read with section 13(3).

Analysis: Section 13(1)(c)(ii) applies only where the trust's income or property is applied for the benefit of persons specified under section 13(3), including a concern in which such persons hold substantial interest. The record did not establish that any specified person held the requisite substantial interest in the recipient company, or that the payment conferred any direct or indirect benefit upon such person. The payment was shown to be applied towards the charitable COVID-19 relief project.

Conclusion: The payment did not attract section 13(1)(c)(ii) or section 13(3); this issue is in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory prerequisites for revising the completed assessment were absent, and the revisional action could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Revision under section 263 is impermissible where the Assessing Officer has made relevant enquiries and adopted a possible view, unless both error and prejudice to revenue are established; an alleged section 13 violation also requires proof of benefit to a specified person or a concern in which such person has substantial interest.

Outcome: Civil appeals dismissed on account of tax effect below the prescribed monetary limit; the question of law on classification was kept open.

Issues: (i) Whether the Authority may rule on the permissibility of overseas agency-commission remittances under foreign-trade and foreign-exchange law; (ii) Whether the relevant CBIC circulars impose a cap or remittance restriction on overseas agency commission, or solely govern computation of export benefits; and (iii) Whether overseas agency commission exceeding 12.5% affects the Section 14 transaction value or the FOB basis for export incentives.

Issue (i): Whether the Authority may rule on the permissibility of overseas agency-commission remittances under foreign-trade and foreign-exchange law.

Analysis: Section 28H(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 permits an advance ruling on customs valuation and related export-benefit questions. The permissibility of remittance under the foreign-trade, FEMA and RBI frameworks does not fall within that jurisdiction.

Conclusion: No ruling was made on the permissibility or remittance of agency commission under the foreign-trade, FEMA or RBI regimes.

Issue (ii): Whether the relevant CBIC circulars impose a cap or remittance restriction on overseas agency commission, or solely govern computation of export benefits.

Analysis: Circular No. 64/2003-Cus. dated 21.07.2003, Circular No. 33/2019-Customs dated 19.09.2019 and Circular No. 20/2026-Customs dated 10.04.2026 prescribe the treatment of agency commission and foreign bank charges for duty drawback, RoDTEP and RoSCTL benefits. They permit benefit computation without deduction up to the overall 12.5% threshold and require deduction only of the excess for those benefits. The circulars neither amend Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 or the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Export Goods) Rules, 2007 nor regulate the payment or remittance of commission.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the 12.5% threshold is not a cap or remittance restriction on agency commission; it operates only for the specified export-benefit computations.

Issue (iii): Whether overseas agency commission exceeding 12.5% affects the Section 14 transaction value or the FOB basis for export incentives.

Analysis: Under Section 14(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 and Rule 3 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Export Goods) Rules, 2007, export value is the transaction value unless the declared value is rejected under Rule 8 of those Rules. Commission paid by an exporter to its overseas agent from sale proceeds is a selling expense and does not reduce the price paid or payable by the overseas buyer. For the specified export incentives, agency commission and foreign bank charges exceeding the overall 12.5% threshold are deductible from the FOB basis only to the extent of the excess.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, agency commission exceeding 12.5% does not by itself reduce an otherwise acceptable transaction value; only the excess affects computation of the specified export incentives.

Final Conclusion: Under the customs valuation framework, the 12.5% threshold governs only the FOB basis for the identified export benefits and does not alter the accepted transaction value or independently create a customs consequence for higher agency commission.

Ratio Decidendi: Administrative circulars prescribing export-benefit computation cannot amend statutory transaction-value rules or regulate matters beyond their stated subject matter.

Issues: (i) Whether the relevant customs circulars prescribe a cap on overseas agency commission or regulate its payment or remittance; (ii) Whether overseas agency commission exceeding 12.5% of FOB value affects the transaction value of export goods for customs valuation; (iii) Whether commission and foreign bank charges exceeding 12.5% of FOB value must be deducted while computing specified export incentives.

Issue (i): Whether the relevant customs circulars prescribe a cap on overseas agency commission or regulate its payment or remittance.

Analysis: Section 28H(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 permits a ruling on customs valuation and export-benefit matters. Circular No. 64/2003-Customs, Circular No. 33/2019-Customs and Circular No. 20/2026-Customs govern the treatment of agency commission and foreign bank charges only for computation of the export benefits specified in those circulars. They do not amend the statutory valuation framework or address foreign-exchange remittances. Questions concerning permissibility under FEMA, RBI directions, the foreign trade law or policy fall outside advance-ruling jurisdiction in this proceeding.

Conclusion: The customs circulars do not prescribe a cap on agency commission or regulate its payment or remittance; no ruling is made on permissibility under FEMA, RBI directions, foreign trade law or policy.

Issue (ii): Whether overseas agency commission exceeding 12.5% of FOB value affects the transaction value of export goods for customs valuation.

Analysis: Under Section 14(1) of the Customs Act, 1962 and Rule 3 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Export Goods) Rules, 2007, export value is the transaction value, subject to rejection under Rule 8. Commission paid by an exporter to its overseas agent from export proceeds is a selling expense and does not reduce the price paid or payable by the buyer for delivery at the place of exportation. Neither the statute nor the Export Valuation Rules provide for deduction of such commission from transaction value merely because it exceeds 12.5% of FOB value.

Conclusion: Agency commission exceeding 12.5% does not reduce the otherwise acceptable transaction value or FOB value for customs valuation, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether commission and foreign bank charges exceeding 12.5% of FOB value must be deducted while computing specified export incentives.

Analysis: The circulars permit export benefits on FOB value without deduction where agency commission and foreign bank charges, separately or jointly, are within the overall 12.5% threshold. They require only the excess over that threshold to be deducted from FOB value for Duty Drawback and extend the same treatment to RoDTEP and RoSCTL benefits.

Conclusion: For Duty Drawback, RoDTEP and RoSCTL, agency commission and foreign bank charges exceeding the aggregate 12.5% threshold must be deducted from FOB value to the extent of the excess, against the assessee to that extent.

Final Conclusion: A commission above 12.5% neither alters the statutory customs valuation of accepted export goods nor independently attracts a consequence under the Customs Act, 1962, but the excess correspondingly reduces the FOB base eligible for the specified export incentives.

Ratio Decidendi: CBIC circulars governing export-incentive computation cannot amend the statutory transaction-value rules or impose an independent cap on an exporter's overseas agency commission.

Issues: Whether the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was barred by limitation, having regard to service of the order-in-original by affixture and the restricted power to condone delay.

Analysis: The order-in-original was sent to the registered address and, after postal return, was served by chaspa on that premises under a panchnama. The same registered address continued to be used in subsequent proceedings, while postal communications were repeatedly returned because no person was available. The recorded service by affixture was accepted as reliable evidence of service. Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 prescribes two months for filing an appeal and permits condonation only for a further one month on sufficient cause. The statutory maximum period cannot be extended beyond that limit.

Conclusion: The first appeal, filed beyond the maximum statutory period after valid service by affixture, was time-barred and could not be entertained; the finding is against the assessee.

Issues: Whether proceedings to reopen deemed assessments under Section 27 of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006 were barred by limitation, and whether the dealer's request for copies of assessment records could extend the statutory period.

Analysis: The returns having been filed with the prescribed documents and proof of tax payment, the assessments stood deemed completed under Section 22(2) of the Tamil Nadu Value Added Tax Act, 2006. The power to reopen such assessments for escaped turnover or wrong availment of input tax credit under Section 27 was subject to the six-year statutory limitation. The dealer's subsequent communication seeking copies of assessment records could neither extend, enlarge nor revive that limitation; statutory jurisdiction cannot be enlarged by correspondence or conduct.

Conclusion: The reopening proceedings and consequential assessment orders, having been initiated beyond the prescribed six-year period, were barred by limitation and without jurisdiction, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the enhanced additional court fee at 1% under the notification effective from 01.04.2016 applies to tax appeals and revisions in which the taxing lis commenced before that date.

Analysis: Section 76(1) authorises levy of additional court fee, while the notification enhancing its rate took effect from 01.04.2016 and contains no express or necessarily implied retrospective operation. The obligation to pay court fee as a condition of appeal forms part of the vested right of appeal and cannot be made more onerous after commencement of the lis. In tax proceedings, the lis commences when, upon dissatisfaction with the return, the assessing authority calls for material or evidence, including through a pre-assessment notice; it does not depend merely on the assessment year, the date of assessment order, or the date of filing the appeal.

Conclusion: The enhanced 1% additional court fee is payable only where the taxing lis commenced on or after 01.04.2016; appeals or revisions arising from a lis commenced before that date remain governed by the earlier rate. Where the commencement date is not established, the concerned appellate or revisional authority must determine it.

Ratio Decidendi: An enhanced court-fee condition affecting a vested right of appeal operates prospectively, absent express or necessarily implied retrospectivity, and its applicability in tax matters is determined by the date on which the lis commenced.

Issues: Whether the Committee of Creditors may withdraw an approved resolution plan before its approval by the Adjudicating Authority on the ground that the corporate debtor's financial position has subsequently improved.

Analysis: A resolution plan approved under Section 30(4) derives binding force from the statutory insolvency framework between the Committee of Creditors and the successful resolution applicant even before approval under Section 31(1). Section 12-A, read with Regulations 30-A and 18(2), permits withdrawal only until approval of the plan by the Committee of Creditors; the Committee's continued role pending implementation does not extend to decisions affecting a plan already placed before the Adjudicating Authority. The commercial wisdom of the Committee cannot override this binding effect. The Adjudicating Authority's review remains confined to statutory compliance under Sections 30(2) and 31(1), and improved profitability alone does not justify refusal of an otherwise compliant plan.

Conclusion: The Committee of Creditors cannot withdraw its approved resolution plan after its submission to the Adjudicating Authority merely because the corporate debtor's financial position has improved; such improvement alone cannot warrant refusal of approval where the plan satisfies Section 30(2).

Issues: (i) Whether the IBC moratorium barred the arbitral tribunal from entertaining the second application under Section 17 and modifying the status quo arrangement while the corporate debtor's counterclaim was pending. (ii) Whether the tribunal's erroneous statement of the scope of the Section 29A extension order invalidated the impugned order. (iii) Whether the Adjudicating Authority had exclusive jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) read with Section 63 of the IBC.

Issue (i): Whether the IBC moratorium barred the arbitral tribunal from entertaining the second application under Section 17 and modifying the status quo arrangement while the corporate debtor's counterclaim was pending.

Analysis: Section 14(1)(a) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 prohibits proceedings against a corporate debtor, but does not prohibit proceedings initiated by it. A counterclaim by the corporate debtor may augment its estate if successful and does not impose a pecuniary liability upon it if unsuccessful. The expression "by or against" in Section 60(6) cannot be read into Section 14(1)(a) to create a bar on the counterclaim. The termination of the development agreement preceded the CIRP; the contractual conditions for possession had not been fulfilled, and the terminated agreement was not property of the corporate debtor protected by Section 14(1)(d). The interim status quo arrangement was a voluntary pro tem measure and could be reconsidered as an arbitral interim measure in aid of the surviving counterclaim.

Conclusion: The moratorium did not deprive the arbitral tribunal of jurisdiction to entertain the second Section 17 application and modify the status quo arrangement in relation to the counterclaim. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the tribunal's erroneous statement of the scope of the Section 29A extension order invalidated the impugned order.

Analysis: The Section 29A extension order had attained finality and permitted continuation of the corporate debtor's counterclaim, not the claim against it. Although the impugned order incorrectly described that order as permitting both claims to proceed, the second interim application was referable to the counterclaim. The misstatement therefore did not affect the tribunal's jurisdiction to determine the appropriate interlocutory arrangement.

Conclusion: The erroneous description of the Section 29A order did not invalidate the impugned order. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether the Adjudicating Authority had exclusive jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) read with Section 63 of the IBC.

Analysis: Section 60(5)(c) confers limited residuary jurisdiction over disputes arising out of or relating to insolvency resolution. That jurisdiction is unavailable for a contractual termination founded on pre-insolvency non-performance and unconnected with the CIRP. Since the termination notice preceded the CIRP and was not occasioned by insolvency, the necessary nexus for invoking the Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction was absent. Consequently, the jurisdictional bar under Section 63 did not arise.

Conclusion: The Adjudicating Authority did not have exclusive jurisdiction, and the arbitral tribunal's jurisdiction was not ousted. The issue is decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral process may continue on the corporate debtor's counterclaim, with interlocutory measures remaining within the arbitral tribunal's competence; the IBC moratorium neither preserves the terminated development agreement as estate property nor transfers this contractual dispute exclusively to the Adjudicating Authority.

Ratio Decidendi: The IBC moratorium and the Adjudicating Authority's residuary jurisdiction do not displace arbitral adjudication of a corporate debtor's own counterclaim where the contractual termination preceded, and is unrelated to, the CIRP.