Issues: Whether departmental appeals involving a disputed amount below the prescribed monetary threshold are maintainable on the basis of alleged cascading or recurring effects, where neither specified exception applies.

Analysis: Section 35R of the Central Excise Act, 1944, as applied to service tax through Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994, authorises the Board to prescribe monetary limits for departmental appeals. The Instruction dated 06.08.2024 fixes a threshold of Rs. 2 crore for appeals before the High Court and applies to pending legacy central excise and service-tax matters. The Instructions dated 17.08.2011 retain only two exceptions: a challenge to the constitutional validity of an Act or Rule, or a finding that a notification, instruction, order, or circular is illegal or ultra vires. The clarification dated 26.12.2014 makes the limits applicable even to recurring matters, while the additional exception for classification and refund issues introduced in 2015 was withdrawn with effect from 03.04.2018. Cascading consequences or the existence of a common issue do not constitute an independent exception. The separate income-tax circular context relied upon does not alter this position. The disputed amount was admittedly below the threshold and the dispute involved neither of the prescribed exceptions.

Conclusion: The monetary-limit instructions preclude the department from pursuing below-threshold appeals merely because of alleged cascading or recurring effects; the proposed substantial questions of law remain open.

Issues: Whether carriers transporting goods by road without issuing consignment notes are liable to service tax as goods transport agencies.

Analysis: Section 65B(26) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires a goods transport agency to provide road-transport service and issue a consignment note. Under Section 66D of the Finance Act, 1994, transportation of goods by road is within the negative list except where rendered by a goods transport agency or courier agency. As the appellants did not issue consignment notes, they did not qualify as goods transport agencies.

Conclusion: The appellants were not liable to pay service tax on the road-transport services.

Issues: Whether continuation of the pre-amendment payment method during the initial part of the financial year constituted exercise of the option under Rule 6(3)(i), thereby barring the assessee from subsequently electing proportionate CENVAT-credit reversal under Rule 6(3)(ii).

Analysis: The amended scheme permitted a manufacturer not maintaining separate accounts to choose either the prescribed payment route or proportionate reversal of credit. Rule 6(3A) contemplated written intimation of the date from which the option under clause (ii) was exercised. Explanation 1 restricted withdrawal only after an option had actually been exercised. The Rules neither deemed an option to have been exercised on the first day of a financial year nor required an election to be made on that date. Continuance of payments under the earlier regime did not, by itself, establish an election under Rule 6(3)(i).

Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to exercise the option under Rule 6(3)(ii) during the financial year. The contrary finding that the assessee had already exercised the option under Rule 6(3)(i) was incorrect.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory option under Rule 6(3) becomes irrevocable only upon its actual exercise; a prior payment practice cannot be treated as a deemed election in the absence of an act of election contemplated by the Rules.

Issues: Whether cancellation of composition permission was justified on the basis that the assessee had purchased sugar sachets from outside the State in breach of the conditions governing the composition scheme.

Analysis: Section 14D of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 permits payment of lump-sum tax by composition subject to prescribed conditions. Rule 28C(6) of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Rules, 2006 prohibits a composition dealer from purchasing eatables or raw materials in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, while Rule 28C(7) permits cancellation upon contravention. The ledger entries showed that amounts were first received from the adjoining hotel business and were thereafter remitted by the assessee to the supplier on its behalf. No purchase of sugar was debited in the assessee's accounts. The inference that the ledger entries were sham was unsupported by evidence, and no corroborative material established that the assessee itself made the disputed inter-State purchases.

Conclusion: The cancellation of composition permission for the period from 04.06.2012 to 31.03.2013 was unsustainable because breach of Rule 28C(6) was not established.

Issues: (i) Whether the assessment was barred by limitation under section 153(1) after extensions under TOLA; (ii) Whether the assessment was invalid on account of the notice under section 143(2), faceless-assessment intimation and procedure, post-draft notice under section 142(1), revised draft and show-cause procedure, SOP timing, or digital authentication; (iii) Whether mutuality excluded income arising under the development agreement; (iv) Whether section 50D determined the full value of consideration and whether section 45(5A) postponed capital-gains taxability for an AOP; (v) Whether the registered development agreement effected a transfer under section 2(47); (vi) Whether the capital gain was assessable in the society's hands instead of in members' hands; (vii) Whether the full value of consideration could be based on the developer's 2021 GST invoice rather than determined as of the transfer date; (viii) Whether separately adding 13,000 square feet was justified; (ix) Whether GST and amenity charges required reduction or deduction from the full value of consideration and protection against double taxation; (x) Whether taxes paid by members on the same transfer were creditable to the society; and (xi) Whether liquid-fund dividend qualified for exemption under section 10(35).

Issue (i): Whether the assessment was barred by limitation under section 153(1) after extensions under TOLA.

Analysis: Section 3(1) of TOLA validly empowered extension of statutory time limits through notifications issued during the pandemic. The limitation for assessment for AY 2018-19, though ordinarily ending on 30.09.2020, stood extended to 30.09.2021. The assessment dated 24.09.2021 was consequently within the extended period.

Conclusion: The assessment was not time-barred; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment was invalid on account of the notice under section 143(2), faceless-assessment intimation and procedure, post-draft notice under section 142(1), revised draft and show-cause procedure, SOP timing, or digital authentication.

Analysis: The objection to the competence of the authority issuing the section 143(2) notice was a jurisdictional objection barred by section 124(3), since it was not raised within the prescribed time despite participation in assessment proceedings. The notice and accompanying e-assessment material sufficiently informed the assessee that submissions were to be made electronically under the faceless regime. The transition after 01.04.2021 was governed by section 144B, and pending proceedings could validly be completed under that provision.

Analysis: The notice under section 142(1), issued after the initial draft, sought supporting material and clarifications. The subsequent addendum show-cause notice specifically disclosed the prejudicial variations concerning the GST-invoice value and the additional built-up area, and the assessee responded to it. The SOP did not create an independent statutory limitation. Digital authentication by an officer of the Assessment Unit was not invalid absent material establishing lack of authority.

Conclusion: No jurisdictional or procedural defect invalidated the assessment; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether mutuality excluded income arising under the development agreement.

Analysis: Mutuality requires complete identity between contributors to the common fund and participators in its surplus. The income arose from a development arrangement with an independent developer, rather than from dealings exclusively among members.

Conclusion: The doctrine of mutuality was inapplicable, and this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether section 50D determined the full value of consideration and whether section 45(5A) postponed capital-gains taxability for an AOP.

Analysis: Section 50D applies only where consideration is unascertainable or incapable of determination. The existence of a determinable consideration precluded its application. Section 45(5A) creates a special deferral mechanism only for an individual or HUF and does not extend to an AOP.

Conclusion: Section 50D was not attracted and section 45(5A) did not defer taxability for the assessee; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether the registered development agreement effected a transfer under section 2(47).

Analysis: The registered agreement conferred substantial and enforceable rights on the developer to obtain approvals and finance, commercially deal with and sell its project share, while materially restricting the assessee's control over the property. Registration of the project, exercise of development rights, and commercial exploitation confirmed that the arrangement exceeded a mere licence to enter the land for construction.

Conclusion: The registered development agreement effected a transfer of rights in the property within section 2(47); this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether the capital gain was assessable in the society's hands instead of in members' hands.

Analysis: The society held registered title to the land and itself executed the development agreement. An AOP is a separate taxable person, and capital gains must be assessed in the hands of the legally chargeable person. Members' beneficial interest or their individual tax disclosures could not shift the taxability of a transfer made by the society.

Conclusion: Capital gains from the transfer were assessable in the society's hands and not in members' hands; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (vii): Whether the full value of consideration could be based on the developer's 2021 GST invoice rather than determined as of the transfer date.

Analysis: Chargeability and computation of capital gains must operate together. Once transfer was treated as having occurred on 24.01.2018, the full value of consideration had to be determined with reference to consideration received or accruing from that transfer. A GST invoice raised more than three years later could be relevant material, but could not automatically constitute the full value of consideration without establishing its nexus to the transfer-date consideration.

Conclusion: The quantification of consideration was restored for fresh determination with reference to the transfer date; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee to the extent of remand.

Issue (viii): Whether separately adding 13,000 square feet was justified.

Analysis: Verification was required of the development agreement, supplementary agreement, allotment documents, and the assessee's actual entitlement. The inquiry must determine whether the 13,000 square feet was carved out of the society's revised entitlement and whether its value had already been included in the full value of consideration.

Conclusion: The issue was restored for verification, with no separate addition to survive if the area was part of the assessee's entitlement and already factored into consideration; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee to the extent of remand.

Issue (ix): Whether GST and amenity charges required reduction or deduction from the full value of consideration and protection against double taxation.

Analysis: The GST component required examination against the development agreement, invoice, basis of valuation, and the manner of actual discharge to determine whether it formed part of consideration and resulted in double taxation. Amenity charges required verification as to contractual obligation, actual incurrence, their connection with transfer, their inclusion in consideration, and possible deduction under section 48(i).

Conclusion: The GST and amenity-charge claims were restored for fresh examination, with a direction to prevent double taxation and allow any legally admissible deduction; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee to the extent of remand.

Issue (x): Whether taxes paid by members on the same transfer were creditable to the society.

Analysis: Although the gain was chargeable in the society's hands, tax cannot be imposed twice on the same income. The assessment particulars of members and taxes actually paid require verification to determine whether they relate to the same transfer and whether credit is legally available.

Conclusion: The claim for tax credit was restored for verification and determination in accordance with law; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee to the extent of remand.

Issue (xi): Whether liquid-fund dividend qualified for exemption under section 10(35).

Analysis: For the relevant year, section 10(35) exempted income from units of a specified mutual fund, subject to statutory conditions. The nature of the liquid-fund investment and supporting evidence required substantive examination rather than rejection solely because the claim had been dealt with under section 154.

Conclusion: The exemption claim was restored for examination of eligibility and correct tax treatment; this issue was decided in favour of the assessee to the extent of remand.

Final Conclusion: The assessment's legal validity, the occurrence of transfer, and taxability of the gain in the society's hands remain undisturbed. The quantification of consideration and the connected claims concerning area, GST, amenity charges, member-tax credit, and dividend exemption require fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A registered development agreement that parts with substantial and commercially exploitable rights in immovable property constitutes a transfer under section 2(47), and the resulting capital gain is chargeable to the person legally transferring those rights.

Issues: Whether the interim moratorium arising from an application under Section 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 affected the concluded auction sale, issuance of the sale certificate, and the auction purchaser's entitlement to possession.

Analysis: The auction was conducted and confirmed before the Section 94 application was filed. Although the sale certificate was issued after the application, the Adjudicating Authority subsequently dismissed the Section 94 proceedings. The dismissed insolvency proceedings had no effect on the conduct or conclusion of the auction, and no impediment remained to grant possession under the sale certificate.

Conclusion: The interim moratorium did not invalidate or affect the auction sale or prevent delivery of possession to the auction purchaser pursuant to the sale certificate.

Issues: (i) Whether the unsubstantiated balance retained from funds received from entities involved in the scheduled offences constituted proceeds of crime; (ii) Whether properties acquired before the scheduled offence could be attached as the value of proceeds of crime when the direct proceeds were unavailable.

Issue (i): Whether the unsubstantiated balance retained from funds received from entities involved in the scheduled offences constituted proceeds of crime.

Analysis: Of the funds received by the appellant's advertising entity, a substantial part was transferred to news channels for advertising. The retained balance was not supported by any memorandum, agreement, or other material establishing entitlement to the asserted commission. Under Section 3 of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002, possession, acquisition, or use of proceeds of crime attracts the offence, and Section 24 places the burden on the person concerned to establish that the property is untainted. That burden was not discharged.

Conclusion: The retained amount was proceeds of crime in the appellant's possession; this issue was decided against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether properties acquired before the scheduled offence could be attached as the value of proceeds of crime when the direct proceeds were unavailable.

Analysis: Section 2(1)(u) of the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 encompasses not only property directly or indirectly derived from criminal activity, but also the value of such property. The middle limb of the definition permits attachment of other property of equivalent value when the actual proceeds have been dissipated, siphoned off, or cannot be traced. This statutory recourse is not confined to property acquired after the scheduled offence; otherwise, the expression concerning value of such property would be rendered ineffective.

Conclusion: The properties were validly attached as equivalent-value property because the direct proceeds of crime were unavailable; this issue was decided against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The attached properties remain liable to be proceeded against as property representing the value of the quantified proceeds of crime.

Ratio Decidendi: Where direct proceeds of crime are unavailable or dissipated, the definition of proceeds of crime permits attachment of any property of equivalent value, including property acquired before the scheduled offence.

Issues: Whether acceptance of the internal Transactional Net Margin Method and deletion of the transfer-pricing adjustment gave rise to a substantial question of law under Sections 92 to 92C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 10B of the Income-tax Rules, 1962.

Analysis: The proposed question arose under the transfer-pricing framework governing determination of arm's length pricing. A prior binding decision had already determined the identical question arising from the same impugned order, and the issue was therefore fully covered.

Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose for consideration; the deletion of the transfer-pricing adjustment remained undisturbed.

Issues: Whether revision of the assessment under Section 263 was valid where the Assessing Officer had accepted the assessee's explanations on CENVAT credit valuation, excise-duty refund and additional depreciation.

Analysis: Revisionary jurisdiction under Section 263 requires the assessment order to be both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue. The Assessing Officer had considered the assessee's explanations and written submissions on each of the three matters and adopted a view permissible in law. The absence of detailed discussion in the assessment order did not, by itself, establish that the assessment was erroneous or prejudicial. The Tribunal's findings that no addition was warranted on the merits of the three matters disclosed no legal infirmity.

Conclusion: The order under Section 263 was invalid; the question of law was answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment adopting a legally permissible view after considering the assessee's explanation cannot be revised under Section 263 merely because the Commissioner prefers a different view, unless it is both erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue.

Issues: Whether reopening of a completed scrutiny assessment under Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, by a notice under Section 148 issued after four years, was valid where unabsorbed depreciation and delayed TDS deposit had already been disclosed and considered.

Analysis: Reopening after four years is permissible only upon failure by the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of material facts necessary for assessment. A notice under Section 148 cannot be used to review a completed scrutiny assessment or revisit an issue already examined and dropped. The assessment record showed that the assessee had disclosed the unabsorbed depreciation and had clarified that no depreciation was claimed for the relevant year; the TDS issue had also been raised and dropped during the earlier proceedings.

Conclusion: The reassessment notice and the consequential order were invalid and were quashed.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order could be sustained where the assessee expressly sought a personal hearing in its reply to the show-cause notice but had inadvertently selected "No" in the hearing option in Form GST DRC-06.

Analysis: Section 75(4) requires an opportunity of hearing where a written request is made by the person chargeable with tax or penalty. The express request for a personal hearing in the reply to the show-cause notice had to be read holistically. An inadvertent selection of "No" in the form could not be treated as an express waiver of the right to be heard, and a mechanical reliance on that selection was impermissible.

Conclusion: Denial of a personal hearing despite the written request breached the principles of natural justice; the assessee is entitled to fresh adjudication after being heard.

Issues: Whether an adjudication order could stand where, despite an express request in the reply to the show-cause notice, the taxpayer was not afforded or notified of a personal hearing.

Analysis: The written reply and subsequent communication expressly requested a personal hearing to explain factual matters and supporting documents. No material showed that a hearing date was intimated after the reply was filed. The order nevertheless proceeded on the basis that no representative had attended to explain the transactions. Section 75(4) of the Maharashtra Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires a fair opportunity of personal hearing where it is sought.

Conclusion: Denial of the requested personal hearing vitiated the adjudication; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalty for concealment under Section 271(1)(c) is leviable where additional income was disclosed in the return filed under Section 153A pursuant to notice under Section 153C, and that return was accepted without any further addition.

Analysis: Sections 153A and 153C prescribe assessment of the other person pursuant to search-related proceedings and override the ordinary return provisions; pending earlier returns or assessment proceedings cease to govern the assessment. The return filed in response to the Section 153C notice disclosed the additional income and was accepted as returned. Under Section 271(1)(c), read with Section 271(1)(iii) and Explanation 4(c), penalty depends on tax sought to be evaded, being the difference between tax on assessed income and tax chargeable after excluding the concealed income. Since there was no difference between the accepted returned income and assessed income, no tax was sought to be evaded. Explanation 5 was inapplicable because it concerns a searched person found with specified assets and did not determine the penalty issue.

Conclusion: No penalty under Section 271(1)(c) was leviable on the additional income disclosed in the Section 153A return filed pursuant to the Section 153C notice.

Issues: Whether revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 could be exercised over a reassessment order for an assessment year already settled by the Settlement Commission.

Analysis: Once an application is allowed to proceed under section 245D(1), the Settlement Commission obtains exclusive jurisdiction over the assessment case. Its jurisdiction extends to matters covered by the application and other matters relating to the case referred to in the Commissioner's report. A final settlement order under section 245D(4) attains statutory finality under section 245-I, leaving no scope for parallel assessment proceedings. The assessment year in question formed part of the final settlement order and a consequential order had been passed; the subsequent reassessment could not furnish a valid basis for revision.

Conclusion: The exercise of revisionary jurisdiction under section 263 was invalid and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Enforcement Directorate could continue retaining seized documents and digital devices and freezing the locker after expiry of the statutory 180-day period without permission of the Adjudicating Authority.

Analysis: Section 17 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 authorises search, seizure and freezing, subject to an application for retention or continuation of freezing before the Adjudicating Authority. Under Section 20(1) and Section 20(3), seized or frozen property may be retained or kept frozen for 180 days, after which it must be returned unless the Adjudicating Authority permits its continued retention or freezing. The 180-day period had expired, and no order permitting retention of the seized articles or continuation of the locker freeze had been obtained.

Conclusion: The Enforcement Directorate lost statutory authority to retain the seized articles or continue freezing the locker; the documents and digital devices must be returned and the locker released to the petitioner.

Issues: Whether a show-cause notice invoking Section 74 was valid when it did not disclose the factual basis for allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 74, which carries a five-year limitation as against the three-year limitation under Section 73, can be invoked only where the notice itself discloses specific allegations and supporting material showing fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts to evade tax. Mere use of those expressions, without particulars demonstrating the basis for their application, cannot justify recourse to the extended limitation period. The notice contained no such factual disclosure or material.

Conclusion: The notice did not validly invoke Section 74 and was unsustainable.

Issues: Whether Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961, inserted retrospectively by the Finance Act, 2026, is constitutionally valid, and whether reassessment notices issued by the Jurisdictional Assessing Officer without faceless automated allocation are sustainable.

Outcome: Notice was issued to the opposite parties. No separate interim order was made in view of the subsisting Supreme Court stay on further assessment and reassessment proceedings, and the matter remains pending for hearing.

Issues: Whether revision under Section 263 in respect of issues outside the scope of reassessment is barred by limitation reckoned from the original assessment order.

Analysis: Section 147 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits reassessment of escaped income, including other escaped income that comes to the Assessing Officer's notice during reassessment proceedings under Explanation 3. However, where reassessment is confined to specified grounds, the original assessment continues to operate for matters not forming the subject of reassessment. For revision under Section 263 concerning such unrelated matters, the limitation under Section 263(2) runs from the original assessment order and not the reassessment order.

Conclusion: Revision under Section 263 on issues not forming part of the reassessment was time-barred; the finding is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the amendment to Section 17(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, concerning taxation of interest-free or concessional loans as perquisites, is unconstitutional.

Analysis: Earlier binding decisions had upheld Section 17(2)(viii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Rule 3(7)(i) of the Income-tax Rules, 1962, holding the delegated mechanism for valuing concessional-loan benefits valid and non-arbitrary. The present constitutional challenge was squarely governed by those decisions.

Conclusion: The amendment to Section 17(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is constitutionally valid.

Issues: Whether separate cash capital contributions, each below Rs. 2,00,000 and received from the same partner on different dates, could be aggregated to attract Section 269ST of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and penalty under Section 271DA of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 269ST applies where cash of Rs. 2,00,000 or more is received from a person in a single day, in respect of a single transaction, or in respect of transactions relating to one event or occasion. The cash contributions of Rs. 1,99,000 and Rs. 9,000 were received fifteen days apart, and neither receipt independently reached the statutory threshold. The record did not establish that the two receipts formed a single transaction or related to one event or occasion; their contribution towards the partner's capital account alone was insufficient to justify aggregation.

Conclusion: The cash contributions could not be aggregated under Section 269ST; consequently, penalty under Section 271DA was not sustainable.