Issues: Whether the Excalibur Hybrid X archery crossbow is classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 9506 99 90 as sports or outdoor-game equipment, or under Customs Tariff Item 9304 00 00 as other arms.

Analysis: Rule 1 of the General Rules for the Interpretation of the Import Tariff requires classification according to the headings and relevant Chapter Notes. Note 1(e) to Chapter 93 excludes bows and arrows from that Chapter, while the HSN Explanatory Notes to Heading 9506 specifically include archery equipment such as bows, arrows and targets. The product propels bolts or arrows through stored mechanical energy in its limbs and string, rather than through explosive charge, compressed air, gas or firearm mechanism. Applying Rule 6 at the sub-heading level, it falls within the residual sub-heading for other sports or outdoor-game equipment.

Conclusion: The Excalibur Hybrid X archery crossbow is classifiable under Customs Tariff Item 9506 99 90 and not under Customs Tariff Item 9304 00 00. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether Clause 24 of the Deed of Guarantee restricted the personal guarantors' liability to the market value of their mortgaged properties; (ii) Whether the repayment plans could be approved despite failing to secure the prescribed creditor voting threshold.

Issue (i): Whether Clause 24 of the Deed of Guarantee restricted the personal guarantors' liability to the market value of their mortgaged properties.

Analysis: Clauses 1, 6 and 9 imposed joint and several liability for the full principal amount, interest, costs and charges, irrespective of enforcement or realisation of securities. On harmonious construction, Clause 24 concerned the security arrangement and did not override the primary liability undertaken under the earlier clauses. A final and unchallenged debt-recovery adjudication had already crystallised the guarantors' liability, which could not be reopened through collateral proceedings under Section 114.

Conclusion: Clause 24 did not cap the personal guarantors' liability at the value of their mortgaged properties; they remained jointly and severally liable for the crystallised debt. The issue is against the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the repayment plans could be approved despite failing to secure the prescribed creditor voting threshold.

Analysis: Under Sections 111 and 114, approval required affirmative votes representing the statutory 66% voting share. The repayment plans did not obtain that threshold. The Adjudicating Authority could not substitute its own view for the creditors' commercial decision or independently approve an unapproved plan.

Conclusion: The repayment plans could not be approved without the requisite 66% creditor approval, and their rejection remained effective. The issue is against the appellants.

Final Conclusion: The finality of the guarantors' full liability and the creditors' rejection of repayment plans lacking statutory approval govern the insolvency process.

Ratio Decidendi: A finally determined personal-guarantee liability cannot be re-agitated in collateral repayment-plan proceedings, and a repayment plan lacking the statutory creditor majority cannot be independently approved.

Issues: (i) Whether the respondent could claim the monetary-threshold exemption under the first proviso to Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. (ii) Whether the bail granted under that proviso was liable to cancellation.

Issue (i): Whether the respondent could claim the monetary-threshold exemption under the first proviso to Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Section 3 covers knowing assistance in processes connected with proceeds of crime, while Section 23 provides for a presumption in interconnected transactions. The first proviso to Section 45(1), which exempts an accused of laundering less than one crore rupees from the twin conditions for bail, is discretionary. Its application turns on the sum of money-laundering attributable to the particular accused, rather than automatically on the total proceeds of crime alleged against all accused. The available money trail confined the respondent's alleged role to conversion and transfer of Rs. 12.88 lakhs; no material connected him, directly or vicariously, with the balance of the alleged proceeds or a larger laundering activity.

Conclusion: The respondent was entitled to seek the monetary-threshold exemption under the first proviso to Section 45(1), in favour of the respondent.

Issue (ii): Whether the bail granted under that proviso was liable to cancellation.

Analysis: Cancellation required a showing that the Special Court's exercise of discretion was perverse, fallacious, or prejudicial to a fair investigation. Continued custody was not shown to be necessary, and the stringent bail conditions sufficiently addressed the asserted flight risk and ensured availability for investigation and trial.

Conclusion: No ground was established for cancellation of bail or interference with the bail order, in favour of the respondent.

Final Conclusion: The statutory exemption from the twin conditions was properly applied because the alleged laundering attributable to the respondent was below one crore rupees, and the existing safeguards adequately protected the investigation.

Ratio Decidendi: For the monetary-threshold proviso to Section 45(1), the amount of laundering attributable to the individual accused must be assessed separately and cannot be mechanically equated with the total proceeds of crime alleged against the wider group; grant of its benefit remains subject to judicial discretion.

Issues: (i) Whether insurance premium collected from borrowers and remitted in full to the insurer formed part of the taxable value of the appellant's service under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994; (ii) Whether invocation of the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was justified; and (iii) Whether penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 was sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether insurance premium collected from borrowers and remitted in full to the insurer formed part of the taxable value of the appellant's service under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: Section 67(1)(i) confines taxable value to the gross amount charged for the service actually provided. This requires a nexus between the consideration retained by the service provider and that service. The premium was collected solely for full onward remittance to the insurer, without mark-up or retention, and was not remuneration for the appellant's service. The administrative charge constituted separate consideration and had already been subjected to tax and interest. The pre-amendment statutory position did not permit inclusion of a pass-through amount lacking the required nexus with the taxable service.

Conclusion: The insurance premium remitted in full to the insurer is excluded from the taxable value, and the service-tax demand on that component is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether invocation of the extended limitation period under the proviso to Section 73(1) of the Finance Act, 1994 was justified.

Analysis: Extended limitation requires fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax. The dispute concerned the interpretational treatment of premium under the valuation provisions. No positive act of deliberate concealment or wilful suppression was established, and voluntary payment of tax and interest on the administrative charges before issuance of the notice negated an intent to evade.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended limitation period was unjustified, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 was sustainable.

Analysis: Penalty under Section 78 requires the same culpable elements as extended limitation. No tax remained payable on the premium component, and no fraud or wilful suppression was established. The liability relating to administrative charges had been voluntarily discharged with interest before the notice, without an independent basis for penalty.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 78 is unsustainable and is set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Service-tax valuation is confined to actual consideration for the taxable service; the premium collected solely for onward remittance, and the consequential interest and penalty, are not enforceable, while the tax and interest voluntarily paid on administrative charges remain undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the pre-amendment Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, an amount collected solely for full onward remittance to a third party, without constituting consideration for the service provider's own service, cannot be included in taxable value.

Issues: (i) Whether TDS borne by the service recipient from its own funds is includible in the taxable value under reverse charge, and whether remand on that question was justified; (ii) Whether service tax under reverse charge was payable at 12% based on the date of receipt of service rather than 10% based on the date of payment; and (iii) Whether interest and penalties survive on the disputed demands.

Issue (i): Whether TDS borne by the service recipient from its own funds is includible in the taxable value under reverse charge, and whether remand on that question was justified.

Analysis: Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994 does not make Section 35A(3) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 applicable to service-tax appeals. Section 85(4) of the Finance Act, 1994 empowers the Commissioner (Appeals) to pass such order as considered fit, including an order of remand. That power of remand, however, should not be exercised where the material fact is already conclusively established. The record showed that tax deducted at source was borne from the service recipient's own funds and was not deducted from the consideration payable to the foreign service provider. Such payment is not consideration for taxable service and cannot form part of the taxable value under Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994.

Conclusion: The Commissioner (Appeals) possessed remand jurisdiction, but the remand was unjustified; self-borne TDS is not includible in taxable value and attracts no service tax. This issue is in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether service tax under reverse charge was payable at 12% based on the date of receipt of service rather than 10% based on the date of payment.

Analysis: Under the reverse charge mechanism in Section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994, the applicable rate of tax is fixed by the date of receipt of service, not by the later date of invoice or payment. Payment made after a reduction in the rate does not alter the rate applicable to services received before that reduction.

Conclusion: The differential service-tax demand at 12%, being the rate applicable when the services were received, is sustainable. This issue is against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether interest and penalties survive on the disputed demands.

Analysis: Interest follows the surviving differential tax demand. No penalty is leviable on the demand relating to the excluded TDS component, and the rate-related short payment arose from an interpretational dispute.

Conclusion: Interest is payable only on the surviving rate-differential demand, while penalties are not leviable. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Self-borne TDS is excluded from the service-tax base; the date of receipt of service controls the applicable rate under reverse charge; and only consequential interest remains payable on the rate-differential liability.

Ratio Decidendi: Tax deducted at source paid by a service recipient from its own funds, without deduction from the amount payable to the foreign service provider, is not consideration and cannot be included in taxable value under reverse charge.

Issues: (i) Whether the notional value of designs and drawings supplied free of cost by customers was includible in the assessable value of motor vehicle cabins? (ii) Whether addition of 0.98% of the value of cabins constituted a valid determination of value? (iii) Whether remand was permissible to cure the absence of evidentiary and valuation foundations in the show cause notice? (iv) Whether the extended period of limitation and equivalent penalty were invocable?

Issue (i): Whether the notional value of designs and drawings supplied free of cost by customers was includible in the assessable value of motor vehicle cabins?

Analysis: Section 4 preserves Transaction Value where the buyer and assessee are unrelated and price is the sole consideration. Section 4(1)(b) and Rule 6 permit addition only upon proof that the free supply is Additional Consideration, is used in or necessary for production, has an ascertainable apportioned value, and has not already been included in the price. The Burden of Proof rested on the Revenue. The record did not establish the character of the drawings, their use or necessity in production, or that their value was excluded from negotiated prices. Specifications communicating a buyer's requirements, as distinct from detailed production drawings, are not a Buyer's Assist requiring valuation addition.

Conclusion: The notional value of the designs and drawings was not includible in the assessable value, and Rule 6 was inapplicable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether addition of 0.98% of the value of cabins constituted a valid determination of value?

Analysis: A valuation under Section 4(1)(b) must follow the prescribed rules. Where Rule 6 cannot determine the money value of alleged additional consideration, Rule 11 requires Valuation by Reasonable Means consistent with the statutory principles. The 0.98% figure was only a suggested percentage, related to tractor development rather than cabin drawings, applied indiscriminately to all customers, and calculated on the value of cabin clearances rather than the value of the alleged free supply. It was neither evidence of the value of drawings nor a rule-based computation.

Conclusion: Addition of 0.98% was not a lawful determination of value and could not sustain the demand. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether remand was permissible to cure the absence of evidentiary and valuation foundations in the show cause notice?

Analysis: The Show Cause Notice as Foundation contained no evidence of value apart from material stating that the value was not ascertainable. Remand to collect fresh evidence and devise a valuation methodology would permit reconstruction of a case not made in the notice, rather than completion of an existing evidentiary inquiry.

Conclusion: Remand to redetermine the alleged amortised cost was impermissible and the remand direction is set aside. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the extended period of limitation and equivalent penalty were invocable?

Analysis: Extended Limitation requires fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, Wilful Suppression, or contravention with intent to evade duty. Periodical returns, audit of the assessee's records, absence of any identified concealment or misdeclaration, and the interpretational nature of the valuation dispute negated such intent. Revenue Neutrality, arising from availability of credit to the recipients, further supported absence of intent to evade. The requirements for penalty were the same as those for invoking the extended period.

Conclusion: The extended period was unavailable and the equivalent penalty was not imposable. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The duty demand, interest and equivalent penalty founded on the proposed valuation fail for the entire period in dispute.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Revenue seeks to add buyer-supplied drawings to transaction value, it must prove their production nexus and ascertainable apportioned value; a speculative percentage cannot constitute a rule-based valuation or be repaired through remand.

Issues: Whether water-charge demands not included in an approved resolution plan may be recovered from the corporate debtor after approval of the plan.

Analysis: Section 31(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code makes an approved resolution plan binding on the corporate debtor, creditors and governmental authorities, while Section 238 gives the Code overriding effect over inconsistent laws, policies and prior orders. The statutory Clean Slate Doctrine extinguishes claims not forming part of the approved plan, including pre-resolution statutory or governmental dues, and precludes their initiation or continuation after plan approval.

Conclusion: The water-charge demands, being claims outside the approved resolution plan, stood extinguished upon its approval and cannot be recovered from the corporate debtor.

Issues: Whether alleged excess collection of GST from buyers of affordable apartments could be treated as profiteering under Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 171 requires an actual benefit arising from a reduction in the GST rate or from input tax credit to be passed on through a commensurate reduction in price. The project commenced after the introduction of GST, with no pre-GST sales or CENVAT-credit baseline for comparison. The amount treated as profiteering represented alleged excess GST collection, whereas GST had been deposited at 12% and a lesser amount was charged from buyers. Such collection did not constitute a saving arising from a tax-rate reduction or input tax credit, and had no relevance to anti-profiteering computation under Section 171.

Conclusion: Alleged excess collection of GST cannot be classified as profiteering under Section 171; the quantified profiteering amount is unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether retaining the pre-reduction cum-tax cinema-ticket prices by increasing the base price after the GST rate reduction contravened Section 171(1), notwithstanding State-regulated maximum fares; (ii) Whether the DGAP's computation of the profiteered amount and its deposit into Consumer Welfare Funds, where recipients were unidentifiable, was sustainable; (iii) Whether penalty was leviable for the period from 01.01.2019 to 31.10.2019.

Issue (i): Whether retaining the pre-reduction cum-tax cinema-ticket prices by increasing the base price after the GST rate reduction contravened Section 171(1), notwithstanding State-regulated maximum fares.

Analysis: The GST rate for cinema admission tickets priced at one hundred rupees or less was reduced from 18% to 12% with effect from 01.01.2019. Section 171(1) required the resulting benefit to be passed to recipients through a commensurate reduction in price. The State fare regime fixed only a maximum permissible fare and did not prohibit a reduction in ticket price. The admitted retention of the cum-tax ticket prices through an increased base price, without cogent evidence justifying such increase, amounted to retention of the tax benefit and unjust enrichment. The absence of invoices did not alter the character of cinema admission as a taxable supply of services.

Conclusion: The retention of the tax-rate benefit by increasing the base price contravened Section 171(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the DGAP's computation of the profiteered amount and its deposit into Consumer Welfare Funds, where recipients were unidentifiable, was sustainable.

Analysis: The computation was based on the admitted increase in base prices following the rate reduction. Costing elements such as electricity, maintenance and security charges were immaterial to the examination of whether the tax reduction had been passed on. No specific challenge was made to the DGAP's methodology, figures, or the original and supplementary reports; the computation therefore stood unrebutted. Since the recipients were unidentifiable, Rule 133(3)(c) applied.

Conclusion: Profiteering of Rs. 10,19,280, together with applicable interest at 18%, was sustained and directed to be deposited equally in the Central Consumer Welfare Fund and the Telangana State Consumer Welfare Fund, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty was leviable for the period from 01.01.2019 to 31.10.2019.

Analysis: The penalty provision came into force only on 01.01.2020. It could not be applied retrospectively to profiteering for the investigated period.

Conclusion: No penalty was leviable for the period from 01.01.2019 to 31.10.2019, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: A supplier must pass on a GST rate-reduction benefit by reducing the price charged to consumers; a regulatory maximum fare does not justify retention of that benefit through an enhanced base price.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory maximum-price regime does not excuse a supplier from passing on a GST rate-reduction benefit by commensurately reducing the price; maintaining the cum-tax price through an increased base price violates Section 171(1).

Issues: Whether the supplier contravened the anti-profiteering requirement by failing to pass on the benefit of the reduction in GST rate on cinema admission tickets through commensurate reduction in prices during the investigated period.

Analysis: Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 requires the benefit of a tax-rate reduction to be passed to recipients by a commensurate reduction in price. Although the GST rate on relevant tickets was reduced from 18% to 12%, the inclusive ticket prices for first-class and second-class categories remained unchanged because the base prices were increased. The subsequent reduction in prices from 11.03.2019 supported limiting the inquiry to the preceding period. Commercial considerations relating to particular films, demand, weekends, holidays, or ticket-price ranges could not override the statutory obligation to pass on the tax-rate benefit. The supplier produced no cogent evidence to justify the increased base prices or rebut the presumption against it, and did not dispute the DGAP's methodology or computation.

Conclusion: The supplier contravened Section 171 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by not passing on the GST-rate reduction to recipients; profiteering of Rs. 81,722, inclusive of GST, was established for the investigated period, against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority was justified in condoning the delay in preferring appeals beyond the maximum condonable period under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department's appeals were maintainable after it had implemented the impugned orders by revoking the cancellation of the taxpayers' registrations; and (iii) Whether failure to seek revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 precluded the taxpayers from pursuing an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority was justified in condoning the delay in preferring appeals beyond the maximum condonable period under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary limitation period for appeal, while Section 107(4) permits condonation only within the further statutorily specified period. A High Court's discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, granted on the facts of a writ proceeding, cannot enlarge the statute-bound jurisdiction of the First Appellate Authority. Equity follows the law and cannot override an express outer limit of limitation.

Conclusion: The question is answered in the negative. The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit, and such condonation was ultra vires. This issue favours Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department's appeals were maintainable after it had implemented the impugned orders by revoking the cancellation of the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department had implemented the impugned orders, restored the registrations, and thereby enabled the taxpayers to resume business and undertake subsequent transactions. This subsequent development materially altered the position between the parties. No effective relief could be granted through a challenge to orders that had already been acted upon without addressing the consequences of restoration.

Conclusion: The question is answered in the negative. In the circumstances, the Department could not maintain its challenge to the implemented orders. This issue favours the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether failure to seek revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 precluded the taxpayers from pursuing an appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Filing an application for revocation under Rule 23 was not practically available after expiry of the prescribed period because the common portal did not permit such filing. The appellate remedy under Section 107 operates independently, and inability or failure to pursue revocation cannot extinguish the statutory right to challenge cancellation through appeal.

Conclusion: The Department's objection based on Rule 23 is rejected. The taxpayers were not barred from pursuing their statutory appellate remedy. This issue favours the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Although the condonation beyond the statutory limit was legally impermissible, the Department's implementation of the orders and restoration of registrations foreclosed an effective challenge in the present circumstances.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot enlarge its time-condonation jurisdiction beyond an express statutory outer limit by relying on case-specific relief granted by a constitutional court in writ jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether the FAA could condone an appeal filed beyond the outer limit in Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department's appeals remained maintainable after it implemented the FAA's orders by restoring registrations; and (iii) Whether the taxpayers' inability to pursue revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred their appeals.

Issue (i): Whether the FAA could condone an appeal filed beyond the outer limit in Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Sections 107(1) and 107(4) prescribe the appeal period and the maximum further period for which delay may be condoned. The FAA, as a statutory authority, has no inherent or equitable power to enlarge that outer limit. Relief moulded by a High Court in constitutional writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not enlarge the FAA's statutory jurisdiction; equity follows the law.

Conclusion: The FAA could not condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4); the condonation orders were ultra vires and coram non judice. This issue is decided in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department's appeals remained maintainable after it implemented the FAA's orders by restoring registrations.

Analysis: The Department restored the registrations pursuant to the impugned orders, following which the taxpayers resumed business and discharged statutory liabilities. These subsequent events left no effective or workable relief capable of being granted without unsettling the restored registrations and intervening transactions, rendering the departmental challenge academic.

Conclusion: The Department's appeals were not maintainable because no effective relief remained after implementation of the restoration orders. This issue is decided in favour of Assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the taxpayers' inability to pursue revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred their appeals.

Analysis: Once the prescribed period elapsed, the common portal did not permit filing of applications for revocation under Rule 23. That inability did not extinguish the independent statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: Inability to seek revocation under Rule 23 did not bar the taxpayers from pursuing their appeals. This issue is decided in favour of Assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory limitation on the FAA's condonation power was affirmed, but the Department's implementation of the restoration orders meant that the taxpayers' active registrations and ensuing compliance were not unsettled.

Ratio Decidendi: An expressly capped statutory power to condone delay cannot be enlarged through equitable relief granted by a High Court in constitutional writ jurisdiction.

Issues: Whether an amalgamated company may carry forward and set off unutilised Minimum Alternate Tax credit of amalgamating companies under a sanctioned scheme of amalgamation.

Analysis: Section 115JAA permits credit for tax paid under the Minimum Alternate Tax regime. The sanctioned scheme transferred the amalgamating companies' tax rights and claims, including unutilised MAT credit, to the transferee company. Section 115JAA(7) expressly denies the credit only where a private or unlisted public company is converted into a limited liability partnership, without imposing a corresponding restriction on amalgamation. That specific prohibition cannot be extended by implication to an amalgamated company, which succeeds to the tax attributes of the amalgamating companies.

Conclusion: The amalgamated company is entitled to set off the unutilised MAT credit of the amalgamating companies, subject to verification of the quantum and availability of the credit in accordance with law.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone appeals filed beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations; and (iii) Whether the taxpayers' inability to seek revocation under Rule 23 barred their statutory appeals.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone appeals filed beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary period for appeal and Section 107(4) permits condonation only within the further statutorily specified period. Relief moulded by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, cannot enlarge the statutory jurisdiction of the First Appellate Authority. Equity follows the law and cannot override an express limitation.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked power to condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit under Section 107(4); this issue is answered in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department restored the registrations pursuant to the impugned orders, after which the taxpayers resumed business and continued statutory compliance. Annulment at that stage would unsettle the restored registrations and transactions undertaken during the intervening period. The challenges consequently became academic and incapable of affording effective relief.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain the challenges in the circumstances after implementing the impugned orders; this issue is answered in favour of the taxpayers.

Issue (iii): Whether the taxpayers' inability to seek revocation under Rule 23 barred their statutory appeals.

Analysis: The portal did not permit a revocation application after expiry of the prescribed period. The statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 operates independently, and inability to invoke the revocation procedure does not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation in appeal.

Conclusion: The inability to seek revocation under Rule 23 did not bar the taxpayers' statutory appeals; this issue is answered in favour of the taxpayers.

Final Conclusion: The restored registrations and their consequential legal effect remain undisturbed, notwithstanding the finding that the First Appellate Authority exceeded its statutory condonation jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot enlarge an express limitation period by relying on equitable considerations or relief granted by a constitutional court under Article 226.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the maximum condonable period prescribed under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain its appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations; (iii) Whether the inability or failure to seek revocation under Rule 23 precluded the statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the maximum condonable period prescribed under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary period for appeal and Section 107(4) limits the further period for which delay may be condoned. The First Appellate Authority, being a statutory authority, possesses only the statutory jurisdiction conferred upon it. Relief moulded by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot enlarge that jurisdiction. Equity follows the law and cannot override an express statutory limitation.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority could not condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit; the condonation and consequential appellate orders were without jurisdiction and ultra vires. This issue is decided in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain its appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department restored the registrations pursuant to the impugned orders, enabling the taxpayers to resume business and fulfil their compliance obligations. This subsequent development altered the legal and commercial position, and no effective relief could be granted without unsettling the restored registrations and intervening transactions.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain the appeals after acting upon the impugned orders; the appeals had become infructuous and no effective relief was available. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the inability or failure to seek revocation under Rule 23 precluded the statutory appeal under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Once the prescribed period had expired, the common portal did not permit an application for revocation under Rule 23. The statutory remedy of appeal under Section 107 is independent and the inability to pursue revocation does not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation in appeal.

Conclusion: The taxpayers were not precluded from pursuing the statutory appellate remedy. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The statutory limit on the First Appellate Authority's power remained enforceable, but the Department's implementation of the restoration orders prevented it from obtaining an effective challenge, and the taxpayers' appellate remedy was not defeated by the lapse of the revocation period.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot condone delay beyond an express outer limit prescribed by the statute, and equitable considerations or constitutional relief granted in another case cannot enlarge that authority's jurisdiction.

Issues: (i) Whether a statutory first charge under Section 48 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 and pre-CIRP attachment proceedings conferred secured-creditor status under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 after the Explanation to Section 3(31); (ii) Whether dues under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 constituted secured debt.

Issue (i): Whether a statutory first charge under Section 48 of the Gujarat Value Added Tax Act, 2003 and pre-CIRP attachment proceedings conferred secured-creditor status under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 after the Explanation to Section 3(31).

Analysis: The Explanation inserted in Section 3(31) clarifies that a security interest exists only where a right in property arises from an agreement or arrangement involving two or more parties, and excludes an interest created merely by operation of law. Being clarificatory, the Explanation applies to pending proceedings. A statutory first charge under the GVAT Act arises solely by operation of law, while attachment proceedings are enforcement measures and do not create consensual security. Such statutory charge therefore cannot be equated with agreement-based security recognised by the Code.

Conclusion: The GVAT dues cannot be ranked as secured debt and must be treated as operational debt.

Issue (ii): Whether dues under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 constituted secured debt.

Analysis: The Central Sales Tax Act does not create a statutory first charge over the corporate debtor's assets. Section 9(2) of that Act does not create a security interest, and the CST component consequently has no basis for secured treatment.

Conclusion: The CST dues cannot be treated as secured debt and must be treated as operational debt.

Final Conclusion: The admitted statutory claim retains its admission but receives only the treatment available to operational creditors under the Code and the approved resolution plan, without secured-creditor waterfall priority.

Ratio Decidendi: Under the clarificatory Explanation to Section 3(31) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, only an agreement-based interest qualifies as a security interest; a statutory charge or attachment arising solely by operation of law cannot confer secured-creditor priority.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain its challenge after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the maximum period prescribed under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary limitation period for an appeal, while Section 107(4) limits the First Appellate Authority's power to condone delay to the further period expressly stipulated. Relief moulded by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the exercise of extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction, cannot enlarge the jurisdiction of a statutory appellate authority. Equity follows the law and cannot override an express statutory limitation.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit; this issue is decided in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain its challenge after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department implemented the impugned orders by restoring the registrations, following which the taxpayers resumed business and continued statutory compliance. Annulment at this stage would unsettle the restored registrations and intervening genuine transactions, while yielding no effective relief to the Department. The Department could not challenge the orders after acting upon and giving effect to them.

Conclusion: The Department's challenge was not maintainable and had become infructuous; this issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Although the statutory limitation restricted the First Appellate Authority's condonation power, the Department's prior implementation of the restoration orders precluded an effective challenge in the circumstances of these cases.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot enlarge its expressly limited power to condone delay by relying on equitable relief granted by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department's appeals were maintainable after it implemented the impugned orders by restoring the registrations; (iii) Whether inability to seek timely revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred the taxpayers from appealing under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary period for appeal, while Section 107(4) permits condonation only within the further period expressly stipulated. A statutory authority has no inherent or equitable power to enlarge that outer limitation. Fact-specific relief granted by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot extend the statutory appellate jurisdiction of the First Appellate Authority.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of Revenue: the First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department's appeals were maintainable after it implemented the impugned orders by restoring the registrations.

Analysis: The Department implemented the impugned orders, restored the registrations, and thereby enabled the taxpayers to resume business and meet statutory obligations. The resulting subsequent developments altered the parties' legal and commercial position. Annulment of the orders after such implementation would yield no effective relief and would unsettle the restored registrations and intervening transactions.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of Assessee: the Department could not maintain appeals seeking to annul orders that it had already implemented, and the appeals had become infructuous.

Issue (iii): Whether inability to seek timely revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred the taxpayers from appealing under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: As the common portal did not permit revocation applications after expiry of the prescribed period, compliance with Rule 23 was not practically available. The statutory appellate remedy under Section 107 remained an independent remedy, and non-utilisation of revocation could not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation in appeal.

Conclusion: The issue is decided in favour of Assessee: inability to invoke Rule 23 did not bar the taxpayers from pursuing the appellate remedy.

Final Conclusion: Although the condonation of delay exceeded the First Appellate Authority's statutory jurisdiction, the Department's implementation of the orders and restoration of registrations prevented any effective reversal in these matters.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot rely on fact-specific relief granted under constitutional jurisdiction to enlarge its expressly limited power to condone delay.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the maximum period allowed by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could challenge the appellate orders after implementing them by restoring the taxpayers' registrations; and (iii) Whether failure or inability to seek revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 precluded the taxpayers from pursuing their statutory appeals.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the maximum period allowed by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes three months for filing an appeal and Section 107(4) permits condonation only for a further one month on sufficient cause. A statutory appellate authority possesses only the jurisdiction conferred by the statute. Relief moulded by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in fact-specific circumstances cannot enlarge that statutory appellate jurisdiction. Equity follows the law and cannot override an express statutory limitation.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the statutory outer limit; such condonation and the consequential appellate orders were coram non judice and ultra vires. This issue is decided in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could challenge the appellate orders after implementing them by restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department implemented the appellate orders, restored the registrations, and thereby enabled continuing business operations and compliance. These subsequent developments materially altered the parties' position. In the absence of any reversal or addressing of the consequences of restoration, annulment of the orders would yield no effective or workable relief and would unsettle intervening genuine transactions.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain its challenge to the implemented appellate orders in the circumstances of these cases. This issue is decided against Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether failure or inability to seek revocation under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 precluded the taxpayers from pursuing their statutory appeals.

Analysis: Once the prescribed period had expired, the common portal did not permit applications for revocation under Rule 23. The revocation mechanism and the appellate remedy under Section 107 operate as alternative statutory remedies; inability or failure to use the former does not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation through the latter.

Conclusion: Failure or inability to invoke Rule 23 did not bar the taxpayers from pursuing their statutory appeals. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The statutory jurisdictional limit governing condonation by the First Appellate Authority remains intact, but the Department's implementation of the restoration orders prevents their retrospective undoing in this batch.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory appellate authority cannot invoke the extraordinary equitable jurisdiction exercisable by a High Court under Article 226 to extend an expressly capped period of limitation under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issues: (i) Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; (ii) Whether the Department could maintain appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations; (iii) Whether the taxpayers' inability to seek revocation within the period under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred their appeals under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Issue (i): Whether the First Appellate Authority could condone delay beyond the outer limit under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: Section 107(1) prescribes the ordinary period for appeal and Section 107(4) limits the further period for which delay may be condoned. The First Appellate Authority, being a statutory authority, could exercise jurisdiction only within those limits. Orders of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, issued in the exercise of extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction on their particular facts, could not enlarge the statutory appellate jurisdiction. Equity follows the law; it cannot override an express statutory limitation. Condonation beyond the prescribed outer limit was ultra vires and coram non judice.

Conclusion: The First Appellate Authority lacked jurisdiction to condone the delays beyond the statutory outer limit. This issue is decided against the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether the Department could maintain appeals after implementing the impugned orders by restoring the taxpayers' registrations.

Analysis: The Department acted upon the impugned orders by restoring the registrations, following which the taxpayers resumed business and discharged their obligations. This material subsequent development left no effective relief capable of being granted in the Department's challenge. The Department's inconsistent conduct engaged the principle that a party cannot approbate and reprobate by implementing an order and subsequently seeking its annulment without addressing the consequences of that implementation.

Conclusion: The Department could not maintain its challenge to the orders after implementing them through restoration of registrations. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Issue (iii): Whether the taxpayers' inability to seek revocation within the period under Rule 23 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 barred their appeals under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: The common portal did not permit applications for revocation after expiry of the prescribed period. The remedy of revocation under Section 30 and the appellate remedy under Section 107 operate as independent statutory remedies. The inability to pursue revocation under Rule 23 did not extinguish the right to challenge cancellation through appeal.

Conclusion: Non-compliance with Rule 23 did not bar the taxpayers from pursuing their statutory appeals. This issue is decided in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: Although the statutory restriction on condonation of delay remains applicable, the restored registrations remain undisturbed because the Department's prior implementation of the impugned orders deprived its challenge of effective relief.

Ratio Decidendi: A revenue authority that has implemented an order restoring registration cannot subsequently pursue a challenge to annul that order where no effective relief can follow from such challenge.