Issues: (i) Whether the delays of 1,163 to 1,583 days in filing the first appeals should be condoned despite dismissal in limine; and (ii) Whether ex-gratia compensation under BSNL VRS-2019 qualifies for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, subject to verification of each assessee's statutory eligibility, including workman status.

Issue (i): Whether the delays of 1,163 to 1,583 days in filing the first appeals should be condoned despite dismissal in limine.

Analysis: The applicable appellate standard of sufficient cause was satisfied by the consistent treatment of identical delays involving BSNL retirees and the liberal, pragmatic approach required where genuine hardship is demonstrated. The prior dismissal had prevented determination of the exemption claims on merits.

Conclusion: The delays in filing the first appeals are condoned, in favour of the assessees.

Issue (ii): Whether ex-gratia compensation under BSNL VRS-2019 qualifies for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, subject to verification of each assessee's statutory eligibility, including workman status.

Analysis: Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applies to qualifying retrenchment compensation. The BSNL VRS-2019 payments were treated as retrenchment compensation rather than ordinary voluntary-retirement compensation. Individual satisfaction of the statutory conditions, particularly the recipient's status as a workman, requires factual verification.

Conclusion: The ex-gratia compensation is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, subject to verification of the statutory conditions by the Assessing Officer, in favour of the assessees.

Final Conclusion: The assessees are entitled to have their exemption claims examined by the Assessing Officer after verification of the stated statutory requirements.

Ratio Decidendi: Ex-gratia compensation substantively constituting retrenchment compensation is eligible for exemption under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the recipient satisfies the provision's statutory conditions.

Issues: Whether a retrospective statutory amendment enacted after the Tribunal's original order constitutes a mistake apparent from the record permitting recall under Section 254(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: The original order was rendered under the legal position then prevailing under Sections 147, 148 and 144B of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and in accordance with binding jurisdictional precedents. Section 254(2) is confined to rectification of a patent error existing in the order when made and does not confer a power to review a concluded decision. A subsequent amendment, even if retrospective, cannot by itself create a mistake apparent from the record in an earlier order. The validity of the amendment was also under challenge, making the matter debatable and unsuitable for rectification proceedings.

Conclusion: The retrospective insertion of Section 147A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 does not constitute a mistake apparent from the record under Section 254(2); recall of the original order was not warranted, in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A subsequent retrospective legislative amendment cannot be used under rectification jurisdiction to review or recall an order that was validly rendered under the law prevailing on the date of that order.

Issues: (i) Whether the addition for alleged unexplained election expenditure based on the seized notebook was sustainable; (ii) Whether any alleged election expenditure was assessable in Assessment Year 2019-20.

Issue (i): Whether the addition for alleged unexplained election expenditure based on the seized notebook was sustainable.

Analysis: The notebook was seized from a shop licensed in the name of a trading concern whose income was declared by another person. Its entries did not identify the assessee, specify whether they represented payments made or received, or contain dates, signatures, or other endorsement linking them to the assessee. The statutory presumption under Sections 132(4A) and 292C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 did not establish attribution to the assessee in these circumstances. No independent inquiry was made from the persons or villages named in the notebook, no alleged recipients were examined, and no cogent material corroborated either the entries or their nexus with the assessee's alleged election expenditure. The burden to establish unexplained expenditure under Section 69C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was therefore not discharged.

Conclusion: The addition for alleged unexplained election expenditure was unsustainable and was deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether any alleged election expenditure was assessable in Assessment Year 2019-20.

Analysis: The election campaign and polling occurred in April and May 2019, while the notebook was seized in July 2019; both events fell in the financial year 2019-20 relevant to Assessment Year 2020-21. The entries relied upon for the addition were undated, and the few March 2019 dates in other pages related only to election schedules and did not establish that the alleged payments or receipts fell in the preceding financial year.

Conclusion: Any alleged election expenditure was not assessable in Assessment Year 2019-20, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The impugned unexplained-expenditure addition lacked a corroborated evidentiary basis and, independently, could not be brought to tax in the relevant assessment year.

Ratio Decidendi: An addition for unexplained expenditure cannot rest solely on entries in a seized notebook without credible evidence establishing the entries and their nexus with the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the former resolution professional's claim for professional fees and CIRP expenses should be determined in these appeals; (ii) Whether adverse observations against the former resolution professional should be expunged; (iii) Whether replacement of the former resolution professional pursuant to the Committee of Creditors' decision was valid.

Issue (i): Whether the former resolution professional's claim for professional fees and CIRP expenses should be determined in these appeals.

Analysis: The fee and expense claim required factual assessment of the work performed, the scale of fees acceptable to the Committee of Creditors, relevant expenses, and the objections of concerned parties. Such determination required adjudication before the Adjudicating Authority.

Conclusion: The claim for professional fees and CIRP expenses is left for determination by the Adjudicating Authority.

Issue (ii): Whether adverse observations against the former resolution professional should be expunged.

Analysis: The observations arose in the context of alleged delay in acting upon the request to replace the resolution professional. Their potential bearing on professional reputation justified their removal in the circumstances.

Conclusion: The adverse observations are expunged in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether replacement of the former resolution professional pursuant to the Committee of Creditors' decision was valid.

Analysis: The Committee of Creditors' decision to replace a resolution professional falls within its commercial wisdom, subject to compliance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and applicable regulations. A resolution professional must act independently, but has no vested right to continue in office; the majority decision of the Committee of Creditors must be respected unless it requires conduct contrary to the Code or regulations.

Conclusion: The replacement of the appellant as resolution professional is upheld against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The removal of the former resolution professional remains effective, the adverse remarks stand removed, and the monetary claim requires adjudication before the Adjudicating Authority.

Ratio Decidendi: A resolution professional has no vested right to continue in office, and the majority commercial decision of the Committee of Creditors to seek replacement must be respected unless it requires action contrary to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 or applicable regulations.

Issues: Whether the extended period under Section 73 of the Finance Act, 1994 could be invoked to recover interest where the recipient had discharged reverse-charge service tax through CENVAT credit.

Analysis: Section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 fastened reverse-charge service-tax liability on the recipient of services received from abroad. Utilisation of CENVAT credit by such recipient for payment of the tax was permissible under the CENVAT framework. Consequently, the ingredients for invoking the extended limitation under the proviso to Section 73 were absent. The limitation applicable to recovery of the principal tax was also applicable to the consequential interest demand.

Conclusion: The interest demand was barred by limitation and was set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether failure to mark "Y" against every export item in electronic shipping bills, despite declaring an intention to claim MEIS rewards, defeats entitlement to MEIS benefits.

Analysis: Chapter III of the Foreign Trade Policy 2015-20 confers MEIS benefits upon export of notified goods to notified markets. The requirement to mark the rewards column in shipping bills is procedural; where exports are genuine and the exporter had declared its intention to claim MEIS, an inadvertent procedural error cannot defeat the substantive entitlement under a beneficial scheme. The absence of a customs grievance and selection of "Y" for the first item in each shipping bill also rendered the objection concerning physical examination insignificant.

Conclusion: The omission to mark "Y" for every item was condonable and did not disentitle the exporter to MEIS benefits; interference with the refusal of benefits was warranted, in favour of the exporter.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit could be denied for alleged non-receipt of inputs on the evidence relied upon by the Revenue; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for the credit demand.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit could be denied for alleged non-receipt of inputs on the evidence relied upon by the Revenue.

Analysis: Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 requires the prescribed procedure to be followed before investigation statements may be relied upon as evidence. The supplier and transporter statements were not tested through examination of their makers as witnesses and consequently had no evidentiary value. The assessee maintained statutory receipt and credit records under Rule 9(5) of the CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004, held valid invoices, made payments through banking channels, and used the inputs in manufacture of dutiable final products. There was no factory investigation, stock discrepancy, evidence of cash being returned by suppliers, or evidence of alternative sourcing of inputs. The Revenue failed to discharge its burden of proving non-receipt through tangible and corroborative evidence.

Conclusion: The CENVAT credit was correctly availed and its denial for alleged non-receipt of goods was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for the credit demand.

Analysis: Invocation of the extended period under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 requires evidence of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty. The show-cause notice neither made a specific sustainable allegation nor established such suppression or intent in relation to the credit availed.

Conclusion: The extended limitation period was not invocable and the demand raised on that basis was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The credit demand, interest liability, and penalties, including the penalty imposed on the director, lacked legal basis and could not subsist.

Ratio Decidendi: CENVAT credit supported by statutory receipt records, valid invoices, banking payments, and undisputed consumption cannot be denied merely on untested supplier or transporter statements and uncorroborated presumptions.

Issues: (i) Whether CENVAT credit, interest and penalty could be sustained on the allegation that inputs and input services were not received, based principally on untested third-party statements; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for recovery of the disputed credit.

Issue (i): Whether CENVAT credit, interest and penalty could be sustained on the allegation that inputs and input services were not received, based principally on untested third-party statements.

Analysis: The credit was supported by valid invoices issued by a registered dealer, statutory records evidencing receipt and credit, gate and goods-receipt records, freight documents, and payments through banking channels. Consumption of the inputs in manufacture and payment of duty on the finished goods were undisputed, while no factory investigation, stock discrepancy, evidence of cash reimbursement, or alternative source of inputs was established. The Revenue therefore failed to adduce positive and substantial evidence of non-receipt of goods or of fraudulent availment of credit.

Analysis: Statements of suppliers and transporters could not be relied upon because the mandatory procedure for their admission under Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944, including examination of the statement-makers, was not followed. The dealer alleged to have issued invoices without supplying goods was also not proceeded against. The demand was further covered by the prior decision arising from the same investigation.

Conclusion: The credit denial, consequential interest and penalties were unsustainable and were decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period could be invoked for recovery of the disputed credit.

Analysis: The notice did not set out, and the evidence did not establish, fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts with intent to evade duty, which are necessary to invoke the extended period under Section 11A of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended limitation period was unsustainable and was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The disputed CENVAT credit was treated as validly availed, and no recoverable liability for consequential interest or penalty survived.

Ratio Decidendi: CENVAT credit supported by statutory records, valid invoices and banking payments cannot be denied on unadmitted third-party statements without positive evidence establishing non-receipt of goods, and extended limitation requires proof of deliberate suppression or wilful misstatement.

Issues: Whether spool welding electrodes used for rebuilding, repair and maintenance of grinding rollers and grinding tables in a cement vertical roller mill qualify as inputs eligible for Cenvat credit.

Analysis: The electrodes were used to repair and maintain machinery directly employed in manufacturing the final product. Materials so used retain the requisite nexus with the manufacturing activity and fall within the scope of input under the applicable credit scheme.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit on spool welding electrodes used for repair and maintenance of manufacturing machinery is admissible, in favour of the assessee.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of as not pressed, with liberty to pursue the statutory appeal.

Issues: (i) Whether remanded assessment proceedings could continue after expiry of the one-year period under Section 34(2) of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004; (ii) Whether the pre-deposit made for hearing of objections could be retained when no demand subsisted.

Issue (i): Whether remanded assessment proceedings could continue after expiry of the one-year period under Section 34(2) of the Delhi Value Added Tax Act, 2004.

Analysis: Section 34(2) imposes a mandatory one-year period for completing an assessment required to give effect to a remand. The expiry of that period was undisputed, and the applicable precedent establishes that, where no fresh assessment is made within the prescribed time, the earlier default assessment demand ceases to exist.

Conclusion: The remanded assessment proceedings could not continue after expiry of the statutory one-year period, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the pre-deposit made for hearing of objections could be retained when no demand subsisted.

Analysis: Once the default assessment demand had ceased and no fresh demand existed, there was no legal basis for retaining the pre-deposit made as a condition for hearing the objections.

Conclusion: The pre-deposit was not liable to be retained and was required to be processed for refund with applicable interest, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Expiry of the mandatory limitation period extinguished the enforceability of the remanded assessment demand and removed the basis for retention of the objection-stage pre-deposit.

Ratio Decidendi: A remanded assessment not completed within the mandatory period prescribed by Section 34(2) leaves no subsisting demand and precludes retention of the related pre-deposit.

Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised against a GST adjudication order despite an efficacious statutory appellate remedy, where non-consideration of replies and absence of an attributed role were alleged.

Analysis: The existence of a statutory appellate remedy, coupled with detailed and disputed factual issues concerning the petitioners' replies, role in the transactions, accounts, invoices and alleged ineligible input tax credit, made writ adjudication inappropriate. The relied-on decision concerning the requirement of a speaking order was distinguishable because it concerned an individual assessee, whereas the impugned adjudication was a common and extensive order involving numerous firms and individuals.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass the statutory appellate remedy where determination of the allegations requires examination of disputed facts by the Appellate Authority.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings concerning the deduction claimed under Section 80JJAA were valid when that claim had already been scrutinised in the original assessment.

Analysis: The original scrutiny assessment involved specific queries regarding the deduction under Section 80JJAA, including details of eligible additional employees and their costs. The assessee furnished supporting material, and the assessment under Section 143(3) expressly accepted the deduction after verification. The subsequent proceedings under Sections 148A and 148 again questioned the same deduction, without identifying any fresh or tangible material unavailable during the original scrutiny. Reassessment cannot be founded solely on a change of opinion regarding an issue already examined and accepted.

Conclusion: The reopening was invalid as it was based solely on a change of opinion; the impugned notice under Section 148 and order under Section 148A(d) were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether reassessment proceedings against an investor could be initiated on the basis of information alleging manipulation by a mutual fund manager, without material linking the assessee to a sham transaction or fictitious loss.

Analysis: The reassessment notice and order were founded on allegations concerning manipulation of accounting methodology by the fund manager. The applicable legal framework requires a rational nexus or live link between the information available to the Assessing Officer and the belief that the particular assessee's income had escaped assessment. The allegations did not disclose material showing that the assessee knowingly participated in any sham arrangement, and the identical issue had already been decided by binding coordinate precedent. The Revenue did not dispute the applicability of that precedent.

Conclusion: The reassessment proceedings lacked the requisite nexus with any escapement of the assessee's income; the notice under Section 148 and the order under Section 148A(d) were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether rejection of the assessee's application for condonation of delay in filing a revised return complied with Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Circular No. 09/2015 dated 09.06.2015; (ii) Whether a condonation application under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is conditional upon proof of sufficient cause for delay in the manner applicable under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Issue (i): Whether rejection of the assessee's application for condonation of delay in filing a revised return complied with Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and Circular No. 09/2015 dated 09.06.2015.

Analysis: Section 119(2)(b) and the Circular permit admission of belated refund claims to avoid genuine hardship, provided the claim is correct and genuine and the case establishes genuine hardship. The authority must independently apply these criteria and may direct inquiry into the claim. The rejection rested on the Revenue's non-acceptance of a favourable decision in comparable cases, the absence of an appellate order in the assessee's own case, and an unreasoned statement that hardship was not made out. These considerations neither determined the correctness and genuineness of the claim nor addressed the assessee's loss of employment, the substantial refund claimed, and the final decisions in analogous cases.

Conclusion: The rejection did not apply the statutory and circular criteria and was invalid. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether a condonation application under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 is conditional upon proof of sufficient cause for delay in the manner applicable under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Analysis: The test under Section 119(2)(b) is distinct from the limitation-oriented inquiry under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Subject to the prescribed six-year period, the controlling requirements are the correctness and genuineness of the refund claim and genuine hardship; a detailed explanation of delay is not an independent precondition. Further, the validity of an administrative order must be tested on the reasons recorded in it and cannot be sustained by a fresh ground advanced subsequently. In any event, the application attributed the delayed claim to reliance on the employer's Form 16 and subsequent favourable decisions concerning similarly situated employees.

Conclusion: No separate sufficient-cause requirement governed the application, and the rejection could not be supported on an unrecorded ground. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The condonation application requires fresh determination under the mandated criteria of correctness, genuineness and genuine hardship, without any determination of the underlying exemption claim under Section 10(10B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Ratio Decidendi: Admission of a belated refund claim under Section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 must be determined by the statutory criteria of a correct and genuine claim and genuine hardship, through a reasoned order confined to its recorded grounds.

Issues: Whether the dispute concerning recovery of income-tax amounts through debit notes, as a component of electricity tariff, should be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction or before the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission.

Analysis: Income-tax claims forming part of tariff require determination of liability on disputed facts and documentary material. The regulatory framework confers adjudicatory authority on the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission over tariff-related claims, including tax components, and provides the appropriate specialised forum for resolving such disputes after affording all concerned parties an opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: The tariff-related income-tax recovery dispute is required to be raised before and determined by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission rather than adjudicated in the writ petition.

Issues: (i) Whether non-compliance with the mandatory procedure under Rule 4(3) of the Foreign Exchange Management (Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal) Rules, 2000 invalidated the adjudication; and (ii) Whether failure to consider A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 10 dated 05.09.2000 rendered the determination of borrower eligibility unsustainable.

Issue (i): Whether non-compliance with the mandatory procedure under Rule 4(3) of the Foreign Exchange Management (Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal) Rules, 2000 invalidated the adjudication.

Analysis: Rule 4(3) required the Adjudicating Authority, after considering the reply to the show-cause notice, first to form and record a reasoned opinion on whether an inquiry should be held and, where adverse, to communicate that opinion and reasons sufficiently before the personal hearing. The requirement was applicable from 01.06.2000 and governed the proceedings initiated in 2014. The prescribed preliminary stage was not followed, which affected the validity of the adjudication at its foundation.

Conclusion: The mandatory procedure under Rule 4(3) was not complied with, and the adjudication was invalid.

Issue (ii): Whether failure to consider A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 10 dated 05.09.2000 rendered the determination of borrower eligibility unsustainable.

Analysis: A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 10 dated 05.09.2000, which prescribed eligibility for specified legal entities to raise external commercial borrowings under the automatic route, was material to the asserted eligibility. The impugned adjudication relied extensively on the later circular but did not address the earlier circular, nor did the regulatory correspondence relied upon address its effect. Its consideration was necessary for a proper determination of the matter.

Conclusion: The eligibility issue required fresh consideration after taking A.P. (DIR Series) Circular No. 10 dated 05.09.2000 and all other applicable material into account.

Final Conclusion: The prior adjudication could not be sustained; the matters require determination afresh in accordance with law after affording both sides due opportunity.

Ratio Decidendi: A FEMA adjudication is invalid where the mandatory preliminary procedure under Rule 4(3) is not followed and material regulatory circulars bearing on the alleged contravention are not considered.

Issues: Whether recovery under Form GST DRC-13 should continue pending consideration of the petitioner's application under Section 112(9) after filing a second appeal.

Analysis: The recovery notice preceded the second appeal. The petitioner was permitted to invoke Section 112(9) before the concerned authority, which was directed to decide that application and the pending request for withdrawal of recovery proceedings in accordance with law.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with a direction to decide the applications within fifteen days, and recovery was restrained until their disposal.

Issues: Whether periods of court-ordered stay must be excluded while computing the limitation period under Section 153B before testing the resultant date for extension under TOLA, and whether the impugned search assessments were time-barred.

Analysis: The limitation period under Section 153B comprises both its main provision and the exclusions in its Explanation. The words "in computing the period of limitation under this section" make the stay-period exclusion an integral part of the initial computation, rather than a later addition to a TOLA-extended date. The resultant composite limitation date alone must be tested against the TOLA window. This construction gives harmonious effect to the provision and avoids an indefinite enlargement of limitation contrary to the requirement of strict construction of taxing limitation provisions. For the years in which proceedings were stayed, the stay lapsed on 23.07.2020 in the absence of an express extension; the exclusion of 218 days yielded 07.05.2021, and even the outer exclusion of 287 days yielded 19.08.2021. Neither date fell within the TOLA window ending on 31.03.2021. For the remaining years, although TOLA extended the limitation date to 30.09.2021, the assessments made in January 2022 remained beyond time.

Conclusion: The Explanation-based exclusions must be applied before determining TOLA eligibility. TOLA did not extend the limitation for the stayed assessment years, and the assessments for all relevant assessment years, together with the connected notices and penalty orders, were barred by limitation and liable to be quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether considering the connected PMLA bail order in deciding the CBI bail applications amounted to abdication of jurisdiction; (ii) Whether the grant of bail was vitiated by omission of material considerations, perversity, illegality or non-application of mind

Issue (i): Whether considering the connected PMLA bail order in deciding the CBI bail applications amounted to abdication of jurisdiction

Analysis: The legal framework for a challenge to grant of bail distinguishes a relevant circumstance from a determinative one. Proceedings of different investigating agencies remain legally distinct, and an order in one proceeding neither binds the other agency nor grants immunity from lawful action. However, a prima facie assessment in a connected PMLA proceeding arising from the same FIR and common alleged predicate offences may be relevant to the bail inquiry. Parity in bail cannot be mechanical, and the individual role of each accused requires separate assessment. The impugned orders recorded the objections, factual nexus and respective roles, and treated the connected PMLA bail order as a relevant factor rather than as conclusive.

Conclusion: Consideration of the connected PMLA bail order did not amount to abdication of jurisdiction.

Issue (ii): Whether the grant of bail was vitiated by omission of material considerations, perversity, illegality or non-application of mind

Analysis: A challenge to the original grant of bail is distinct from cancellation of bail based on supervening circumstances. Interference with a grant of bail requires demonstrated perversity, illegality, reliance on irrelevant considerations, omission of material circumstances, or non-application of mind; it does not permit a threadbare evaluation of evidence or substitution of a different discretionary view. The legality of the bail orders had to be assessed on the material available on the date of their making. The orders recorded the objections, allegations, common factual foundation, individual roles, applicable bail considerations and conditions imposed. The subsequent filing of the charge-sheet and alteration of penal provisions could not retrospectively render the orders perverse.

Conclusion: No material omission, perversity, illegality or non-application of mind was established in the grant of bail.

Final Conclusion: The original bail orders remain legally sustainable, and the trial is to proceed uninfluenced by the prima facie observations recorded in the bail proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: In a challenge to grant of bail, a prima facie bail order in a connected proceeding arising from the same factual foundation may be a relevant but non-determinative circumstance; interference requires a demonstrated defect in the exercise of judicial discretion on the material available when bail was granted.